MCDOWELL AND HEIDEGGER ON KANT'S SPONTANEOUS RECEPTIVITY

Mark B. Tanzer

In recent years, a growing trend has been the attempt to break down the wall, and open up the lines of communication, between the analytic and continental traditions. And a major obstacle faced by these divide-bridging endeavors is the problem of defining the traditions in the first place. One way to bootstrap our way into a solution to this problem is to examine how various analytic and continental philosophers address identical issues, thereby allowing the construction of dialogues between representatives of the different traditions, through which their basic distinguishing characteristics could be identified. This procedure, however, gives rise to problems of its own since the disparate philosophical idioms adopted by the traditions can make it difficult to determine when and if identical issues are really addressed. Still, promising cases for such dialogue construction can be found, and, in this essay, I will examine what I believe to be such a case.

It has often been claimed that the analytic and continental traditions parted ways by virtue of their interpretations of Kant.[1] It would seem, then, that the field of Kant-interpretation would offer a relatively fertile ground for cultivating dialogues between the traditions, through comparisons of analytic and continental treatments of specific points of Kant-interpretation. And in the Kant-interpretations of Heidegger and McDowell, we find a particularly promising case for making such a comparison. For both interpretations explicitly focus on the same issue in Kant's thought, which they both view as lying at its heart—i.e., Kant's notion of subjectivity as spontaneous receptivity. Furthermore, they both articulate their own thought in terms of their assessments of Kant's alleged failure to draw the ultimate conclusion of subjectivity's spontaneous-receptive structure. Thus, comparing Heidegger and McDowell with regard to Kantian spontaneous receptivity allows us an extended and detailed look at how a continental philosopher and an analytic philosopher address the same problem, both as it pertains to interpreting Kant and as it pertains to their own positions.

* * * *

As McDowell sees it, Kant is important because he shows the way to resolve a pivotal difficulty plaguing contemporary philosophy. The difficulty that McDowell has in mind is that of an apparently "interminable oscillation"[2] between a belief in the Myth of the Given and a radical coherentism. And he sees Kantian thought as offering a way out of this dilemma insofar as Kant holds that knowledge of the objective world is made possible through a combination of receptivity and spontaneity, i.e., through a notion of subjectivity for which "spontaneity is inextricably implicated in deliverances of receptivity."[3] In order to see how Kantian spontaneous receptivity resolves the dilemma between the Myth of the Given and radical coherentism, we must first get a clearer picture of how this dilemma arises.

The dilemma originates in the attempt to maintain what McDowell calls a "minimal empiricism,"[4] which is the rather uncontroversial view that we can experience the world and that such experiences can tell us something about what the world is like. Only by meeting these two conditions—being *of*, or from, the world; and revealing something *about* the world—can experience count as being directed toward the world. For an experience that fails either to be an experience of the world or to be informative about the world is not world-directed in any genuine sense.[5] And McDowell argues that there is at least an apparent conflict between these two fundamental conditions of the possibility of world-directedness.

Beginning with the first condition, in order for experience to be of the world, the experiencing subject's representations must be deter-

mined by the world that it experiences; it must passively accept what the world shows to it. That is, the experiencing subject must be receptive of the world.[6] For representations that are impervious to the world would be determined completely internally, generated not by the world but by the representing subject itself. And as so generated, such representations are not representations of the world but of the representation-producing subject. Therefore, world-directed experiences must be undergone by a passive, receptive subject since otherwise they would not be experiences *of* the world at all, and so would fail to satisfy the first condition of world-directedness.

