A Double-edged Scalpel:
Colorado’s Healthy Reputation and Its Tuberculosis Struggle

The Classroom as a Colonial Institution:
How Academic Curriculum was used to kill
Native Culture in Federal Off-Reservation
Boarding Schools, 1879-1928

Clutch Hitter:
Frederico Peña’s Struggle to
Bring Major League Baseball
to Denver in the 1980s

Let’s Have a War:
Hardcore Punk vs. the L.A. Suburbs
Department of History

University of Colorado Denver

Pamela Laird, Ph.D.,
Department Chair
U.S. Social, Intellectual, Technology, Public History, Business

Christopher Agee, Ph.D.
20th Century U.S., Urban History, Social Movements, Crime and Policing

Ryan Crewe, Ph.D.
Latin America, Colonial Mexico, Transpacific History

James E. Fell, Jr., Ph.D.
American West, Civil War, Environmental, Film History

Gabriel Finkelstein, Ph.D.
Modern Europe, Germany, History of Science, Exploration

Mark Foster, Ph.D., Emeritus

Susan Gustin, M.A.
US History from the Gilded Age through the 1920s, World War I

Marilyn Hitchens, Ph.D.
Modern Europe, World History

Xiaojia Hou, Ph.D.
China, East Asia

Rebecca Hunt, Ph.D.
American West, Gender, Museum Studies, Public History

Marjorie Levine-Clark, Ph.D.
Modern Britain, European Women and Gender, Medicine and Health

Brandon Mills, PH.D.

Thomas J. Noel, Ph.D.
American West, Art & Architecture, Public History & Preservation, Colorado

Kelly Palmer, Ph.D.
Modern Europe and France

Stacey Pendleton, M.A.
Cold War/US, Modern Britain

Carl Pletsch, Ph.D.
Intellectual History (European and American), Modern Europe

Myra Rich, Ph.D., Emeritus
U.S. Colonial, U.S. Early National, Women and Gender, Immigration

Alison Shab, Ph.D.
South Asia, Islamic World, History and Heritage, Cultural Memory

Richard Smith, Ph.D.
Ancient, Medieval, Early Modern Europe, Britain

Chris Sundberg, M.A.
Africa and History Education

William Wagner, Ph.D.
U.S. West

James Walsh, Ph.D.
Immigration, U.S. Labor, Irish-American

James B. Whiteside, Ph.D., Emeritus
Recent U.S., Vietnam War, U.S. Diplomatic, Sports History

Greg Whitesides, Ph.D.
History of Science, Modern U.S., Asia

Kariann Yokota, Ph.D.
Colonial and Early U.S., Pacific Rim

Front Cover: National Jewish Hospital, (Denver Public Library)
Coors Field, (Denver Public Library)
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Since 1983, the University of Colorado Denver Historical Studies Journal has featured the finest research and historiographical essays from the history department’s brightest and most ambitious students. It provides student writers with an opportunity to hone their craft to professional academic standards. It also provides student editors with tangible experience in the various aspects of the editorial process. The 2014 issue features a diversity of innovative topics, thorough research, precision writing, engaging storytelling, and distinctive arguments. In short, the journal builds on thirty-one years of sound historical scholarship.

Two of the journal’s four essays focus on pivotal themes in Denver history. Rachel Ancar’s “A Double-edged Scalpel: Colorado’s Healthy Reputation and Its Tuberculosis Struggle” argues that late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century Denver wanted the economic benefits of selling hope to the sick while at the same time refusing responsibility for the increasingly grim realities of a growing epidemic. In the process, Ancar exposes a truly western historical contradiction, and one that has been underrepresented by Western-American historians.

Justyn Larry tells the story of how former Denver mayor Federico Peña succeeded in bringing major league baseball to Denver where his predecessors failed through a long and precarious public-private initiative, combined with a relentless public relations campaign that eventually won over the Denver public. Larry frames his essay, “Clutch Hitter: Federico Peña’s Struggle to Bring Major League Baseball to Denver in the 1980s,” in the context of LODO during the early 1980’s, a time in which the area suffered from an economic recession due to a declining monolithic oil-based economy, rising rents, and the conspicuous absence of retail.

Focusing on a recent historical phenomenon in Los Angles, Samuel Smith’s “Let’s Have a War: Hardcore Punk vs. the L.A. Suburbs,” analyses the unprecedented violence associated with the city’s hardcore punk scene during the 1980s. Relying chiefly on eyewitness accounts, Smith ventures into virtually untouched historical terrain by looking beyond broad sociological explanations of post-1960s teen angst, into the external triggers L.A. Hardcore related violence, such as flagrant police brutality and media hype which motivated a culture of alienated and cynical suburban youth to form a new more militaristic punk community.

Last, in the most broadly focused of our four essays, Samuel Irving’s “The Classroom as a Colonial Institution: How Academic Curriculum was used to kill Native Culture in Federal Off-Reservation Boarding Schools, 1879-1928,” explores the role of curriculum in converting native religion, tribal collectivity, and spiritual attachment to native soils into Christianity, self-reliance, and capitalism. Expanding on previous historical scholarship, Irving argues that external forms of cultural suppression in Federal Off-Reservation
Boarding Schools such as changing clothing, cutting hair, and silencing native dialect were immediate expressions of a much deeper intellectual assault on Native American identity and agency.

On behalf of the editorial staff, I would like to thank the faculty members who submitted over thirty student papers for consideration. We regret that we could only publish four essays. We would also like to thank our student writers for their diligence in re-drafting their work. It has been a pleasure to work with a talented group of historians who have made significant scholarly contributions to their fields of study. The journal's editorial staff deserves special recognition for fine tuning the work of our student writers and selecting the journal's historical images. Special recognition is also due to Shannon Fluckey for her excellent work as the journal's designer and to Professor Tom Noel for his longstanding support as faculty editor. Thanks also to Professor Rebecca Hunt for also reviewing the proofs. Last, it must be noted that associate editor Darlene Cypser did an exceptional job of overseeing the journal after a personal medical issue sidetracked me. Thank you, Darlene, for the experience, professionalism, and leadership you brought to the team.

GREGORY BRILL
Editor
“No discussion of state medicine would be complete without the consideration of pulmonary tuberculosis, the most ubiquitous, and next to malaria, the most destructive disease of mankind.”
— C.D. Spivak, 1915

At a meeting in 1944, Mark Harrington, president of the Denver Tuberculosis Society, condemned the tuberculosis control methods in the city “as both inadequate and ineffective.” He cited subpar conditions on the tuberculosis wards at the Denver General Hospital, inadequate financing of the state aid program for needy tuberculosis patients, insufficient tuberculosis dispensaries, and a lack of beds for tuberculosis patients. Seventy years earlier Colorado had touted itself as the “Best Place in the World for Consumptives,” but the conditions Harrington cited discredited this claim.

Before antibiotics revolutionized the treatment of tuberculosis, many “consumptives,” (a term for persons infected with the disease) traveled to the state believing that the climate, elevation, and pure air would provide a cure. The perceived healthiness of Colorado’s environment was advertised throughout the country and served as a powerful driver of economic and social development for the state. Unfortunately, as thousands of these health-seekers migrated to the state, many continued to sicken and die from the disease despite the promise of health.

Rachel Ancar is pursuing a double BA/BS degree in History and Integrative Biology, with a minor in multidisciplinary research methods at the University of Colorado Denver. She is attending medical school in Fall 2014. This article reflects her interests in the history of science and medicine.
As the most common cause of death in nineteenth-century United States, tuberculosis had an indelible impact upon medicine and society. Any discussion of tuberculosis requires understanding it as a social disease, or a disease whose occurrence is directly influenced by social and economic factors. David S. Barnes’ book, *The Making of a Social Disease: Tuberculosis in Nineteenth-century France*, discusses the re-emergence of tuberculosis around the world in the twenty-first century in the context of social understandings and responses developed two hundred years earlier. Barnes emphasizes that the evolving understanding of tuberculosis in French society was influenced not only by scientific and physical variables, but by “forces that operated through language and systems of thought.” This idea informs the way that Barnes developed his study and allowed him to analyze the course of tuberculosis outside of the traditional paradigm of medical progress, triumph, and consensus. Ultimately Barnes argues, “[S]tages of knowledge about tuberculosis do not just show the developing content of medical science. They also reveal the changing social context within which that knowledge was embedded.”

The field of public health developed as the intersection between the scientific and the social, as evidenced by tuberculosis control and prevention efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. The role this field played in American society has been extensively studied, especially in the context of tuberculosis. In *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown*, Nayan Shah provides an analysis of the public health efforts enacted in response to epidemics among the Chinese population in San Francisco. Shah notes a critical difference between the responses to an 1876 smallpox outbreak in San Francisco’s Chinatown and the epidemic of tuberculosis in 1939. Shah suggests that these differences are due to a complex interplay of changes in the practice of public health, ideas of citizenship, and the role of the government in promoting health in society. This shaped “for Chinese Americans, the journey from menace to model minority.” He identifies public health in the nineteenth century as primarily acting in a regulatory role to establish the behavioral norms that should be followed by the public. Groups that disrupted these norms were subject to efforts “to contain or exclude any such threats.” In the twentieth century however, public health evolved to justify and implement minimum standards of health through growing welfare and entitlement programs. Shaw argues the assimilation of Chinese Americans as acceptable societal subjects was crucial. This enabled the application of public health efforts to prevent tuberculosis by improving social conditions. Emily K. Abel, in *Tuberculosis and the Politics of Exclusion: A History of Public Health and Migration to Los Angeles*, observed the opposite response in Los Angeles. This city, like Colorado, was known as a health destination. However, Los Angeles governmental policies actively sought to exclude poor health-seekers from the area. This included sending those who sought state aid back to their home localities. Abel argues that the city’s major immigrant group being Mexican rather than European drove these differences, because “[w]hile European immigrants gradually came to be seen as white, Mexicans increasingly were racialized as brown.” Abel concludes that in the 1920s and 1930s tuberculosis helped “to define who should be considered a member of U.S. society and who should be treated as an outsider.”
Few modern historians have focused exclusively on the role that tuberculosis played in the development of Colorado. Nevertheless, the state’s participation in the health tourism movement of the West has been examined. In *Health-Seekers in the Southwest: 1817-1900*, Billy M. Jones explores the major, yet often neglected, role those looking for health played in the development of the Western frontier. The healthy reputation of the West developed as health, or lack thereof, became associated with environmental factors. At this time, medicine had few answers for the diseases that afflicted the population and “[b]y mid-century the truth of the failure of formal medicine was admitted.” As a result, physicians endorsed traveling and changing residences as “the panacea which early medicine could not supply.” Western states like Colorado developed into health resorts, which enticed people and business into the developing frontier. Jones also points out that those who promoted the healthy reputation of the West often “ignored the grim realities of numerous poorly marked graves and many casually recorded deaths.”

Greg Mitman, in his article “The Geographies of Hope: Mining the Frontiers of Health in Denver and Beyond, 1870-1965,” examines the importance of Denver’s reputation as a health resort. Mitman argues that “health” was a major commodity for the state. Approximately 30,000 invalids had traveled to Denver by 1890 seeking a cure, most of them infected with tuberculosis. Mitman argues that health formed part of the economic base upon which Denver was established, and cites an article in the *Rocky Mountain News*.
that proposed to transform Denver’s sewers, sidewalks, and hydrants in order to “attract wealthy health-seekers.”

He also notes a major shift in perceptions toward health seekers. In the early 1900s, tuberculosis was increasingly identified as a disease afflicting the poor. This subverted efforts to attract invalids as an economic resource.

Jeanne Abrams, in *Blazing the Tuberculosis Trail: The Religio-Ethnic Role of Four Sanatoria in Early Denver*, notes the importance of tuberculosis health seekers in the social, political and economic development of Colorado. She argues that the state wooed consumptives, but never developed the institutions and policies necessary to deal with the consequences of this advertisement. Religious and charitable organizations opened sanatoriums as a safety net for the poor, tubercular populations of Denver. Abrams documents a strong disinterest and dislike for the poor who arrived in Colorado looking for a cure. One doctor is cited as saying that “[n]o pauper, indigent, ignorant, careless, or vicious consumptive should go to Colorado” unless it can be assured that the patient will not “become a burden or a danger.” Despite the fact that consumptives were dying in the streets, the first institution for indigent consumptives, the National Jewish Hospital for Consumptives was not opened until 1899. Abrams cites fear of contagion as one of the major reasons why Colorado lagged behind in developing public institutions for tuberculosis care.

These health-seekers continued to impact Colorado after the peak of the health frontier identified by Jones. As deaths from tuberculosis in the state increased toward the end of the nineteenth century, fear of infection did not fully explain the slow and ineffective development of policies and institutions to address the growing public health concern. Colorado health professionals and policymakers saw the ubiquitous problem of tuberculosis as an opportunity. They attempted to boost the prestige and finances of the state.
Advertising from businesses, travelers, and state officials contributed to Colorado’s healthy reputation. The Union Pacific Railway lauded Colorado as a health resort in order to encourage people to travel to the state. A publication entitled “The Resources and Attractions of Colorado for the Home Seeker, Capitalist and Tourist” established health as one of the state’s natural resources because “Colorado possesses great wealth in her natural scenery, her pure air, and her places of attraction for health and pleasure.” 24 The publication claimed that Colorado’s climate was scientifically recognized as beneficial for all lung diseases, and stated that, “the State has become the Mecca of consumptives.” 25 In support of these claims, the publication cited results from a five-year study of the Colorado climate’s effect on tuberculosis by “one of Denver’s most eminent physicians” and the testimony of former invalids from the East who “are now strong and actively engaged in business affairs of the West.” 26 The company sought to establish Colorado as a beautiful and healthful place to visit, but also encouraged people to stay in the state and become involved in its growing commercial affairs.

The Denver Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade also took part in developing Colorado’s healthy image. In its first annual report from 1883, the board commented, “[I]t is a trite saying that people come to Colorado for health or wealth.” 27 The report also emphasized the benefits of the state’s high altitude for treating tuberculosis. It cited “one of the leading authorities on the subject in our country” as asserting that the “cold, dry air of high elevations is beneficial to cases of incipient disease of the lungs.” 28 Frank Fossett wrote a tourist’s guide to traveling in the Rocky Mountains, and a “historical, descriptive and statistical work” on Colorado. 29 In the latter publication he proclaimed, “[T]he climate of Colorado is unrivelled…. [I]t carries healing in its wings and this is becoming so widely known that Colorado has been very justly termed the world’s sanitarium.” 30 As a result of this reputation, Denver “is visited by thousands of people who come in search of business, health, pleasure or a fortune.” 31 Local newspapers also proclaimed the wonders of Colorado’s climate, which was “a region far more healthful than the fabled islands and more beautiful than dreamland.” 32 It was then expected that “a bulk of travel and wealth will be poured through this region.” 33 By the end of the nineteenth century,
Colorado’s reputation as a health haven had been firmly established. Government officials and citizens were expecting this reputation to help the state grow economically. People were encouraged to travel to the state for their health, and stay for the wealth.

Initially, many in Colorado viewed the thousands of tuberculosis sufferers as a boon to the state’s economic and social development. These health seekers made up a significant proportion of the settlers in the state, and many of those who recovered became “boosters of the region and of the climate to which they believed they owed their lives.” Julian Ralph, a former consumptive who moved to Denver, wrote a book in 1893 on the new western states. He cited a population of 30,000 invalids living in Denver, which was one-fourth of the city’s total population at the time. Ralph claimed that the invalids in Denver were men “of wealth, as a rule, and of cultivation and of taste.” They were crucial to development of the city, more so, he claimed, than “oil and gold and silver.” Ralph qualified his assertion by explaining that Denver’s invalid population contributed to the uniqueness of the city, because it “was not mining that begot the taste which crowds our residence quarter with elegant dwellings, or that created a demand for clubs like the Denver Club.... [T]he influence of the invalid is seen in all this.” His work describes a Denver that benefitted socially from the presence of its rich and cultured invalid population. These were the types of people envisioned by those who advertised the benefits of Colorado’s climate. Men of wealth who would come to the state, would be healed, and would stay to participate in business and society.

Another book written by western traveler George W. Romspert in 1881 confirms some of Julian Ralph’s assertions. When he visited Denver and Colorado Springs, the other Colorado city well known for its health resort reputation, he noticed that the hotels “are principally occupied by invalids who come with fortunes.” Unlike Ralph, however, Romspert mentioned the tuberculosis sufferers who were not wealthy. Those who could not afford housing in hotels or boarding houses set up tent cities, which were in sharp contrast to “hale, hardy persons, who are rolling in luxury and happiness.” He mentioned invalid families “with scarcely enough to eat and not sufficient clothing to hide their wasted frames.” In his overall assessment, he dwelled little on this population. Like many who believed in the healing powers of climate, Romspert dismissed those who were dying, claiming “while there are deaths now and then, a greater portion of the invalids go away mended.” In the second half of the nineteenth-century, it seemed that Colorado’s healthy reputation attracted invalids who were contributing to its cities economically and socially. These visitors were welcomed and often stayed in the state.

Colorado physicians also played an important role in affirming Colorado’s health-resort status. Three famous Colorado doctors, Dr. Charles Denison, Dr. Samuel Edwin Solly, and Dr. Samuel A. Fisk, helped to establish climatology as the scientific study of climate and its effect on diseases. This field helped to validate claims of Colorado’s healthy climate. Dr. Denison founded the American Climatological Association, and the other two doctors were prominent members. Additionally, they wrote books about
the health resorts in Colorado Springs and the Rocky Mountains. A survey taken early in the 1900s suggested that “one-third of Colorado’s doctors had come to the state because of tuberculosis in themselves or a member of their family.” Personal experience, expert opinion, and pervasive rhetoric likely convinced doctors that state’s fresh air could help to heal their tuberculosis patients.

A Denver physician, Sherman G. Bonney, published a study in 1897 that examined the effect of Colorado’s climate on tuberculosis. He had studied 200 cases of the disease and concluded that three-fourths of cases “properly applicable to the climate” would improve better in Colorado than in other localities. He also concluded that an individual’s ability to “conform to a proper regime of daily life” plays a major role in curing the disease. Financial status often contributed to a patient’s ability to follow directions regarding activity level and nutrition, which is why Bonney also suggested “cases with limited resources are better at home.” At the same time, however, he pushed for those with the proper resources to come to Colorado for “her increased social advantages, and later on, her favorable business opportunities.” With this study Bonney aimed to reaffirm the effectiveness of Colorado’s climate and encouraged wealthy consumptives to travel to Colorado and stay in the state. A Colorado Springs doctor, S. W. Morrison, also made an argument for the state’s climate. He asserted, “Colorado has the climatic influences most potent in the cure of consumption” and provides a physiological explanation for the benefits of high altitude on the lungs. As a sign of the time, however, Morrison also qualified his climatic argument by explaining that it “will not restore life to the dead; too many leave coming here as a last resort and come only to die.” When Morrison wrote this in the last decade of the nineteenth century, Colorado’s death rate from tuberculosis had been steadily increasing. Physicians needed an explanation for why the scientifically proven benefits of the state’s climate failed so many.

