PRAGMATIC DEMOCRACY: 
INQUIRY, OBJECTIVITY, AND EXPERIENCE

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Abstract: This essay argues that to understand Dewey’s vision of democracy as “epistemic” requires consideration of how experiential and communal aspects of inquiry together produce what is named here “pragmatic objectivity.” Such pragmatic objectivity provides an alternative to absolutism and self-interested relativism by appealing to certain norms of empirical experimentation. Pragmatic objectivity, it is then argued, can be justified by appeal to Dewey’s conception of primary experience. This justification, however, is not without its own complications, which are highlighted with objections regarding “radical pluralism” in political life, and some logical problems that arise due to the supposedly “indefeable” nature of primary experience. The essay concludes by admitting that while Dewey’s theory of democracy based on experience cannot answer all of the objections argumentatively, it nevertheless provides potent suggestions for how consensus building can proceed without such philosophical arguments.

Keywords: democracy, John Dewey, experience, inquiry, objectivity, pluralism, pragmatism, Robert Talisse.

Many Americans express pride that they live in a “democracy.” But pride is not enough to sustain a democracy, and there continue to be very good reasons to see the status of democracy as uncertain. As political philosopher Ronald Beiner describes our situation, “[W]e find ourselves barbarized by an empty public culture, intimidated by colossal bureaucracies, numbed into passivity by the absence of opportunities for meaningful deliberation, inflated by absurd habits of consumption, deflated by the Leviathans that surround us, and stripped of dignity by a way of living that far exceeds a human scale” (1992, 34). Even if we bracket Beiner’s compelling concerns, it remains true that democracy is hard to maintain. As a form of political and cultural organization, democracy must be constantly reinvented, since it is of the very nature and essence of democracy to be something that cannot be handed on from one person or one

1 My thanks to Robert Talisse for pointing me toward this book.

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generation to another. "Every generation," writes John Dewey, "has to accomplish democracy over again for itself; that its very nature, its essence, is something that cannot be handed on from one person or one generation to another, but has to be worked out in terms of needs, problems and conditions of the social life of which, as the years go by, we are a part, a social life that is changing with extreme rapidity from year to year" (LW 13:299).

Much of my work on Dewey has focused on the epistemic and metaphysical aspects of his view of experience. And while I am not a political philosopher, my inquiries into Deweyan experience have increasingly led toward Dewey's democratic theory, especially to inquire how well it can apply to areas such as politics. Provoking my recent skepticism is Robert Talisse's *Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics* (2004) and *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy* (2007). In *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*, which I reviewed in 2008, Talisse criticized Dewey's democratic theory for being, in effect, what Rawls called a "comprehensive view" (see Hildebrand 2008c and 2008a, 121-22). By making sufficiently grandiose metaphysical assumptions (about the good life and "experience") Dewey's view becomes, Talisse argued, "reasonably rejectable" by any who could provide good arguments against it. Talisse's conclusion is that anyone advocating the implementation of Dewey's view would be open to the charge of oppressing at least some in society who could reasonably reject Dewey's characterizations of the good life and experience. This fact—Dewey's formulation of a democratic theory which, if implemented, could have antidemocratic results—shows why Dewey's proposal for democracy is, as stated, unacceptable. In lieu, Talisse proposed a metaphysically leaner model based upon Peirce.

My review of Talisse defended Dewey, but in retrospect that effort felt incomplete. Here, instead of rearguing my case, I intend to embrace the skepticism Talisse provokes and trace out several threads. First, I briefly explain what I believe is "epistemic" in Dewey's vision of democracy, particularly how experiential and communal inquiry produces what I call "pragmatic objectivity." Second, I show how pragmatic objectivity provides an alternative to absolutism and self-interested relativism by appealing to certain norms of empirical experimentation—for example, that conditions and procedures be avowed and transparent. The balance pragmatic objectivity produces is then connected back to democratic ways of life. Third, I ask how pragmatic objectivity can be justified, and then seek

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3 Additional connections between philosophical "pragmatic objectivity" and sibling ideas proposed in contemporary history and media/journalism criticism are explored in Hildebrand forthcoming.

