Chapter One

A People Yet to Come

"People of Color" Reconsidered

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Dear white fella
Couple things you should know
When I born, I black
When I grow up, I black
When I go in sun, I black
When I scared, I black
When I sick, I black
And when I die, I still black.

You white fella
When you born, you pink
When you grow up, you white
When you go in sun, you red
When you cold, you blue
When you scared, you yellow
When you sick, you green
And when you die, you grey.

And you have the cheek to call me colored? [1]

Born and raised in Korea, I had never considered myself a person of colo until I moved to the United States. As a recent immigrant, the first challenge was to accept that I *am* a person of color—in fact, there is no other possibility for me but to be a woman of color. Realizing the racial meaning of one's own body as an adult is a debilitating experience since it requires a radical, profound reconstitution of identity. For a long time I was reluctant to accept this part of my new identity or to allow it any determining power, since I wanted to be a scholar among other scholars, not a woman-of-color scholar or even a

woman scholar. As do many others, I thought denial would take the power away from this "absolute" reality. When I realized that denial was not going to open up more possibilities and began articulating myself as a racialized subject, I faced another challenge—I was told that Asians and Asian Americans are not people of color.

What does it mean to identify oneself as a person of color in the United States? Who are the people or peoples we refer to when we say "people of color"? If the distinction between "colored" and "noncolored" is arbitrarily drawn by whiteness, as the above poem points out, is it not problematic to adopt the term to describe racialized peoples?

In the United States, various terms have been used to designate those who are not white: colored people, people of color, racial and ethnic minorities, and more. The term "people of color" originated from the French phrase "gens de couleur libres" (free people of color), which indicated free people of mixed race in the French West Indian colonies in the 18th century. The term "free people of color" was used in Louisiana in reference to an intermediate class between whites and enslaved blacks. Along with more derogatory terms such as "negroes" or "colored,"[2] the term "people of color" was initially used to designate black people in the United States.[3] Then it evolved to be a more general, neutral term that embraces various forms of racialization. As Vidal-Ortiz points out, "One of the developments of the term *people of color* is precisely its flexibility in accommodating various groups similarly disadvantaged, even if their disadvantages are based on different variables (e.g., access to education, housing, employment, immigration status, English proficiency)."[4]

The "flexibility" of the term, however, comes with limitations. It importantly highlights the supposed commonality among the people it includes as a general category—the shared experience of systemic racism—but tends to obscure differences among racialized peoples. Manning Marable writes,

> Many advocates of diversity and the study of racialized ethnicities tend to homogenize groups into the broad political construct known as "people of color." The concept "people of color" has tremendous utility in bringing people toward a comparative, historical awareness about the commonalities of oppression and resistance that racialized ethnic groups have experienced. Our voices and visions cannot properly be understood or interpreted in isolation from one another. But to argue that all people of color are therefore equally oppressed, and share the objective basis for a common politics, is dubious at best.[5]

As Marable notes, questions have been raised regarding the problem of homogenization that the notion suggests. Lumping all nonwhite peoples together neglects historical specificities of various forms of racism and often prioritizes the experience of certain racial groups over others. For example, Linda

Martín Alcoff showed how the black–white binary in racial discourse fails t recognize the differential racialization processes of Asian Americans an Latino/a Americans and thus creates conflicts within communities of color. More recently, Jared Sexton claimed that there is a form of color blindnes inherent to the concept of "people of color" that "insists upon the monolithi character of victimization under white supremacy," and thus fails to under stand the specificity of antiblackness and the singular structure of racia slavery.[7]

I agree that recognizing the differences between racial groups is critica for coalition building. I would like to ask further, however, *by whom* and *fo what purpose* these differences are to be recognized. The ways racial differ ences are understood currently seem to rely largely on their proximity t whiteness; peoples of color are hierarchized according to the degree to whic one is regarded as "colored," or to the degree to which one is white-iden tified. White normativity has become so adaptable that it can embrace diver sity while maintaining racial hierarchy by promoting certain forms of assimi lation—the unthreatening, subservient kind. Positioning differential racial ization and assimilation processes in relation to whiteness does not advance people of color's understanding of themselves beyond their lack of white ness. The notion of "people of color" would remain reactionary if it does no move beyond the building of coalitions in opposition to whiteness. Further more, the "people" as a collective political subject would defeat its own purpose if it reproduces internally the logic of racial domination and aliena tion that it aims to resist.