As Colorado’s health-haven reputation grew and attracted more health-seekers, deaths from tuberculosis increased. Before the territory was admitted as a state, vital statistics for the territory reported deaths from consumption in Colorado at 24 persons. These statistics changed drastically by the end of the century. By 1877, the principal cause of death in Denver was consumption, accounting for 63 deaths and 24.7% of the deaths of in the city. However, these statistics were qualified in a note at the bottom of the report stating, “[I]n the deaths from consumption, a large percentage of the cases were contracted outside of the state.” In the same report, Dr. Frederick J. Bancroft, President of the State Board of Health, wrote a statement about the health status of Colorado Springs. He accounted for deaths from diseases such as cholera and scarlatina (scarlet fever), but he recorded none from tuberculosis “as all the cases of that disease are imported, and all deaths are among transient residents, the result has no bearing upon the health of the city.” Dr. Bancroft acknowledged that there were at least 500 consumptives in the city’s population of 3,000.
He made two interesting assertions in this statement: there were no consumption deaths in the city among permanent residents and that the deaths from consumption that did occur did not reflect upon the healthiness of the city.

By 1885 deaths from consumption in Denver were reported to be 149 out of 789 total deaths. In the report for these vital statistics, Dr. D. H. Dougan suggested that the deaths from consumption be subtracted from the total deaths in the city, because the disease “rarely or never originates here. Once this is done, we have a total of 640 deaths from causes natural in Denver...a statistical table that we respectfully submit to the world.”54 Despite the fact that the state’s health haven reputation was built upon the climate’s ability to cure consumption, the deaths occurring from the disease were disregarded as unimportant to the health of its cities. Crucial to this assertion was the idea that tuberculosis could not originate in Colorado.

Reports from the state board of health on tuberculosis deaths in the state have been compiled in figure 1. This data shows a gradual increase in consumptive deaths in the state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1887</th>
<th>1889</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL DEATHS</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1119</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>1808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths from Consumption</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted East</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted West</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted in Colorado</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted in Denver</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 1:** Deaths from Tuberculosis in Colorado and where Contracted55,56

The board began documenting where the cases of tuberculosis originated and this information also reflected an increasing number of the cases originating in Colorado, or from an undetermined place. Figure 2 shows the same trends throughout the 1890s. The amount of people dying who contracted the disease outside of Colorado was continuing to increase, but more people were also dying who contracted the disease in the state. These trends contradicted Colorado’s health resort reputation and the belief that consumption could not originate in the state’s pure air.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1898</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL DEATHS from Consumption</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted in Colorado</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted outside of Colorado</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage contracted in Colorado</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>17.93</td>
<td>17.99</td>
<td>19.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 2:** Adapted from Colorado Medicine, from the Denver Bureau of Health to demonstrate increasing deaths from consumption originating in Colorado57
The state took few actions to address the growing tuberculous population and the increasing death rate from the disease. The legislature established the State Board of Health, consisting of nine physicians, in August 1876. The board, however, had little authority and a budget of only five hundred dollars. It ceased to exist in 1886 and was not reestablished until 1892. These struggles reflect a lack of concern and planning by the state, which seems strange considering the importance that tuberculosis invalids played in the development of Colorado.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the medical community had accepted the germ theory of disease and discovered the bacteria that caused tuberculosis. With the knowledge that the disease was not hereditary, the focus of the medical community and public health officials shifted to preventing infection. Yet the state would not pass legislation addressing tuberculosis infection concerns until 1909 and nothing was done to address the fact that in Denver “most private hospitals would not admit indigent tuberculous patients, and even the County hospital provided only a few beds for the thousands of poor consumptives.” By 1890, there were no sanatoriums in the state, and the poor could not afford to stay in the boarding houses.

At the end of 1899, the state board of health “took the position that under healthy conditions consumption could not exist in this state” and therefore the cases originating in Colorado were blamed on “the carelessness of the consumptives who have come from other parts of the country.” The board suggested that the legislature enact laws against spitting in public, which they believed spread the disease. The board continued to focus on regulating dangerous behaviors and developed a suggested set of rules for consumptives because they were “alarmed by the death rate in Colorado occasioned by so many cases of tuberculosis.” The recommendations stated that persons with tuberculosis were not dangerous as long as they were careful. However, in the same set of directives they recommended that rooms be disinfected after a consumptive leaves and that “those in good health should ostracize the unfortunate ones.” Although officials attempted to qualify concerns about infection, they also contributed to public fears and encouraged the perception that outsiders were the only danger to Colorado residents. Whether the tuberculosis sufferers were arriving in Colorado too late to be helped or were unable to find help, this population in Colorado would no longer be perceived solely as social and economic resources.

As tuberculous invalids continued to migrate to Colorado in search of a cure, a conflict developed between the potential to cultivate the economic prospects that the newcomers represented with the potential dangers of infection. An article from one Denver publication clearly defines this tension as the need “to obtain the patronage of hundreds of thousands of consumptives without having the germ of their disease distributed.”
Statistics from the early 1900s describe an environment in which this would become increasingly difficult. The amount of people dying in the state from tuberculosis continued to increase, as shown in Figure 3. In 1912 the annual report from the Denver health department reported 662 deaths from tuberculosis, which accounted for 19.48 percent of all deaths in the city. The report also shows that the City and County hospital admitted 3,855 total male and female patients for the year 1912. Of those patients only 208 were tubercular patients. This represents only five percent of patients admitted at the hospital, but tuberculosis deaths represented nearly 20 percent of all deaths in the city. When it is considered that the numbers of those who died from tuberculosis is not representative of all who were infected and displayed symptoms, the low admittance rate is concerning, especially considering that the county hospital provided beds for the city’s poor consumptives.

Despite evidence to the contrary, many in Colorado held on to the assertion that tuberculosis could not originate in Colorado. The Denver Times published an article in 1901 in response to statements and recommendations made by the State Board of Health in 1899 and 1900. The article disputed the assessment made by the board that tuberculosis was now originating in Colorado by explaining, “[T]he report is disputed by a large majority of physicians skilled in the treatment of this particular disease.” This is because “contagion is impossible in an atmosphere which carries no decomposition.” The article also asserted that when tuberculous victims travel to Colorado in time “the result is almost invariably recovery or very great improvement” and that it had not yet been proven that tuberculosis was dangerous to the residents of the state. A doctor in the journal, Colorado Medicine, claimed, “[T]he development of any form of tuberculosis in Colorado residents is so rare as to excite comment.” The data from figures 1-3 show that these assertions were not based upon fact. Deaths among those traveling to Colorado and among previous residents were increasing. Yet, the pureness and healthiness of the state’s climate continued to be proclaimed because this idea was crucial to Colorado’s image and reputation as a health resort.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the rhetoric in Colorado changed towards tuberculosis health-seekers as they continued migrating to the state. An account from Thomas Crawford Galbreath, an easterner who came to Colorado for a tuberculosis cure, highlights some of these changes. Galbreath told the story of his time in Denver and his trouble finding accommodations. He was kicked out of one boarding home when the owners discovered that he had tuberculosis and he had trouble finding another place to stay. He believed, “Colorado is most glad to welcome the contents of the purse the invalid brings with him, but she would greatly prefer that the invalid should not accompany the purse.” Galbreath also cited the difficulty consumptives had finding jobs in the city, as many help wanted signs specified, “No Invalids need apply.” He suggested that the hard-
ships endured by many of the tuberculous immigrants arose because “of the prevalency of consumption, the heart of the average Denverite has become hardened toward the tubercular patient.”77 Galbreath also noted the expensiveness of the search for health. He divided the physicians in Denver into those who encouraged the immigration of invalids and “glory in his condition as long as his money holds out” and those who “assist him in his efforts at keeping down expenses.”78 The “contrary” and “antagonistic” attitude of the Denver public towards those with tuberculosis prevented consumptives from getting into “lodging houses in the city of Denver unless he gets in under false pretenses.”79 This and the “sheer number of migratory consumptives” made it difficult for them to find labor to support themselves.80 The situation in Denver at this time was in sharp contrast to that described by Julian Ralph fifteen years earlier. The consumptives in Denver were now being shunned rather than invited as bearers of culture and wealth.

Government officials did little to address the tension between Colorado’s image and the reality of life for its tuberculosis migrants. The policies enacted dealt exclusively with efforts to control infection and document cases of the disease. In 1909 the legislature passed legislation banning the use of public drinking cups and compelling doctors to report cases of tuberculosis like they did other contagious diseases.81 In 1913 another law was passed requiring that “all premises vacated by consumptives be cleansed and disinfected.”82 These laws only addressed one aspect of the growing problem in the state’s cities and ignored other potential causes of increased mortality and transmission, such as lack of access to care and healthy living conditions.

Instead, those with a stake in Colorado’s reputation attempted to counteract the growing trend in the medical community to deny the benefits of climate for the treatment of tuberculosis. When physicians realized that “social and economic factors played an important role in the contraction and history of the disease as well as its relief, they began to advocate institutionalization close to home.”83 This shift was especially evident after 1908.84 Galbreath also spoke of this shift, concluding in his book: “[A] consumptive can chase the cure in his own home…. [H]is chances are increased rather than diminished by the very condition of his being at home.”85

In 1923 The American Review of Tuberculosis published the results of a study commissioned by the Committee of the Denver Sanatorium Association under a grant from the National Research Council. The study examined the 23,608 deaths certificates from 1908 to 1920 which showed tuberculosis as the cause of death.86 On 3,044 of these death certificates, the place of origin of the disease was undetermined. The death rate from tuberculosis in Colorado during this period was 208.9 per 100,000 persons, compared to 147.5 for the United States. The study determined that cases from outside Colorado equaled 17,080 deaths and those developed inside Colorado equaled 3,484 deaths.87 Of these deaths, 4,848 died three months after arriving in Colorado and 9,539 died within one year. This data was taken to suggest that the high death rate was a result of physicians and communities sending “away from home tuberculous persons so far advanced in disease...especially since so many of them are indigent.”88

The committee conducted the study in cooperation with the State Board of Health. The authors, six Denver physicians, stated that the census mortality statistics showed that Colorado had a higher death rate from tuberculosis than all other states except one.89
The stated purpose of the study was to “determine the ratio of deaths from tuberculosis developed in Colorado to the whole number of deaths from tuberculosis in the State.” The authors concluded that the “excessive mortality among tuberculosis immigrants to Colorado” could be attributed to the fact that so many waited to come until the disease was far advanced. The deaths within the first three months were attributed to “overexercise, more or less united with privations and worry.” The authors excluded the deaths from tuberculosis immigrants that occurred within the first year, and from this corrected data they explained, “[W]e can only conclude that climate may offer an environment peculiarly beneficent to the needs of most tubercular patients.” This statement was made to challenge what the authors lamented as “propaganda against climate in the treatment of tuberculosis,” which had become prevalent during the previous 20 years. In the report the authors qualify their results by acknowledging, “[I]n order to make our fundamental statistics complete, the relative proportions of the imported and the indigenous populations of Colorado” should have been obtained. Without this information, it is not accurate to conclude that there is a higher death rate among tuberculosis immigrants. Regardless of the accuracy of the study, the conclusion drawn in the report is noteworthy. In spite of growing evidence and sentiment to the contrary, these physicians continued to support the superior quality for Colorado’s climate as a cure for consumption. The Denver Sanatorium Association suggested the study in order to defend the state’s reputation from the high tuberculosis death rates. By deducting the deaths that occurred within one year of arrival, it was claimed that when tuberculosis patients came to Colorado in time and adhered to the proper regimes, such as those enforced in sanatoriums, the climate would still exert its healing effects.

In the effort to qualify the effectiveness of the state’s climate, the medical community characterized a specific population as the source of the state’s tuberculosis problem. In the 1904, edition of Colorado Medicine, Dr. C. E. Cooper, discussed the relationship between tuberculosis and public health. He asserted the increasing number of deaths from tuberculosis among Colorado residents “arises from one, and only one, source—the consumptive who comes here seeking his health.” Dr. Cooper asked, “[I]s it just, let me ask, for the unfortunate consumptive...to come among us bringing with him his affliction and to subject our healthy members of society to infection.” He laid the blame for the state’s tuberculosis problem on the individuals immigrating to the state. The public had
a right to be protected from these individuals. Dr. Cooper suggested the only way to achieve this without violating the liberty of consumptives would be for them to “adopt such measures, based upon the truths that bacteriology and hygiene have given us.”97 Most sanitariums were “beyond the finances of the average consumptive” leaving him or her “a limited number of institutions to choose from.”98 Dr. Cooper hoped this dilemma would be addressed when the public would “lay aside this dread” and aid the consumptive in “his struggle, through the erection of free sanitariums, clinics, and individual assistance.”99 He predicted that if these tuberculous immigrants lived according to the rules of “bacteriology and hygiene” in order to avoid spreading their disease, the state would respond by providing them assistance.

Others also discussed the circumstances of these poor tuberculosis immigrants. Dr. W. T. Little chided eastern physicians who sent poor consumptives to Colorado as “unworthy of his profession. And still hundreds of such come to Colorado every year, their lives shortened by the hardships they are forced to endure.” He suggested that only those in “moderately easy financial circumstances” come to the state.100 He further characterized Colorado consumptives as being of lower quality, stating that “50 percent of those who come here could not get into any of the closed establishments of Europe and America” as the state had been “a dumping ground... for the consumptives of the East.”101 Dr. James J. Waring, co-founder of The Webb-Waring Institute for Medical Research and Chairman of the Department of Medicine of the University of Colorado School of Medicine, argued that the “obligation to make proper provision for the irreducible quota of the indigent and coincidentally to protect the native population...is inescapable.”102

While the need for these provisions seemed evident from discussions of indigent tuberculosis migrants, only a few religious and charitable institutions provided free services, most notably the Jewish Consumptive Relief Society. The city hospital provided some beds for tuberculosis patients, but a system of publically funded tuberculosis assistance for poor populations would not be developed until 1937. For the most part, the demand for beds and tuberculosis treatment would continue to outpace the available resources.

Colorado, unlike other states, never established state institutions for treating consumptives.103 The medical community and state health officials characterized Colorado’s tuberculosis problems as chiefly those individuals who migrated to the state in search of a cure and this population was increasingly...
described as poor, dying, and dangerous. In this context, there was little public or political incentive to use state or local funds to address the struggles facing this population aside from efforts to prevent the spread of tuberculosis to the healthy population.

The tuberculosis control program established in 1937 reflected some of the perceptions regarding the tuberculous population established earlier in the century. In this year the Colorado Tuberculosis Association, established in 1910 and funded privately through the sale of Christmas Seals, finally received public funds and approval for the legislation it created to care for the indigent tuberculous. The tuberculosis control program appropriated 50,000 dollars to be distributed by the Division of Tuberculous Control in the Department of Welfare. The original law required those receiving aid through the program to have 3 years of residence in the state. By the year 1953, it had been reduced to a one-year requirement. This program utilized the existing facilities in the state, which ensured Colorado would continue to be “the only state without a state sanatorium or a system of county institutions for the care of the needy tuberculous.” Although this program provided care for needy tuberculosis patients, it continued to exclude those who could not qualify as Colorado residents. State care would only be provided once a person could be officially designated as a Colorado citizen, rather than a transient, indigent, tuberculosis patient. This is the same population that had been identified years before as the greatest source of tuberculosis deaths and danger in the state.

In the late 1940s, public health officials and organizations tried to improve tuberculosis control in the state in part by changing perceptions about those who suffered from the disease. During this period, “tuberculosis mortality studies...showed relatively high resident death rates from the disease in the four-county Denver Metropolitan area,” especially in districts with lower socio-economic status. According to Alfred E. Kessler, executive secretary of the Denver Tuberculosis Society, “one person dies of Tuberculosis
in Denver every 53 hours.”  

Another article in the *Denver Post* warned, “Denver’s death rate from tuberculosis doesn’t make pretty reading. It is higher than that of thirteen other cities of comparable size.”  

Crucially the Denver Tuberculosis Society rejected the explanation that “Denver’s high tuberculosis death rate is a result of infected persons coming here to seek a cure.” It claimed this was untrue because Denver’s high death rate was among the residents “who have been living and working here for many years.”  

The article cited a long list of problems exacerbating the city’s tuberculosis problem: one nurse for every 6,000 persons in Denver when the ratio should be 1:2000, only 200 beds for tuberculosis patients when there should be at least 400, too many tuberculosis patients being treated in their homes, half of the 200 beds for tuberculosis patients were in institutions that did not meet minimum treatment standards, lack of an accurate reporting and follow-up system, and “less than half of the city’s needy tuberculars are being taken care of by tax-supported institutions.”  

The same concerns were expressed by Mark Harrington a year earlier where he proclaimed the “inadequacy of the tuberculosis and public health program in Colorado and in Denver particularly.”  

Some of these issues were finally addressed in 1947, when the state legislature passed the Sabin Bills. Florence Sabin, a retired physician, campaigned for this legislation in order to reform the public health system in Colorado, which included a bill increasing the “number of hospital beds for tuberculosis suffers” and increasing “the per-diem payment to hospitals for the care of indigent tuberculosis patients.”
Tuberculosis health-seekers originally served as a putative source of economic and social enrichment for the state. Private companies and the state government advertised the numerous benefits of Colorado’s climate and elevation in an effort to bring business, visitors, and settlers to the area. Doctors, newspapers, and former consumptives also helped to confirm and perpetuate Colorado’s healthy reputation. The success of these efforts resulted in thousands of people with tuberculosis migrating to the state in the hopes of a cure. Unfortunately, many of these sufferers continued to sicken and die. Thereby highlighting the failure of Colorado’s climate to cure as well as the state’s lack of institutional controls and protections to address the influx of health-seekers it had attracted.

Policymakers would not begin to effectively address these inadequacies until the late 1940s. As deaths from tuberculosis continued to rise, many in the state resisted the transformation of tuberculosis health-seekers from an economic and social commodity into a newfound burden. This resistance was facilitated by efforts to associate the tuberculosis problem with nonresident and poor populations. Through this characterization, the blame for Colorado’s high tuberculosis death rate was attributed to outsiders in an attempt to preserve the state’s healthy reputation.
Tulalip Indian School, 1912
Photo by Ferdinand Brady (Museum of History and Industry, Seattle)
They told us that Indian ways were bad. They said we must get civilized. I remember that word, too. It means 'be like the white man.' I am willing to be like the white man, but I did not believe Indian ways were wrong. But they kept teaching us for seven years. And the books told how bad the Indians had been to the white men—burning their towns and killing their women and children. But I had seen white men do that to Indians. We all wore white man's clothes and ate white man's food and went to white man's churches and spoke white man's talk. And so after a while we also began to say Indians were bad. We laughed at our own people and their blankets and cooking pots and sacred societies and dances. I tried to learn the lessons—and after seven years I came home...
It was a warm summer evening when I got off the train at Taos station... I went home to my family. And the next morning the governor of the pueblo and two war chiefs and many priest chiefs came into my father’s house. They did not talk to me; they did not even look at me. When they were all assembled they talked to my father.