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to show how it is underwritten by Dewey’s conception of experience—specifically by “primary” or “everyday” experience. Fourth, I try to make some trouble for experience, partly with (a) Talisse’s “radical pluralism” objections, and partly by questioning Dewey’s contention that primary experience is (b) “ineffable” and (c) able to provide a “check” on theory. Finally, I admit that while Deweyan experience cannot solve—argumentatively—the problem of radical pluralism, it provides potent suggestions for how consensus building can make progress, even without argumentation.

Democracy as Epistemic

To understand the sense in which Dewey’s vision of democracy is epistemic, let us begin with a problem. Your young daughter is being bullied by boys at school. After talking with teachers and the boys’ parents about the situation, it is clear that you and your daughter are the only ones who think a serious wrong is being perpetrated. The others are simply dismissing the problem with various pseudo-explanations that, in essence, amount to: “Boys will be boys.”

Anyone with a child would be frustrated by the answer “Boys will be boys.” This response, after all, seems “objective” insofar as it refrains from blaming specific people or circumstances and only refers impersonally to boys’ abstract and unchangeable nature. But if we wish to get behind this answer—to see why it obfuscates and so is a bad kind of answer—we need to see how it is generated by the kind of objectivity that is pragmatically undemocratic.

Typically, “democracy” is identified with political machinery—universal suffrage, recurring elections, political accountability to the electorate, trial by peers, and so on. But mechanisms alone do not express the soul of democracy, which Dewey argues is “wider and fuller.” Deweyan democracy is composed of two complementary parts. One is normative: the basis in a community’s laws, customs, and institutions. A second is epistemic: the collaborative process of inquiry with which a democracy can identify, prioritize, and solve problems. Taken together, these compose “democracy” in its fullest sense—as a way of life or “mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (MW 9:93). Let us examine both parts of democracy, starting with community.

Community

No problem is ever encountered, evaluated, or resolved in a vacuum. An event is taken as a “problem” whenever established habits—existing preferences and values—are interrupted. A problem only exists from a perspective someone actually inhabits. Personal perspectives are neither static nor atomic: they arise, reside, and evolve for individuals within commu-
nities. Communities can provide the conditions for individual flourishing which, in turn, can revitalize communities. It is in fact because communities are the sites of value creation and conservation that the techniques and bureaucratic structures of democratic government are of subordinate importance. The “great contribution of American life to the world’s history,” writes Dewey, is its “subordination of the state to the [free and self-governing] community” (LW 5:193). Clearly, when group values conflict—or when a group’s aims contravene guiding documents, such as a nationally ratified constitution—appealing to the “objective function” of government is indispensable. But to read such an appeal to “objectivity” as an appeal for complete neutrality constitutes an absurd interpretation. It is not possible to fully divorce means (for example, policies and laws) from ends (for example, community values); moreover, an attempt to govern from an impossible pretense of perfect neutrality seems more likely to do harm than good because it tends to (1) create clumsy and morally obtuse policies (based as they are upon a fanciful notion of objectivity) and (2) alienate government employees who would like to be compassionate but are compelled—for reasons of political correctness, not sound reasoning—to operate from a hyperbolically neutral basis that they cannot even explain. A more constructive construal of “objectivity” (as “pragmatic objectivity”) is available, and I will return to it in a moment.

Inquiry

In addition to the provision of democracy’s normative background by community, there is the second aspect necessary for democratic life, an epistemic basis in inquiry. Inquiry includes the epistemic acts taken by individuals and communities to formulate ends, solve problems, and improve conditions. Four aspects of pragmatic inquiry are paramount. First, inquiry is dynamic: it is a process of problem solving that involves feeling, observation, analysis, hypothesis, and experimental action. Second, inquiry’s results are fundamentally provisional: any results achieved by inquiry (which may be codified as “laws,” “principles,” and so forth) should be understood to be “reliable” or “warranted” but never absolutely “true.” Third, to be an effective method, inquiry must be self-

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4 In Dewey’s view of human growth and development, there is no natural antagonism between the individual self and society, any more than there is an antagonism between a note and the harmonic context in which it manifests itself. Whether one grows up amid conservative Mormons or liberal environmentalists, individual growth is dependent upon the opportunities to create and interact with others that the community provides. Moreover, the degree to which an individual acts mainly in consent or dissent with her community is irrelevant to the fundamental importance of community—for it is only as one strives to make and remake one’s family, company, religion, or country does one become an individual in any interesting sense at all.

