On the Viability of Dreyfus's Heidegger

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Through the 1991 publication of his book *Being-in-the-World*, Hubert Dreyfus has become widely regarded as the leader of a relatively new school of Heidegger interpretation. And although Dreyfus-Heideggerians are still a minority among Heidegger scholars, their prominence has increased steadily in recent years.[1] Dreyfus's book, which focuses on *Being and Time*'s Division I analysis of everyday Dasein's involvement with ready-to-hand entities, compares the anti-Cartesianism articulated in this analysis with that of several twentieth-century analytic philosophers, most importantly the later Wittgenstein. This approach, like Richard Rorty's, has the advantage of rendering Heidegger accessible and relevant to an audience that had previously considered his thought to be essentially meaningless and thus philosophically inaccessible and irrelevant. And in view of Dreyfus's current influence, a question that must be addressed is whether this attempt to assimilate the analytic and continental traditions yields an accurate account of Heidegger.

A striking feature of Dreyfus's interpretation is its admitted inability to fully integrate Divisions I and II of *Being and Time*. According to Dreyfus, the Heidegger of Division I espouses a form of prag-

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1. Since *Being-in-the-World* (Dreyfus 1991) appeared, Dreyfus has coedited, with Harrison Hall, *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (Dreyfus and Hall 1992), which includes articles by several commentators who were students of Dreyfus, such as John Haugeland, Charles Guignon, and William Blattner, as well as other commentators whose approach to Heidegger is clearly influenced by Dreyfus. Dreyfus's influence is also seen in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Guignon 1993), which was edited by Guignon, and includes articles by Guignon, Hall, and Dreyfus. In 2000, a two-volume Festschrift for Dreyfus appeared (Malpas 2000a and Malpas 2000b); while Dreyfus's approach was amply represented in *Appropriating Heidegger* (Faulconer and Wrathall 2000), a collection of essays illustrating a variety of current styles of Heidegger interpretation.

matism; in Dreyfus's words, "Heidegger can be viewed as radicalizing the insights already contained in the writings of such pragmatists as Nietzsche, Peirce, James, and Dewey" (Dreyfus 1991).[2] The Heidegger of Division II, on the other hand, is an existentialist (Dreyfus 1991, xiii). And Dreyfus draws this distinction in view of the differing evaluations of the social world found in the two Divisions of *Being and Time*. Specifically, Heidegger the radical pragmatist, under the influence of Dilthey, emphasizes the positive function of Dasein's social dimension, i.e., "the social context as the ultimate foundation of intelligibility" (Dreyfus 1991, 7, also 143, 155); and it is here that Dreyfus detects a fundamental agreement between Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein. As he puts it, "[f]or both Heidegger and Wittgenstein . . . the source of the intelligibility of the world is the average public practices through which alone there can be an understanding at all" (Dreyfus 1991, 155).[3] Heidegger the existentialist, on the other hand, under the influence of Kierkegaard, emphasizes the negative function of Dasein's social dimension, i.e., "the conformism and banality" (Dreyfus 1991, 143) that result from social life since the intelligibility that it grounds is a mere "pseudoclarity achieved at the expense of a 'genuine' clarity that is covered up" (Dreyfus 1991, 156). According to Division II of *Being and Time*, then, the social obscures rather than reveals. And it is here that Dreyfus detects a fundamental disagreement between Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein.

As Dreyfus sees it, *Being and Time* attempts to combine Heidegger's Dilthey-influenced pragmatist view of the social (prominent in Division I) with his Kierkegaard-influenced existentialist view of society (prominent in Division II). And the result of *Being and Time*'s combining of these radically opposed evaluations of society is an incoherent "secularization" of Kierkegaard (Dreyfus 1991, 333–36, also 229). But, Dreyfus claims, the later Heidegger, recognizing the impossibility of integrating Divisions I and II, abandons Division II's existentialist suspicion of Dasein's social dimension and carries on Division I's radical pragmatist project, albeit in a transformed manner

2. In his article "Wittgenstien, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language" (Rorty 1993, 337–57), Rorty, too , sees the Division I analysis as a form of pragmatism and as in conflict with Division II.

3. Rorty asserts this same similarity between Heidegger and Wittgenstien (Rorty 1993, 347–48).

(Dreyfus 1991, 336–37). Ultimately, then, *Being and Time*'s contribution to twentieth-century philosophy is Division I's recognition of the fundamental role played by social practices in Dasein's relation to the world. Hence, Dreyfus's comparison of Heidegger's anti-Cartesianism with the later Wittgenstein's.