The chiefs said to my father, “Your son who calls himself Raphael has lived with the white men. He has been far away from the pueblo. He has not lived in the kiva [a sacred ceremonial chamber] nor learned the things that Indian boys should learn. He has no hair. He has no blankets. He cannot even speak our language and he has a strange smell. He is not one of us.”

Sun Elk, Taos Pueblo
Such was the reception of Sun Elk upon returning to his tribe in 1890 after spending seven years at Carlisle Indian School. "He is not one of us." This statement stands as a testament to the academic annihilation of native culture as the explicit goal of federal off-reservation boarding schools. Returning an outcast among his own people, Sun Elk was precisely the type of graduate the federal government sought.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the reservation system ushered in the era of official internal colonization of Native Americans. With no remaining western frontier past which to displace them, the United States government was forced to shift strategies of domination. Thus, the colonizer began calculating the most cost-effective means of control. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas J. Morgan callously pointed out in 1889: “One disastrous Indian war might be more expensive than the entire work of educating the whole rising generation.” Thus the solution, as so aptly phrased in the title of historian David Wallace Adam’s seminal work, was *Education for Extinction*. To solve the Indian problem, eliminate Indian identity.

Commissioner Morgan argued that education was “the most effective means of Americanizing our foreign population,” provided this academic assault on native culture began “while they are young and susceptible.” With a lack of geographic space to further usurp from the colonized, the United States government set to work attempting to dominate the expanses of the native mind. Thus, the off-reservation boarding school was the selected colonial institution to remove native children from the influence of their families and tribal elders and fully immerse them in the culture of the colonizer.

The boarding school era began in 1879 in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Founder of Carlisle and father of the boarding school system Col. Richard H. Pratt coined the phrase “Kill the Indian in him, and save the man.” He painted his mission in militaristic terms in a letter to President Rutherford B. Hayes by arguing that his school was doing more to combat the Indian problem than the whole of his former regiment put together. The peril of this new phase of U.S. aggression against natives was not lost on Luther Standing Bear, the first student to enter Carlisle. He viewed his journey as that of a warrior sacrificing his life for the honor of his tribe. Given the graveyards full of victims of disease and depression that soon became part of the landscape of these schools, the threat to Standing Bear’s life was no mere metaphor.
The purpose of these institutions was to remove all vestiges of native culture. The initial attack focused on the native exterior. Immediately upon arrival, the child was forced to replace native clothing and long braided hair with the dress and style of European-Americans. With nearly equal abruptness, the school ended all other native cultural phenomenon: language, sleeping habits, eating habits, etc. For the duration of the native’s education, his or her life was strictly segmented and regimented by the European conception of time. The school day was divided between academic and vocational training, the latter being little more than a euphemism for forced manual labor.

Much has been written about the above-mentioned forms of colonization. However, the academic component of the boarding school has not garnered as much attention. While physical appearance and language were the first targets, all cultural phenomena were under attack. Native religion, tribal collectivity, and spiritual attachment to native soils were to be converted into Christianity, self-reliance, and capitalism. It is here where the academic assault ensued. While cutting hair, changing clothing, and silencing native languages provided the initial, ostensible attack, the mind would be the most important target for this cultural assassination. Education, then, would be the weapon of choice.

Understanding this form of colonization begins with an analysis of the mind of the colonizer to understand his version of history and the position of the native in this “savagery to civilization” narrative. In history classes and textbooks, this narrative was then used to diminish native cultural achievements. It relegated native cultures to the distant past, making any notions of tribal identity still in the minds of the student anachronistic. As discussed above by Sun Elk, these same texts and lessons went further to denigrate natives in comparison to Europeans. The essential learning in history and civics classes at these schools was that the United States was a beacon of light and progress and the native was a savage stuck in the past in need of saving. Along with this usurpation of the past, classes sought to tear down any remains of tribalism in the native mind and replace it with capitalistic individualism and patriotic devotion to the nation. Via this multifaceted academic assault, the boarding school attempted to erase native identity education.

FROM SAVAGERY TO CIVILIZATION

Nothing better illuminates the mentality of the colonizer, and hence the belief system to be burned into the mind of the colonized, than John Gast’s 1872 painting “American Progress” (see back cover). The eye is immediately drawn to Columbia, the angelic figure of “progress” literally bringing light to the North American continent. Behind her stands the industrial splendor of civilization, which she carries with her in the form of the telegraph wire. Guided by her light are the brave settlers venturing out into treacherous new territory. And in the darkness before her, a few diminutive natives flee from the light of civilization. This famous image rather succinctly sums up the story of American history as believed and taught by European-America. But imagine hearing this narrative from the perspective of the fleeing native. It is rather telling that the text in her arm is entitled “School Book,” for it is through academic curriculum that native children were taught to loathe, and eventually renounce, all aspects of their tribal selves so as to step into the light of civilization.
All colonial endeavors proceed from a pervasive, fundamental belief in the superiority of the colonizer over the colonized. This belief then manifests itself in all particular colonial institutions. Indeed it is the underlying philosophical justification for all such endeavors of domination. Thus, Indian education policy was built upon the belief that European-American society was the pinnacle of human development and must overtake that of the native societies.

In the late nineteenth century, Lewis Henry Morgan, the leading anthropologist of the United States, gave scientific support to this belief with his social evolution theory. Morgan’s most widely-read work, *Ancient Society* published in 1877, gave voice to the justification of the internal colonization of Native Americans. Morgan posited a universal progression of human society from savagery through barbarism, finally ending in civilization. Every society could then be placed into a sublevel of one of these three categories based upon their means of subsistence, government, language, family, architecture, and property. According to Morgan, of these criteria, “property” was the most effective determinant of advancement towards civilization.

Morgan claimed that European-American society had progressed to the pinnacle of civilization. The nuclear family was the most advanced form of familial relations. Territory as property in a political unit was a concept that “fixed the boundary line between ancient and modern society.” The capitalist drive to amass private property was the driving force behind European-America’s speedy path to social perfection.

In Morgan’s view, Native society was barely off the starting blocks. Natives had yet to progress to a family based on monogamy, and, without the drive for private property, all other facets of progress were stifled. Thus, the spectrum in which Morgan situated the numerous tribal societies of North America ranged from upper savagery to middle barbarism, with only a select few reaching the latter.

Morgan was clear to deny any sense of relativism in his assessment of native cultures. This social evolution was everywhere the same: “The history of the human race is one in source, one in experience, and one in progress.” Morgan saw a unique opportunity to witness ancient history first hand. Since Europeans were at some point long ago at these more primitive stages, Native Americans represented their own remote ancestors. This notion of the colonized as an anachronism further supported the belief in the superiority of the more advanced colonizer.

However, just because natives had yet to reach civilization, it did not mean that they could not get there eventually. With the help of the benevolent white society, perhaps they could be civilized much sooner than if left to their own devices. And what better way to expedite this process than through education. One sees how nicely Morgan’s theory of social evolution buttressed the United States’ assimilationist campaign. Rather than the
callous calculation that education was cheaper than annihilation, one now could selflessly extoll American progress as a hand gently guiding the native from savagery to civilization.

As a national leader in the field of anthropology, Lewis Henry Morgan was influential beyond academic circles. Historian Frederick Hoxie notes that those in charge of formulating Indian policy found intellectual backing for their assimilationist campaign through Morgan’s theory. Throughout the boarding school years, those in leadership roles were explicit in their adoption of L. H. Morgan’s theory identifying the native as an anachronistic savage and used his theory to justify their cultural extinction campaign. In the same letter to President Hayes in 1880, Richard Pratt enthusiastically described Carlisle’s mission as creating “Civilization out of savagery!” In a paper read before the influential Mohonk Conference in 1889, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas J. Morgan clearly displayed a belief in the social evolution theory as he discussed native’s diminutive placement on the “scale of civilization.” He did so in no uncertain terms, employing “ignorant” and “brutish” in his generalizations of native cultures. Furthermore, ranking low on the social evolutionary scale, Morgan posited that natives had yet to develop philosophy and “true religion.” Ten years later, one sees this narrative still fully operational in the mind of Superintendent of Indian Schools Estelle Reel when she described the native as “just starting on the road to civilization.”

With the “savagery to civilization” narrative so overtly operational in the minds of the boarding school leadership, it stands to reason that this was the central component to the curriculum of colonization. As those at the helm of the boarding school system made clear, the native had to be educated into understanding his inferiority. The exterior cultural extinction process began with the hair and clothing, then immediately set to work in its attempt to silence the native tongue. Seemingly all sources about these schools, both primary and secondary, are uniform in their discussion of the forcefulness and effectiveness with which the English language was imposed on the native child. However, this was but the opening salvo of the educational assault. One must delve deep into what these new words were saying to the native child in order to comprehend the internal attack on native identity. Their first step was to teach the child the native’s place in the march of progress. History education, then, was used to place the native present somewhere far in the European past.

Horace E. Scudder’s *A Short History of the United States of America* was included in Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas J. Morgan’s 1890 list of books adopted for use in Indian schools. Scudder’s work did its part to promote European-American progress and the natives’ lack of progress in the minds of boarding school students. In the few pages devoted to native history and culture, the key term repeated was “savage.” North America at the time of discovery was a wilderness untouched by human agency. Scudder describes the Pilgrims as having arrived at the “land of Canaan.” While what
is said of Native Americans promotes the “savagery to civilization” narrative, the general lack of Native American history in the history texts also speaks volumes. This intentional silence was meant to teach the native child that his or her past did not contribute to the progression of history.

As Scudder’s text exemplifies, Native American history was at most a footnote in the historical narrative presented to native students, if not a total silencing. Furthermore, one can see how, in the few pages devoted to the topic, history education worked to position native and Euro-American societies in their respective places on the social continuum. Perhaps most telling of how this narrative drove the colonizers, and in turn how they sought to fix their version of history into the minds of the colonized, is the first question from the 1918 fifth grade final examination in history, civics, manners, and right conduct; “When and by whom was America discovered?”26 One knows the “correct” answer to this question. But consider what it meant for a native child to give such a response. To answer this question repeatedly is to relegate one’s heritage, indeed one’s parents and grandparents to mere stepping stones over which Europeans marched on their path of progression.

AMERICAN PROGRESSION, NATIVE STAGNATION

It was not enough to condemn all Native American societies as stunted in social development. This native infancy needed to be juxtaposed with the maturity of modern Euro-American culture. Not only was this juxtaposition one of antiquity versus modernity, so too was it a comparison of the cruelty of the savage with the benevolence of the saint. Just as Gast’s painting showed American progress spreading light across the continent, history education was meant to teach native children to loathe their elders for being savage impediments to white progress. Thus, when dealing with historical encounters between Native and European-Americans, history education further promoted the progress narrative through denigration and demonization of native society, and conversely extolled that of European-America.

After Wyoming Superintendent of Public Instruction Estelle Reel lent her support to President McKinley’s 1898 campaign, he appointed her to the position of National Superintendent of Indian Schools.27 Reel, in her 1901 uniform course of study curriculum guide, set the tone for how American history was to be taught in boarding schools across the country. Natives were not to be brought to any deep level of understanding in any field of study. Rather, “they should know enough about it to be good, patriotic citizens.”28 This limited understanding should “always seek to create a spirit of love and brotherhood in the minds of the children toward the white people.”29 This inculcation of patriotic love towards the usurper required creativity in what was presented and what was omitted. Realizing the near impossibility of presenting even a basic description of native-white encounters in a completely positive light, Reel and Morgan both required that history instruction individualize the guilt of particular usurpers so as not to attribute injustice to Euro-American society in general.30 With their own personal experience of the injustice of the colonizer, as well as that of their parents and tribal elders, it stands to reason that this patriotic retelling of American history made the subject difficult for native children to swallow.31
These orders were not mere suggestions. Rather, Superintendent Reel made it clear that they were to be followed to the letter. Starting in 1901, Gertrude Golden spent seventeen years teaching in Indian schools in various states. In that time she had the opportunity to meet with Reel while she was visiting schools across the country to ensure her uniform course of study was being implemented with fidelity. During their encounter, Golden commented on the strained relationship she had with her superior. To this Reel replied, “Miss Golden, absolute, unquestioning obedience to superior officers is necessary in the Indian service.” Thus, the colonial machine sought to ensure that the native child faced a unified front in this cultural assault.

A review of the recommended history texts of the boarding schools reveals two clear means of omitting the genocidal history of the westward expansion of the United States. One method of masking the injustice was through omission of the presence of Native Americans. In many instances, Scudder’s text presented “Manifest Destiny” as a natural westward flowing of civilization into unoccupied land. Ignoring that the United States expanded via smallpox, slaughter, and broken treaties into lands inhabited by natives, Scudder presented narrative of the solitary settler in the wilderness.

Thomas W. Higginson’s Young Folks’ History of the United States noted how early European explorers encountered “no sign of human life, except, perhaps, a half-naked Indian.” With this sentence, one sees not just the marginalization of Native American presence on the continent, but also the marginalization of the native as a member of the human community. Later in Higginson’s text, the United States’ expansion received similar treatment as that found in Scudder’s work. In other texts, the omission is so complete that natives do not even receive this brief biased treatment. William A. Mowry’s Elements of Civil Government devoted two chapters to American history without even mentioning Native Americans.
When natives were not omitted from the history texts, a second theme that permeated these books was the shrouding of westward expansion in legalistic terms. Repeatedly Higginson referred to treaties as means of compensation for native land. The breaking of these treaties received little attention. In one three word sentence of this nearly three hundred page text, Higginson conceded that “Treaties were broken.” However, he used this brief instance of honesty to further solidify the cruel savagery of the native: “The Indian could answer only with the tomahawk, the blazing fagot, and the scalping-knife.”

In his discussion of early settlement, he noted how the Pilgrims settled all accounts with the natives, from purchasing corn to land. While he conceded that some of these treaties may seem unfair, he immediately reminded the reader that “we must remember that the knife or blanket might often be of more value to the Indian than a dozen square miles of forest land, especially as there was a whole continent left for him to occupy.”

While history lessons were required to distance European-Americans from instances of injustice, the exact opposite was the true for natives. History texts of the time reveled in their depictions of the cruelty and injustice of Native American toward the saintly settler. Early in Scudder’s text he noted that natives took every opportunity to interfere with the progress of the civilized settler, and he followed this with numerous references meant to cement native savagery in the mind of the reader. In discussing the heroism of Captain John Smith, Scudder described how “an Indian with a club was making ready to beat out the captive’s brains.” Higginson made similar reference to natives torturing captives. He went on to posit that Indians had no shame in killing unarmed settlers and burning villages.

Colonial curriculum placed natives anachronistically in pre-civilization and then went on to portray native society as not just stifled but cruel. In conjunction, the colonizer then sought to portray his civilization as Gast portrayed Columbia, bringing light to the darkness that was native society. This juxtaposition was perhaps most clearly presented to the native student in McGuffey’s Sixth Eclectic Reader. As noted in his preface, William H. McGuffey was very deliberate in his selection in his educational anthologies. In an included essay on North American Indians, author Charles Sprague showed no less deliberation in his denigration of the native, describing him as the “poor child of nature [who] knew not the God of Revelation.” The comparison of the native and the settler received no less biblical significance: “the anointed children of education have been too powerful for the tribes of the ignorant.”

The national leadership required patriotism to be woven into every lesson plan. Regardless of the particular subject, inculcating love of the colonizer was essential learning. Both Commissioner T. J. Morgan and Superintendent Reel made repeated references throughout their published works to how natives were to be, as Morgan put it, “taught to love the American flag.” In the minimal one and a half pages Reel devoted to music in her course of study, she insists that patriotic songs must be taught.

With Lewis Henry Morgan’s social evolution theory for backing, the colonizer was proud of his work catapulting the native into civilization. Many saw this work as a further testament to the “manifest destiny” of European-American society, the capstone of civilization. Thus, the curriculum sought to give credit for such philanthropy. Reel
saw history education as a venue for pointing out to the native the benevolence of the United States Government for providing Indian children with free education. The native student then had to prove his or her gratitude for the gift of civilization on test day. Another grade five final examination question prompted the native child to “[t]ell two things the Government is doing for the Indians, and two things the Indian must do for the Government.”

As Sun Elk’s story made clear, this national narrative was told and retold so as to implant the colonizer’s version of history into the children. The colonial conquest of the native mind was to be achieved through relentless repetition, eroding away the native’s living memory as the drop of water eventually carves out a cavern. So too, did the colonizer work to make the colonized question his own memory.

“TO GET AN INDIAN TO EARN”

The curriculum set about erasing the native child’s sense of history and his or her place in it. It then filled this void with history as understood by the colonizer in terms of the “savagery to civilization” narrative. The textual authorities undermined native identity by presenting it as an impediment in the way of history’s march of progress. With the child’s native history usurped and replaced with the national narrative, and his or her native identity made a source of shame in comparison with the grandeur of the colonizer, the final blow in this three-pronged academic assault was to sever any remaining ties to native tribalism, and replace this worldview with one of capitalist individualism. Native education then answered Superintendent Reel’s question: “How are we to get an Indian to earn...?”

Indian boarding school teachers of the era observed tribalism manifest in student behavior and academic performance. Whereas white society saw individual achievement as a driving force behind nearly all endeavors, including academic success, the native child’s cultural identity was constructed around collectivity. Thus, native students were much more reticent in the classroom, reluctant to raise a hand and differentiate themselves from their peers. In her numerous years teaching native students across the western United States, Gertrude Golden observed very little fighting among native students under her tutelage, which again seems to be a testament to tribalism.

