THE ENLIGHTENMENT and Philadelphia’s Eighteenth-Century Taverns

MEASURING IDEAS: 
The Political Segregation of German Prisoners of War in America, 1943-1946

FEEDING FEARS: 
Standards of American Motherhood in Baby Food Advertisements, 1930-1960

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How Ceramic Craft Becomes Art in the West

CATCHING UP WITH THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT: 
Evaluations of a Dissident Society in Motion

CULTURE, STONE AND TECHNOLOGY: 
The Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building
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Historians ask questions, seek answers, and then interpret the answers. History has been challenged over time to be relevant in its teachings and fair in its analysis. The responsibility of the historian is to distinguish fact from fiction. We learn from historian Richard J. Evans that,

*History is an empirical discipline, and it is concerned with the content of knowledge rather than its nature. Through the sources we use, and the methods with which we handle them, we can, if we are very careful and thorough, approach to a reconstruction of past reality that may be partial and provisional, and certainly will not be neutral, but is nevertheless true.¹*

Every generation of historians will be challenged to find their way through the theories of previous historians. Historians must learn the methods of their teachers and then make them relevant to their course of study. The History Department at the University of Colorado Denver challenges students to do just that. Students are privileged to conduct their own research and find their way with the guidance of experienced faculty.

This is the twenty-sixth annual publication of the *Historical Studies Journal*; the opportunities and experience provided to authors and staff is invaluable. The authors represented in this volume of the *Historical Studies Journal* are examples of the richness and diversity of the History Department program. Our authors explore the period of enlightenment in Philadelphia’s Eighteenth Century taverns and German Prisoners of War in WWII America, the role of advertising in the introduction and production of baby food and the development of ceramic art in the West. And, finally an updated study of the Viet Nam Antiwar movement and the incorporation of Native American culture in the Ben Nighthorse Campbell building on the new Health Sciences campus are explored.

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*EVELYN RAE STOOL WALDRON*

*LANCE WESTFALL*

Editors
Philadelphia was a welcome site. Nineteen days after leaving Boston, John Adams, Samuel Adams, Thomas Cushing, and Robert Treat Paine were ready to freshen up. Rather than retire to their lodgings, however, Adams recalled that, “dirty, dusty and fatigued as we were, we could not resist the Importunity, to go the Tavern, the most genteel one in America. There we were introduced to a Number of other Gentlemen of the City—Dr. Shippen, Dr. Knox, Mr. Smith, and a Multitude of others, and to Mr. Linch [sic] and Mr. Gadsden of South Carolina.”

Over the next few days, Adams met more prominent men at this same tavern. Thomas Lynch, “a solid, firm, judicious Man,” was also a gossip. Lynch dealt the juicy details of, “the Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh—the Story of his Wifes Sister, and of his Dodging his Uncle,” much to Adams’s delight. Adams was also impressed by Virginian Benjamin Harrison, who proclaimed he would have walked to Philadelphia if that were the only way. South Carolina’s Edward Rutledge seemed “good natured, tho conceited,”


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Maryland’s Thomas Johnson had “a clear and cool Head,” and Delaware’s Caesar Rodney was “the oddest looking Man in the World. He is tall—thin and slender as a reed—pale—his face is not bigger than a large Apple. Yet there is Sense and Fire, Spirit, Wit and Humor in his Countenance.” These men, along with many others, would form an intimate circle in the upcoming weeks. They were the delegates to the First Continental Congress. They were dining companions in Philadelphia’s City Tavern.

In September and October of 1774, the City Tavern “was not long in becoming the favorite rendezvous of those men who founded our government,” but was only one of many taverns in Philadelphia that acted as an institution of the public sphere and nurtured Enlightenment discourse. Many ideals now associated with that intellectual and social movement—economic advancement, rational inquiry, cosmopolitanism, and republicanism—climaxed and prospered in Philadelphia, rather than in New York City, Boston, or Charleston. Philadelphia taverns were manifestations of the Enlightenment in America, so much so that they deserve recognition alongside their counterparts of the public sphere, namely, the English Coffeehouse, French Salon, and Masonic Lodge.

The Tavern and the Economy

Home to between 28,802 and 36,946 inhabitants, in 1774 Philadelphia was “one of the largest cities in the British Empire” and “outstripped Boston and New York, each of which had more than a half-century head start”. The City of Brotherly Love stood apart:

Philadelphia, aside from being the national capital during the early Revolution and again from 1790 to 1800...was the principal center of the American press and bar; the leader in American science and medicine; the capital of American deism, Presbyterianism, Northern Episcopalianism, and Lutheranism; the urban center for much of the upper South, the city which had long had the most cosmopolitan population, and the center of attention for foreign visitors.