Notice that Dreyfus's attempt to build a bridge across the analytic/continental divide in the figures of Wittgenstein and Heidegger depends upon the incompatibility of Divisions I and II since it must dismiss the latter; Heidegger's existentialist proclivities must be overridden by the pragmatist dimension of his thought. For Dreyfus's bridge is supported by Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's valorization of social practices, and so would be undermined by Division II's denigration of the social. To assess the viability of Dreyfus's Heidegger, and his assimilation of the traditions, then, we must examine Dreyfus's case for the incompatibility of *Being and Time*'s two Divisions.

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Dreyfus first draws his distinction between the opposed strains in *Being and Time* in his analysis of Heideggerian *das Man*. From Dreyfus's point of view, the sections that examine *das Man* are pivotal for a proper understanding of *Being and Time,* but are fundamentally confused (Dreyfus 1991, 143–44). The alleged confusion results from the fact that *das Man* is the manifestation of Dasein's social dimension, and so it is at this point in *Being and Time* that Heidegger's Wittgensteinian valorization and Kierkegaardian denigration of the social world collide. In Dreyfus's terms, *das Man* performs both a positive function and a negative function for Heidegger. And Dreyfus intends to resolve the confusion that issues from this collision of incompatibles by treating the two functions of *das Man* separately, although Heidegger himself failed to consistently maintain this separation. This failure, Dreyfus argues, "prevents the chapter [on *das Man*] from having the centrality that it should have in an understanding of *Being and Time*" (Dreyfus 1991, 144). With this in mind, Dreyfus postpones his consideration of the negative function of *das Man,* and focuses on its positive function. And in doing so, Dreyfus shows us why he considers the analysis of *das Man* to be so important.

According to Dreyfus, Division I, chapter 4, which contains the analysis of *das Man,* constitutes "the last nail in the coffin of the

Cartesian tradition" (Dreyfus 1991, 144). The first nail was driven in by Division I, chapter 3, in which Heidegger attacks Descartes's subject/object division. Heidegger attacks the Cartesian isolation of the subject from the world through his analysis of everyday experience, which shows that Dasein does not immediately experience things as the subject-independent, external objects of a theoretical encounter, as the Cartesian ontology implies. Rather, things normally appear as the useful, or ready-to-hand, objects of a practical encounter—things with which Dasein is involved, and that only are what they are in terms of this involvement. Heidegger takes this as his phenomenological clue to the essential Dasein-relatedness of things,[4] thereby initiating the assault on Descartes's isolated subject. As Dreyfus interprets this move, the practical encounter is grounded in a background of "skills and practices" (Dreyfus 1991, 22), a "knowing-how-to-cope" (Dreyfus 1991, 18) that cannot be accounted for within the Cartesian subject/object ontology. The analysis of *das Man*, according to Dreyfus, extends this attack on Cartesianism by further dissolving the cabinet of isolation within which Descartes had locked the subject. For this analysis shows that not only is Dasein essentially involved with, and so connected to, things, but it is also essentially related to others; that is, Dasein is necessarily social.[5] Thus, the analysis of *das Man* completes the dissolution of the subject's Cartesian isolation; it is the last nail in the coffin of Cartesianism.

Dreyfus arrives at his interpretation of *das Man's* role in Heidegger's critique of Descartes through the aforementioned decision to focus on *das Man's* positive function, i.e., on the fact that, for Heidegger, the background of skills and practices that grounds the practical encounter is necessarily a background of "*shared* background practices" (Dreyfus 1991, 144, my emphasis), or *social* practices. And since the structure of the practical encounter is Heidegger's phenomenological clue to the structure of any encounter between Dasein and entities, the fact that ready-to-hand entities can only appear

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4. In a 1925 lecture course, Heidegger explicitly states that this is the force of his analysis of the everyday encounter with the ready-to-hand, when he tells us that this analysis "has provided us with an initial phenomenological insight into the structure of encounter in worldhood" (Heidegger 1985, 200).

5. In his *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (Guignon 1983, 104), Guignon also interprets the analysis of *das Man* in this way.

against a socially determined background reveals that social practices play this same role with regard to beings per se. Therefore, the public, *das Man*, is "the source of the intelligibility of the world . . . through which alone there can be any understanding at all" (Dreyfus 1991, 155).[6] It is this valorization of the social as a fundamental world-revealing power that, according to Dreyfus's reading, renders the pragmatist Heidegger incompatible with the existentialist Heidegger, and links the former with Wittgenstein (Dreyfus 1991, 155). For Dreyfus, then, the analysis of *das Man* is the key to *Being and Time* because it is here that we must distinguish Heidegger's pragmatist dimension from his existentialist dimension, and rid *Being and Time* of the existentialist taint that has prevented interpreters from appreciating Heidegger's positive evaluation of the social world, and so has obscured the bridge linking Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian thought.