As the narrative taught, the splendor of western civilization was built upon the drive for individual ownership of property. Lewis H. Morgan’s social evolution theory made clear that individual desire for ownership “marks the commencement of civilization.” Thus, the classroom as colonial institution set about educating the tribalism out of the child. Commissioner T. J. Morgan made clear that “Education should seek the disintegration of the tribes...” He was just as explicit in his desire to replace tribalism with a national identity. In his instructions on how boarding schools should celebrate George Washington’s birthday, he noted that along with the general silencing of native historical figures, “the heroes of American homes and history may be substituted as models and ideals.” Superintendent Estelle Reel directed that the classroom should be the venue from which the native could “rise out of the nonvolitional mass” and enter into American progress.
Reel asked, “How shall we change him from a destroyer to be a productive factor in our civilized society?”59 The answer was to replace savage collectivity with civilized capitalism. The overt means of promoting individual capitalism was via industrial education, which comprised half of the school day.60 However, similar to the pervasive patriotic indoctrination, the creation of a consumer culture in the minds of the native, coupled with the vision of menial labor as the means to achieving these material dreams, was also part of every lesson plan. As mentioned above, Reel did not want American history taught with any depth, for fear it may disrupt the narrative of benevolent U.S. progress. However, her history curriculum guide went to great length explaining how “[t]he dignity of labor should be impressed upon the minds of the Indian student....”61 She further posited knowledge of the natural inclinations of the native, prompting teachers to tell native students that agriculture was “peculiarly the industry of the Indians.”62

Teaching a native his predisposition to agriculture was no small feat. Thus, Reel was sure to take every opportunity to indoctrinate. Along with history, both geography and natural studies were important so far as they were a vehicle to further promote individual agricultural endeavors.63 To prove their understanding of the new relationship to the earth, students needed to name and describe six farm products, three farm animals, and three machines used for farming to pass the 1918 geography final exam.64 Arbor Day celebrations taught individual ownership of newly-planted trees.65 Even the arts, one of the most apt venues for the expression of one’s cultural identity, were hijacked for remolding purposes. Native children were taught to paint solely because “They will need it frequently on their farms.”66

Geography class was an effective means of educating natives out of their tribal relationship to the earth. History first taught natives how their former societies, stuck in savagery, contributed nothing to civilization. They next learned that severance from the tribe and individual agricultural labor was their means of entering modernity. Geography then showed the native the real importance of the earth in terms of accumulating property and that it was this lack of knowledge that left native societies behind while Euro-America paved the path of progression. Geography education replaced spiritual connections to the land with conquering of the soil. Superintendent Reel’s section on geography made this intention clear; “the real importance of the earth to man in giving him his living can not be too strongly emphasized, and the child must be led to think deeply on the subject as to how he can deal with the earth that it may yield him its best increase.”67

Zitkala-Sa, 1898
(Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Kenneth E. Behring Center)

Charles Eastman, 1916
This radical severing of tribal ties to land and community was not lost on the native student. Indeed, many student accounts spoke of the internal tumult created by the curriculum of colonization. Zitkala-Sa of the Dakota Sioux eloquently described the results of her boarding school education; “Like a slender tree, I had been uprooted from my mother, nature, and God.”68 In a similar reflection, Santee Dakota Dr. Charles A. Eastman noted, “I felt that my foothold was deserting me. All my savage training and philosophy was in the air, if these things were true.”69 Indeed this was the intention. Tribal collectivity was to be educated away, clearing space for the indoctrination of individualistic capitalism. The sturdy ground on which native culture stood for untold centuries was to be ploughed up and the seeds of civilization sown.

CONCLUSION: THE VANISHING INDIAN

The historical narrative taught in Indian Boarding Schools relegated native societies to the annals of history. Failing to progress, they were little more than an impediment to European-American progress. Tribalism was taught into extinction, individual capitalism was indoctrinated, and the American flag was firmly rooted onto the once barren North American continent. The curriculum of mental colonization practiced in these schools then can be summed up with one final examination question, answered through the native student’s new identity: Where is the Native American today? The answer, as written by the textual authorities was... “Gone.”

Cultural extinction was the essential lesson taught in the classroom as a colonial institution. As guest speaker Reverend J. A. Lippincott pronounced at the 1898 Carlisle graduation commencement, “The Indian is dead in you.”70 This was the message all along. Commissioner T. J. Morgan noted in 1890, teachers should “carefully avoid any unnecessary reference to the fact that they are Indians.”71 Indeed, the presence of the native child was an existential obstruction to the national narrative. The Indian must vanish, must be melted away by the light spreading across the once dark continent. This was how the textual authority ended the narrative.

“But this race is passing away.”72 With this dismissive statement, Higginson’s history text ended its brief description of American Indians. McGuffey’s reader painted this extinction in vivid color. Whereas for a short time the native’s “degraded offspring crawl[ed] upon the soil... Two hundred years have changed the character of a great continent, and blotted forever from its face a whole, peculiar people.”73

However, despite this push for cultural extinction, native identity persists. Native American children have not vanished, nor are they the only disenfranchised demographic filling the seats of classrooms across the country. We must acknowledge that curriculum and teaching has been used for purposes of indoctrination. Furthermore, teachers standing in front of modern, diverse groups of students need to be aware of the unstated lessons taught within the stated objectives. While this is not to suggest in any way that public education today is akin to the overt attempts to destroy native culture in turn of the century boarding schools, a continued vigilance of cultural sensitivity and the inclusion
of various perspectives must be maintained. Awareness of past hijackings of education for destructive, political ends helps maintain this vigilance. While the boarding school buildings crumble, the attempted colonial domination of the native mind is a legacy that must be remembered.
Mile High Stadium, 1976
(Denver Public Library)
“The Tampa people have learned what it cost me five years and a lot of money to learn, that you can’t just step in and move a big league team,” Denver oilman Marvin Davis told the Rocky Mountain News in late October 1983. “The way things stand,” Davis continued, “expansion is the only way we’re going to get a team. No matter what offer you’d make for an existing team, it would only be your first step. You’d be facing possible imminent domain actions and a never-ending series of lawsuits.”

Davis knew what he was talking about. The Denver millionaire tried relentlessly through the late 1970s and early 1980s to bring a major league franchise to the Mile High City. With limited support from his local government and facing opposition from each franchise’s home city, Davis’ efforts continually fell flat. Davis had given up on buying a major league team outright due to these problems, and merely watched as Tampa Bay’s businessmen floundered through the same mistakes while trying to acquire a team from another city.1

Marvin Davis first attempted to buy an existing major league franchise and transfer it to the Mile High City in 1977. Negotiations between Davis and the Oakland Athletics owner, Charles O. Finley, had reached their apogee in December when Finley agreed to sell the team to Davis and allow them to move to Denver and begin playing ball at Mile High Stadium at the opening of the 1978 season. One obstacle stood between Davis’ dream of owning a team: the lease that Finley and the Athletics held with the city of Oakland and

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Justyn Larry is pursuing a Masters in history, focusing on the twentieth century United States at the University of Colorado Denver. Justyn is interested in how politics shape the physical landscape of downtown, and plans to continue work on this topic and expand on the ideas explored in Clutch Hitter in his thesis.
the Oakland Coliseum that ran through the next decade. This proved a bigger problem than either Davis or Finley expected. The revenue generated by the Athletics through their lease at the Coliseum and the prestige Oakland boasted as a “big league” town, proved too much for the city to let them go. The Denver oil magnate’s cursory attempts to obtain a franchise fell flat in Denver’s boom years. As the economic situation in Denver grew worse and downtown began to struggle, efforts to gain a major league baseball team took on a new dimension and began to look like an answer for revitalizing downtown. If a man as wealthy as Davis could not bring a team in by himself, perhaps Denver needed to find a different solution.2

Throughout the nation’s history, downtowns across America have undergone periods of boom and bust. Scholars have explored the purposes and techniques employed to bring downtown back to prominence when businesses and people move away from the area. Historians agree that politicians and businessmen both work diligently to promote downtown to draw people into civic centers through different improvements or attractions, thereby boosting the area’s economy. Additionally, historical studies have begun to address the effects that boosters predicted and promoted in their efforts to draw consumers back into the downtown area. They discuss the presence of coalitions created from the interactions between politicians and private businesses, and investigate the interplay between business and government and their separate agendas regarding to growth in cities. Alongside the study of the parties involved in pro-growth politics, scholars have begun to study the effects of public policies and the repercussions on how cities develop, or “policy feedback.” This “policy feedback” explains the lasting effects that policies such as new sales taxes, creation of politically motivated organizations, and efforts of politicians to bring private business into the political process, have on local politics and future relationships between business and local government.3

Early in the 1980s, Denver’s downtown had begun to struggle with a downturn in its economy. The city relied on a first-term mayor to help resolve their fiscal problems and revitalize business in the downtown area. One of the goals for stimulating development in downtown involved bringing a major league baseball franchise to the city. In The Sports Franchise Game, Kenneth Shropshire focuses on the efforts that cities undertake to obtain a major league team and explores the perceived economic and societal benefits that a team brings. Shropshire states that the cooperation between the private sector and the public sector to revitalize downtown relies on enhancing the city’s image in addition to the economics that govern the politics of growth. While money represents the most important factor for boosters in gaining a major league baseball team, civic image comes in a close second. Bringing in a major league franchise gives a city what Shropshire describes as a “big-league image.” Not only does the team bring more business to downtown, but increases the city’s esteem on the national level. Cities with a major league team gain prestige with their “big-league image,” and have an advantage over cities without major sports teams, giving them more influence when attempting to attract new business.4

Throughout the twentieth century, proponents of downtowns struggled to understand what consumers wanted or needed from downtown and endeavored to adapt to
the omnipresent change in consumer demands, altering the composition of downtowns across the nation over the course of the twentieth century. As the twenty-first century grew nearer, boosters gradually began to understand the factors that drew people into downtown and to appreciate that both their target audience and their audience’s interest in downtown changed over time.

The boosters involved in bringing baseball to Denver believed that a new team had the potential to improve the economy. However, they faced a unique challenge in that they needed to convince the Major League Baseball Commission that Denver met the standards set forth for what constituted a “big-league city.” They also had to persuade the taxpayers of Denver of the benefits.

In 1983 Denver elected a young politician running on a platform of growth and expansion. In his bid for Mayor of Denver, Federico Peña promised to bring business back to downtown. Part of this pledge involved bringing a major league baseball team to downtown to help improve the city’s image and economy. These campaign promises signified the beginning of an eight-year process that brought together elements of politics, private business, and the Denver voting populace, which Peña hoped would ultimately lead to a major league team in Denver.

Despite political and business leaders’ desire for a major league team, there existed elements in Denver that fought the process once they realized the sacrifices and demands that obtaining a team would mean for the city. The Major League Baseball Commission initially cited three criteria for a new franchise: an existing stadium, a strong fan base, and local ownership. Throughout the 1980s, as Denver endeavored to meet these obligations, the commission altered their terms making it more difficult to qualify for a team. As the financial costs for luring a team mounted, Denver’s ability to compete for a team came into question. The costs also raised the question of who really gained and lost in the quest for major league baseball. Detractors questioned a major league team’s ability to live up to the promises the boosters made, while boosters vaunted the ability of a team to revitalize the city’s economy. Eventually, the dream of major league baseball drew Mayor Peña into a fight on two fronts. The city enjoyed a solid fan base eager to adopt a team, but the cost of building a stadium to comply with the Major League Baseball Commission’s demands relying primarily on Denver’s taxpayers, spawned criticism and new antagonists that threatened to upset Denver’s hopes for a team.

To overcome these obstacles, Mayor Peña built a coalition of politicians at the city and the state levels that worked with private businessmen to raise private funds to lobby major league baseball for a team and to persuade the Denver public that the future financial gains outweighed the immediate pecuniary costs they faced.5
CREATING A ‘BASEBALL CLIMATE’

Denverites had clamored for a team since 1959 and major league baseball had continuously disappointed them. For Marvin Davis, the fight for a team persisted until voters elected Federico Peña as their mayor in 1983. As Davis and Charles O. Finley tried to overcome the problem of the Athletics’ lease in Oakland, the two men tried to find some compromise that would enable Finley to sell the team through the first quarter of 1978. The Athletics were struggling to meet their operating costs and attract a larger fan base. The team was hemorrhaging money in Oakland, competing with the San Francisco Giants for the attention of the Bay Area, and Finley desperately wanted to sell the team to someone willing to move the Athletics. “The Giants… would benefit by having competition from the A’s for the Bay Area baseball dollar removed,” Rocky Mountain News columnist Bob Collins stated. With the Giants playing not far from the Coliseum, the market simply could not sustain two teams during this era. The San Francisco Giants wanted the A’s out of town so badly that they offered to play half their home games at the Coliseum if the City of Oakland, Alameda County, and the Oakland Coliseum would let them release the Athletics from the obligations in their lease.

Local politicians and businessmen posed the largest problem for teams seeking to change locations and find a fresh start in a new city as well as for boosters from other cities seeking to lure their team away. What Denver boosters had worked for since 1959, boosters in cities with a major league baseball team already possessed. Major league baseball represented a commodity that had the potential to pump millions of dollars to the local economy each year. When the Pittsburgh Pirates investigated moving to a different city in late 1981, business leaders in the city expressed outrage. “The Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce says major league baseball is responsible for bringing in $33 million in the local economy each year,” stated T.J. Simmers, writer for the Rocky Mountain News. The benefits caused business and political leaders to fight against anyone threatening to steal a commodity that brought such a significant amount of money into the local economy.

By 1983, the Denver oil magnate had given up on buying a team from another city and luring it away from its home market. He realized that lobbying the Major League Baseball Commission for expansion represented the only viable option. “Marvin Davis, after hammering futilely at baseball for five years with his oversize wallet in an effort to buy an existing major league team and move it to Denver,” Denver columnist Bob Collins stated, “has turned his attention to getting an expansion team and is talking with Tampa, Florida interests about a two city approach to accomplishing this goal.” Davis finally realized that support from business and civic leaders ultimately decided whether a team stayed or left. His new tactic, contingent on Major League Baseball and their desire to expand, would require much more than just a substantial bank account. To successfully pressure the league for expansion and obtain a franchise, Davis needed the backing of Denver’s political leaders with a willingness and ability to create a coalition capable of working toward this goal.

After five years of hard work, Marvin Davis, who now understood that private business needed the support of the local government, turned the pursuit over to the politicians. While still interested in owning a major league team, in 1983 Davis stood aside and let...
newly elected Mayor Peña lead the lobbying campaign with Major League Baseball. The mayor set about the task of bringing baseball to Denver almost immediately. Only months after he took office, Peña left for New York to meet with Charles Feeney and Lee MacPhail, Presidents of the National League and American League, respectively. “They continue to have very good feelings about Denver with respect to location and enthusiasm on the part of our fans and the support in general from the entire community,” said Peña, in an interview with Rocky Mountain News journalist Chris Broderick. Mayor Peña pledged to keep up his lobbying efforts with league officials to maintain a presence and to continue to emphasize Denver’s desire to host a team.9

In contrast to Marvin Davis’ effort to gain a team utilizing limited political resources, Mayor Peña hoped to coordinate efforts between his office and local businesses. He did this not only to lobby for a team with the Major League Baseball Commission, but also to combat criticism in Denver that would arise over the money spent on their initial lobbying efforts, and eventually the costs for a new stadium. Continuing to work off and on with local oilman Marvin Davis, the Mayor hoped to expand his base of private cooperation. Throughout his two-term effort to gain a major league baseball team, at one time or another Peña’s coalition enjoyed support from the local branch of AT&T, Adolph Coors Brewing Company, the Denver Chamber of Commerce, and wealthy local businessmen John Dikeou, Neil Macey, and Steve Earhart. AT&T and the Chamber of Commerce allocated funds to lobby for a team with the Major League Baseball Commission and helped support efforts in Denver to convince the populace of the financial potential a new baseball team represented for the city, while Coors and Dikeou provided money to buy and own the rights to a potential team. Peña relied on these private entities chiefly to monetarily support Denver’s bid for a team. Their assistance also enabled the city to maintain a presence with the Major League Baseball Commission and helped to lobby the public to support the city’s drive to meet the Major League Baseball Commission’s conditions.10

BOOSTING DENVER’S IMAGE

Before Federico Peña took office in 1983, Mayor Bill McNichols and his administration led Denver through an energy boom and the rapid development that followed through the boom in 1970s and the early 1980s. In the winter of 1982, the price of oil began to drop and the money from the oil industry that had protected Denver’s economy from the national recession began to dissipate.

As the economic situation worsened in the Mile High City, construction in Denver
continued unabated. In 1980 and 1981, oil companies leased a quarter to a third more space than they needed, which constituted roughly forty to forty-five percent of all leased space in Denver. With rents rising in the downtown area, the large oil companies leased massive amounts of office space with the expectation that their future development necessitated the space. Builders created millions of square feet of office space before the economic crash. After taking office in the summer of 1983, Mayor Peña inherited a beautiful, almost fully developed city, but one without the business or opportunity to sustain it.\footnote{11}

As the energy industry redesigned downtown to suit their needs, the creation of this massive amount of office space pushed retail shops out of the city’s core and virtually eliminated the foot traffic downtown. Dan Love, head of Oxford Ansco, and one of North America’s leading core city developers, stated, “If I were... Denver, I would be disturbed about the dissipation of retailing downtown. There is no city in America that has a strong downtown except the ones that have strong retail.” The focus on the creation of skyscrapers and office space in Denver created an economy dependent on oil. With retail space dwindling and rent prices steadily on the rise, retail stores had begun to move to the suburbs. In the transition, the city began to lose its sales tax revenue generated by the retail trade. The oil business had driven the decisions regarding Denver’s growth for the last fourteen years with little input from the city government. Peña’s vision for downtown Denver involved the interaction between public and private interests. By bringing a major league franchise to Denver, Peña hoped to revitalize the downtown area by revitalizing the populace’s interest in downtown and luring retail business back as well.\footnote{12}

When Federico Peña took office as Denver’s Mayor in 1983, he believed major league baseball could greatly benefit the city if he could generate cooperation between his office and Denver’s businessmen to work together to not only convince Major League Baseball to expand one of the two leagues, but to offer Denver one of the new franchises.\footnote{13}

The freshman mayor believed that Denver had a good shot at gaining a new franchise, and hoped to use the city’s existing stadium to meet one of the Major League Baseball Commission’s criteria. Peña intended to use Mile High Stadium to house a new team, but the struggling city would need to float the bill for the aging stadium’s renovation. To offset the sting to Denver’s taxpayers of the $650,000 cost of remodeling the stadium, he directed attention to a study initiated and funded by the Denver Chamber of Commerce delineating the benefits of a new team for the city. The Chamber projected that a new baseball team could bring as much as $85 million into the Denver economy in the first year, with an estimated $11 million per year after that, and roughly $2 million per year in tax revenues. The report also noted that Denver possessed “fanatical fans,” an existing stadium, and a desirable location, which fulfilled two-thirds of the Major League Baseball Commissioner’s requests. Peña and the boosters hoped to use the report’s findings as “ammunition” in the fight between cities once the league decided to expand.\footnote{14}