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correcting. Since its purpose is to serve evolving creatures in a changing environment, specific techniques and assumptions of any inquiry must remain open to correction, modification, or deletion. Finally, inquiry is social: it involves collaboration and communication among people navigating a problematic situation together. People banded together in such an enterprise constitute a “public.”

A genuine democracy, then, is an achievement of inquiry that enacts these four aspects and prefers, as better, certain epistemic practices over others. It prefers certain methods of problem solving (empirical, experimental) over others (blind loyalty, dogmatic assertion); it prefers certain ways of communicating (active listening, creative dialogue, genuine debate) over others (patronizing monologues, repetitious propaganda); it prefers certain attitudes (future oriented, innovative) over others (retropection, mere conservation of custom). If we keep these four aspects of pragmatic inquiry in mind—along with the associated preferences—it becomes easy to understand why free speech, association, and universal education would be “fundamental” to a pragmatist: they are fundamental to the epistemic functioning of democratic inquiry.

As I will discuss later, there is also a pragmatist faith that experience binds all of these epistemic preferences together. In part, this is a faith that all the resources needed for good choices can be found in our conjoint and communicated experiences; in part it is a faith that people will exhibit both the ability and the will to use what is found in such experience to revise aims, methods, and values in light of a future that is arguably better. Such a faith might also be called a “regulative hope,” since it helps to regulate our social conduct by affirming the value in engaging with one another despite any certain knowledge about successful outcomes, human nature, or glorious destinies.

Objectivity: Pure, Nonexistent, and Pragmatic

In describing how Deweyan democracy integrates community with inquiry, I have labeled democracy’s communal basis “normative” and its inquiredal methods “epistemic.” In the ebb and flow of practical living, of course, such distinctions blur. Communities emphasize the value of their own epistemic habits; as they proudly claim themselves to be “sensible people” or “fair minded,” they place a normative emphasis upon what might be labeled strictly “epistemic” values (for example, of accuracy and impartiality). In such an emphasis, “objectivity” often becomes a rhetorical trump card for forcing opponents into submission, and each side deploys claims to objectivity (or “common sense”) as argument stoppers. Such a use of “objectivity” is, from a pragmatic standpoint, unproductive. Moreover, it is rooted in a false dualism that the pragmatist can expose and render powerless.
Deweyan democracy mediates between these various conceptions of objectivity by proposing a better understanding of it. It takes up the tension between those worried about relativism (who argue that objectivity should be “pure” and not based on any particular community or interest group) and those worried about absolutism (who suspect that even the word “objectivity” serves to help members of the status quo maintain their domination of those less powerful). The challenge a pragmatist must meet, briefly, is to (a) discover what kind of objectivity can be conducted and tested by a plurality of actual communities without yielding contentious and relativistic results. (That is, it is important to discover the kind of objectivity that can satisfy some concerns of absolutists.) The pragmatist must also (b) explicate a conception of “objectivity” that will not serve as validation of the status quo or be suspect for conferring tacit acceptance of mechanisms and rules that have operated in prejudicial and discriminatory ways. (That is, it is important to formulate an objectivity that can satisfy pluralists.)

Dewey moves beyond the dichotomy of absolute objectivity versus relativism by mounting a critique of “pure” neutrality or objectivity as unachievable. “One can only see,” writes Dewey, “from a certain standpoint, but this fact does not make all standpoints of equal value. A standpoint which is nowhere in particular and from which things are not seen at a special angle is an absurdity” (LW 6:14–15). At the same time, Dewey criticizes the radically pluralist notion that perspectives could be so discrete that they would have nothing substantial in common. For even among the most disparate groups, he notes, “the same predicaments of life recur” (MW 9:337). This fact—that predicaments recur—offers, he thinks, an empirical baseline useful for forging consensus and inquiry on common challenges.

While those advocating unqualified relativism or absolutism may hold these views on purely theoretical grounds, the views are also motivated by practical needs—needs that Deweyan “pragmatic objectivity” can satisfy. If we analyze the living motives of the antagonists, it can be seen that absolutists seek closure—that is, they are motivated by a practical need to terminate inquiry and take action; it is also clear that relativists seek inclusion of diverse perspectives—and this springs both from the goal of moral fairness and the epistemic instinct to keep hypotheses imaginative so they might contribute to the broadest possible corroboration of “best results.”