However, although subjectivity's world-directedness requires that it be receptive in order to meet the first condition thereof, this very receptivity seems to preclude the subject's passively received representations from telling it anything *about* the world. That is, satisfying the first condition for world-directedness appears to render meeting the second condition impossible. To see why this is the case, we must examine how McDowell understands the structure of representations that inform us about the world, or to use McDowell's phrase, representations "that things are thus and so."[7]

For a representation to represent that the world is in a certain way is for that representation to be conceptualized, or to have conceptual content.[8] That is, such a representation represents the world as being of a certain character. And the possession of such conceptual content is tantamount to a representation having the character of a belief since a belief is a representation maintaining that some state of affairs is the case. Thus, representations that tell us something about the world are beliefs.[9] By examining the nature of beliefs, then, McDowell finds what is characteristic of conceptualized representations, of representations that inform us about the world. And McDowell's pivotal claim, in this regard, is that beliefs require an active representing subject because they are the sorts of representations that must be integrated into a relational system of beliefs, a world-view.[10]

Since belief-representations are determined to be the beliefs that they are by their location within a system of beliefs, a belief's identity is not necessarily determined by the experience in which it originates. For a given experience may yield a representation that can be legitimately located in a variety of places within such a system. That is, disparate beliefs can be implied by a particular perceptual episode, and so the representing subject must actively determine how the representation in question is to fit into their belief-system.[11] In this way, the receptive subject is equally active, or spontaneous, in that it determines the very identity of its belief-representations.

McDowell vividly expresses the impossibility of passive reception grounding beliefs by maintaining that such experiences could serve as exculpations but could not serve as justifications for beliefs.[12] This distinction can be understood in the following way. An essential characteristic of belief-representations is found in the way that sensory episodes are related to them. Specifically, this relation is one of justification; sensory episodes justify (or fail to justify) beliefs. For, as we have seen, belief-representations tell us that the world is thus and so, and the same sensory episodes can justify different beliefs. This relation, in which the relation between the grounding-phenomenon and that which it grounds, is not such that the former necessarily determines a unique identity for the latter, although it does limit the range of legitimate cases of the latter. Such is the structure of the justificatory relation, the relation that holds between sensory episodes and belief-representations. And McDowell's position is that in order for this relation to obtain, the subject that entertains a belief must have an active dimension. Thus, experience can only ground beliefs for an active subject; or, in other words, only a spontaneous subject can take experiences as justifications.

A purely passive subject, on the other hand, could never possess beliefs because experience could never stand in a justificatory relation to its representations, but only in an exculpatory relation. That is, the relation between experience and a purely receptive subject would be one in which the particular representations that it entertains were necessarily determined by the particular sensory episodes that grounds them. In such cases, the grounding experience would not justify the subject's possessing the representation that it grounds, as in the case of experiences that ground beliefs; but, instead, the experience would exculpate the subject from bearing any responsibil-

ity for possessing the experience-grounded representation, insofar as the latter would be necessarily determined by its grounding experience. Thus, a purely passive subject, being unable to stand toward experience in a relation of justification but only one of exculpation, cannot have beliefs, and so cannot possess world-directed representations. Hence, one of McDowell's formulations of his critique of the Myth of the Given runs as follows:

> But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications.[13]

World-directed representations, then, insofar as they are about the world, cannot be passively received by the representing subject, but must be actively constituted by subjectivity. Yet, their coming from the world requires that the representing subject passively receive, rather than actively constitute, them. And it is the tension between these requirements that has given rise to contemporary philosophy's oscillation between theories that cling to the Myth of the Given and those that adopt a radically coherentist stance. Specifically, recognition of the fact that world-directedness demands a passive subject has led to theories that locate the source of world-directed representations outside of the scope of the representing subject's active cognitive powers, that source being a pure Given. This position McDowell refers to as the Myth of the Given, borrowing a phrase from Sellars—i.e., theories that argue for a distinguishable moment of pure receptivity, characterized by representations that possess non-conceptual content. But recognition of the demand that subjectivity actively constitute its world-directed representations has inspired the rejection of a pure Given, resulting in theories that locate the source of world-directed representations within subjectivity itself. This position McDowell refers to as radical coherentism —i.e., theories arguing that since all representational content must be conceptualized, subjectivity must be purely active, its world-directed representations being internally generated, impervious to the objective, external world. As McDowell characterizes it, a "frictionless spinning in a void."[14] Both types of theory are inadequate because each satisfies one of the criteria of world-directedness while failing to satisfy the other. Hence, the oscillation between opposed, equally inadequate theories.