America’s most famous philosophe found a home here as well. Historian Henry Steele Commager described Benjamin Franklin, writing:

Printer, journalist, scientist, politician, diplomat, educator, statesman, author of the most popular of aphorisms and the best of autobiographies, he was, or seemed, the complete philosophe, American style, as representative of his nation as Voltaire was of France or Goethe of Germany or Holberg of Denmark or Banks of England.

Influenced by both the city’s dynamics and Benjamin Franklin’s character, the taverns of Philadelphia were destined to leave a mark on the city’s distinct heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and economy.

That influence was greatly felt in Philadelphia’s busy Middle Ward. Philadelphia’s laborers, merchants, and professionals, along with fatigued travelers, frequented the Middle Ward, particularly between Chestnut Street and High Street (more commonly
called Market) and Second and Third Streets. As the city’s main thoroughfare, Market Street sustained an immense public market. Chestnut, Second and Third Streets invited urbanites to peruse their shops and businesses. The London Bookstore on Second sold books on medicine and law, as well as swords, scientific instruments, spurs, and backgammon tables. A business on Third displayed a piano that was constructed within its very walls. The up and coming Middle Ward was a half-mile walk from the Delaware River, with brick footwalks, gutters, and trees probably bordering the streets. The State House and Carpenter’s Hall were to the southwest. The Middle Ward was the place to be.

Taverns abounded here. The One Nun Tavern, on the northeast corner of Third and Chestnut, had front and back rooms on the ground floor, a kitchen, stables, and upstairs lodging. The Indian King and Three Tuns Tavern were located at High Street between Second and third, and on a Chestnut Street lot, respectively. The Indian King and Three Tuns were two of the largest taverns; both had kitchens, stables, and hired help. The three-story high Indian King had eighteen sleeping rooms, its guest room walls were plastered, and some lucky travelers cozied up to fireplaces before bed. After 1750, the London Coffeehouse appeared at Front and Market, and in 1773, the City Tavern stood at Second and Chestnut.

The enormity of the One Nun and the Indian King were unique compared to the usual unassuming exterior and claustrophobic interior of Philadelphia’s taverns. Despite identification signs, tavern exteriors looked identical. Their interiors were cramped. Guests converged around a large, oblong table squeezed into a single room, sharing conversation or even a communal drinking bowl. Booths and banquettes did not exist, eliminating privacy. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, most taverns were also private residences, regular food menus were unavailable, and most lacked private meeting rooms. Any upstairs lodging was small and crowded. A typical room had “white-washed walls, bare floors, plain curtains and hard beds.” Strangers often shared both room and bed.
Taverns were open sun-up to sundown. Laborers, seamen, artisans, stage drivers, post riders, and travelers came early. They downed a quick meal and a dram, forgoing formal breakfast that was not provided until nine. Between nine and noon, locals came to read and discuss the newspaper and merchants conducted their business. Dinner was served at noon, and soon thereafter, gambling began. Oftentimes a cockfight or fistfight occupied the afternoon, or sometimes later than that, as a retiring guest, Dr. Alexander Hamilton, discovered at the Three Tuns:

*At six in the evening I went to my lodging, and looking out at the window, having been led there by a noise in the street, I was entertained by a boxing match between a master and his servant. The master was an unwieldy, pot-gutted fellow, the servant muscular, rawbon’d, and tall…*16

Philadelphians could purchase tickets to concerts or lectures between dinner and supper, served at seven in the evening. Balls, concerts, political debate, or societal meetings, such as the first of Benjamin Franklin’s Junto, escorted Philadelphia into the night.17 Hour by hour, taverns welcomed a variety of people and a variety of activity.