This paper problematizes the notion of "people of color" as it is used in racial discourse in the United States. I consider the strategic importance of the term "people of color" for multiracial coalition building as well as the reluctance toward such categorization as a merely negative delimitation that reproduces white normativity as an organizing principle of "the people" within communities of color. In order to abolish its conceptual dependency on whiteness, the notion of "people of color" should be construed in affirmative terms that point beyond their negative, oppositional identity as nonwhite. It is my contention that the notion is best understood through its implicated *absence*—the absence of belongingness, and of self-determination. This is not an absence in the sense of lack, a lack of whiteness. It is an absence in the sense of "yet-to-come" that refuses racial predeterminations as the condition of presence. Thus I explore the idea of absence as a temporal experience and show in which sense people of color *do not belong in the present*, using Frantz Fanon's description of the racialization process as "arriving too late" in the world. Then I turn to Gilles Deleuze's concept of "a people to come" (*un peuple à venir*) to articulate what this absence of the people entails. I conclude by arguing that the notion of "people of color" understood as "a

people yet to come" is an assertion of the right to belong and a call for a new form of subjectivity.

THE NOTION OF "PEOPLE OF COLOR"

Before we look at the notion of "people of color," let us briefly consider the term "people" as a political concept. This is important because the inherent ambiguity of the term "people" is relevant to the tension between the commonalities and differences among people of color. On the one hand, "the People" is understood as a unitary political body whose general will constitutes the basis of the state. On the other hand, "the people" refers to a multiplicity of subgroups of the People, oppressed and marginalized. In this section, I examine the notion of "people of color" as an instance of the latter, characterized by oppositionality and externality, and consider the limitations of understanding the term only in reference to whiteness.

According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the notion of "People" as popular sovereignty is based on the idea that the authority of a state comes from the consent of the people. The legitimacy of sovereignty is derived from the general will of the people. He writes, "Thus, before examining the act whereby a people chooses a king, it would be well to examine the act whereby a people is a people. For since this act is necessarily prior to the other, it is the true foundation of society."[8] For Rousseau, the people constitute themselves as a sovereign through the immanent rearrangement of forces rather than giving the power to someone external to them: "the people only contracts with itself."

Rousseau's idea of the people as sovereign presupposes the identity of the governing and the governed, and thus no subordination to the will of others. The supposed unity of the people is what gives them power. But the condition under which the unity is imagined politically determines the distribution of power among the people. Once the question of the people becomes that of power differentials among them, we are already speaking of multiple peoples, fragmented and divided, rather than "the People" as a unitary subject.

This explains why, when we consider actual groups of people as a political construct, they are often defined by division or opposition; a people is organized *against* what it is not, whether it is a state, class, or race. As Sadri Khiari argues, it is when an *exterior* to the people, potentially hostile to the people, becomes apparent that the constitution of a people is mobilized.[9] We may say that *externality* is the condition for possible emergence of the entity of a people. Oftentimes, what the people resists is what binds them together. Since the motive for its organization is external, there exist no immanent characteristics that make the people an indivisible whole prior to its construction. As Kevin Olson writes, with no preexisting collective identity, the

power of the people is imagined as a *normative* construction—as having an inherent value, natural rectitude, or obligatory force: "Attempts to settle the meaning and composition of the people are also attempts to attach normative connotations to them."[10]

Let us now consider the notion of "people of color" in terms of externality. As a negative delimitation, it indicates "nonwhites." The category as presently used makes sense only in reference to whiteness. *There is nothing intrinsic to the people that brings them together*. Moreover, not only what mobilizes the constitution of the people but also the determination of the people itself—"of color"—lies external to the people; racialization of the peoples is itself an external demand and an external imposition of meanings. Hypothetically, those who are never in contact with whiteness would neither identify themselves as a person of color nor constitute themselves as a people.