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We can now address the legitimacy of the aspects of Dreyfus's interpretation that we have sketched. Beginning with his pivotal reading of *das Man*, Dreyfus's focusing on the positive function of the public, on *das Man*'s world-constitutive power, yields a questionable picture of *Being and Time*. By only taking *das Man*'s positive aspect into account, Dreyfus is led to grant world-constituting powers to the public that Heidegger typically reserves for either Dasein, Being, or the Dasein/Being relation. For example, Dreyfus maintains that, for Heidegger, "[s]ociety is the ontological source of the familiarity and readiness that makes the ontical discovery of entities . . . possible" (Dreyfus 1991, 145). In a similar vein, Dreyfus holds that the "ontological background" of all of Dasein's activities is its "sociocultural background" (Dreyfus 1991, 161). This apparent overestimation of the role played by the Heideggerian public, rooted in the alleged incompatibility, and thus the separability, of Divisions I and II, is the price that Dreyfus pays to link Heidegger with Wittgenstein. The suspicion that this overestimation casts on his reading does not invalidate it, but it should compel us to look more closely at Dreyfus's in-

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6. As Guignon (1983, 109) puts it, "[t]he source of the structures of significance that make up the world is therefore not the res cogitans or transcendental ego, but the public-in-general."

terpretation of *das Man*. For if we can find a way of interpreting Heideggerian *das Man* that does not assert an incompatibility between its positive and negative aspects, then we will have a preferable interpretation since such an interpretation would both maintain the consistency of Divisions I and II and avoid Dreyfus's overestimation of the Heideggerian public. In the process, we may lose the bridge from Heidegger to Wittgenstein, but this may be the price that *we* pay for an internally consistent account of Heidegger's thought. To see how Dreyfus's assertion of an incompatibility between the two aspects of *das Man* can be avoided, let us reexamine how he arrives at this claim.

As we have seen, Dreyfus views the analysis of *das Man* as furthering the attack on the Cartesian subject begun in Division I, chapter 3. That is, while chapter 3 shows that beings can only appear to Dasein insofar as it is engaged in background practices, chapter 4's analysis of *das Man* shows that these practices are social practices. Therefore, chapter 4 extends the analysis of chapter 3 by further qualifying the background practices that make Dasein's relation to entities possible as, more specifically, social. Here, we can clearly see why Heidegger's Kierkegaardian denigration of the social seems, from Dreyfus's point of view, to be dispensable.

While the positive function of *das Man* complements the conclusion drawn in *Being and Time*'s preceding chapter, the negative function of *das Man* does not advance Heidegger's argument against the Cartesian subject. For, given Dreyfus's understanding of the Heideggerian critique of Cartesianism as an attempt to fully dissolve the subject's cabinet of isolation, Heidegger's negative remarks concerning Dasein's social dimension are either irrelevant to that critique or they are inimical thereto. Specifically, the fact that the social obscures the intelligibility that makes beings possible is irrelevant to Heidegger's anti-Cartesianism when considered apart from *das Man*'s positive function and inimical to Heidegger's anti-Cartesianism when considered in conjunction with *das Man*'s positive function. This can be seen through the following considerations.

If the purpose of chapter 3 is to show that background practices are required for beings to appear, then, absent the qualification of these practices as social (i.e., *das Man*'s positive function), the fact that the social obscures the intelligibility of beings (i.e., *das Man*'s negative function) is completely ancillary to the conclusion of chapter 3.

Unless the necessary background practices are qualified as social, claims about the negative effects of Dasein's social dimension are irrelevant to the development of Heidegger's argument. However, if we combine *das Man*'s positive and negative functions, then Heidegger's argument would run as follows. Although beings can only appear through Dasein's background practices, these practices do not yield an adequate revelation of beings since such practices are socially determined. This inadequacy, rooted in *das Man*'s negative function, undermines Heidegger's critique of Cartesianism; it effectively repudiates chapter 3's advance over Descartes's subject/object division since the fact that beings can only appear through Dasein's background practices was intended to demonstrate that Dasein is essentially involved with, and thus connected to, beings. But if the background practices that allow beings to manifest themselves, and so be what they are, reveal beings inadequately due to the social character of these practices, then Dasein loses its essential connection with beings. The social character of our background practices may forge a connection between ourselves and others, but not between Dasein and beings since socially constituted beings could be illusory. Hence, Descartes's skepticism about objects, which depends upon the isolation of the subject, survives when *das Man*'s positive and negative functions are combined.