The tavern keepers, striving for prosperity, were just as varied as their businesses. Samuel Carpenter, a wealthy, Quaker merchant, established the Globe Tavern and Carpenter’s Coffeehouse on Front Street, near the Delaware River’s bustling docks. To better support his family of eight, Enoch Hobart operated a tavern as a second job. Wealthy Philadelphian George Emlen ran the popular Three Tuns Tavern on Chestnut Street, a supplement to his other ventures, such as his stable and bakery. The Crooked Billet, owned and operated by Quaker widow, Alice Guest, was a model tavern, strictly adhering to licensing laws, while the widow Cox of the Blue Anchor was charged with keeping a disorderly house. The widow Gray ran and lived at the Bull’s Head Tavern, playing hostess downstairs and inhabitant upstairs. John and Sarah Biddle, marriage and business partners, worked side by side managing the Indian King.18

European *philosophes* believed that all individuals had a right to “equal opportunity and social mobility,” and these colorful character sketches of some of Philadelphia’s tavernkeepers reveal that most Philadelphians were equal competitors in “the race of life.” Men, women, and couples owned taverns. The rich and poor applied for licenses. No one was immune from license denial or suspension. An easy entrance into the tavern trade meant that almost any Philadelphian could seek wealth, status, and happiness. Europeans, however, witnessed “class, gender, and racial restrictions in “the race of life.”19 In Philadelphia there were similar racial restrictions to tavern ownership. Usually, however, obtaining a license and running a tavern depended not on a colonist’s background, but on their “determination and ability to hustle up business and make a penny where it could be made. A determined, tactful, but relatively poor alehousekeeper could compete successfully for profits with a less able but relatively well-off tavernkeeper.”20 These social conditions in Philadelphia demonstrate a remarkable adherence to Enlightenment ideals.

This was just what William Penn had intended. Since the colony’s founding, Penn had allowed tavern construction in Philadelphia, despite the contradiction with his Quakerism. Penn meant to ensure Philadelphia’s success in “the race of life,”
believing that “a handful of taverns in the city would speed the work of development, not only by serving the needs of travelers and workmen but also by convincing potential emigrants that Philadelphia was habitable.” In contrast, Boston’s Puritans felt that public houses would negate their mission of reforming “public and private behavior by compelling a conformity to the nascent modern value of temperance.” Penn’s prescient decision helped secure Philadelphia’s future economic prosperity.

Philadelphia’s heterogeneous population also induced competition between different cultures and religions, which sponsored “economic security and advancement that were the envy of laboring men elsewhere.” Further, colonial guilds held little sway. An American Encyclopedie was unnecessary. “The failure of the craft guilds to control the trades of the town gave newcomers and resident artisans alike an occupational freedom unknown in Europe...It meant for the common man that there was always a chance for a fresh start.” All told, Philadelphia’s economy took off mid-century.

While the city on the Delaware prospered, Boston and New York City experienced economic distress. In New York City, a 1765 observer lamented that “the ill-boding aspect of things, cramping of trade, suppression of paper money, duties, courts of admiralty, appeals, internal taxes, etc., have rendered the people so poor, cross, and desperate that they don’t seem to care who are their masters or indeed for any masters.” In 1740 Boston “lost approximately one thousand residents because of a prolonged recession in trade. Consequently, the number of public houses dropped from about 180 in 1740 to 162 in 1752.” In contrast, Philadelphia’s tavern population grew as the city did and by 1756 Philadelphia claimed 101.

William Penn provided Pennsylvania an equal playing ground. The sanctioning of tavern operations, minimal ownership restrictions, and freedom from powerful guilds helped secure Philadelphia’s economic future. Such prosperity kept Philadelphians pouring into their taverns’ unique public spaces, enhancing the Enlightenment practices inside.

What is Enlightenment? “Dare to know!”

If Immanuel Kant’s motto for the Enlightenment was “Dare to know!”, then within their taverns Philadelphians distilled the essence of the Enlightenment. The noisy conversations, educational opportunities, and scientific ponderings that took place inside Philadelphia’s taverns were evidence of the spirit of rational inquiry. Curious Philadelphians had much to inquire about and found many people with whom to engage. The populations that converged on Philadelphia’s taverns were remarkably heterogeneous.

Food, drink, singing, and toasting were commonplace in every tavern. Philadelphians used these rituals to, “draw into fellowship men and women from different cultural backgrounds and social stations.” Naturally curious Philadelphians enjoyed chatting with strangers and politicians. For instance, a Dr. Alexander Hamilton, stranger to the city, was surprised and uncomfortable with one of his dinner table neighbors. He recalled, “A gentleman that sat next me proposed a number of questions concerning Maryland, understanding I had come from thence. In my replys I was reserved, pretending to know little of the matter...” Benjamin Franklin was once a stranger...
to Philadelphia, too. During his first visit, he dined at the Crooked Billet on Water Street. He later recalled that as he ate, “several sly questions were asked me, as it seemed to be suspected from my youth and appearance, that I might be some runaway.”