Pragmatism’s task, then, is to offer a conception of objectivity that does not eliminate perspectives but instead shows how a plurality of perspectives can be managed harmoniously and productively. Such an alternative “pragmatic objectivity” could blunt critics’ charges that pragmatism amounts either to (a) a thinly veiled relativism, pushing its own agenda, or (b) a view that, by assuming traditional norms of inquiry, permits the status quo to maintain established advantages.

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What, then, is "pragmatic objectivity"? First, its chief concern is the way inquiry operates—its process. Objectivity is not an end state of inquiry; rather, it is a virtue of practice, a regulative ideal for inquiry. In traditional conceptions of objectivity—say, an "objective account" of a historical event—the intent is to depict what "actually happened." Seeing no way to hit such an experience-transcendent target, the pragmatist translates "objective account" into "the obligation of inquirers to adhere to those regulative habits which make inquiry an effective process." A pragmatist can accept the traditionalist's search for "what really happened" if it is understood within a pragmatic rubric about the habits of inquiry. Taken in this way, a search for "what really happened," writes Dewey, "is a valuable methodological canon [because it is] interpreted as a warning to avoid prejudice, to struggle for the greatest possible amount of objectivity and impartiality, and as an exhortation to exercise caution and skepticism in determining the authenticity of material proposed as potential data. Taken in any other sense, it is meaningless" (LW 12:236, my emphasis). None of Dewey's methodological rules seems unorthodox. What makes the rules pragmatic is that their value derives from their function in regulating the process of inquiry rather than their contribution to ensuring a correspondence with what is "real." We have, says Dewey, an interest not in reality per se but in what the function of objectivity yields in inquiry: "To be 'objective' in thinking is to have a certain sort of selective interest operative . . . One may have affection for a standpoint which gives a rich and ordered landscape rather than for one from which things are seen confusedly and meagerly" (LW 6:14–15).

Critics' greatest concern with Dewey's operational-pragmatic account of objectivity is that it is relativistic—fixed by no standards independent of human activity. But if we start from where we are—that is, with our cares and concerns—then this concern can be set aside. The question becomes, instead: On what non-absolute basis can a pragmatist reject and condemn "bias"? A pragmatic-objective answer about bias will be, again, operational. For it is not the mere presence of bias but the kind of bias being manifested. As Dewey puts it, "[C]ertain kinds of bias . . . are obnoxious. Bias for impartiality is as much a bias as is partisan prejudice, though it is a radically different quality of bias" (LW 6:14). Distinguishing between kinds of bias or interests as, for example, commendable or condemnable need not appeal to standards external to experience; such distinctions must instead appeal to practically experienceable consequences. We can say, "This bias opens up inquiry and makes possible stable, determinate, and satisfactory solutions whereas that bias closes off inquiry from wider participation and corroboration, and yields solutions that are shortsighted, unstable, and only idiosyncratically satisfactory." Moreover, even these judgments—which differentiate between biases—can have no fixed standard, since they are also directed by context, perspective, and goals. This is not relativism, however, because it is part of our context as
inheritors of the “democratic experiment” that we value those epistemic norms which lead to reliable judgments and policies.  

**Connecting Objectivity with Democracy**

We can now restate more succinctly the connection between democracy and objectivity. *Democracy* is a way of life that empowers communities (and individuals) to express and secure their values by engaging in the epistemic process of social or public inquiry. *Pragmatic objectivity* is a virtue exemplified by inquiries with processes that are accessible, transparent, and amenable to challenge or revision. Democracy and objectivity are mutually supporting because (a) *objectivity* is an epistemic virtue made possible by the conditions of democracy, and (b) a *democracy* can survive and sustain these conditions only when its citizens seek objectivity in their inquiries (and maintain institutions, like schools or public-minded journalism, that nurture the requisite capacities for inquiry).

With these connections in mind, let us return to our example of the young girl bullied by boys. We can see now that the excuse (for bullying) that “Boys will be boys” is both undemocratic and not genuinely objective. By citing a truism, defenders seek to circumvent inquiry and argument; they appeal to objectivity, but it is the objectivity of a truism: oversimplifying and deceptive it seeks to block, not advance, inquiry. Rather than provide genuine (operational or pragmatic) objectivity—by reviewing evidence, canvassing viewpoints, testing hypotheses—these antidemocrats merely seek cover to use force.