What is the significance of this *externality*? The externality in the constitution of people of color can be thought in two ways: the recognition of whiteness as the external motive for its organization, and the identity formation of the people as an externally construed entity. First, the externality is expressed in an oppositional structure that centers whiteness as the organizing force for people of color. Some argue that the racial divide between whites and nonwhites introduced by the term creates a misconception that being white is not a race and thus racialization concerns only people of color.[11] However, the oppositional structure only makes racial privilege explicit to those to whom it is often invisible. It calls attention to white normativity while revealing the fact that the racialization of people of color is a product of white domination as well as a necessary element in producing white subjectivity. The category of people of color does not aim to establish the oppositional structure but to dismantle it, so that racial differences can be properly understood as constitutive of any subjectivity.

Second, for people of color themselves, the externality concerns a question of racial identity. Identifying oneself as a person of color is a positioning of subjectivity in relation to the white, necessitated by white normativity, but not a submission to racial ascriptions as external determinations. Thus "person of color" as self-identification could be used to express resistance toward such subordination. Yet "person of color" as an imposed category does not provide an *affirmative* formulation of identity beyond the acknowledgment of racial hierarchy. Not being able to define oneself on one's own terms and constantly having to situate oneself in relation to whiteness could make one vulnerable to pressures to assimilate to white norms. Lastly and relatedly, the externality of racial determinations and its implied lack of affirmative identity can result in interethnic tensions. As mentioned earlier, when white normativity as the external uniting force of the people is internalized, people of color are likely to conceive themselves and each other according to their

proximity to whites. The people would lose its collective force when it reproduces within it the racial hierarchy it is trying to resist. If the aim of racial struggle is not to obtain the power of dominance but to reclaim the right to self-determination, then it is compromised by the use of the term "people of color" in a purely oppositional sense.

In this regard, the process of Asian and Asian American racialization is worth noting. It is said that Asian Americans and immigrants from Asia have become "basically white," and that they are a model minority well assimilated to the white culture. In her article on the invisibility problem of Asian Americans, Yoko Arisaka discusses how assimilation requires a rejection of their identity not only as Asian but also as a person of color. Thus successfully assimilated Asians are invisible as a group both in the dominant culture and in the racial minority culture.[12] From their point of view, becoming invisible is not a problem but rather "a sign of success." She continues to point out that the rejection of racial identity could contribute to the interracial tensions within communities of color. According to Arisaka, "It is not unusual to see such assimilated Asians developing racism against blacks and Hispanics, adopting exactly the racism prevalent in white middle-class culture. The irony of course is that they are often targets of such racism themselves, yet they continue to think of themselves as being lucky that they are still 'more white' than the other groups."[13]

What Arisaka calls the "assimilationist ideology of white-identification"[14] is a particular expression of external determinations as internalized. Assimilation is often considered as a process of "deracialization," since white normativity presents itself in nonracial terms. But assimilation is ultimately white identification, and the attempt to conform, assimilate, or "deracialize" takes the effacement of one's nonwhite self. This is an attempt destined to fail because it is impossible for Asian Americans, portrayed as "ineradicably foreign," to become white.[15] Having rejected one's racial identity as a person of color and having been rejected by whites, one could easily be placed in the in-between state as nonwhite and noncolored, or in an impossible state between "honorary White" and "forever foreigners" in Mia Tuan's terms.[16] The assimilationist ideology perpetuates itself through this identity crisis that makes nonwhite subjects more precarious, and thus more susceptible to internalizing racial identifications ascribed by whites, such as the myth of the model minority. The model minority myth defines Asian American success by white norms and presents it as a model for other peoples of color, who in turn are racialized by their failures to meet those norms.[17] Thus, on the collective level, the assimilationist ideology is sustained by a hierarchy between peoples of color based on their proximity to whiteness that reinforces the normalization of whiteness.[18]

In short, what is most alarming about the externality in the constitution of "people of color" as collective subjectivity is its lack of self-determination and affirmative identity. Given its oppositional nature, the strength of the notion "people of color" lies in its critical power rather than a creative one. The following questions arise: How can people of color organize themselves without reproducing the oppressive logic of white supremacy within the communities of color? How do we understand racial differences without hierarchizing them in relation to whiteness? Can the term "people of color" be used in a way that does not submit either to an inferior, submissive position or to the assimilationist ideology?