Frequenters of political hotspots, “Philadelphia’s tavern goers could eavesdrop on their governors, or tax them man-to-man with their opinions.” The ubiquitous tavern chatter was not chatter at all—it was purposeful dialogue inclusive of every patron.

Taverns were also centers of education. Urbanites learned how to dye silk at the Three Tuns, and about screenmaking and wireworks at the Bull’s Head. George Abington, from London’s Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, gave dance lessons to the gentlemen and ladies at the King of Mohawks Tavern. Any Philadelphian planning a European expedition could visit the Queen’s Head where Michael Coleman Saugnessey, a Latin professor, taught foreign languages. In Philadelphia’s taverns, colonial men and women activated and exercised their minds.

While silk dying and dancing might have been fleeting hobbies or interests, organized groups with explicit causes met regularly. “The persistence with which Philadelphia’s clubs, societies, and associations used public houses for activities which demand a modicum of privacy is testimony to the value they placed on the peculiar space taverns enclosed.” Fishing companies, ethnic associations, working-man’s juntos, philosophical societies, Masonic meetings, governor’s clubs, and so forth all gathered in taverns, discussing specific topics and following meeting agendas.

Attending a club’s meeting in Philadelphia, Dr. Hamilton was introduced by Dr. Phineas Bond into the Governour’s Club, a society of gentlemen that met at a tavern every night and conversed on various subjects…

Our conversation was entertaining; the subject was the English poets and some of the foreign writers, particularly Cervantes, author of Don Quixot, whom we loaded with elogiums due to his character.

Occasionally, taverns witnessed the founding of certain clubs, such as Benjamin Franklin’s Junto. The tavern space was clearly adequate for agenda-oriented associations interested in and driven toward particular goals.

Tavern spaces also provided a venue for the intellectual inclinations of the city’s most well known inhabitants. The American Philosophical Society, a child of Franklin’s Junto, held its first meeting in a Philadelphia tavern and aimed for advances in geography, mathematics, natural philosophy, astronomy, medicine, and the like, all for society’s benefit. American Philosophical Society members like Benjamin Franklin, an avid inventor and explorer of electricity; David Rittenhouse, the father of the Orrery (or planetarium); and Benjamin Rush, a pioneering physician, shared, “the faith of their European contemporaries in the ultimate triumph of reason.” Science, an Enlightenment goddess, was more than welcome within the tavern.

Charleston was Philadelphia’s closest rival in scientific studies. By the mid-eighteenth century, intellectuals of the city dabbled in Natural History. Charleston’s scientists attempted to track the path of Venus, and established the Charleston Museum for Natural Science. Typically, however, Charleston’s scientific endeavors pale in
comparison and even mimic Philadelphia’s pioneering. For instance, Franklin’s guidebook, *Experiments and Observations on Electricity*, was widely used in Charleston and instead of constructing an orrey from scratch, the southern city tried to acquire one from Rittenhouse.\(^39\) Philadelphia remained America’s scientific powerhouse.

A Philadelphia tavern was so much more than one would expect. In addition to the basic and obvious services a public house provided, these institutions served as prime locations for the inquiring public. Tavern sponsorship of inquisitive conversations, education courses, organizational meetings, and scientific questioning gave Philadelphians a genuine chance to “dare to know”.

**A Cosmopolitan Evolution and Revolutionary Ferment**

Before 1766, the exteriors and interiors of taverns dictated a cosmopolitan company. Cosmopolitanism was forced upon, but also fostered by, tavern patrons who engaged their minds in what seemed a *philosophe’s* heterogeneous, egalitarian, Utopia. The rich spoke politics with the poor, the Mennonite toasted the Presbyterian, the Virginian shared a communal bowl with the local Philadelphian, and the artisan learned French with the merchant. “The shared consumption of food and drink was understood to take place on terms of temporary equality.”\(^40\) After 1766, Philadelphia’s cosmopolitanism evolved, forgoing a social cosmopolitanism for an intellectual one, which in turn fostered the coming rebellion.