In the final analysis, then, the negative function of *das Man* is, from Dreyfus's point of view, either irrelevant or inimical to Heidegger's anti-Cartesianism; in either case, the basic argument of *Being and Time* is better off without Heidegger's existentialist leanings since the negative evaluation of our social dimension that results from this tendency does not advance his argument against the Cartesian notion of subjectivity.

Now we can see precisely how the alleged incompatibility between the two aspects of *das Man* can be reconciled, thereby allowing an interpretation of *Being and Time* that integrates its two divisions, and so does not overestimate *das Man*'s role in the constitution of the world. This can be done by showing that, in fact, *both* the positive and negative aspects of *das Man* advance the position initiated in Division I, chapter 3. The first question to be asked, here, is: What, exactly, is the position put forward in chapter 3? For it is in answering this question that Dreyfus, prior to his explicit analysis of chapter 4, already commits himself to the problematic consequences of his interpretation.

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Earlier, we saw that Dreyfus views chapter 3 as the opening move of Heidegger's assault on the isolation of the Cartesian subject; and that, according to Dreyfus, Heidegger attacks this isolation by arguing that things normally appear as useful things against a background of practices. These practices, along with the useful things encountered through them, form a context of relations that is not reducible to the sum of those practices and things, but is presupposed by them. This amounts to a critique of Cartesianism, Dreyfus argues, because Descartes's subject/object division implies that things appear as isolable units rather than as intrinsically contextualized (Dreyfus 1991, 45f, 115f). Ingredient to the position put forward in chapter 3, then, is that things are necessarily relational, or contextual. Heidegger refers to this relational context within which things appear as the world, and the ultimate purpose of chapter 3's analysis of the world is to discover its basic ontological structure, i.e., to designate the fundamental feature that makes the relational context of background practices what it is, the feature that constitutes the very "worldhood" of the world. And Heidegger claims that this distinguishing feature is the world's "significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*)" (Heidegger 1962, 120, 160). It is in his interpretation of worldhood or significance that Dreyfus makes the interpretive move that determines his characterization of Heidegger, and thus characterizes his attempted bridge between Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Dreyfus holds that since the set of background practices that makes up the world is a relational context, the worldhood of the world must be its contextuality. Thus, Dreyfus equates significance with "meaningful context" (Dreyfus 1991, 121).[7] In view of the fact that Heidegger takes his analysis of the ready-to-hand as the phenomenological clue to the structure of beings per se, Dreyfus's interpretation of Heideggerian significance implies that *whatever is* is significant in the sense of fitting into a context of relations: to be is to be contextualized. In other words, the very being of beings is their contextuality. That this is Dreyfus's position is verified by his claim that Dasein's understanding of being is an "understanding of the referential whole" (Dreyfus 1991, 102). And it is this interpretation of

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7. Mark Okrent, whose book *Heidegger's Pragmatism* also interprets Heidegger as a Wittgensteinian pragmatist, makes a similar move when he equates Heideggerian significance with "functionality contexture" (Okrent 1988, 41–43).

significance that apparently justifies Dreyfus's problematic reading of *Being and Time*'s chapter 4 analysis of *das Man* since the same relations that hold between the background practices required for beings to appear and *das Man*'s positive and negative functions also hold between the contextuality of beings and *das Man*'s two functions. That is, while the positive aspect of *das Man* can be seen as qualifying the contextuality of beings as a socially determined contextuality, the negative aspect of *das Man* is either irrelevant or inimical to this contextuality. (This can be seen by substituting the relational context for background practices in our previous argument concerning the relation of background practices to *das Man*'s two functions.) Hence, Dreyfus's interpretation of significance as contextuality allows his overestimation of the social through the dispensability of the negative aspect of *das Man* since this aspect of the Heideggerian public does not seem to advance Heidegger's argument against Descartes. Therefore, the problematic features of Dreyfus's interpretation that result in his inability to integrate Divisions I and II follow from his interpretation of Heideggerian significance.[8]