I propose that we conceive the notion of "people of color" in affirmative terms that point beyond its opposition to whiteness. In what follows, I show that the notion of "people" in "people of color" is best understood in terms of its implicated *absence*—the absence of self-determination and that of belongingness. I articulate the idea of absence as a way people of color situate themselves—or fail to do so—in the world. It is an absence not as a lack or deprivation in relation to whiteness, but as a radical break from predetermined conditions of recognition that forms a new ground for self-determination. In the next section, I discuss how the temporal structure of racialization renders people of color absent in the present, drawing on Frantz Fanon's description of arriving "too late" in the world.

THE ABSENCE OF THE PEOPLE: BETWEEN "TOO LATE" AND "TOO EARLY"

Fanon's phenomenological analysis of the formation of the racialized subject begins with a troubled relation between one's black body and the world: "In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema," or a structuring of the self as a body in the spatiotemporal world.[19] When confronted with the collective white gaze, expressed as the white boy's outcry "Look, a Negro!" Fanon discovers the meanings attached to his black body beyond its corporeality. While many readers of Fanon tend to focus on the phenomenology of racial embodiment or on corporeality,[20] I would like to draw attention to the temporal dimension. His temporal account of the racialization process, despite its brevity, is illuminating. He writes,

> Too late. Everything had been predicted, discovered, demonstrated, and exploited. My shaky hands grasped at nothing; the resources had been exhausted. Too late! But there again I want to understand. Ever since someone complained that he had arrived too late and everything had already been said, there seems to be nostalgia for the past. . . . "You have come too late, much too late. There will always be a world—a white world—between you and us: that impossibility on either side to obliterate the past once and for all." Understand-

> ably, confronted with this affective ankylosis of the white man, I finally made up my mind to shout my blackness.[21]

The sense of belatedness in Fanon's arrival in the world expresses a painful recognition of the impossibility to resist, get past, or overturn the imposed meanings of blackness. As he writes, "The evidence is there, unalterable. My blackness was there, dark and unarguable. And it tormented me, pursued me, disturbed me, angered me."[22] Fanon describes this feeling of powerlessness as an *overdetermination*; the relationship of his body to the world is defined not only by the corporeal schema but also by a "historico-racial schema" that throws him back in the place of his ancestors who were enslaved and colonized.[23] Accordingly, he is not invited to constitute the world but is "interpellated" to reconstitute himself as a racialized subject in accordance with external (over)determinations.

This failure of bodily schema in racial interpellation has an ontological implication, what we might call "temporal dissonance" that predetermines one as *unaligned* with the world. The "unfamiliar weight" or the burden of "corporeal malediction" that is placed on his body is derived from the impossibility of obliterating the past. The feeling of "too-lateness" arises from the irreversibility of colonial history and the continuous domination of this past over his racialized body in the present. Unable to assert one's being apart from the irrevocable past, he cannot advance in time: *He no longer belongs to the present.* In George Yancy's words, the Negro has always already done something wrong by virtue of being a Negro.[24] The meaning of the black body is "always already" there, so that one can never arrive soon enough to speak for oneself.

The temporal aspect of racialization is crucial since it is a fundamental impediment to resistance. For Fanon, resistance is based on the possibility of recognition, and since racialized black subjectivity is grounded in the past, there is little chance for recognition: "The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man."[25] In this failure of recognition, the present is defined by whiteness as a norm that predetermines what blacks are supposed be. Whiteness as the present state of race leaves a person of color with two options: either conform to their expectations about people of color or assimilate to white norms. Neither option gives you the right to belong.