An existing stadium and a report lauding Denver’s fans looked nice on the city’s resume, but Mayor Peña and his supporters needed to maintain a presence and show Commissioner Ueberroth that they satisfied his other requirements. Peña cited “very close contact” with the major league expansion committee as one of the most important policies that the city needed to maintain. “A second city effort,” the mayor stated, “will be
to support ‘showcase’ kinds of events that will show the baseball world that Denver is a big league town.” In the drive to obtain an expansion franchise, Denver’s boosters needed to prove that Denver had the prestige associated with big league cities.15

In May the following year, the mayor took another step forward in his efforts to lobby the Major League Baseball Commission for an expansion team with the formation of the Denver Baseball Commission. AT&T funded the Baseball Commission with a generous contribution of $75,000, and promised a total of $160,000 in total spread over the first three years of the Commission’s operations. Mayor Peña appointed Steve Katch as the Commission’s Executive Director, with the sole goal of bringing Major League Baseball to the Mile High City. “We believe that the commitment today by AT&T marks a new era for public/private cooperative efforts in general and Denver’s move to obtain big league baseball in particular,” Peña stated regarding the formation of the commission and the generous financial commitment by AT&T’s local office. This cooperation between private business and public officials marked one of the biggest preliminary steps in Denver’s move toward a major league team and proved vital to the mayor’s, and the city’s, efforts.16

Prior to the formation of the Denver Baseball Commission, the Denver Chamber of Commerce and local business executives put up scant amounts of money to fund the Mayor’s lobbying efforts. The city needed more powerful backers to help showcase the city. “Denver need[s] to do more than just rely on oilman Marvin Davis and other potential owners to work for a franchise,” Peña stated. In an ailing economy, Denver needed all the help it could get to present a favorable front for Major League Baseball. “There are communities like Seattle and Toronto... that got a major league franchise before Denver did,” Denver Baseball Commissioner Katch contended, “in my opinion, simply because of the laissez faire attitude that had been taken in the past.” Denver’s failure over the years to gain a Major League team stemmed from a soft approach and the dearth of meaningful political support to bring a team to the city. Previous efforts lacked the cooperation between the city and local businesses that characterized Peña’s drive to bring a team to the Mile High City. Katch agreed with the mayor’s assessment that keeping a strong and consistent presence through lobbying and local events provided the key to landing a team.17

The privately funded Denver Baseball Commission worked with the mayor’s office to draw positive attention to Denver from the Major League Baseball Commission in a variety of ways, including exhibition games to display the fervor that Denver’s fans showed toward baseball. Because the Major League Baseball Commission insisted on a strong fan base as part of their criteria, Denver’s boosters wanted to display their fan’s enthusiasm for the sport. In 1985, the city hosted one of many of these games, between the Chicago Cubs and the Seattle Mariners, brought to Denver by the Baseball Commission. Mayor Peña released a proclamation for the event, which read, “I, Federico Peña, Mayor of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, do hereby proclaim April 6 and 7, 1985 as the only official Sunny and Warm Major League Baseball Days in Denver.” While clearly a promotional stunt, the mayor’s proclamations served to keep the spectacle of major league baseball in the public eye and to draw attendees to the game to show the Major League Baseball Commission Denver’s commitment to the sport.18
Despite the abysmal weather that plagued the games throughout the weekend, they succeeded in drawing huge numbers of fans, demonstrating Denver residents’ dedication to the sport, and willingness to make baseball successful. The exhibition game sold 60,000 tickets for the two games and the Denver Post boasted that attendance reached over 42,000 for the first day of the games, despite temperatures that hovered in the mid-thirties for most of the day. The Denver Baseball Commission and the mayor clearly designed the event to create publicity to draw the attention of major league baseball. The buzz the mayor created in the local press, along with the Denver Baseball Commission’s success at bringing major-league baseball to Denver, even if only for a few games, combined with the Denver fans’ overwhelming response and willingness to attend the game in less than ideal baseball weather, spoke to the city’s yearning for major league baseball. The mayor and the privately funded commission sent a strong message to the Major League Baseball Commission that Denver had what it took to host a team.19

Even with such a huge outpouring of fan response to the games and the promotion that the City of Denver put in to these types of events, and lobbying, the effort to draw baseball to Denver drew critics, even at the earliest stages. Through 1984, the baseball effort in Denver cost almost $300,000 in goods and services provided by the city, plus whatever extra cash private individuals and business invested in the effort. Rocky Mountain News Staff Writer Kevin Simpson questioned the expense in a front-page article. In interviews with Major League owners and officials, Simpson questioned the costs. “I don’t think it’s necessary,” American League president Bobby Brown stated, “No matter what the people in Denver did, as long as the baseball hierarchy knows they’re interested in a franchise, we know the city is viable and under consideration.” Denver baseball fans had heard this rhetoric before. Over the last three decades, the city’s efforts to gain a team went unrewarded, largely due to lack of effort. Since 1959, the story remained unchanged. Major league baseball told city officials and businessmen in Denver that they would receive a team; Denver let the pressure off and subsequently lost out when expansion occurred. Local politicians and businessmen cited this repeated slight to Denver in response to the journalist’s questions and added that the quest for baseball required a lot of money, but the rewards outweighed the costs.20

The tough economic climate in Denver created further animosity towards baseball and detractors used this sentiment to characterize the national pastime as an industry that capitalized on the poor by subsidizing baseball at the local and state levels to line the pockets of the rich. Denver Post editorial writer Dick Meister chimed in on this issue in a column in the newspaper and described the public expense that San Francisco laid out for the Giants. San Francisco politicians condemned land, raised millions of dollars through bond issues to build a stadium, new streets, parking, and justified these taxpayer expenses by noting the perceived rewards the city stood to gain. Meister, a free-lance writer from San Francisco, wanted to warn the Denver public that cooperation between private businesses and government to bring baseball to Denver likely would end up placing the cost on the taxpayers, while the players, owners, and businessmen reaped the rewards.21

As the criticism toward baseball began in the Denver press, Major League Baseball’s Commissioner Peter Ueberroth threw Denver another curveball as the 1985 season
opened, challenging the gains that the mayor and his coalition had attempted to make. “I only favor expansion where there’s a city that qualifies to get a team,” Ueberroth stated. “There are none that qualify right now.” The Major League Baseball Commissioner’s 1985 criteria included: an owner with roots in the community, a good fan base, and city, county, and state support. The criteria implied political support from all levels, as well as support from the private community. Despite Mayor Peña’s efforts to bring together his office, public business, and the Denver public during his first years in office, he had failed to help the city meet the Baseball Commission’s new criteria for expansion.

Governor Dick Lamm, the Denver press, and Mayor Peña immediately challenged Ueberroth’s remarks in a collective rebuttal of the commissioner’s appraisal of the Mile High City. “That assessment is a slap in the face to Denver, and its sports fans,” said Peña, in an interview with Denver Post writer Joni Blackman. The mayor continued and cited the turnout of roughly 77,000 fans that sat through miserable weather at the previous weekend’s two exhibition games. Peña’s immediate response and his clear disappointment with the baseball commissioner’s remarks signified the damaging effects that these comments had for Denver. The mayor’s retort appeared alongside an editorial from Denver Post writer Woody Paige, at the top of the front page the day after the commissioner’s comments. These prominently placed articles displayed displeasure of the mayor, the fans, and the Denver Post at the commissioner’s insinuation that Denver did not deserve a major league baseball team, while stirring up controversy and drawing attention to the city from the baseball commission.

The speedy response to Baseball Commissioner Ueberroth’s statements earned both Mayor Peña and Governor Lamm conversations with Ueberroth to clear up the matter and argue their case with the commissioner. The Denver Post released an article following an interview with Peña about his phone conversation with Commissioner Ueberroth. Both the mayor and governor received assurances that Ueberroth intended no slight toward Denver, but the city had work to do if it wanted a major league baseball team. Notwithstanding Peña’s initial response to Ueberroth’s comments, the mayor continued to maintain an open dialogue with the Baseball Commissioner and pushed for details on how the city might improve its standing.

In the months following the public debate between Ueberroth and Peña, the Mayor extended his effort to gain a major league team in a move that would draw further public criticism. The Denver Baseball Commission and Mayor Peña recommended publicly financing an $80 million stadium to lure baseball to the city. The request came months before Baseball Commissioner Ueberroth expounded on the necessary measures that each city must meet to qualify for a major league team. Ueberroth listed the initial three
benchmarks for a team as fan support, local ownership, and political support. Ueberroth added a usable stadium as the fourth criteria, leading Denver’s Baseball Commissioner Steve Katich to question Mile High Stadium as a place for a new team to play. “The stadium’s size is not the best for a major league team,” Katich claimed. “That’s not to say that Mile High won’t work. But the question... is this: If Denver doesn’t build a new baseball stadium, will someone else, and will we lose revenues to someone else after all our work to bring a team to town?” The issue of a stadium eventually entwined itself with whether or not Denver would gain a team and produced further public scrutiny regarding the cost to taxpayers. The political push for a baseball-only stadium intensified as the decade wore on and major league baseball’s demands for expansion cities grew increasingly rigorous. As Peña worked to create a climate that would bring a major league team for Denver and fulfill the requirements of major league baseball, Commissioner Ueberroth continued to add to his list.25

RAIN DELAY

Late in 1985, Baseball Commissioner Peter Ueberroth finalized his catalogue of requirements for cities seeking an expansion team, which included criteria that created new problems for Denver’s efforts. The new additions to the list included an owner with a net worth of $100 million, a baseball-only stadium, and a commitment of 10,000 full season ticket holders, amongst others. Business and political consultant David Greenberg commented on the demands in his weekly editorial in the Denver Post. “More cynical observers might conclude that the commissioner’s office isn’t really interested in expansion,” Greenberg alleged. “By setting unreasonable standards for expansion criteria, the commissioner has developed a way to slow the process down.” Outlandish as Ueberroth’s standards seemed at the time, Mayor Peña and Denver’s business elites moved to meet them during the rest of the decade.26

With the loss of one of their private supporters in 1986, Mayor Peña’s coalition began to hit rocky ground and the hunt for baseball in Denver started to become increasingly difficult. The Denver Baseball Commission’s main sponsor, AT&T, opted to discontinue their funding after their initial commitment and contribution ran its course. AT&T public relations director Jerry Arca stated, “We just feel it’s time for someone else to step forward now and carry on.” Denver Baseball Commissioner Steve Katich responded to Denver Post questions about AT&T’s decision to cease funding and
said that he expected AT&T to bow out after the third year, but that the commission remained committed to operating until Denver had a team. Katich listed income from events like the exhibition games that Denver hosted and public funding as means to keep the commission running.27

Over the next five years, Mayor Peña and the Denver Baseball Commission worked with local businessmen John Dikeou and Adolph Coors on plans for a new stadium and the other criteria necessary to gain a team and keep the dream alive in Denver. Denver real estate mogul Dikeou and his brothers had stepped forward in 1985 to purchase Denver’s AAA baseball team, the Denver Zephyrs. By 1988, the Dikeous and Mayor Peña had begun to draft plans to meet the ownership portion of the standards laid down by Commissioner Ueberroth. The effort gained further support in 1990, when the Dikeou brothers announced that Adolph Coors and Company had joined them as a limited partner in the Denver Zephyrs and would retain the same ownership in a major league team if the expansion committee awarded Denver a team. The Dikeous planned to maintain primary control of the triple A team and the major league franchise should Denver obtain a team, with Coors as a silent partner.28

PLAY RESUMES

While a potential ownership for a major league team in Denver began to coalesce, the initial steps to fund a new stadium had begun as well, initializing cooperation between Mayor Peña’s office and the State of Colorado. The first step these boosters undertook created the Denver Metropolitan Tax District, sponsored by House Representative Kathi Williams, and introduced in the State Legislature in January 1989. A collaboration between Williams, local businessman Neil Macey and John Dikeou, the bill proposed a one-tenth of one-percent sales tax on every ten dollars in the Denver Metropolitan area, with the hopes of raising $80-90 million in bonds to build a 40,000-plus seat, baseball-only stadium.29

Mayor Peña fully endorsed the measure raised in the House, but expressed his desire for the bill to explicitly name Denver and one of the sites he and the Denver Baseball Commission had researched as possible stadium locations, hoping it would draw more business downtown. “The presence of a major league team is an inducement to lure new industry,” the mayor stated. “It’s a drawing card that can influence decisions. Pittsburgh successfully has changed from a steel city to a high-tech city. Denver is looking for new, non-polluting businesses to replace the varnished energy industry as a financial base.”30 The presence of a major league baseball team signified growth and a vibrant downtown that had the ability to support industry. Not only would the team potentially bring money to the downtown in the form of attendees, but it also opened the door to the possibility of drawing new business and industry to Denver. In the late 1980s, Denver moved ahead steadfastly in its hunt for a major league baseball team, going so far as to request funding for a stadium from its taxpayers before expansion had even taken place. House Bill 1341, as the stadium tax bill became known in the Colorado House and Senate, eased its way through the legislative process following its introduction, and led to a vote on the proposed tax in August of the following year. The bill stipulated that a Stadium Committee would
choose the site following its approval by the Denver voters. Additionally, the sales tax only went into effect if the Major League Baseball Commission granted Denver a team.31

As House Bill 1341 sped towards approval and a 1990 vote, a major shift occurred in the major league baseball world that had potential to reward Mayor Peña’s seven years of hard work. Baseball Commissioner Peter Ueberroth announced that he intended to step down as commissioner. His replacement, Bart Giamatti, former president of the National League, mentioned in a press conference that work on expansion could potentially start in the summer of 1989. After more than half a decade of work towards his campaign promise, expansion finally had become a real possibility. As a major league team grew closer to becoming a reality, Peña and his coalition now faced barriers on two fronts. They needed to continue their efforts to convince Major League Baseball that they deserved a team while lobbying Denver’s citizens to pay for a new stadium.32

Critics began their campaign against the proposed stadium tax by questioning the rationale behind taxpayers funding a new stadium for a privately owned business. Denver Post editorial writer Tom Gavin, known for his cynical editorials focusing on events in and around Denver, led the assault in mid-February 1989. Gavin noted that the owners who built Mile High Stadium specifically for baseball did so with their own funds. The journalist argued that if the Dikeous wanted a new stadium, they needed to pay for it, not Denver’s taxpayers. Gavin continued to use this theme in articles attacking the stadium tax right up until the public vote on the issue. In an assault on Denver’s boosters and their repetitious discourse about the benefits to Denver’s economy, Gavin stated, “[Y]ou could get the black plague installed here if you billed it as good for the economy. More work for gravediggers, body-washers, home casket kit supplies, you know.” Though more verbose, his second column addressed a similar premise to the first, asking the voting public why they should subsidize a stadium for the private interests.33

In an interview with the Denver Post in mid-summer 1990, Mayor Peña addressed the public’s concerns about the new stadium and the associated expenses and tried to diffuse the problem of public taxation by requesting assistance from private companies to help defer the expense. When asked how he felt about adding a sales tax to fund the stadium, he stated “I feel more comfortable because it’s spread over the six-county area. There will have to be some kind of public participation in the funding. But it would also be very helpful to have some private participation.” Peña openly discussed the difficulty in adding a financial burden to Denverites and tried to solve the problem by noting that the proposed tax covered such a broad base of Denver’s population. The mayor also called public attention to his desire that private business would cooperate with the taxpayers and local government to help fund the project.34

Mayor Peña continued his public lobbying efforts by emphasizing the importance of the vote toward the end of the interview and the implications that the vote had in the eyes of the Major League Baseball Commission. When asked about the potential consequences of the public’s failure to support the upcoming vote, the mayor responded, “There couldn’t be a more negative statement to major-league baseball. I think it would be very difficult to ever get Denver back to No. 1 or No. 2 on the list.”
In all likelihood, if the vote had failed, the campaign to gain a major league baseball team anywhere in the near future would have failed with it. Peña also confidently compared the hunt for a franchise to the city’s attempt to bring AT&T to Denver, a fight that the city won. AT&T’s arrival in Denver marked a boost for the local economy, including the initial funding for the Denver Baseball Commission. By tying the AT&T to the hunt for major league baseball, the mayor hoped to show the Denver public the possible economic benefits for the city if he and his coalition could bring a major league team to town.³⁵

The stadium fight continued through the summer of 1990, right up to the election in August, with the local newspapers polling public opinion the whole way. Based on the survey results, the outcome remained uncertain. In early July, the Denver Post reported that in its most recent poll, forty-six percent of Denver’s voters said that they would approve the stadium bill, five percent remained undecided, and forty-nine percent opposed the measure. Despite all the work that led up to this pivotal moment, the opportunity to fulfill one of the primary criteria and convince the Major League Baseball Commission of Denver’s willingness to host a team remained uncertain.³⁶

Amidst the turmoil of the vote for the stadium, the private owners of Denver’s triple A baseball franchise and the potential rights to a major league team began to experience financial problems which drew negative publicity in the Denver papers. This created further chaos in the city’s major league hunt. During the summer of 1990, John was involved in two lawsuits with separate banks arising from missed principal and interest payments. To maintain a positive front and downplay the negative implications of a struggling ownership, Mayor Peña publicly defended the charges against Dikeous as commonplace in the real-estate business.³⁷

While one member of Peña’s coalition was experiencing financial difficulties, the stadium planners released their proposed plan for Denver’s new stadium in mid-July, which included a dramatically increased price tag. The new ballpark, as planned, would cost $139 million, a fifty-eight percent increase over the original price of $80 million, and well above the $100 million the August 14 vote would cover with the stadium sales tax. The designers pinned their hopes for the extra money on private business in the form of concessions, scoreboard ads, luxury boxes, club seating, and a corporate sponsor to name the stadium. Public-private cooperation gradually became indispensable as the city drew closer to the stadium vote and expansion.³⁸

The problems for Peña’s coalition continued to escalate as the election grew nearer, compounding his efforts to meet the Major League Baseball Commission’s criteria. Days after the planning committee announced increases in the proposed stadium price, the Dikeous further aggravated Denver’s problems. John Dikeou announced his intent to sell his Triple A team, the Denver Zephyrs and the prospective rights to Denver’s major league franchise. Amidst all the other problems facing the city in their quest for major league baseball, this announcement came at the worst possible time. Further intensifying the ownership problems, Coors altered its commitment to the city several days later when the brewer announced that they would rather put up the money to name the stadium than to remain on as silent partners. The two announcements sent Mayor Peña scrambling to address the new complications. “I don’t think that anybody should be pressured about
being an owner,” Peña commented. “[Dikeou] has to make the decision if he wants to go all nine innings.” Peña maintained a positive attitude while struggling to deal with the myriad of public problems that Denver faced leading up to the stadium tax vote. Outwardly unconcerned about the city’s possible inability to meet one of the key criteria to gaining a major league team, Peña noted that as he began his search for new owners, he needed to evaluate whether potential owners would announce their intentions before or after the stadium tax election. Peña understood that dealing with the problem of getting the stadium tax to pass took priority over finding new owners. The search for owners could resume following the stadium vote, but without a baseball-only stadium, the potential for the team disappeared.39

Mayor Peña’s struggles to meet the Major League Baseball Commission’s standards suffered another blow when the commission announced the franchise fee in the summer of 1990. Two weeks before the stadium tax vote, the National League announced a $95 million franchise fee required to bring a team to town. Prior estimates pegged the franchise price tag around $80 million and experts projected the initial startup costs for the team between $25 and $40 million in addition to the franchise fee. In the midst of all this tumult, the Major League Baseball Commission had asked that cities requesting a major league team fill out a questionnaire and required a $100,000 deposit to apply for a team, due in thirty days. Without a viable owner or ownership group, Denver’s boosters needed someone to step up to the plate and apply to the commission for a team, and come up with $100,000 deposit. “I’m confident a locally based ownership group will emerge,” the mayor stated.40 Always conscious of the necessity of maintaining an optimistic front, even in times of crisis, the mayor remained unflappable.