The pre-1760 social cosmopolitanism of Philadelphia’s taverns was unique and striking. Dr. Alexander Hamilton, visitor from Maryland, was a guest at Philadelphia’s Three Tuns Tavern in June 1744.\(^41\) During his stay, he found ample time to frequent the city’s taverns, where the people, conversations, and activities were curiosities to him. At dinner on Friday, June 8th, Hamilton found himself immersed in Philadelphia’s diverse cosmopolitanism. He recorded the experience in his journal:

> I dined att a tavern with a very mixed company of different nations and religions. There were Scots, English, Dutch, Germans, and Irish; there were Roman Catholicks, Church men, Presbyterians, Quakers, Newlightmen, Methodists, Seventh day men, Moravians, Anabaptists, and one Jew. The whole company consisted of 25 planted round an oblong table in a great hall well stoked with flys. The company divided into committees in conversation; the prevailing topic was politics and conjectures of a French war.\(^42\)

It is unclear in which tavern Dr. Hamilton ate that day, but the heterogeneity exhibited was natural to all of Philadelphia’s public houses. As Dr. Hamilton described, Philadelphians of all ancestries and religions, as well as genders, classes, and trades gathered together comfortably in public houses. Elbow to elbow around the communal tables were rich male citizens, aspiring patriciate, current judicature (also their minions and personal secretaries), timeserving clerks, master craftsmen, artisans, laborers (occasionally their wives and sweethearts), rogues, or vagabonds.\(^43\) Slaves, apprentices, and Indians were unwelcome in licensed taverns, and instead frequented unlicensed taverns, called “tippling houses,” where they drank and socialized in secret, dark
Yet, despite the exclusion of minority groups, and in comparison to other colonial cities, Philadelphia in general, and Philadelphian taverns in particular, were socially cosmopolitan.

Other cities in Colonial America did not exhibit such striking social tolerance. While Charleston’s population was impressively heterogeneous, its artisans, merchants, and planters usually convened in separate public houses to discuss business and politics. New York City’s cosmopolitan flair was comparable to Philadelphia’s, but its residents did not socialize as easily in public houses. New Yorkers were divided by distinct neighborhoods, classes, ethnicities, and religions. Therefore, taverns were constructed in both the city slums and the elite neighborhoods, and were visited by patrons of appropriate classes. Social stratification was old news in Boston, a city that had long grown impatient with social diversity. In 1719 “greater gaps now existed between the material life of the upper and lower strata even in public houses,” and the character “of tavern life in Boston became more complex as different clienteles distinguished themselves from each other. Most evident was the withdrawal of the genteel into select companies.” Philadelphia’s pre-1760 tavern scene, by contrast, encompassed a social diversity unknown elsewhere.

In his rich study *Rum, Punch and Revolution: Taverngoing & Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia*, historian Peter Thompson theorizes that the social character of taverns shifted during the final third of the eighteenth century. He argues that in the 1760s, “Philadelphians of all ranks and backgrounds grew disillusioned with the mixed company previously typical of their city’s taverns,” and certain taverngoers displayed, “increasing preference for sociability among men of similar background and opinion. At the same time, sections of the taverngoing public demanded the more efficient provision of specific services.” Philadelphia’s booming economy produced divisions of wealth, and in turn “a class-based system of social stratification.” Also, at the boiling point of revolution, patriots and loyalists disassociated themselves from one another, as opinions on the conflict with Britain trumped any past friendships or associations. At first glance, it seemed that Philadelphia’s cosmopolitanism would meet the same fate as her fellow colonial cities. To the contrary, the separation into distinct tavern companies actually allowed Philadelphia’s intellectual cosmopolitanism to emerge.

Around 1766, educated and influential urbanites began shunning the mixed company of the usual taverns. The conscious separation of the upper, educated classes from the lower, uneducated classes, undermined social equality, but promoted cosmopolitanism in the intellectual realm. In ordinary taverns like the Three Tuns, common Philadelphians, “talked there upon all subjects—pollicks, religion, and trade—some tolerably well, but most of them ignorantly.” For Philadelphia’s local and visiting elite, this became unacceptable. Desiring well-informed, unimpassioned debate, the emerging upper class removed themselves from ordinary public houses, selecting more reputable ones like the City Tavern or London Coffeehouse.