In our current endeavor to find an interpretation of chapter 3's position that would reconcile the positive and negative aspects of *das Man*, we must focus on Dreyfus's interpretation of significance. For, as we can now see, it is ultimately his equating significance with contextuality that allows him to dismiss *das Man*'s negative aspect. This negative aspect, however, can be seen as advancing the position put forward in chapter 3 if we focus our interpretation of Heideggerian significance not on the necessary contextuality of things, but on the fact that, for Heidegger, the relational context within which things can appear is anchored in Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, Dasein is that "for the sake of which" (Heidegger 1962, 116–17) the relational context, or world, is what it is since the useful things of immediate experience are always useful for, and thus referred to, Dasein. Therefore, the world context is essentially *for Dasein*. Thus conceived, the fundamental feature that makes the relational context of background practices what it is is its having a necessary relation to Dasein; the basic

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8. Okrent's interpreting significance in essentially the same way as Dreyfus leads him to also overestimate the role of the social in Heidegger (Okrent 1988, 45–51, 1333–34).

ontological structure, or worldhood, of the world is not its contextuality but its being for Dasein, its Dasein-dependence. Significance, then, is equivalent to Dasein-dependence.[9] In Heidegger's words, "[t]he upshot of that analysis [the chapter 3 analysis of worldhood] was that the referential totality of significance . . . has been 'tied up' with a 'for the sake of which'" (Heidegger 1962, 236), i.e., with Dasein.

Notice that our interpretation of significance as Dasein-dependence, like Dreyfus's interpretation of significance as contextuality, views chapter 3 as an attack on the Cartesian subject/object division. On our reading, whatever is is significant in the sense of being essentially related to Dasein. In this way, Dasein is released from the isolation that characterizes the Cartesian subject since the essential Dasein-relatedness of entities forges an intrinsic connection between Dasein and things. But our interpretation of significance, unlike Dreyfus's, allows both the positive and negative functions of *das Man* to play a role in Heidegger's anti-Cartesianism, thereby allowing the consistency within Heidegger's work that Dreyfus's interpretation denies. This can be seen in the following way.

Beginning with *das Man*'s positive function, Heidegger argues in chapter 4 that the object of immediate experience is not only useful for Dasein but is also useful for others. Therefore, the world, or relational context within which entities can be what they are, is not only for Dasein but for others as well. The world is a "with-world" (Heidegger 1962, 155). Thus, the ontological structure of the world, its significance, is not only its being for Dasein, but its being for Dasein *qua* social, its being for the public—for *das Man*. As significant, then, things are necessarily referred to *das Man*, or dependent upon *das Man*. In Heidegger's words, *das Man* "articulates the referential context of significance" (Heidegger 1962, 167).

To this point, our interpretation of significance, like Dreyfus's, views chapter 4's analysis of *das Man* as extending chapter 3's position. That is, the Dasein-dependence, or significance, of entities is qualified as dependence upon Dasein *qua* social, or Dasein as a manifestation of the public, of *das Man*; significance is necessarily social

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9. For a fuller discussion of the connection between Dasein-dependence and significance, see my "Heidegger on Realism and Idealism" (Tanzer 1998, 97–100).

significance. But unlike Dreyfus's interpretation, ours renders the negative aspect of *das Man* relevant to the position articulated thus far. This relevance becomes clear when we note that the negative function of *das Man* does not simply refer to Heidegger's distrust of the public. Rather, while *das Man* in its positive function makes Dasein's world-constituting power possible since things are only Dasein-dependent insofar as Dasein is social, at the same time, *das Man* prevents Dasein from fully exercising this power, and herein lies its negative function.

Das Man restricts Dasein's world-constituting power insofar as the specific type of world-constitution that *das Man* makes possible (i.e., socially determined world-constitution) has the salient characteristic that the constituting agent does not have complete control over the determinations that it constitutes. For any particular Dasein or group thereof cannot arbitrarily constitute things in whatever way they choose. Instead, the entities that Dasein constitutes, though dependent upon Dasein, possess a dimension that is impervious to Dasein's constituting power, a dimension that makes entities what they are independently of Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, the world that Dasein constitutes is "that wherein Dasein as such *already* is" (Heidegger 1962, 120, my emphasis): it is *pre*determined, and thus determined without Dasein.[10] It is a world to which Dasein "has always submitted itself" (Heidegger 1962, 121) since Dasein must conform to its resistant dimension, the Dasein-independent dimension that is beyond Dasein's control. The negative function of *das Man*, to which Dasein "stands in subjection" (Heidegger 1962, 164), is its limitation of Dasein's world-constituting power. This negative function subjugates Dasein's world-constituting power to the Dasein-independent, predetermined dimension of the socially constituted world.