If the "too-lateness" concerns the overdetermination by the past and the impossibility to belong in the present, it necessarily relates, strangely enough, to the sense of arriving "too early"; absence in the present implies both "no longer" and "not yet." Fanon writes, "Don't expect to see any explosion today. It's too early . . . or too late."[26] I take being "too early" to mean a sense of rejected future. For a black person, the possibilities of seeing oneself otherwise are not yet actualized. With whiteness as a center, there is no alternative future. According to Fanon, "there is but one destiny for the black man. And it is white."[27] As Didier Fassin puts it, racial ascription is not only an imposition of an identity but also a deprivation of possible alternative identifications.[28] Since whiteness centers its norms as the only basis for recognition in the present, its projected future does not include any other political or ontological possibilities that allow nonwhites to belong. In Alia Al-Saji's words, "white subjects have already used up these possibilities" and have *moved on*, while leaving the colonized people with "a closed past, incapable of development on its own terms and cut off from the creativity that gives rise to an open future."[29]

While Fanon describes the racialization of Africans under colonialism, I wish to elaborate the experience of temporal dissonance by people of color upon the "discovery" of their race under the white gaze. As long as they are overdetermined by color, *the people do not belong in the present.* In the following, I develop how to affirm the present absence of the people by imagining a futurity that is not bound by whiteness as "the now."

PEOPLE OF COLOR AS A "PEOPLE YET TO COME"

We have examined the notion of "people of color" in terms of externality—a lack of self-determination and its absence in the present. In what follows, I propose that we rethink the term "people of color" through Deleuze's concept of "a people to come" (*un peuple à venir*), which appreciates the being of the people who cannot be accounted for in the dominant language.

Deleuze introduces the concept of "people to come" in his second book on cinema. In classical cinema, such as Soviet films, "the people are there, even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though blind or unconscious."[30] In modern political cinema, however, the people are no longer represented as united, collective political subjects. Deleuze writes, "If there were a modern political cinema, it would be on this basis: the people no longer exist, or not yet . . . *the people are missing.*"[31] According to him, the absence of people is obvious to oppressed and exploited nations that undergo a "collective identity crisis," being in a state of perpetual minorities. But this does not indicate a renunciation of cinema as political art but the new basis on which modern political cinema is founded. The absence also informs a necessary change in the form of struggle:

> If the people are missing, if there is no longer consciousness, evolution or revolution, it is the scheme of reversal which itself becomes impossible. There will no longer be conquest of power by a proletariat, or by a united or unified people. . . . The death-knell for becoming conscious was precisely the consciousness that there were no people, but always several peoples, an infinity of peoples, who remained to be united, or should not be united, in order for the problem of change. It is in this way that third world cinema is a cinema of

> minorities, because the people exist only in the condition of minority, which is why they are missing.[32]

Deleuze observes two things here: first, the limitations of "tyrannic unity" that *subjects* different peoples to an abstract ideal rather than making them *subjects*. Recognizing the absence of people is to acknowledge the limits of a totalizing principle under which the people used to be unified. As discussed earlier, the "people" understood as one, homogeneous entity erases its internal differences. Second, Deleuze speaks of the myth of a united people organized against "the oppressor" or "the colonizer." The ways power operates on colonial consciousness make the struggle not for a reversal of power relations, but for a production of new subjectivity through continuous resistance; it is no longer sufficient to form a collective identity of the people in opposition to "the enemy."

What then could be done "in order for the problem to change"? Rather than adopting an imposed, united subjectivity or reversing power relations, Deleuze advises the displacement of the scheme through *the invention of a people*. He writes, "The moment the master, or the colonizer, proclaims 'There have never been people here,' the missing people are a becoming, they invent themselves, in shanty towns and camps, or in ghettos, in new conditions of struggle."[33] Drawing on Kafka and the Quebecois filmmaker Pierre Perrault, Deleuze defines the condition under which postcolonial subjectivity is produced as *impossibility*—the impossibility of writing in the dominant language and the impossibility of living under domination: "It is as if modern political cinema were no longer constituted on the basis of a possibility of evolution and revolution, like the classical cinema, but on impossibilities, in the style of Kafka: *the intolerable*."[34] Kafka invented what Deleuze calls a "revolutionary writing" in his use of the German of Prague intermixed with Czech and Yiddish. This "minor" use of the major language resists its oppressive quality by revealing the poverty of the language of the colonizer while deliberately choosing not to enrich it.[35] Perrault, in his depiction of the colonized person who comes up against an impasse in every direction, imagines a new people through *crisis*. The invention of a people concerns "not the myth of a past people, but the story-telling of the people to come."[36]

The strength of Deleuze's notion "people to come" lies in the affirmation of absence that defines the condition of the people, who breaks from the here-and-now predetermined by dominant power relations. The concepts of "the intolerable" and "crisis" that Deleuze brings together here shed a different light on our discussion of temporal dissonance. If Fanon emphasized the failure of recognition in the production of racialized subjects on the basis of temporal discrepancy, Deleuze demonstrates how the affirmation of absence *declares* the impossibility of living under present domination, while breaking away from dominant logic and language.[37] It marks the passage from the people who arrived too late to the production of a "people yet to come." Here resistance does not lie in the recognition from or the assimilation with the oppressor, but in the invention of a people that is not yet in the present.