* * * *

According to McDowell, twentieth century philosophy has moved between the Myth of the Given and radical coherentism because it has consistently thought of the receptivity and spontaneity of subjectivity as incompatible, and so has had to maintain that, at the most fundamental level of world-directed representation, only one of these dimensions is exercised. McDowell sees that the only way to end this quarrel is to find a way to combine receptivity and spontaneity at every level of empirical experience.[15] And he notes that this is precisely what Kant attempted with his notion of subjectivity as spontaneous receptivity. Kant succinctly sets out the horns of the dilemma, and notes their inadequacies, with his famous formula: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[16] Still, McDowell claims, Kant ultimately failed to do justice to this, his most important insight. McDowell's diagnosis of Kant's failure, which leads to McDowell's own positive position, runs as follows.

On the one hand, Kant correctly maintains that spontaneity and receptivity are intrinsically combined from "the standpoint of experience."[17] That is, insofar as Kant conceives of the world of empirical experience, the phenomenal world, as subject-independent, and thus of subjectivity as passive in its reception of phenomenal objects, he avoids radical coherentism; and insofar as Kant conceives of the phenomenal world as subject-dependent, and thus of subjectivity as an active world-constituting agent, he avoids the Myth of the Given. However, Kant fails to maintain the inextricable connection between receptivity and spontaneity from the "transcendental perspective."[18] That is, subjectivity's relation to the noumenal world is one in which things are purely subject-independent.[19] And, according to McDowell, empirical experience of phe-

nomena is, for Kant, ultimately rooted in subjectivity's being affected by noumena—a type of affection that is purely receptive, with no spontaneous, active role played by the representing subject.[20] In short, Kant's admission of the noumenal thing in itself, his adoption of a "transcendental framework," results in his falling prey to the Myth of the Given. McDowell summarizes this critique of Kant as follows:

> It is as though Kant were saying that although an exculpation cannot do duty for a justification, and although, empirically speaking, we can have justifications for empirical judgments, still the best we can have for empirical judgments, transcendentally speaking, is exculpations.[21]

But why would Kant adopt the transcendental framework, thereby reverting to an erroneous position that he could have successfully avoided with his notion of spontaneous receptivity? McDowell finds the reason for this in Kant's acceptance of the modern scientific conception of nature, i.e., nature as a realm of purely mechanistic, efficient causes and effects.[22] This conception of nature leads to the Myth of the Given since subjectivity's cognitive relation to natural objects, thus conceived, could only be purely receptive. For all of its representations would be the result of necessary causal processes rather than being spontaneously integrated into a system of beliefs.

Accepting the scientific conception of nature, Kant's ontology must include a purely subject-independent realm, and since the phenomenal world is not such a realm, Kant was compelled to posit the thing in itself to play this role. Thus, Kant's position begins with his groundbreaking insight into the need for a combination of spontaneity and receptivity, of activity and passivity, in order for experience to be possible. This insight determines his notion of the phenomenal world as both subject-dependent and subject-independent. But he combines this with an acceptance of the scientific conception of nature, causing his reversion to the Myth of the Given and its view of the world as subject-independent.

So, Kant, ultimately, cannot solve the problem of the oscillation between coherentism and the Myth of the Given, between a purely active and a purely passive notion of subjectivity. And with his assessment of the source of Kant's relapse into the Myth of the Given, we find McDowell's own solution to the problem—a re-conceptualization of nature. Specifically, he re-conceives nature so as to include two dimensions, one of which holds the key to the possibility of world-directed representations.