**Experience and Objectivity**

So far I have shown how a non-foundational form of objectivity (pragmatic objectivity) functions as a regulative ideal for the kind of epistemic inquiry required for any substantive form of democracy. However, I have not said much about what grounds pragmatic objectivity. For Dewey, the ground or basis is, of course, experience. More specifically, it is “primary” or “ordinary” or “everyday” experience, which is also the starting point for any empiricism Dewey thinks can be called “serious” or “genuine.” Central to such an empiricism is the “method of denotation.” Dewey writes, “The experiential or denotative method tells us that we must go behind the refinements and elaborations of reflective experience to the gross and compulsory things of our doings, enjoyments and sufferings—to the things that force us to labor, that satisfy needs, that surprise us with beauty, that compel obedience under

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5 In any debate about policy, writes Dewey, “[t]here may well be honest divergence as to policies to be pursued, even when plans spring from knowledge of the same facts. But genuinely public policy cannot be generated unless it be informed by knowledge, and this knowledge does not exist except when there is systematic, thorough, and well-equipped search and record” (LW 2:346).
penalty” (LW 1:375–76). This is a familiar Deweyan imperative. It counsels, “Start with life, don’t start with words! Return to experience, not to theory!” A denotive method must guard against observations and parameters that prefigure or predetermine what are the “acceptable” outcomes. The method “warns us,” writes Dewey, “that all intellectual terms are the products of discrimination and classification,” and that “we must, as philosophers, go back to the primitive situations of life that antecede and generate these reflective interpretations, so that we re-live former processes of interpretation in a wary manner, with eyes constantly upon the things to which they refer” (LW 1:386, my emphasis).

This rehearsal of Dewey’s denotive method is unremarkable; I aim to emphasize those passages that identify “experience” as the mark of what I wish to call the “pragmatically objective.” For, as Peirce pointed out, one cannot reach pragmatic clarity merely by relying upon the methods of tenacity or authority, or upon the a priori repurposing of a handy web of terms and theories. Rather, one must force one’s theories to pay regard toward something not already contained or implied by the terms of the theory. To force theories to undergo such tests is to utilize what Dewey calls the “primacy and ultimacy of the material of ordinary experience.” Such experience, he says, “provides a check or test for the conclusions of philosophic inquiry” (LW 1:26). The value of primary experience, then, is its ability to guide theory and give it an “an extra-theoretical check” (see Pappas 2008, 23).

To briefly summarize the connections made so far: genuine democracy rests upon habits of epistemic inquiry; such inquiry is effective when it strives for pragmatic objectivity; and pragmatic objectivity is itself sought by habits of vigilantly starting from and testing results with ordinary or primary experience. Through this connection, primary experience underwrites democracy.

**Interrogating the Denotive Method and Primary Experience**

Now, it was abundantly clear to Dewey that the term “experience” does not typically resolve most disputes regarding political theory. As Richard Bernstein (2006) points out in his review of Martin Jay’s book *Songs of Experience* (2004), both conservative and progressive thinkers have appealed to the way experience funds wisdom, and the resulting debate (over how “experience” itself should be construed and employed) is contentious and ongoing. While it is true that cumulative political experience can inform one’s judgment about reigning ideologies, it is also true that we too easily become unmindful of prejudices built into our experience; for this reason it is important to insist that experience itself be “subjected to rigorous critique” (Bernstein 2006, 268).