The rhetoric intensified in the local newspapers on both sides of the stadium tax debate as the stadium ballot date grew nearer, with proponents and critics lobbying Denverites to either endorse or veto Denver’s hopes for a new baseball team. John McHale, the Chairman of the Denver Metropolitan Major League Baseball Stadium District, the entity responsible for raising the money for a new stadium, discussed the benefits of major league baseball and a new stadium for the Mile High City. “The effects of baseball on the local economy have been virtually studied to death,” stated McHale. “All the studies arrive at a similar conclusion: Baseball will be a $90 million annual industry for the metro economy, and will create about 700 new jobs. Up to half of the revenue will be new money from tourists and out-of-state sources.” McHale and other boosters counted on tourists and visitors from the surrounding areas to bring “new money” to the area. These pleas for a new stadium to foster financial growth played well in Denver, a city struggling through economic depression.41

Detractors used the newspapers as a vehicle for their arguments as well and maintained the objections that they had begun voicing half a decade earlier. By using public funds, they asserted that the new ballpark would only benefit the wealthiest Denverites and hurt the bulk of the city’s citizens by levying a sales tax on the entire community. Chairman McHale noted that private companies intended to help foot the bill. Plans for a new stadium created a partnership between the city, which stood to contribute $97 million through sales tax revenue, and private investors who promised to contribute $47 million
to the project, both contingent on Major League Baseball’s decision to award Denver a team. In the adjoining response to McHale’s column in the Post, Clyde Harkins, vice president of the Colorado Union of Taxpayers, refuted this argument. The Colorado Union of Taxpayers, allied with the National Taxpayer’s Union, a bi-partisan lobbying group of citizens, sought to limit government spending and the influence of special interest groups. Harkins argued that money spent at the new baseball stadium represented money not spent at local businesses, which accounted for 85 percent of new jobs in the Denver metro area. “A taxpayer-built stadium subsidizes big businesses at the expense of small business,” claimed Harkins, “and the 80-85 percent of this area’s residents who likely won’t attend any baseball game except the annual fireworks extravaganza.” Harkins contended that the stadium unfairly taxed people who could barely make ends meet, which made no sense when the city had a perfectly good baseball stadium in the form of Mile High, built specifically for baseball. According to critics, the new stadium promised not to save Denver from its continued economic woes, but to drive a larger wedge between the upper and lower class by further enriching the wealthy, and placing another financial burden on those already impoverished. 42

Peña and Denver won a major victory in their bid for a major league baseball team on August 15, 1990. Voters approved the stadium tax and helped Denver move past one of the largest hurdles that the city faced in bringing a major league team to town. “Denver Mayor Federico Peña said the stadium guarantee ‘nails it for Denver.’”

Despite the mayor’s confidence, problems remained. The city still needed to sort out who would step up to take the Dikeous’ role as team owners, and the Major League Baseball Commission still needed to vote on which two city’s would receive the nod for a team.43 Following the acceptance of the Stadium Tax Bill, Denver’s boosters continued the search for a private owner to purchase the ownership rights for the team to fulfill the Major League Baseball Commission’s benchmarks. The answer to the ownership question came at the end of August. Denver Post journalist Irv Moss reported that a small group of local owners had begun the process to purchase the rights to a potential team. Moss reported that Colorado native Steve Ehrhart and New Yorker Mike Nicklous, provided the most significant financial backing and had become the new primary owners of the rights for Denver’s major league team, pending the Baseball Commission’s decision on the two new franchises locations. A meeting in New York the next month would determine Denver’s baseball fate and shed light on whether or not the hard work and money would pay off. 44

In their final promotional effort, Denver sent a baseball-lobbying contingent to New York to argue their case and convince the commission that the Mile High City met their requirements for a team. Mayor Peña, Governor Roy Romer, owner Steve Ehrhart, the Vice President of

![Governor Roy Romer](Denver Public Library)
Economic Development for the Greater Denver Chamber of Commerce, amongst others went to New York to represent the city and sell major league baseball officials on the idea of a National League team in Denver. “Denver baseball boosters emerged from a meeting with the National League yesterday wearing broad smiles and making broad claims about their ‘dynamite’ performance,” claimed Denver Post writer Paul Hutchinson. When asked about their odds for gaining a team following the meeting, Mayor Peña stated, “there are a reasonable amount of risks involved, but it’s well worth it. Time is an investment, but if you want to reap the rewards, you have to make the investment. This is a competition and there are some uncertainties involved.” Despite all the money spent, the hard work invested, and their convictions concerning the success of their New York performance, the political and business coalition that had worked so extensively to bring baseball to Denver now had to wait until the following summer for an answer.45

BASES LOADED, BOTTOM OF THE NINTH

While Peña and Denver awaited an answer from the Major League Baseball Commission, they had plenty of other tasks to fill their time. The city needed to select a site for the new ballpark, and Mayor Peña neared the end of his second term in office. Whether or not the major leagues selected Denver as the home to one of two new expansion teams, Mayor Peña and his coalition had done all they could to realize their goal. Following Marvin Davis’ failed attempts that led up to Mayor Peña’s two terms in office, every step the city took toward the dream of major league baseball presented a new struggle for Denver. Once the Mile High City had the full backing of both local business and politics, the coalition headed by Mayor Peña stood a much better chance of succeeding. The start from humble beginnings with a small baseball commission and meager budget had come within inches triumphing in the struggle for a major league team that had taken the city more than three decades.

Ignoring the colossal hindrances that lay in front of him, Mayor Peña had created an alliance that brought together many elements of Denver’s society. By doing so, he had fostered a climate that encouraged growth and change that resulted in the Mile High City’s success in the quest for baseball. The final decision on the two expansion teams came in June 1991 when the Major League Baseball Commission awarded Denver a National League team. In 1993, for the first time, a major league team based out of Denver would take the field in Mile High Stadium. Planners projected the completion of the new ballpark in Lower Downtown for 1995. Local newsmen lauded the Denver mayor as the driving force that brought baseball to town. “Mayor Federico Peña is going out as Denver’s Mr. Baseball,” stated Denver sportswriter Rockies, 2008

(Denver Public Library)
Irv Moss. “It doesn’t really matter that Denver’s first major-league baseball team will be officially awarded after Peña step[s] away from office. The National League expansion franchise will be delivered Friday and that’s close enough.” In addition to the accolades, Mayor Peña threw the first pitch out at a June 30 triple A baseball game between Denver and Omaha, in celebration of baseball’s immanent arrival. “Part of tonight’s celebration should be reserved for Peña,” Moss stated. “Among the six cities that were the finalists, Peña was the only mayor who was in office all eight years of the campaign. Whatever he throws tonight to start the game, Peña already has tossed his best baseball pitches. And they were all strikes.”

Coors Field, 2009
(Denver Public Library)
The Elk’s Lodge Massacre is a landmark event in punk rock history. At an Elk’s Lodge in Los Angeles on St Patrick’s Day 1979, fifty L.A.P.D. officers in full riot gear stormed an all-ages concert featuring the bands X and the Go-Go’s. Without warning, fans were brutally attacked with nightsticks and forced to flee. Fans threw bottles in self-defense; eight were arrested. The rest fled.

At a press conference the next day, the L.A.P.D. commander said simply: “[A] riot broke out and the police were called.” The police lieutenant who led the raid said, “It was a life or death situation; there were fights, people falling down stairs, and bottles were being tossed.”

However, the three entertainment reporters who witnessed the events told a different story. They claimed the police response was completely unprovoked. One entertainment reporter said, “The only time I saw people throw bottles was after police had angered and frightened them by their rough tactics. Usually when you deal with police you can establish some dialogue or logic with them. This time there was none.”

Punks called it the “Elk’s Lodge Massacre.” It marked a turning point in the punk scene in the Los Angeles area. After the Elk’s Lodge show, punk looked more threatening to mainstream culture, while the police looked more threatening to the punks. The incident also put Los Angeles punk on the map as people realized something musically exciting was happening in Hollywood. A mixed blessing, this event...
attracted fans who sought a little more excitement, and perhaps even violence, in their live music experience. These newer fans were younger, less arty, and considerably more rowdy. The majority of them hailed from the suburbs. Most were bored or curious, looking for something to break the monotony of the musically staid 1970s. But some were social misfits looking for somewhere to belong, something to fill the vacuum created by economic stagflation and a slew of domestic dysfunctions of leftover from previous decades. ³

Punk shows became significantly more violent in the coming months and years as the music (and the police response to it) turned ugly. Publicity from events like the Elk’s Lodge chaos certainly helped. Newer, younger bands fueled the new dynamic with faster music and an affinity for mayhem and nihilism. Bands seemed to spring up overnight, as did their young fans. The police continued to crack down on punks, and many L.A. venues banned punk rock shows (some voluntarily, others under police pressure). The older punk scene stalled in L.A. proper, but spread rapidly into suburbia. “Hardcore” – the name for this newer, younger, faster, and angrier form of punk, produced some of the best-known punk bands to emerge from Southern California. Hardcore spawned Black Flag, the Circle Jerks, the Descendents, the Vandals, Suicidal Tendencies, TSOL, the Minutemen, Social Distortion, Redd Kross, Agent Orange, the Adolescents, and Bad Religion. Compared to the other U.S. hardcore scenes, the Southern California hardcore scene provoked an astonishing amount of violence. Violence in the Southern California punk scene wasn’t limited to that of punks against cops, like at the Elk’s Lodge. It often included violence between fans as well as fights between musicians and audience members. Penelope Spheeris titled her 1981 documentary, which captured punk’s shift toward hardcore in Southern California, Decline of the Western Civilization. To many hardcore fans, that was exactly what appeared to be happening. What may be surprising is that punk fans wanting to see the film’s debut in Hollywood had to pass through one hundred members of the L.A.P.D. in full riot gear to get in. This was a unique occurrence in the history of Hollywood documentary debuts. Spheeris was quickly contacted by police chief Daryl Gates demanding she not screen the film again. She obliged. The power structure in L.A. seemed to view punk as a threat. Maybe it was.⁴

Why did hardcore appealed so widely to young suburbanites coming of age in 1970s Southern California and why the hardcore scene was so notably violent? Punk rock was at its core protest music designed to confront the worst of society head-on. Violence is the worst of any society’s ills, so why would hardcore punk music and the subculture built around it tolerate violence, or, even worse, celebrate it?

Was hardcore punk in Southern California was a significant social movement or merely a consortium of violent nihilists bent on destruction? In studying the violence of the hardcore scene, historians have looked at the alienation of teenagers as well as the social capital they gained from deviant or violent behavior. But these examinations only looked at the internal factors—that is, the psychology and sociology behind the band members and their fans—and did not tell the full story. Teens in Southern California did not have a monopoly on alienation or on hardcore punk. The Southern California hardcore scene developed at the same time hardcore began to take hold in a variety of U.S. metropolitan areas, including Washington D.C., Boston, San Francisco, Austin, New
York City, and Minneapolis. None of them spawned rioting like the Los Angeles scene. Therefore the internal factors alone cannot explain why violence was more prevalent in L.A.’s hardcore scene.

There are valid arguments regarding the internal, sociological roots of hardcore violence. The sense of alienation that developed in post-1960s suburbia was real. For one thing, there was a sense that the peace and love movement had failed. Anger seemed a natural reaction. The rising divorce rates and dysfunctional homes fomented by massive social change and brutal economic circumstances also tell an important part of the story. But external factors like police brutality and media hype fueled as much violence in the L.A. hardcore punk scene as societal shifts and teen angst.\(^5\)

**Origins of Punk**

Punk rock is a form of sped-up rock and roll originating in the 1970s, characterized by harsh lyrics attacking conventional society and dominant culture, often expressing alienation and anger. The music is often performed by novices with little musical virtuosity. Satisfaction for the listener is derived from the music’s raw emotional appeal. In a sense it is folk music, for the people, by the people. Songs often last under two minutes. Guitar solos are infrequent or non-existent.

Punk’s non-musical roots lie in a variety of socio-economic patterns that existed primarily in the Unites States and Great Britain in the mid-1970s. But it also was fueled by the state of rock and roll music itself, which a handful of musicians and fans saw as losing the urgency, authenticity, and quality it had enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s. The development was reactionary in a sense, but also a conservative movement meant to revive the energy of a once powerful medium that profoundly shaped youth culture, and by extension, mainstream popular culture itself as it became too massive to ignore.\(^6\)

**Origins of Hollywood Punk**

In 1977, New York punk band the *Ramones* and British punk band *The Damned* played in Los Angeles. This was the impetus for a small punk scene that emerged in Hollywood. The first wave of L.A. punk bands included *X*, the *Germs*, the *Dils*, the *Screamers*, and the *Weirdos*. They took their cues from diverse sources, much like the seminal New York scene had done in 1974. A small group of poets, artists, and college students coalesced around a small group of punk bands. Early on, fans and musicians were, for the most part, the same people. They were inspired by the punk groups passing through town and were given a reason to get excited about rock and roll again. But they were also inspired by what they saw as a society in decline, perhaps passed the point of no return. As John Doe of *X* recalled, “People realized everything was fucked up, and they couldn’t do anything about it and they didn’t want to. We wrote [songs] about how estranged we were.” Tony Kinman of the *Dils* put it a different way: “We were into [the] punk-rock revolution to destroy the way things were, to destroy the status quo.” The music that this small group of Hollywood punks created was loud, fast, sometimes angry, at other times funny, but it always exciting and vigorous.\(^7\)
Yet the Hollywood entertainment machine was not the least bit interested in signing, promoting, or listening to them. For the scene to survive and prosper, it had to promote and sustain itself. In late 1970s L.A., the radio was dominated by disco and the mellower sounds of groups like Journey, Styx, and REO Speedwagon. This softer side of rock aged well along with its audience. Still, not every young person in suburbia could relate to or build an identity around the Top-40 hits. The bigger venues in and around L.A. were available to established bands only. Smaller clubs preferred to showcase cover bands that played music people already knew. This left the new punk bands with virtually no venues to perform in. The first venue to showcase any sort of local punk rock show arose spontaneously. The Masque, ground zero for L.A. punk rock, was an abandoned Hollywood building rented out by musician turned club promoter Brendan Mullen. He rented the space for his band to practice in after being thrown in jail for disturbing the peace while practicing at his home. He then subsidized his rent by allowing other bands to practice there. The types who showed up at his space were all untrained followers of the punk aesthetic. The bands practiced during the week but had no place to play on the weekends. Mullen decided to let the bands play for audiences in the rehearsal space and named it the Masque. Bands played for free in front of tiny audiences and the space was completely unlicensed. Eventually the Weirdos, a group made up of local art students that practiced at the Masque, asked if they could charge money for their shows to pay for the theatrical props they used. Mullen said yes, and others followed suit. Hollywood punks now had a venue, and many of them, like Don Bolles of the Germs, rented living quarters at the Canterbury Apartments a block away.

To promote the scene, punk aficionados created fanzines. Zines, as they were called, had been around since the 1960s but were taken to a more amateurish level within the punk scene. They were an important part of the do-it-yourself (DIY) ethic that was crucial to the survival of punk rock. Zines were irregularly released, typically Xeroxed or cheaply printed collections of band reviews, record reviews, letters, ads for underground stores and bands, photos, interviews, and articles about the punk scene. They were sold at concerts and mom-and-pop record stores. Some of the early L.A. zines like Slash and Bomp! evolved into record labels. Slash released the first albums by X and the Germs. An ex-employee of Bomp!, Lisa Francher, started Frontier Records in 1980 and put out many significant hardcore records. A refusal of Bomp! owner Greg Shaw to put out Black Flag’s first single inspired Greg Ginn of Hermosa Beach, a small L.A. suburb, to start his own record label, SST.

A small handful of seedy venues like the Olympic Auditorium and the Whisky A-Go-Go eventually allowed punk performances. But most venues tried to keep punk away. Few knew what to make of punk and its underage audience. Other venues were pressured by the police to follow suit. Punk bands already had trouble finding venues to play and usually played at house parties, rented out their own halls, service lodges, community centers, or found obscure clubs or ethnic restaurants in gritty areas looking for a little extra cash. Playing in rougher parts of L.A. like Watts, South Central, Downtown, Koreatown, and East L.A. inadvertently added to the dangerous mythos of punk and created a need for punks to travel in groups for safety.
As the punk scene grew and attracted bigger audiences, acts of violence and vandalism by a few members of the younger crowds looking for excitement became more common. Rowdy dancing, broken windows, holes in walls, and sinks knocked of pedestals in bathrooms were played up in the newspapers and on news programs. This created a viscous cycle as violence and vandalism that drew media attention, and media attention that drew larger crowds. This combined with punk airplay by non-profit suburban college radio stations like KXLU, plus the widely heard and influential Sunday night “Rodney on the ROQ” program on semi-commercial KROQ, to vastly increase the punk scene.

As punk rock grew, the authorities took notice. The Masque was shut down in 1978 for not having any licenses. Fundraisers to revive the venue at The Elk’s Lodge were for naught. Still the small punk scene thrived and began a strange and violent life of its own.