For McDowell, the two dimensions of the natural are nature as the "realm of law," or nature as a system of mechanistic causes and effects;[23] and a second aspect of nature, which McDowell names "second nature." This aspect of nature inhabits what McDowell, borrowing another phrase from Sellars, calls the "space of reasons."[24] By the space of reasons, McDowell refers to the previously mentioned relational system of beliefs into which representations must be actively integrated in order to count as belief-representations. As we have seen, such representations can only be possessed by an active representing subject, while a subject whose representations are all the result of mechanistic causal processes is purely passive. Thus, insofar as world-directed representations must be beliefs, they cannot be the result of nothing but causal interactions between the world and the representing subject. What gives such representations their belief-character is not the fact that occurrences in the world impinge on the subject's sensory faculties, thereby causing, or necessitating, the occurrence of certain representations, but rather the fact that certain worldly occurrences can justify, or count as reasons for, holding certain beliefs about the world. The human subject's ability to draw inferences from its sensory experiences, to take experiences as reasons for holding beliefs, for situating representations within a world-view, is the human being's possession of a second nature. And McDowell sees the positing of such a second nature as solving the problem of world-directed representations due to its spontaneous receptive character. That is, exercises of second nature are spontaneous insofar as they generate beliefs, and they are receptive insofar as they are natural.[25]

* * * *

In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger focuses on Kant's conception of finitude, which Heidegger sees as the heart of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. More specifically, he claims that Kant's search for the conditions of the possibility of experience is an explication of the fundamental structure of human finite subjectivity.[26] And this fundamental structure, Heidegger argues, is spontaneous receptivity[27]—a structure whose discovery is Kant's greatest achievement.

The connection that Heidegger finds, in Kant, between finitude and spontaneous receptivity can be seen by examining Kant's distinction between finite and infinite intuition.[28] For Kant, the characteristic mark of the finite subject is its possession of a receptive dimension. That is, while infinite cognition produces its object through the very act of cognition, finite cognition must be given an object; the cognized object must already be on hand prior to the act of cognition. So, whereas infinite subjectivity is purely active, purely spontaneous, finite subjectivity is passive, receptive. In other words, finite cognition, for Kant, is non-productive cognition. However, Kant's finite subjectivity cannot be purely receptive, but must possess an equally essential spontaneous dimension. The precise reason for this, and thus the connection between finitude and spontaneous receptivity, can be clearly illuminated by considering Kant's famous letter of 1772 to Marcus Herz.[29]

Heidegger invokes the letter to Herz in his 1927–28 lecture course entitled "Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*" because he maintains that, in the letter, "the problem of [the first] *Critique* is formulated for the first time."[30] For Heidegger sees the letter as articulating Kant's first formulation of the problem of the a priori synthetic judgment,[31] which Kant himself designates as the fundamental problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. And the letter conceives the problem of the synthetic a priori in terms of the relation between such judgments and the objects thus judged. That is, it asks how a representation-object relation could obtain in cases where the representations "are neither brought about by the object nor do they create the object itself."[32] The connection between this question and finite, or non-productive, cognition can be seen through the following considerations.

As we have seen, an infinite subjectivity, for Kant, produces, rather than receives, its objects, and so the representation-object relation proper to it is one in which the representation produces the object. Therefore, insofar as finite subjectivity is receptive, its representation-object relation is one in which the former does not produce the latter. At the same time, however, Kant holds that the objects of finite cognition do not create its representations. According to Heidegger, Kant makes this claim because he adopts the Platonic insight that to know things, we must "first determine beings in their ontological constitution."[33] In other words, we must have an advance understanding of the basic structure of things in order to gain knowledge of the things so structured. And knowledge of things requires this pre-understanding because it makes experience of things possible.[34] Heidegger's reference to Plato makes clear what he has in mind here. Unless we already comprehend that which makes a thing the thing that it is, we could not recognize, and thus experience, the thing as such. Kant, then, grounds knowledge of beings in the pre-understanding of the ontological constitution thereof. And since this knowledge makes experience possible, it cannot result from, but must precede experience. This is why the representation-object relation obtaining in finite cognition is not one in which the object produces the representation.

We can now see how the question asked in the letter to Herz is equivalent to the question concerning finite cognition on which Heidegger's Kant-interpretation focuses. The representation-object relation that obtains in finite, non-productive cognition cannot be one in which the former produces the latter since that is the representation-object relation that characterizes infinite, productive cognition. Nor can it be one in which the object produces the representation since, in that case, it would not be cognition at all. Thus, in the representation-object relation characterizing finite cognition, neither term produces the other. And it is into the possibility of such a representation-object relation that the letter to Herz inquires. According to Heidegger, then, Kant's fundamental problem, the possibility of a priori syn-

thetic judgments, is the problem of finite cognition, which is a type of cognition in which the cognizing subject does not produce its objects, nor do its objects produce its cognitions.