What was fresh about the pragmatists’ use of experience, Bernstein reminds us, was the fact that their appeals to experience were not merely dialectical. Rather, “American pragmatic thinkers... *self-consciously*
attempted to develop a new holistic conception of experience” that sought to pay “full justice to the cognitive, scientific, religious, aesthetic, political, and historical dimensions of experience” (Bernstein 2006, 270). Dewey, in particular, seized upon experience’s dynamic, experimental, and aesthetic aspects and in so doing made the pragmatists’ instrumental uses of it especially pertinent to democracy. For Dewey, writes Bernstein, “Aesthetic experience is not a special genre or realm of experience. The aesthetic dimension is a pervasive quality of experience, and this quality can potentially characterize any experience—including scientific inquiry and practical activity. . . . Dewey emphasizes the political significance of experience and democratizes experience. He brings art and aesthetic experience back to the context of the everyday life of ordinary people . . . [and] advocates a social and political ideal in which all experience becomes enriched, and funded with emotional and cognitive meaning. Consequently his moral and political ideal is also aesthetic” (2006, 271–72). Now, I think Bernstein is right about all of this—that the use of “experience” as a bulwark in political arguments is highly susceptible to misuse or abuse; that Dewey’s deployment of “experience” is especially compelling when it pushes toward aestheticizing (i.e., makes meaningful) the rhythms played out by our everyday lives and institutions. Still, much has been written attacking and defending the metaphysical implications of Dewey’s use of “experience;” and Richard Rorty is the typical fulcrum of many of these debates. But to my mind, Talisse’s recent complaints about Dewey’s idea of experience (and democracy “as a way of life”) are interesting and different from Rorty’s. For Talisse’s challenges are directed toward those who see Dewey’s use of “experience” as helpful for discussions about democracy, and so people such as Bernstein and myself need to respond. After a brief recap of Talisse’s position, I will start to make a response, if not a rebuttal.

Talisse and Dewey’s Comprehensive View

Recall that Talisse argues that Dewey’s idea of experience is ill suited for democratic theory because regardless of how non-dogmatic and flexible this account of experience is—no matter how perspectival, transactional, experimental, or aesthetic Dewey makes his formulation—it is nevertheless a philosophical account of experience. Such accounts, according to Talisse, are thick, not thin; they are comprehensive or metaphysical views about the big questions of life; they are not restricted to issues we would be content to call “procedural.” These thick accounts can be reasonably contested by others with differing (thick) views of experience. Thus, any efforts made to promulgate Deweyan democratic theory are, de facto,

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promulgations of Dewey’s underlying (thick) view of experience. By advancing this version of democratic theory, Deweyans either exclude or oppress those whose democratic views might fail to share Dewey’s underlying account of “experience.” Thus, Dewey’s democratic theory cannot be implemented without contradicting itself, pragmatically; that is, its implementation would be “un-democratic.”

To date, my responses to Talisse have largely relied on an appeal to the perspectival and experimental approach of Dewey’s entire philosophical project—not just his approach to experience as a central philosophical idea. Dewey’s account of experience is so open (non-prescriptive), I have argued, that content for it can be supplied by a wide diversity of individual and communal goals without violating Dewey’s core value of having people work out their own answers (by consulting their own experience), all the while communicating so as to minimize conflict. Citing Dewey’s thoroughgoing and progressive experimentalism, I thought, could inoculate Dewey against Talisse’s charge it was nevertheless a comprehensive view which, in its implications for democracy, was insufficiently distinct from other, more authoritarian ones.

However, as I have continued to examine not only Dewey’s notion of experience but also his finer-grained notion of “primary” experience, questions have arisen for me surrounding his notion of primary experience that I cannot at present resolve. It is not clear whether these concerns strengthen Talisse’s argument—because they further problematize the coherence of the concept of “experience” itself—or whether they are, instead, merely tangential. Nevertheless, I seek out my readers’ assistance by raising these concerns here.

Two Concerns

The Ineffability of Primary Experience

My first concern about experience regards the nature of primary experience. In Experience and Nature, Dewey advanced the rather evolutionary notion that each new moment is so constituted by uniqueness, novelty, and chance that it could never be exhaustively predicted by rational systems. There is something radically fresh in how experience is had, and what is had is not only individual but also shared in social life. In Dewey’s philosophical jargon, what is had is “primary experience,” and the “denotative method” points toward it. Yet Dewey also described primary experience as “ineffable.” “Immediate things,” he writes, “may be pointed to by words, but not described or defined”

Talisse’s argument isn’t singling out the Deweyan view, per se. Indeed, anyone else who tied her theory of democracy to a positive metaphysical view—Kantianism, Epicurean atomism, whatever—would, in effect, face the same objection Talisse raises against Dewey.

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The problem Dewey is singling out is that while experience at its most primary is undefinable, indescribable, and ineffable, it can nevertheless be pointed to. How can Dewey’s “denotative method” (or any other) point to something that cannot be characterized? To point or gesture, even vaguely, at one thing rather than another is at least to performatively disambiguate it by a (tacit) characterization.