**ORIGINS OF HARDCORE**

Punk rock in L.A. began with a truly artistic impulse. As such it did not really conform to any rules or a single style. Early on, bands like The Go-Gos and Devo, who moved to L.A. from Ohio in 1979, were considered punk. It should be noted as well that punk rockers like Darby Crash of the Germs, and John Doe of X were, like most of the first wave of punk rock fans, baby-boomers. In L.A., many of the promoters of early punk rock like Greg Shaw at Bomp! and Rodney Bingenheimer at KROQ were as well. They remembered the 1960s and sought to bring back the excitement of 1960s garage rock in a new form. Punk allowed them that opportunity.12

But the younger generation caught punk fever, came to Hollywood, and took the scene in a different direction. Out in the suburbs they heard media reports about Hollywood punk and listened to punk records played on stations like KROQ on Sunday nights. The violence that seemed to follow them into the clubs caused venues to ban punk from dozens of clubs in L.A. This younger generation wanted their punk music to adhere to a narrowly defined version of punk. It had to be super-fast, super angry, and super simple. It had to be the “punkest” of the punk. They called it “hardcore” though the term was not in wide use until 1981.13

The turning point at which hardcore overtook the more conceptual Hollywood punk scene was significant because it codified punk rock. As rock critic Michael Azerrad noted, early punk rock was an ethos, but hardcore turned it into a genre. A new rigidity entered the hardcore scene and “the singers seemed like drill sergeants.” Hardcore punks were expected to conform to a certain musical style, dress, and attitude. This is when the hardcore subculture that was associated with so much violence emerged.14

**VIOLENT SUBCULTURES**

Hardcore became a true subculture. Subcultures appeal to young people who perceive themselves as marginalized by the dominant cultural institutions. In a subculture, young people create identities apart from the mainstream of society. This is because youth are confined to a rigid structure, have virtually no economic or political power, and are constrained by home, school, and work where they are asked to abide by the rules and beliefs
established by others. They carry out their belief structure and style in public spaces like streets and concert venues. Style can be expressed with dress, attitude, or hairstyle, and is intentionally visible to others. The reaction they get from their style helps identify them as part of a subculture.

Steven Baron examined North American hardcore subcultures and the violence that accompanied them. He believes that within a subculture, like that of hardcore punk fans, violation of the social order, either symbolically or actually, is endemic. In this way, members can achieve status, which regular society denies them, through antisocial behavior. Violence, he theorized, increased prestige among suburban hardcore punks. In a way, it was a requirement for membership in this group. In hardcore subculture violence was appeared as self-mutilation (cutting, piercing, tattooing, and self-inflicted cigarette burns), slam-dancing, fighting in parking lots, and rioting or throwing bottles at police.15

In this sense, violence took many forms: against oneself, against fellow punks, and against outsiders. Were hardcore punks around L.A. simply nihilistic, or were they defending themselves against a real threat? The answer is a little of both. But neither reason alone is enough to explain the level of chaos that permeated the L.A. hardcore scene.16

Deviance within a culture, even in a free society, demands response. Dominant cultures respond to subcultures in a variety of ways. One way is through the commodification of a subculture. That is, a style can be marketed and sold, even be brought into the dominant culture. The media can also react to the group by creating a “moral panic” which amplifies the deviance that some of the members engage in and applies it to the entire group. Both of these reactions occurred as more and more young people became part of the hardcore subculture. Ads for temporary colored hairspray appeared on television, Saks Fifth Avenue sold $100 gold safety pins, and the L.A. Times, television news programs, and even television dramas like CHiPs and Quincy, M.E., and sitcoms like Square Pegs and Silver Spoons, portrayed hardcore punk rockers as violent miscreants to be shunned.17

It is not possible for a dominant culture to completely neutralize a subculture through commerce or the media, however, because not all activities of the subculture can be manipulated by the media or exploited by commercial outlets. The more serious elements of a subculture must sometimes be dealt with by law enforcement and the court system. This is what happened to the hardcore subculture. Hollywood punk was vanishing, but interest in hardcore punk spread throughout surrounding suburbs. When these suburban kids came to L.A. looking for hardcore, the police were waiting, the media followed, and so the hardcore subculture faced a frontal assault on two fronts.18

The hardcore subculture that developed in suburbia was fueled not by artistic experimentation like the Hollywood punk scene had been. The suburban youth that hardcore appealed to were wrestling with different issues. Some had a difficult home life as divorce rates doubled from 1970-1980. Severe inflation, unemployment, the 1973 oil embargo and a subsequent recession shrank family budgets and forced both parents in many two-parent households to work, thus spending less time with their kids. The 1970s were characterized by deep economic and social problems that have been examined extensively. Tony Cadena, who started the Orange County punk band, the Adolescents, explained punk’s appeal to him and described where he grew up as a
very suburban right wing, white middle-class stifling environment....

[T]here was no father in my family. We were dysfunctional. A welfare family in an upper-middle class neighborhood. Punk came along at just the right time. It gave me a chance to reject everything I couldn’t have anyway. I started bringing bands into my garage to rehearse. It was exciting to tip that ‘hood on its ear. It was the final fuck you.19

Young people with feelings similar to Cadena were by no means a majority, but there were enough of them around near where he lived in Fullerton, California, to build a punk rock scene and start a few great hardcore bands. As the social ills and economic malaise continued, more young people were seduced by hardcore. As they realized there were other kids just as unhappy as they were, punk became an alternative culture for them, and an alternative family as well—a family with its own set of rules and attitudes about behavior, including violence.20

Hardcore musicians and their subculture of fans created a bizarre alternative world with its own set of rules, fashion, beliefs, and rituals. The hardcore fashion ritual was quite different than proceeding punk concepts of fashion. Fewer dog collars, Mohawks, and safety pins were seen. Hardcore males (and some females to a lesser extent) cut their hair short with electric clippers to prevent hair-pulling during possible fights. Steel-toed combat boots were beneficial for the same reason. Army surplus jackets were also common. It was a militaristic look for youth ready for combat. Another ritual worth examining is the notorious violence that seemed to consistently pervade the hardcore scene. Punks were under constant threat from anyone not punk, which was just about everyone. And the threat was real, whether from police, jocks, drunken construction worker types, or rival groups of territorial punks. Being punk was dangerous. Hardcore style developed out of boot-strap self-defense. Traditional modes of self-defense, such as police or sympathetic citizens, were without question, unavailable.21

HARDCORE VIOLENCE

Music critic Michael Azerrad and others have called Black Flag, a band that originated in 1977 in Hermosa Beach, California, the inventors of hardcore. They are the epitome of hardcore: they were the first. They had their own record label. They toured relentlessly and promoted themselves with brilliant, challenging artwork. Their music was brutally distorted, loud, and angry. They also stood up to the police. They began playing at parties and would invariably be shut down by the police after 20 minutes. They were excluded from playing the Masque in Hollywood early on because they did not fit in with the Hollywood punks, and they lived too far away (15 miles west) to be accepted as part of the local scene. Instead they played in rented halls, youth centers or anywhere they could. Their first gig was at the Moose Lodge in Redondo Beach in front of about 100 people. Later they began to play regularly at the Fleetwood, a former Ralph’s supermarket in Redondo Beach. They developed a sizable following which made the Hollywood punks take notice. Another group that took notice was the wild punks from Huntington Beach in Orange County.22
Chuck Dukowski of Black Flag discussed his band’s role in the violent hardcore punk scene in southern California: “[W]e started to attract youths from Orange County—which, 20 miles down the coast, was developing a hyper-violent scene around hardcore punk bands like TSOL and Agent Orange.” But simultaneously, Black Flag began to receive the kind of attention they did not want at all. This was the attention of the police.23

Black Flag’s drummer, Robo, a Columbian national, recalled the violence that the Orange County punks brought to Black Flag shows as well:

This was at the beginning of the Orange County punk explosion. The surfers cut off their hair and turned into punks. And they were fucking maniacs! Crazier than hell. The Hollywood punk was a totally different animal, into drugs and getting drunk, liking the Sex Pistols. But the surf punks—these guys were insane. At the show, they’d start going in circles, punching each other—one big dance floor brawl. That was invented by the surf punks. Every fucking high school had hundreds of them. And that crowd liked us, and would come to our shows at the Fleetwood.24

These shows looked violent to outsiders, and to some insiders too, and the police frequently shut them down. Sometimes the punks were forced out into the street and assaulted by police. Riots would erupt, and glass storefronts and car windows would be shattered and car aerials would be ripped off. Bottles would fly towards cops, and any punks the police could catch, whether causing a problem or not, were beaten. To the police, all punks were a problem. These riots typically lasted ten minutes or so. There is something telling about the typical riot’s short duration. It indicates that most punks were not hell bent for mayhem, but rather trying to escape. The media blamed the punks in the audience for the destruction and violence, but cops blamed the band and cracked down on them hard.25

Black Flag began playing more shows in L.A. proper as their popularity grew and hardcore swallowed the Hollywood punk scene. At the same time, the hardcore fans from Huntington Beach and the rest of Orange County outnumbered the L.A. fans by a factor of three. Violence seemed to follow both Black Flag and their Orange County fan base. This prompted LA Weekly music gossip columnist Pleasant Gehman to tell her readers, “Fans of bands with ‘reputations’ like Fear, China White, Black Flag, the Circle Jerks, etc: if you want to continue seeing these bands, then you as an audience have to shape up. The violence is going too far when every gig turns into a riot.” She was right, many hardcore shows devolved into riots. But the fact is, they did not become riots until the police arrived. Her quote shows that even the alternative press bought into the narrative that the problem with hardcore shows was the fans. To understand what was really going on and what the press was missing, one has to understand what was happening within the Los Angeles Police Department.26
THE L.A.P.D. VS. HARDCORE

Los Angeles police chief Daryl Gates is best known for his role as the leader of the L.A.P.D. during the Rodney King beating and the riots that followed in 1992. The riots killed 53 people and caused over $1 billion in damages, the worst riots in any U.S. city during the 20th century. What does that have to do with punk rock? A lot. The hardcore punk scene in Los Angeles was also the most violent in the country. Chief Daryl Gates took control of the L.A.P.D. in 1978 just as punk rock arrived in L.A. There is little doubt that the severity of the L.A. riots in 1992 were in large part fueled by rage from marginalized blacks and Latinos that resulted from the policies of the L.A.P.D. under Gates’ stewardship. Voiceless Angelinos living in poverty expressed their fourteen years of L.A.P.D. mistreatment, brutality, and racism through violence. The hardcore punks reacted to their mistreatment similarly with violence.

Gates is celebrated in conservative circles for his toughness on crime. He created the SWAT concept, the DARE program, and the CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) special operations unit. He talked tough, saying that “casual drug users should be taken out and shot,” and saying that the reason so many African Americans died in choke holds while in custody of the L.A.P.D. was because their arteries were different from “normal people.” Crime and gang membership rose sharply under his tenure, and a conservative taxpayer backlash, Proposition 13, limited property taxes and decimated the L.A.P.D. budget. He was forced to do a lot of policing across sprawling geography, on a shrinking budget. His response was rejecting a community policing strategy, where cops build relationships with the community members they serve, and instead militarized the police department. His strategy was to meet criminal violence with superior violence, rather than deescalating violent or potentially violent situations. A backlash proved inevitable. It culminated with the 1992 riots, but it began with punks.27

The non-violent punks in Hollywood at the Elks Lodge Massacre gave Gates his first chance to attack. In doing so, he completely radicalized the Hollywood punk scene paving the way for hardcore. Chuck Dukowski, bass player for Black Flag was at the show when the cops arrived. He could not believe that the cops were attacking without cause and whacking teenagers across the head with nightsticks. Angered further that the band on stage did not do something more to stop the police, he told himself if “I was in that position where it was incumbent upon me to stand up against the pigs, I wasn’t going to back down. I wanted to stand up to them.” He got many chances to prove it, as nearly every Black Flag show in L.A. between 1980 and 1983 ended with a riot or police raid.28

One of the reasons Black Flag was harassed so heavily by the police was their relentless DIY advertising. Black Flag pasted-up hundreds of flyers all over Los Angeles before every show and spray painted their logo on any available freeway overpass. They were hard to ignore, and the flyers led the cops right to their concerts where the police would incite violence, intimidate teenage concertgoers, and often cause damage themselves in order to blame the punks. Photographer Glen Friedman remembers many riots incited by police at tiny hole-in-the-wall clubs with small audiences. “It looked like a military operation going on...The kids did not generally cause the trouble the police were supposedly responding to in the first place.” Friedman witnessed cops beating up kids then breaking storefront windows in order to blame the kids when the media showed up.29
Henry Rollins of Black Flag remembers police videotaping and photographing punks outside concerts to identify them and add them to a list of troublemakers. Cars with Black Flag stickers were pulled over, their drivers harassed, and the band was consistently followed and had their office/practice studio/sleeping quarters staked out. They also had their phones tapped. This all seems crazy now, but in 1983, Gates’ Public Disorder Intelligence Division (PDID), a spy network made up of 200 officers was shut down by the California courts which ruled its snooping illegal and politically motivated. The city settled for $1.8 million in damages for First Amendment infringements upon twelve different groups of plaintiffs. David Cay Johnston, metro reporter for the L.A. Times from 1980-1983 and winner of the Pulitzer Prize in journalism, remembers having his car broken into seven times while covering the L.A.P.D. for four years. Each time only his paper work was stolen, never any cash sitting in his car’s ashtray. It even occurred once in the parking garage of the L.A.P.D. headquarters at Parker Center. After he complained to the cops it stopped. Johnston had gotten the message and the L.A.P.D. knew it. Once at a party he was personally intimidated by Gates when the chief recited everything he had ordered at dinner on a blind date and asked Johnston if he liked “busty red-heads,” describing the woman he was with. The message was clear: Gates was tracking his every move and the L.A. Times’ reporter would be wise to back off. The city council and city attorney were openly intimidated and threatened by Gates, and even those at the highest levels of the L.A. Times were too afraid to cross him.

While these anecdotes do not relate directly to punk rock violence, they illustrate what bands like Black Flag and their fans were up against at the same time that L.A. Times reporters like Johnston were being harassed and intimidated. It also explains the reluctance of the press to support the punks against police brutality.30

The local L.A. punks were not the only ones to recognize how strange the L.A.P.D. treated hardcore fans. In 1982, Kim Pilkington from the zine, We Got Power, interviewed singer Glenn Danzig of the Misfits, a hardcore band from the east coast, which proves the point. Asking how the L.A. cops compare to New York cops Danzig replied, “Cops are cool in New York. They know they got [sic] better things to do than be bothering little kids. They’re assholes here! It’s ridiculous here…. It’s more than just harassment.” He suggested the punk kids arm themselves against the cops. While a silly suggestion likely made in jest, it shows there was something of a war going on with the potential to escalate. Other bands from outside the L.A. area also commented on its warlike hardcore scene. It was a very real and very frightening.31

Dave Markey, the writer of the hardcore fanzine We Got Power, recalls an incident at a hardcore show that demonstrated both the brutality of the L.A.P.D. and how cowed the L.A. Times was by chief Gates. Markey witnessed a non-punk photographer on assignment from the L.A. Times being brutally beaten outside a concert at Mendiola’s Ballroom. But the article the next day made no mention of this. Instead it blamed the crowd for the riot. The 1983 article, “Twelve Arrested at Punk Fracas,” made “no mention of innocent, unarmed teenage kids being maced and assaulted” and no mention of the photographer who was attacked, according to Markey. Markey further noted that most punk kids did nothing to provoke the police, and the few who did would do little more than throw a
bottle. Still, it was completely over the line for the police to attack all punks for the actions of a few. The media seemed to feed off the violence however, sensationalizing it, blaming the punks, and covering for the police. The L.A.P.D. had no fear of a media exposé on their brutality and civil service laws protected Gate’s job.32

Markey saw these riots happen with such frequency that he began to rate them in his fanzine next to album and concert reviews. His May 1983 issue included six “Police Raid Reviews.” The above-mentioned “fracas” at Mendiola’s Ballroom was awarded five stars out of five. Markey wrote:

The men in blue decided to throw a little party. What fun. Highlights of the evening were the two police officers who took [it] into their hands to smash storefront windows so it would look nice and violent on TV. Hats off to the friendly neighborhood policemen who maced and batoned [sic] innocent bystanders, including a USC student who got his camera and head smashed.33

The media blamed the punks for the perpetual violence and protected the police. This meant the punks were on their own against the cops but the police had guns, tear gas, helicopters, German shepherds, and nightsticks. All of the above were used against punk rock concertgoers. The L.A.P.D. used their full paramilitary power against unarmed, mostly white teenagers, many not old enough to drive. The media, the one power structure strong enough to expose them, to shame them for their cowardice, brutality, and abuse of power, refused. Many of these kids were no angels, but they were completely overpowered by the police.34

What was the L.A.P.D. trying to accomplish by attacking teenagers? This is a question many punks are still asking themselves today. But there seems to be a general consensus from the folks who were there at the time. Lisa Francher of Frontier Records thought the police just did not want punk rock to happen. Promoter Steven Blush believes they were trying to prevent another 1960s-type counterculture. Dez Cadena of Black Flag said that “the cops thought punk was a rebellion that threatened them, the American family, and society in general—and they wanted to stomp it out.” In a sense, they nearly did. During the hardcore era, the police closed fifty-six clubs that catered to punks in Los Angeles County, mostly through harassment.35

BLACK FLAG VS. THE L.A.P.D.

Black Flag responded to constant police harassment with the only power they had: free speech. Songs like “Police Story” and “Revenge” disparaged the cops. Album artwork, flyers, and stickers became militant. The album released for their single, “Police Story,” featured an illustration of a police officer with a gun in his mouth. A quote bubble from the gun’s holder demanded the officer “Make me come, faggot,” implying the trigger would be pulled otherwise. This image also adorned flyers pasted in vast quantities around L.A. advertising the next Black Flag concert. Cop-baiting radio ads ran that called out chief Gates by name. The cops noticed and were not pleased.36
Band members began being arrested for disturbing the peace during rehearsals. When Black Flag toured, their office and living space was raided and searched. The LAPD phoned cities where Black Flag was touring out of state to get those events cancelled. The police put the band under surveillance and ran them out of Hermosa Beach, Redondo Beach, and Torrance. They eventually resurfaced in a secret hideout in Koreatown, west of downtown LA. The police also prevented them from securing many gigs around Los Angeles by intimidating club owners. Henry Rollins, Black Flag's muscle-bound, tattooed singer, remembers their run-ins with the LAPD this way: “The cops would always do unlawful things to (mess) with you—they’d put guns in your face. We were scared of cops.” It is easy to see why. Musicians and fans alike were terrorized by police.37

BEHIND THE ORANGE CURTAIN

At the same time Black Flag was enduring police harassment, the Orange County hardcore scene was booming. Hardcore bands and fans from conservative, upper middle-class Orange County, California, played a crucial role in the development of both hardcore punk and the scene’s reputation for violence. On the surface, it seems that idyllic Orange County beach towns like Huntington Beach, full of sunshine, wealth, and conservative politics, would be a strange place for hardcore to develop so strongly. But something lurked beneath the surface. A 1982 article on hardcore punk in Penthouse magazine described the place as sterile tract homes built in the 1960s as an escape from urban problems that led to new ones. A young punk outside a Hollywood club interviewed for the article described the Orange County kids by saying “these surf punks who come beat people up—they’re just a lot of bored rich boys who decided to shave their heads.” This was of course a gross generalization, but it speaks to the perception many L.A. punks held regarding the Orange County punks who took over the hardcore scene.38

Dez Cadena of Black Flag remembers the shift in 1980 when more and more kids from Orange County came to their shows and punk music got faster and earned the “hardcore” moniker. Cadena believes the Republican enclaves of Orange County were very boring. Other than surfing or skateboarding, there just was not much going on. He thinks a lot of the kids were military brats that had nothing better to do but join gangs. “When punk came along, which is fun to skateboard to, they got into it. They cut their hair and co-opted the “cholo” (Mexican gangster) bandanna look. That wasn’t punk. That was hardcore.”