"PEOPLE OF COLOR" RECONSIDERED: RESISTANCE THROUGH REFUSAL

Deleuze's conceptualization of colonial subjectivity as "a people to come" provides insights into the formation of racialized subjects. It reveals the temporal structure of absence in terms of "not yet" or "to come." It acknowledges crisis as a condition for the new forms of struggle. What is shared across different peoples of color is absence, the lack of the right to belong to the present. Understood in terms of absence, the notion of people in "people of color" is a name for numerous peoples who are unnameable in the dominant language of the present that is centered on white normativity. This affirmation of absence is not a resignation to white-imposed absence but a refusal to make one's presence recognizable in the terms that are invented deliberately to deny their presence; it is not about overcoming temporal dissonance but affirming it while taking presence away from whiteness and racialized temporality. The struggle of people of color is that of asserting their right to fully belong by detaching the dominion of whiteness over the present rather than making a place in the white space. Defined as such, the notion of "people of color" would resist racial ascription and refuse white identification.

Perhaps a distinction between two concepts of people would be helpful; *the* people of color—as opposed to *a* people—could remain reactionary, defined in opposition to and understood in proximity to whiteness, in reproducing the logic of white domination. *A* people of color understood as "a people yet to come" concerns an invention of new forms of subjectivity based on self-determination of the peoples themselves. It reframes the question of racialization as a productive condition of any process of subject formation, rather than the one that concerns only nonwhite people.

These two concepts of people are related to two kinds of refusal; understanding the notion of people of color as "people to come" takes a conscious refusal of the present racial identifications. It puts one in identity crisis as well as a battle with oneself. It rejects a hasty integration or recognition through white-identified assimilation. This form of refusal is not a *denial* of racial identity or an attempt at "deracialization" as a form of reluctance to negative implications of *the* people of color. The attempt to deracialize combines well with the assimilationist ideology. Assimilation, as a search for recognition on whites' terms, is a strategy to *feel* belonging to the present that

is condemned to fail. This form of refusal leads to a deeper subordination as well as a perpetuation of racist ideology.

There is no doubt that the notion of "people of color" is necessary for building coalitions among communities of color to resist white supremacy. However, the term should be adopted with critical awareness given the externality of its organizing principle. Speaking through their absence, a people of color invents itself in the now as a people to come, by refusing both the colonial past that they are identified with and the white future ascribed to the existing people of color. As Jarrett Martineau and Eric Ritskes write, the freedom realized through refusal is "the freedom to imagine and create an elsewhere in the here; a present future beyond the imaginative and territorial bounds of colonialism."[38]