We can connect this puzzle (about the ineffability of primary experience) to the larger, foregoing question (about experience and democracy) by posing two questions. First, if primary experience is ineffable, it seems to follow that it cannot reliably be pointed to; if this is true, how can it serve as a “check” on democratic theory? Second, if Talisse’s concerns about thick or metaphysical views are valid, does not the fact that Dewey had a theory not only of experience but of primary experience serve as confirming evidence for Talisse’s claim that Dewey held a metaphysical view that must be reasonably rejectable? Lacking answers to these questions, I move on to my second concern.

The Experimental Check Provided by Primary Experience

My second concern about experience regards Dewey’s claim that primary experience (which is predominantly non-theoretical) provides a way to “go back” and “check” the truth or warrant of theoretical claims. One sees that in Dewey’s denotative method, as in experimental science, there is a demand that theory be checked. Such checking is accomplished via an active, social, and often physical process. By coordinating communication and action, we corroborate hypotheses and theoretical claims. In other words, we verify a proposal’s warrant by coaxing others to try out what we have undergone and compare what they find. In effect, our method justifies its beliefs by inducing others to have and report on their own primary experiences.

Again, this was the epistemic point Dewey had in mind when he urged philosophers to “go back to the primitive situations of life that antecede and generate [their] reflective interpretations.” Such efforts to “go back” will, he argues, put “us knowingly and cautiously through steps which were first taken uncritically, and exposed to all kinds of adventitious influence” (LW 1:386, my emphasis) What is interesting about Dewey’s phrase “the primitive situations of life” is that it places an emphasis not on what is abstract or cognitive (as if “going back” was just about “checking one’s

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⁵ Here, from *Experience and Nature*, is the larger quotation: “Immediacy of existence is ineffable. But there is nothing mystical about such ineffability; it expresses the fact that of direct existence it is futile to say anything to one’s self and impossible to say anything to another. Discourse can but intimate connections which if followed out may lead one to have an existence... Immediate things may be pointed to by words, but not described or defined. Description when it occurs is but a part of a circuitous method of pointing or denoting; index to a starting point and road which if taken may lead to a direct and ineffable presence” (LW 1:74-75, emphasis in original.)
work”); rather, the emphasis is upon situations, which are undergone and cumulatively reshaped over time by further experience, both suffered (primary) and reflective (secondary). But this is where things get tricky. For while Dewey relies upon phrases like “going back” or “returning” to primary experience, it is actually impossible to “go back” to the same primary experience that funded a theory’s creation; a flowing river cannot be used to “check” itself, since it is never the same river twice.

How, then, can primary experience check theory? Clearly not the way a ruler checks the length of a line. Rather, it checks theory by assessing the pragmatic value of theory’s results. Here is how I would frame it: As we live our lives—that is, in the course of primary experience—we encounter problems; some of those problems are knotty enough to force us to pause, reflect, and devise a theory about what is wrong and what needs to be done. To say that a theory is “checked” by primary experience is to say that attention has been paid to whether or not the theory directs the course of further primary experience toward valued outcomes and goals. Experienced trajectories are then labeled “better” rather than “worse.”

The check on theory is an experiential check, a socially mediated check. The operative question is whether or not the frustration or obstruction created by a problematic situation can be mitigated—and the flow of experience reestablished—to the satisfaction of the person or persons initiating a specific inquiry. Such an assessment does not call a theory or judgment true or false, but rather calls it “good enough” or “not good enough” —where “enough” is always indexed to the pervasive, underlying quality at issue in the thinker’s problematic situation. It is worth remarking that one can only “check” a theory in concert with other inquirers if there is at least tacit agreement about norms regarding which procedure and vocabulary are “proper” (or adequate) to describe what has been experienced. The establishment of those norms of experimentation indicate the presence of even deeper agreements (again, perhaps, tacit) regarding the long-term values and purposes connected with the use of the method of experimental inquiry to test, fix, and report what all will agree to call “true” or “reasonable.”

Radical Pluralism

Perhaps it seems as if I have resolved my concern about the kind of “check” primary experience places on theory. Deweyans may be satisfied,

9 For example, my primary experiences with cars are reshaped as I ride in them, learn to drive them, pay for their maintenance, read their histories, appreciate their aesthetic and environmental impacts. Every fresh encounter with them—every primary experience—derives its character, in part, from all these experiences.