In view of the above, we can see that Kant's groundbreaking insight, for Heidegger, is that the finite subject's fundamental structure is that of spontaneous receptivity. Insofar as finite subjectivity's representations do not produce its objects, insofar as finite subjectivity is finite, it is passive, receptive of the world. But the finite subject cannot be purely passive; if all of its representations were produced by their objects, then it could not entertain representations of objects at all. Therefore, insofar as finite subjectivity's objects do not produce its representations, insofar as finite subjectivity is finite *subjectivity*, it is active, spontaneous in its cognition of the world.

* * * *

At this point, we can see some clear similarities between Heidegger's and McDowell's assessments of Kant. Both view him as having made a highly significant discovery—the spontaneous-receptive structure of human subjectivity. They also agree that this discovery is significant because it allows Kant to chart a course between two opposed, and equally untenable, views of subjectivity's relation to the world. McDowell makes this point by noting that Kantian spontaneous receptivity allows us to maintain a position between coherentism and the Myth of the Given, thereby avoiding their inadequacies. Heidegger makes the point by noting that the notion of spontaneous receptivity allows Kant to avoid confusing the human subject with either an infinite subject or an entity that lacks subjectivity altogether. An equally important similarity between Heidegger and McDowell is that both argue that Kant failed to follow his view of subjectivity to its ultimate conclusion. And this final similarity leads us to the basic difference between Heidegger's and McDowell's assessments of Kant—i.e., in their different views of what the implications of Kantian subjectivity are, their different views of what conclusion Kant ought to have drawn from the spontaneous-receptive structure of subjectivity, but failed to.

As we have seen, McDowell faults Kant for clinging to the modern scientific conception of nature in the face of subjectivity's spontaneous-receptive character. For McDowell, the proper conclusion to draw from the Kantian notion of subjectivity is that nature must have a second, non-causal but justificatory, dimension. To see Heidegger's version of the proper conclusion to be drawn, we look to his critique of Kant, which can be best understood by first noting the important role that Kant's spontaneous receptivity plays in Heidegger's own thought.

We have seen that the characteristic activity of Kant's finite subject is the performance of a priori synthetic judgments, judgments in which neither the representation nor its object produces its counterpart. In his Kant-interpretation, Heidegger equates these judgments with the understanding of being,[35] the explication of whose structure is the fundamental problem of *Being and Time*. In this way, Heidegger saw his own project in *Being and Time* as akin to Kant's attempt to articulate the structure of finite cognition. The analytic of Dasein, seen in this light, is guided by the exigencies of conceiving a spontaneous-receptive subject. And Heidegger faults Kant for clinging to the priority of the faculty of reason in the face of subjectivity's spontaneous-receptive character.[36] Specifically, Heidegger maintains that while the defining act of the spontaneous-receptive subject, i.e., its performance of a priori synthetic judgments, or in Heidegger's terms its understanding of being, is not an act of reason, Kant assumes that the representing subject is fundamentally rational, and so its defining act must be an act expressing that rationality. And, according to Heidegger, the understanding of being is non-rational insofar as its very structure is to resist full univocal determination. Kant, Heidegger claims, saw this but refused to draw the conclusion that subjectivity is fundamentally non-rational; he "had to shrink back"[37] from this implication of the nature of spontaneous-receptivity, and so he reasserted the priority of the faculty of reason in the second edition of the *Critique*.[38] The reason for Kant's refusal is, ultimately, rooted in his allegiance to the ontology of the present-at-hand,[39] which holds that whatever is, is fully and univocally determinate—that is, is ratio-

nal—and so can be fully and univocally articulated by rational subjectivity.