NOTES

1. Unknown author, quoted in Giora, *Our Mind*, 5.
2. The term "colored people," although it is regarded as a derogatory term now, was also used as a term of racial pride, as in the name of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) (Oxford Dictionary). It is also worth noting that in South Africa "coloured"—formerly known as "Cape Coloured"—refers to a person of mixed European and African or Asian ancestry (see https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coloured).
3. Vidal-Ortiz, "People of Color," 1037.
4. Ibid.
5. Marable, "Problematics of Ethnic Studies," 56.
6. Alcoff, "Latino/as, Asian Americans, and the Black–White Binary."
7. Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness," 48.
8. Rousseau, "On the Social Contract," bk. I, chap. 5, 163.
9. Khiari, "The People and the Third People," 88.
10. Olson, "Conclusion," 127.
11. "Many people, notably U.S. Whites, critique the use of the term because it presumes that Whites have no color, effectively missing the point that whiteness studies has tried to bring forth during the past decade or so—that the invisibility of whiteness is marked, even if in very subtle ways, by the politicized use of the term *people of color*" (Vidal-Ortiz, "People of Color," 1038).
12. Arisaka, "Asian Women," 214.
13. Ibid., 216.
14. Ibid., 217.
15. Alcoff, "Latino/as, Asian Americans, and the Black–White Binary," 7.
16. Tuan, *Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites?*
17. Emily S. Lee examines how the immediate association of the Asian American identity with upward class mobility affects the formation of the group identity of Asian American women, who are more likely to be tradition-bound, isolated, poor, and thus failing as a model minority. Lee, "Ambiguous Practices of the Inauthentic Asian American Woman."
18. In this sense, David H. Kim describes the model minority myth as "one of the greatest of the most recent inventions of White supremacy as a political system" that allows a partial incorporation of Asians while normatively defining them as unthreatening and maintaining racial hierarchy. Kim, "Shame and Self-Revision in Asian American Assimilation," 110.
19. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 110.
20. See, for example, Alcoff, "Towards a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment"; Ahmed, "A Phenomenology of Whiteness"; Fassin, "Racialization."

21. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 100–101, translation modified: "Trop tard. Tout est prévu, trouvé, prouvé, exploité. Mes mains nerveuses ne ramènent rien; le gisement est épuisé. Trop tard! Mais là aussi je veux comprendre. . . . Vous arrivez trop tard, beaucoup trop tard. Il y aura toujours un monde—blanc—entre vous et nous. . . . Cette impossibilité pour l'autre de liquider une fois pour toutes le passé. On comprend que, devant cette ankylose affective du Blanc, j'aie pu décider de pousser mon cri nègre" (Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, 128–130).
22. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 116.
23. "I was responsible not only for my body but also for my race and my ancestors" (Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 92).
24. Yancy, *Look, a White!*, 2.
25. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 90.
26. Ibid., xi.
27. Ibid., xiv.
28. Fassin, "Racialization," 423.
29. Al-Saji, "Too Late," 6.
30. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 216.
31. Ibid., 215–16.
32. Ibid., 219–20.
33. Ibid., 217.
34. Ibid., 219.
35. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, 23.
36. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 223.
37. James R. Martel finds in Fanon's account of racialization the sense of refusal beyond the acknowledgment of failed recognition. According to Martel, in his insistence on being a subject who is black while refusing the "misinterpellated" subject, Fanon "brings down the apparatus of interpellation" (Martel, *Misinterpellated Subject*, 101).
38. Martineau and Ritskes, "Fugitive Indigeneity," 4.

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Chapter Two

Multiplicitous Selves

Being-between-Worlds and Being-in-Worlds

Mariana Ortega

Here I would like to think of Gloria Anzaldúa's account of *mestizaje* with its movement of both multiplicity and oneness in light of María Lugones's description of world-traveling and Heidegger's account of *Dasein* as being-in-the-world.[1] Such thinking together with Anzaldúa, Lugones, and Heidegger leads me to a notion of multiplicitous selfhood as *amasamiento*, an act of kneading three different visions of self. While the Heideggerian view of *Dasein* offers an important general explanation of selfhood, it nevertheless does not capture the experience of marginalized, in-between selves that Latina feminist phenomenological descriptions so powerfully depict. Examining these three thinkers together thus discloses important similarities and differences between their accounts. The view of multiplicitous selfhood that arises out of this thinking is meant to capture a general sense of selfhood while at the same time also emphasizing the lived experience of selves in the margins. Following Anzaldúa, Lugones, and Heidegger, I describe the multiplicitous self as being-between-worlds and being-in-worlds.

First, I briefly describe some elements shared by both the Heideggerian explanation of *Dasein* and the notion of the new *mestiza* and other selves described by Latina feminists. I also point to a key difference between the Heideggerian view and Latina feminists' visions of self, namely, that the self in the borderlands, or the self that world-travels, constantly experiences ruptures in her everyday experiences that lead to a more thematic or reflective orientation toward activities. Lastly, I introduce the notion of multiplicitous selfhood as being-between-worlds and being-in-worlds. In so doing, I bring to light the intersectionality and flexibility of this self and explain both her multiplicity and her oneness, neither elevating the sense of multiplicity such