10 In evaluating a particular judgment, writes Dewey, “enough is always enough, and the underlying quality is itself the test of the ‘enough’ for any particular case. All that is needed is to determine this quality by indicating the limits between which it moves and the direction or tendency of its movement. . . . Any proposition that serves the purpose for which it is made is logically adequate” (LW 5:255).
but many others will not. Their dissatisfaction is instructive and helps further illuminate the way in which Dewey’s answer fails to satisfy critics like Talisse.

Consider the case of the religious believer who does not see the scientific method as at all decisive. In other words, someone who does not share the experimental norms about what it means to verify, experiment, or corroborate. Such types pose a serious test for Deweyan experience, one of radical pluralism. Let us say this person denies evolutionary biology and offers the following rebuke to philosophers and scientists who have been insisting that the religious argument is logically inconsistent:

*Christian Denier of Evolution*: You’ve demonstrated that Creationists don’t always reason consistently across all cases, and that we are inflexible about some of our religious interpretations. We admit all of this to be true. But now you must see that inconsistency and inflexibility are necessary for reproducing our identity—they are tools which sustain our tribe. Indeed, it is you who must explain why we should privilege your values—your logical norm of “consistency,” your experimental norm of “fallible” interpretations. Why should we privilege them over the ideological values sustained by our narrative? To put this in reasonable language (that you can understand): we determine what is epistemically permissible by consulting our cultural values. We place loyalty to our religious community above what your William James in *Pragmatism* called scientists’ “almost religious” esteem for facts. Your scientists are devout about facts. We are devout about God. Q.E.D.

Deweyans can try to respond to such objections by explaining that experimental method is transparent and open to correction; that proper scientific experiments deal in choices that are, as Dewey puts it, “avowed,” so that anyone else who wants to can evaluate for himself an experiment’s conditions, procedures, and purposes. Then, he can try to repeat the experiment. ¹¹

While those in the scientific choir could all sing along with this, such words will not satisfy others who don’t care about transparency, corroboration by shared experience, and fallibility of results. They just are not even in the same game. Fairly or not, the question Talisse requires a Deweyan democrat to answer is: How do you deal with such holdouts? How does the theory of the Deweyan democrat handle this kind of case? With experience? Pshaw. Experience cannot solve this problem.

¹¹ As Dewey puts it, “The purport of thinking, scientific and philosophic, is not to eliminate choice but to render it less arbitrary and more significant. . . . When choice is avowed, others can repeat the course of the experience; it is an experiment to be tried, not an automatic safety device” (LW 1:35).
Conclusion: Trying Other Strategies

Alas, I have no good answer for Dewey. I suspect there is something wrong with the question, for example, an immoderate expectation for what democratic theory can or should do, but I cannot prove this suspicion here. Dewey’s view, as I read it, recognizes the possibility of such radically plural objections but refuses to engage in the kind of philosophy that sets itself the task of gaming out such objections and then constructing abstract philosophical theories to preclude them. So, in those cases where we do not share something as fundamental as an empirical and experimental approach to problem solving, Dewey’s approach recommends other kinds strategies, especially those that can invoke shared predicaments and at least some common values. He refers to such non-argumentative tactics as a search for “total attitude,” a “more comprehensive point of view from which the divergences may be brought together, and consistency or continuity of experience recovered” (MW 9:336).\footnote{For more on the creation of a “total attitude” as well as on the debate between science and religion over evolution, see Hildebrand 2006.} Progress toward a total attitude is made by remaining persistent in our interactions with others, regardless of theoretical or ideological disagreements. This may, for example, amount to dealing with a common threat or experiencing a common enjoyment (a joke, meal, game) or by going through things (i.e., having primary experiences with others); in these ways, non-communicative antagonists may come to see common values previously invisible. This change—in essence coming to see “the other” differently—is fundamental to making progress in just that area of epistemic disagreement that caused all the pessimism to begin with. Such a method is fallible, and there is no certainty that it can resolve all disagreements or prevent all complaints over “oppression.” But it is deeply reverent of the perspectives of others and the need to keep creating democracy as we all try to get along.

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