Jack Grisham, singer for the most notorious Huntington Beach band, TSOL, thought suburban beach kids had the same reasons to be angry as urban denizens or anybody else. Grisham claims he had to learn to fight because punks like him were constantly harassed by “jocks, the greasers, and the police…. We were looked at as pariahs and lepers…. There were daily battles to survive.” For Grisham and others, violence was a means of self-defense. And besides, he noted, “Did they really think you had to be a scrawny art student to realize Reagan was a terrorist and you’d been lied to for years?” Hardcore, it turned out, was surprisingly universal and crossed class lines. Grisham’s thoughts illuminate the attraction hardcore had for white, typically upper-middle class kids from Orange County. But these were kids tanned and muscled from years of surfing, kids who could hold their own in
fights against fellow punks and outsiders alike. Suburban punks brought more physical strength to the scene.39

Muscle-bound or not, being punk in conformist suburbia during the Reagan years was not without its challenges.40 Jack Grisham remembers construction-worker types who used to beat up punks after concerts or even attend punk concerts with the intention of beating up scrawny punk kids. He remembers when this changed. In 1979, his first band, Vicious Circle, played their first concert and the “wannabe punk killers” had the tables turned. They were messing with the wrong punks. “[The punks] weren’t cute little kids spraying wash-out crazy color in their hair—these were monsters, outcasts, and sadists. These were kids willing to take a beating to be different. Vicious Circle was a maniac attractor.” About a year after their first show, a friend was jumped by a biker being strangled during a Vicious Circle concert. Grisham flew off the stage, cowboy boots first, ripping a gash out of the biker’s face with his spurs, leaving him unconscious in a pool of blood, and possibly missing an eye. The band continued playing and Grisham returned to the stage to sing. The biker came to, went to his motorcycle in the parking lot, and returned with a loaded .45 pistol. Grisham barely escaped with his life. The show ended with a standoff between the cops, who had arrived by then, and the biker. Grisham fled to Alaska to lay low for a few weeks and avoid any subsequent trouble with biker gangs.41

Once he returned to southern California he was recruited to join TSOL, a band seeking a singer. They made up the most physically intimidating hardcore group in southern California. Grisham was 6’3”. The other band members were 6’4”, 6’2”, and 6’0”. They gained a huge following and were known for their good looks, a rarity in hardcore, and the violence and ambulance convoys that always seemed to accompany their performances. Blackjacks, brass knuckles, and razor knives were common at TSOL shows. There were fights in parking lots and fights in the audience—even the dancing was violent. Grisham recalls numerous fistfights and stabbings at TSOL shows.42

The Huntington Beach punks invented “moshing,” but originally it was called the Huntington Beach Strut. “Dancers” moved in a circle in front of the stage, arms flailing, bumping and pushing everyone they came in contact with. This made the audience more participants than spectators. While it could provoke fights, and often did a few times a night, it was a communal experience, and those who fell would be quickly helped up by others. This form of dancing separated the dedicated from the pretenders.43

Crowds also participated at hardcore shows by climbing on stage and jumping off into the crowd, or by joining the singer on stage to scream into the microphone. While slam dancing and stage diving were violent, they were controlled and mostly orchestrated. The media hyped the most outrageous and violent events while ignoring that the vast majority of fans were truly just having fun and minding their own business at concerts. Countless L.A. Times articles, like 1980’s “Violence Sneaks into Punk Scene,” which focused on a punk concert stabbing and called the scene a “warzone” illustrates the point.44 Typically absent from the article was any suggestion that the L.A.P.D. might better serve L.A. by protecting innocent punk teenagers from the violence of a few, rather than lump them all into a broad category that deserved what they got.45
CUCKOO FOR HARDCORE

A nightclub in Costa Mesa, California called the *Cuckoo’s Nest* booked the only punk shows in Orange County. Most of the great local and touring hardcore bands played there. It was unfortunately situated next door to Zubie’s, a cowboy bar/steak house with a mechanical bull. Both clubs shared a parking lot, which led to numerous fights between the punks and suburban cowboys. Neither approved of the fashion choices made by the other, which added to the trouble. The Costa Mesa city council voted to shut down the *Cuckoo’s Nest* and it took a California Supreme Court ruling to get it back open on First Amendment grounds. Conservative Orange County was terrified of punk and fought to kill it.46

The *Cuckoo’s Nest* held a crowd of about 300, but *TSOL* drew much larger crowds as the 1980s progressed. In 1983, as the scene was getting larger and increasingly violent, the band played a show in West Hollywood at S.I.R. studio, a rehearsal space rented out for the show. It held 2,000 but the promoter squeezed in nearly 500 hundred more. Toward the end of their set, the riot squad arrived. They ordered the music to stop but the band played a few more songs in defiance. The promoter made his way to the stage and asked everyone to leave, but the band had a different idea. Grisham commanded the crowd to sit down in order to force the police to drag them out one by one. The band played John Lennon’s “Give Peace a Chance,” then gave an order to his entranced fans, some of whom screamed, “Tell us what to do, Jack!” Grisham watched briefly as kids were dragged out one by one. Giving up on civil disobedience he shouted, “There are more of us than there are of them. Let’s get ‘em!” The audience ran screaming into the streets and the cops attacked. Bottles were thrown. The riot was once again reviewed by *We Got Power*, which gave it four out of five stars:

> The West Hollywood police division had a problem. They had to stop a punk rock riot (as seen on Quincy and CHiPs) but there was no riot, so they decided they would create one. They closed the show down and got cans and bottles thrown at them.

Grisham clearly incited this event, but his audience only tried to leave in haste. The police attacked, and could have just as easily let the concert finish and allowed everyone to go home quietly. The show was wrapping up anyway. The actions of the police made no sense. Grisham later said he did not like having the power to be “a punk rock Jim Jones” and it freaked him out a little to be able to command 2,500 teenagers to do his bidding. He quit the band after the “riot.” *TSOL* continued on in a few different incarnations, although they became a more traditional rock band and abandoned their hardcore roots once Grisham left. Whatever the reasons for Grisham’s departure, *TSOL* and other hardcore bands lost steam. The scene fractured. What was left of it went deep underground.

By 1984, *Black Flag* was playing heavy metal, sporting long hair and openly confusing and angering their fans. Many other hardcore bands slowed down their tempos and let their hair grow as well.47 Heavy metal was gathering momentum along the Sunset Strip, and the sound of more than a few hardcore bands followed suit. Five years later, this metal-punk hybrid would birth the “grunge” sound, made popular by Washington State’s
Nirvana and make a lot of punk rock malcontents in the Pacific Northwest very wealthy. But 1984 was more Orwellian than Cobainian. The L.A. hardcore era drew to a close with a whimper. But it breathed a last gasp.

The years 1983 and 1984 marked an increased effort by the L.A.P.D. and chief Gates to clean up the city as the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics neared. The L.A.P.D. ramped up what looked like a military occupation of poor neighborhoods, where a lot of punk bands played, and politicians and judges revived old anti-syndicalist laws (which prohibit attempts to destroy organized government) to jail masses of people, especially black youth. Gates put out the order, handed down by Mayor Tom Bradley, a former L.A.P.D. cop himself, to round up all known and suspected gang members with the intention of holding them until the Olympics were over. The L.A.P.D. also set out to “clean up Hollywood,” the territory frequented punks. Most of those held were never charged with crimes, and the policy continued after the Olympics.48

At the same time, some punks were coalescing into gangs. There were a few major ones by 1983. The LADS (L.A. Death Squad) was the smallest with about 50 members. The HBs (from Huntington Beach), FFF (Fight For Freedom), and Circle One had roughly 200 members apiece. These gangs lacked leaders but followed specific bands very closely, occasionally acting as unpaid security. But the most significant hardcore gang was the Suicidal Posse that followed the band Suicidal Tendencies. Suicidal Tendencies had a breakthrough novelty hit called “Institutionalized” that sold tens of thousands of records and got them a music video on MTV—a first for a hardcore band. Singer Mike Muir, a notorious brawler from Venice Beach co-opted a Mexican gangster “cholo” look (bandanna slung low over his eyes, flannel shirt buttoned up) in the video, which rapidly started to attract real gang members with real guns to hardcore shows. Scotty Wilkins was a member of the L.A. hardcore band Verbal Abuse and a member of the LADS gang at the time. His crew did not get along with the Suicidals. At a hardcore concert in Pasadena, California with some guys from the FFF crew, one of them began passing out guns. Wilkins immediately bailed out of the L.A. hardcore scene to find a mellower one up the coast in San Francisco. Others followed his lead, and many bands changed their sound, leaving hardcore behind. Many fans, fearful of the punk gangs, stopped going to shows as well.49

Dave Markey of We Got Power, summed-up the shifting ethos of hardcore when fan-on-fan violence appeared normalized:

> There was a fair amount of jocks and thugs at punk shows, and there was violence. Usually it was confined to those who were looking for it, and to the gang mentality types...Soon the scene was filled with followers, wannabe gangsters, and actual gang members. They weren’t bringing anything into [the hardcore scene] but pose and senseless violence.

The violence surrounding hardcore had caught up with it, destroyed the scene and made it seriously dangerous. Hardcore music became secondary to the violence. And it was no longer much fun, which, despite what the police and the media had people believe, was what lured teenagers to hardcore music in the first place.50
CONCLUSION

Hardcore is a fast and electrifying form of music. Some fans responded by slam-dancing into fellow fans, stage-diving, breaking things, and acting like complete goons. There is no question that hardcore punks did a terrible job policing themselves and put the whole scene in jeopardy with their ridiculous macho behavior and senseless infighting. The venues that hosted hardcore concerts cared very little about security and safety and put the lives of their young patrons at risk. But the police did a terrible job of policing the L.A. hardcore scene as well. It is not odd that mobs of teenage boys, often fueled by alcohol, drugs, or anger, got into fights and vandalized private property. But this same type of behavior was happening nationwide in close to a dozen hardcore scenes throughout the U.S. What is odd is how the police and media in Los Angeles grossly mishandled the situation. Instead of working with club owners, the L.A.P.D. harassed them. Instead of deescalating hyper concertgoers, it baited them. Instead of quelling mayhem, it encouraged it. Instead of protecting innocent concertgoers from acts of violence, it let the few bad actors within the scene attack the majority. All the while, the L.A. television media, which included three network affiliates plus three independent channels with news programming, and the highly regarded *Los Angeles Times*, whose duty should have been to provide balanced reporting, hype punk violence and ignored the real source: the paramilitary L.A.P.D. that viciously attacked punks without cause, broke windows to frame the punks, and refused to protect innocent concertgoers from fan-on-fan violence. Chief Gates may have believed he was fighting a war to preserve an American value structure that was shifting, but he abused his power and broke the law to do it. The media exploited the violence for ratings or to maintain a close relationship with Gates. But this gave a very brutal and corrupt police department free reign to terrorize teenage concertgoers just looking to have a good time. Hardcore did turn even more violent as gangsters with guns got into the scene and there is plenty of blame to be levied at the punk bands for stirring up their fans and tolerating dance floor aggression. But the L.A.P.D. shares just as much blame, and the role the local television news stations and newspapers played in sensationalizing punk violence and covering for chief Gates and the L.A.P.D. is unforgivable. Today punk is a non-threatening part of mainstream culture, available for purchase at a mall near you. That said, maybe hardcore did not lose the war after all. *Black Flag* have reformed and are currently on tour. And Orange County’s *TSOL* played a reunion gig with Jack Grisham in West Hollywood in 2011. It ended nostalgically with an hour and a half of rioting. This time it was the fans, not the cops, who were to blame. At last.51
Notes

A Double-edged Scalpel: Colorado’s Healthy Reputation and Its Tuberculosis Struggle
by Rachel Ancar

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by Sam Irving

5 Mary A. Stout, *Native American Boarding Schools*, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012), xii.
8 Luther Standing Bear, *Land of the Spotted Eagle*, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1933), 231.
15 Morgan, *Ancient Society*, 10-14. Morgan posited the use of pottery as the dividing line between upper savagery and lower barbarism. Indian tribes east of the Missouri River made it to the latter. He ranked “Village Indians of New Mexico” at the level of middle barbarism due to their use of irrigation and adobe-brick and stone in house building.
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28 Reel, *Course of Study*, 146.

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34 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *Young Folks’ History of the United States*, (Boston: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham, 1875), 45.

35 Higginson, *Young Folks’ History*, 252.


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61 Reel, *Course of Study*, 151.

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Federico Peña's Struggle to Bring Major League Baseball to Denver in the 1980s
by Justyn Larry

9 Bob Collins, “Finley Agrees to Sale of A’s: Oakland Lease Main Obstacle to Denver Shift,” Rocky Mountain News, December 15, 1977, 1; Chris Broderick, “Baseball Presidents balk at Peña’s Pitch for City,” Rocky Mountain News, November 16, 1983, 7; In Bob Collins’ column, “Finley Agrees to Sale of A’s,” Davis discussed his desire to buy a team, “Well, sometimes when you’re 52 you decide you want to do something that’s fun. As men get older, the toys get more expensive.”
Attack Against Mayor,” *Rocky Mountain News*, July 14, 1982, 6; for more on franchise benefits to the local economy, see Shropshire’s, *The Sports Franchise Game*, 19, 28, 31.


15 Sherman, “Baseball to Study,” A10; For more information on the importance of a “Big League Image,” and the value of national perception see Shropshire’s, *The Sports Franchise Game*, 8.


19 Dana Parsons, “Baseball Fever Melts Cold,” *Denver Post*, April 4, 1985, A3. Mayor Peña made several of these proclamations during the mid-eighties which were quoted in the local papers, and appear to be playful attempts to publicize these events; Peña also exuberantly ordered sunshine and warm temperatures for one 1985 exhibition game, chronicled by Joni H. Blackman, “Stolen Thunder,” *Denver Post*, April 4, 1985, A3.


28 Irv Moss, “Bye, Bye, Bears,” *Denver Post*, January 19, 1985, A1; Moss, “Coors Going to bat for Baseball Expansion,” A1; See Rader’s *Baseball*, 220, 234, for the problems major league baseball had been suffering for decades. From the 1960s to the 1990s, baseball’s influence as the national pastime fell behind the National Football League, which experienced greater growth due to its television appeal. This trend began to change during the 1980’s as attendance at major league games began to slowly rise, but the league’s struggles influenced expansion.


34 Irv Moss, “Peña to Make Pitch for Downtown Baseball Stadium Sites,” *Denver Post*, June 1, 1990, D1, D3.

35 Moss, “Peña to Make Pitch, D3.

Let’s Have a War: 
Hardcore Punk vs. The L.A. Suburbs, 1979-1984
by Sam Smith

1 Robert Hilburn, “Police and Fans Disagree on Raid at Rock Show, Concert Goers Outraged but L.A.P.D. Defends Tactics” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1979, E1. It should be noted here that Hilburn was the Times’ pop music critic. Complaints against the L.A.P.D. tactics at punk concerts were consistently relegated by the Times’ its entertainment section and covered by entertainment reporters, rather than by its Metro reporters, who regularly covered the L.A.P.D.

2 Marc Spitz and Brendan Mullen, We Got the Neutron Bomb (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 188. The most plausible theory for the arrival of the police came from Brendan Mullen, former owner of the Masque nightclub. He thought a bottle accidentally fell from the second floor of the venue onto the street. See the interview with Mullen in Don Snowden’s Make the Music Go Bang (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997).


4 McLeod, Kids of the Black Hole, 121. Spheeris’ film title was also a nod to Oswald Spengler’s, Decline of the West (1928) which asserted that “music is the art that failed” to show restraint, unlike painting and sculpture.


6 The best description of the philosophical differences between the first wave of punk and the hardcore scene that arose quickly thereafter can be found in Ryan Moore, “Postmodernism and Punk Subculture: Cultures of Authenticity and Deconstruction,” The Communication Review, 7: 305-327, 2004.


8 Van Halen was one of these cover bands that became successful. See their album Van Halen II that features covers of Roy Orbison, the Kinks, and others.

9 Spitz and Mullen, We Got the Neutron Bomb, 126.
Frontier put out albums by the Circle Jerks, TSOL, the Adolescents, and Suicidal Tendencies. SST was the most significant record label of the hardcore era, boasting roster that by 1985 included the Minutemen, Bad Brains, Soundgarden, Dinosaur Jr., Husker Du, Sonic Youth, the Descendants, the Meat Puppets, and Black Flag.

Spitz and Mullen, *We Got the Neutron Bomb*, 158-161.


Baron, 208-209.

Szatmary, *Rockin’ In Time*, 296.

Szatmary, *Rockin’ In Time*, 296.


Babcock, “Their War,” 1.

Babcock, “Their War,” 1.

Babcock, “Their War.” 1. Babcock notes that Black Flag drummer Robo said ¾ of Black Flag’s mailing list in the early 1980s consisted of fans from Orange County. See also the 1981 BAM article, “Black Flag Violence Must Stop” which blames the fans, not the police, for hardcore violence.


Markey and Schwartz, *We Got Power!*, 186-190.

Markey and Schwartz, *We Got Power!*, 186-190.


Babcock, “Their War.” 1. First verse of lyrics to the song, “Police Story”: This fucking city/is run by pigs/they take the rights away from/all the kids/understand that we’re fighting a war/we can’t win/they hate us/we hate them/we can’t win/no way. Raymond Pettibon designed the “Police Story” image, though wisely left picture unsigned. He also designed the artwork for most of the albums and flyers produced for Black Flag and many for other SST artists. He designed the band’s iconic logo, four black bars stylized to appear like the waving black flag of anarchy. Pettibon is the brother of Black Flag and SST Records founder Greg Ginn. A world-renowned artist today, he bears much of the credit for Black Flag’s exceptional marketing efforts. Azerrad, *Our Band Could Be Your Life*, 21.


Ebersole, 70. Grisham, 156.

42 Grisham, 155.
43 “Huntington Beach Punk Roots-Huntington Beach Strut”
45 Blush, American Hardcore, 64-65.
46 Tom Berg, “O.C. Punk Club to go Hollywood,” Orange County Register (February 10, 2009)
49 Blush, American Hardcore, 111.
50 Markey and Schwartz, We Got Power!, 186.
51 Dennis Romero, “Punk Rock Violence At Sunset Strip’s Key Club During TSOL Show”
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