* * * *

We can now note the key differences between McDowell and Heidegger in terms of their differing diagnoses of, and their consequently differing remedies for, Kant's failure to acknowledge the ultimate implication of subjectivity's spontaneous-receptive structure. McDowell argues that spontaneous receptivity can be accommodated by expanding the scope of nature beyond the realm of efficient causes and effects, so as to include a realm of justifications, the space of reasons. And by locating the space of reasons within nature, he intends to preserve the rationality of subjectivity, of spontaneous receptivity. McDowell suggests that this is what is at issue in his positing of second nature, when he says that if we locate the space of reasons outside of nature—a position that he calls "rampant platonism"[40]— then our ability to recognize justifications, to perform the acts that distinguish us as human, spontaneous-receptive subjects is rendered "mysterious,"[41] "occult,"[42] beset by a "sense of spookiness,"[43] whereas this same ability, naturalized as McDowell's second nature, becomes "permeated with rationality."[44]

McDowell's argument for the mysterious, non-rational character of a space of reasons beyond nature turns on his claim that to be human is to be a member of "a certain species of animals."[45] That is, being human is equivalent to having certain natural characteristics, and so is exhausted by having a certain place in nature. But if the space of reasons is outside of nature, then the human subject's connection thereto is non-natural. As McDowell puts it, it requires that we conceive "human beings as partly in nature and partly outside it."[46] But in view of his conception of being human as having a certain place in nature, the rampant Platonist's conception of humans as both natural and non-natural is tantamount to viewing human beings as both human and non-human; the human being's connection with the space of reasons becomes a non-human ability.[47] Hence, its air of mystery, which is avoided through McDowell's naturalism of second nature. And it is the avoidance of this mysteriousness, of the non-rational, that motivates McDowell to accommodate spontaneous receptivity within a form of naturalism—his remedy for Kant's failure.

For Heidegger, a de-naturalization of subjectivity may, but need not, lead to the de-rationalization against which McDowell guards. This is because Heidegger views naturalism as one of many possible versions of the ontology of the present-at-hand, the latter being the conception of the world as rational—the view that whatever is, is univocally determinate. Since the ontology of the present-at-hand can take many non-naturalistic forms, then, a de-naturalized subject is not necessarily a non-rational subject. McDowell only interprets de-naturalization as tantamount to de-rationalization because he interprets being human as being a type of natural being. Thus, from Heidegger's point of view, while a subjectivity outside of nature is not necessarily non-rational, a subjectivity beyond the scope of the ontology of the present-at-hand is.

With the above in mind, we can see that Heidegger's critique of Kant, his remedy for Kant's failure to draw the ultimate implications of subjectivity's spontaneous-receptive structure, is the precise opposite of McDowell's. That is, since spontaneous receptivity cannot be accounted for by the ontology of the present-at-hand, the non-rational character of subjectivity must be admitted and confronted. Rather than expanding an ontological realm that would otherwise fail to accommodate spontaneous receptivity, as does McDowell, Heidegger allows spontaneous receptivity its rightful place beyond the scope of reason. As a result, philosophy is saddled with the task of addressing this non-rational structure, of addressing the mystery that is the understanding of being. Thus, while McDowell expands the scope of nature in order to preserve subjectivity's rationality, Heidegger restricts the scope of the ontology of the present-at-hand, and thereby rejects subjectivity's alleged rationality.

* * * *

If we were to take Heidegger and McDowell as representative of continental and analytic philosophy, then the above confrontation between them would lead us to construe the difference between the traditions in terms

of their willingness to allow ambiguity, or indeterminacy, into their ontologies. While Heidegger's locating spontaneous receptivity outside of the sphere of the rationally determinable, yields an ontologically indeterminate conception of subjectivity—Dasein—McDowell's locating spontaneous receptivity within the sphere of second nature preserves the rationality, and thus the univocal determinacy, thereof. And while this distinction, between those who admit the indeterminate and those who do not, may not be equivalent to the distinction between analytic and continental philosophers, it may be as good a heuristic principle as there is for ascertaining where the traditions part company. Construing the dividing line in this way at least has the virtue of according with the relatively crude, but perhaps not completely unwarranted, caricatures that members of the traditions typically paint of their opponents—i.e., continental philosophers as illogical and muddle-headed, and analytic philosophers as excessively reductive and scientistic.