In view of the above, the negative function of *das Man* renders things Dasein-independent; it allows things to be what they are without Dasein. In terms of our interpretation of significance as Dasein-dependence, we can say that while the positive aspect of *das Man* qualifies the significance of things as social, the negative aspect of *das Man* refers to the fact that Dasein-dependence, so qualified, is nec-

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10. For a fuller discussion of the connection between predetermination and Dasein-independence, see my "Heidegger on Realism and Idealism" (Tanzer 1998, 104f).

essarily correlated with an equally essential Dasein-*in*dependence, or *in*significance.[11] Socially constituted entities are equally Dasein-dependent, or significant, and Dasein-independent, or insignificant.

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With our interpretation of significance as Dasein-dependence, *das Man*'s negative aspect is neither irrelevant nor inimical to the argument that Heidegger develops in chapters 3 and 4 of *Being and Time*'s first Division, as Dreyfus's interpretation of significance as contextuality implies. Instead, while chapter 3 argues that whatever is is significant in the sense of being Dasein-dependent, chapter 4 shows that Dasein plays this significance-giving, world-constituting role as social, as *das Man*. Chapter 4 then goes on to argue that since the Dasein-dependence of entities is socially determined (*das Man*'s positive function), these very entities are equally Dasein-independent (*das Man*'s negative function). So, when we interpret significance as Dasein-dependence, the negative function of *das Man* is indispensable to Heidegger's critique of Cartesianism as this negative function is ingredient to, and thus inseparable from, *das Man*'s positive function.

Here, it may be objected that allowing *das Man*'s negative function a role in Heidegger's argument destroys its anti-Cartesian force. For, as we saw earlier, the ultimate inadequacy of Dasein's world-constituting power—an inadequacy that is manifested as *das Man*'s negative function—seems to undermine chapter 3's advance over Descartes's subject/object division since it apparently severs Dasein's essential connection with beings. In other words, the negative function of *das Man* seems to drive subjectivity back into the very cabinet of isolation from which Heidegger's analysis of the practical encounter was designed to free it. But a closer look at *das Man*'s bi-dimensional structure reveals that its negative dimension, when interpreted as the source of the Dasein-independence of entities, allows Heidegger to completely dissolve the Cartesian cabinet.

To understand how *das Man*'s negative aspect functions in this dissolution, we must recall that entities, as Dasein-independent, as

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11. For a fuller discussion of the connection between Dasein-independence and insignificance, see my "Heidegger on Realism and Idealism" (Tanzer 1998, 101–102).

constituted without Dasein, are *pre*determined. Nevertheless, these entities are constituted by Dasein since the negative function of *das Man* is intrinsically linked with its positive function, which renders entities Dasein-dependent. *Das Man*'s bidimensional structure, then, implies that Dasein constitutes that which is already constituted prior to Dasein; Dasein constitutes the world before it constitutes the world. Hence, Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as structured in such a way that it is outside of itself, or "ahead of itself" (Heidegger 1962, 236). Possessing this structure, Dasein cannot be understood as a self-contained isolated subject since it has no purely interior realm within which to be locked. Therefore, both the positive and negative aspects of *das Man* must be taken into account in Heidegger's anti-Cartesianism because, when taken together, they reveal that Dasein must precede itself, and thus is ontologically outside of itself.

Given the inseparability of *das Man*'s two functions, our interpretation avoids Dreyfus's overestimation of the role played by the public in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's social dimension is not intended to simply valorize the power of the social, thereby permitting us to dismiss Heidegger's negative assessment of the public; rather, it serves to illuminate Dasein's strange self-preceding, ecstatic structure, of which *das Man* is the everyday manifestation. And since our interpretation renders *das Man*'s two functions compatible, we are able to integrate Divisions I and II of *Being and Time*. For the incompatibility that Dreyfus's alleged was an incompatibility between Heidegger's positive and negative evaluations of the social. Thus, Dreyfus's distinction between Heidegger the radical pragmatist and Heidegger the existentialist collapses; isolating either tendency yields an inadequate picture of Heidegger's thought. In Dreyfus's case, isolating Heidegger's pragmatist tendency results in the appearance of an illusory similarity between Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein. Through our interpretation, then, we lose Dreyfus's bridge across the analytic/continental divide, but gain an internally consistent account of *Being and Time*.

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