ENDNOTES

1. For good examples of this position, see Michael Freidman *A Parting of the Ways* (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), and Andrew Cutrofello *Continental Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
2. John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Massachusetts: Harvard, 1994), 9.
3. Ibid., 40–41.
4. Ibid., xi.
5. This is why McDowell maintains that the problem he addresses is not simply an epistemological problem, but is a more general one. That is, he is not simply examining the conditions of the possibility for having knowledge, or knowledge-representations, of the world. Rather, he is examining the more fundamental problem of the possibility of "being in touch with the world at all" (ibid., xiv). See also ibid., 6.
6. Ibid., 8–9.
7. Ibid., xi, 9, 26.
8. Ibid., 26.
9. McDowell explicitly equates such representations with judgments, or more specifically, as possessing the same sort of content (*conceptual* content) as do judged representations (see ibid., 9, 50). But he also maintains that *beliefs* and judgments are equivalent on this score (see ibid., xi–xii, 14, 46).
10. For McDowell's claim that conceptualized representations are elements of a world-view, see ibid., 12, 29, 31, 40, 55. For the claim that conceptualized representations thus require an active subject, see ibid., 9–13.
11. See ibid., 12–13.
12. Ibid., 8, 13.
13. Ibid., 8; see also 13.
14. Ibid., 42, 50, 66.
15. This is the essence of McDowell's response to Gareth Evans (ibid., 47ff.).
16. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75. McDowell invokes and interprets this formula at *Mind and World*, 3–4.
17. Ibid., 41.
18. Ibid..
19. Ibid., 41, 96.
20. As McDowell makes the point, "In the transcendental perspective receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be independent of our conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any that fits the ordinary empirical world" (ibid., 41).
21. Ibid., 43.
22. Ibid., 96–98.
23. Ibid., xv, 70–71, 96–97.
24. Ibid., xx, 84, 87–88.
25. For the connection between the natural and receptive, see ibid., 87.
26. See Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 5th. edition, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana, 1990), 14f.
27. This is most clearly stated in Heidegger's *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana, 1997), 283. See also ibid., 280 and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 91, 107–09, 137.
28. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B71–72. Heidegger highlights the importance of this distinction in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 17–18 and *Phenomeno-*

logical Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 58–61.

29. For a fuller discussion of the importance, for Heidegger, of this letter, see my "Heidegger on A Priori Synthetic Judgments," *Heidegger Studies* 21 (2005).
30. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 36.
31. Ibid.
32. "Appendix: Kant's Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772," trans. Arne Unhjem, from Lewis White Beck, *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 232.
33. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 31. See also *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 7.
34. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 32.
35. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 9–12; and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 35, 38.
36. Heidegger makes this point by saying that Kant discovered that finite cognition is, ultimately, grounded in the transcendental imagination rather than pure reason (see *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 117f. and 150–151); and that Kant refused to accept this conclusion. However, Heidegger also notes that the fundamental structure of the Kantian transcendental imagination is that of spontaneous receptivity (see *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 280. See also ibid., 188–89, and 283; as well as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 91, 107–09, and 137). For a fuller discussion of this issue see section V of my "Heidegger on A Priori Synthetic Judgments," *Heidegger Studies* 21 (2005).
37. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 118.
38. Ibid., 112f.; and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 279–80.
39. As Heidegger puts it, Kant "following the tradition, identifies *beings* with what is *extant*" (*Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 30). See also bid., 136.
40. McDowell, *Mind and World*, 77.
41. Ibid., 78.
42. Ibid., 83.
43. Ibid., 93.
44. Ibid., 85.
45. Ibid., 77.
46. Ibid., 77.
47. As McDowell puts it, it requires that "human minds must somehow be able to latch on to this inhuman structure" (ibid., 77).

University of Colorado at Denver, Denver CO 80217–3364