Later, in conjunction with the brewing of rebellion, Philadelphia taverns’ cosmopolitanism continued to evolve. In the spring of 1776, John Adams wrote to Abigail from Philadelphia, relating a curious situation. Abigail read:
This is St. Georges Day, a Festival celebrated by the English, as Saint Patricks is by the Irish, St. Davids by the Welch, and St. Andrews by the Scotch. The Natives of old England in this City heretofore formed a Society, which they called Saint Georges Clubb, or Saint Georges Society. Upon the Twenty third of April annually, they had a great Feast. But The Times and Politicks have made a schism in the society so that one Part of them are to meet and dine at the City Tavern, and the other at the Bunch of Grapes, Israel Jacobs’s, and a third Party go out of Town. One sett are staunch Americans, another staunch Britons I suppose, and a Third half Way Men, Neutral Beings, moderate Men, prudent Folks – for such is the Division among Men upon all Occasions and every Question.53

Stories like this had become commonplace in Adams’ temporary home. Philadelphia’s comfort with heterogeneity, as well as its acceptance in busy taverns, increasingly appeared a thing of the past. Philadelphia’s social cosmos was indeed on the decline, while its intellectual cosmos began to rise.

This remarkable shift in the complexion of Philadelphia’s cosmopolitanism occurred most noticeably in places like the City Tavern or London Coffeehouse. Like the taverns that came before them, these institutions welcomed a variety of men, all of different ancestries, religions, monetary backgrounds, and professions. They gathered from all thirteen colonies. But the diversity present after 1760 was unique. Four key elements—the gravity of worldly topics, the higher education of tavern patrons, the level of discourse, and the more focused use of tavern space—enabled post-1760 taverns to develop an intellectual cosmopolitanism. And this critical evolution subsequently facilitated organized revolution—a development which was particularly evident within the City Tavern.

The City Tavern was built in 1773 and stood on the west side of Second Street, between Walnut and Chestnut.54 When the modern, three-story building was not in use for entertainments like dress balls, banquets or concerts, members of the First and Second Continental Congresses discussed the day’s work in the City Tavern.55 It was a favorite spot for colonial political minds, beginning with the Revolutionary period and lasting through the Constitutional Convention. The delegates normally wound down with a newspaper in the bar and coffee room, the two front rooms on street level. For supper, delegates walked to the back of the building to one of several large club rooms. Two of these rooms could combine to extend fifty feet long and could accommodate up to one hundred people, anticipating the aforementioned entertainments.56 Following supper, lodgings above supplied a respite before the trying day in Congress tomorrow.

The City Tavern’s construction coincided with the onset of organized American resistance in Philadelphia. For instance, months before the First Continental Congress assembled, in May 1774, Pennsylvanians met in the City Tavern’s long room to discuss an appropriate response to the Intolerable Acts.57 Then, from early September to late October 1774, delegates to the First Continental Congress converged on Carpenter’s Hall. They debated reconciliation versus independence, voted for an all-colony boycott
of British goods, and agreed to meet again on May 10, 1775, for the Second Continental Congress. Following the daily congressional sessions, many delegates retired to the City Tavern, only one block to the east. Each day's topics accompanied the representatives to the Tavern, enlivening the space with boisterous voices, ripe with excitement over colonial unity, or dismay regarding a break with England.

Those assembled were indeed an educated lot. The reader will recall that Edward Shippen, Thomas Lynch, and Christopher Gadsden first met John Adams at the City Tavern during the First Continental Congress. Dr. Edward Shippen IV was educated in medicine. South Carolina's Thomas Lynch and Christopher Gadsden were educated in England, the former at Eaton College and Gonville & Caius College in Cambridge, the latter in a school near Bristol. John Adams, a Harvard graduate, dined on occasion with Thomas Jefferson, a William and Mary College alum. Many lawyers attended the First Continental, all of whom patronized the impressive tavern. John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, Peyton Randolph of Virginia, and John Rutledge of South Carolina, received degrees from Middle Temple in London. Not only were the men in the City Tavern talking about the world, they were of the world.

It was a further walk to the City Tavern for the congressmen of the Second Congress, meeting in the Pennsylvania State House three and one-half blocks to the west. But the traitorous operations in play at the State House still found their way to the City Tavern's supper tables. Some of the sixty-five delegates dined there on July 1, 1776, the evening before Congress declared the United States an independent nation. The thought and discussion active in Carpenter's Hall and the State House, but also in the City Tavern, evolved from local opinions on British policy, to colony-wide thoughts of national union, to forged opposition to Great Britain. The intellectual musings bouncing about these buildings, including the City Tavern, progressed from local to national to international. Their intellectual cosmos had matured.

This maturation, inspired by the Enlightenment, helped propel the Revolution onward. The Declaration was signed and the Constitution composed in Philadelphia—and their authors and contributors pondered nightly in the City Tavern. In order to realize an American, republican government, the existing political authority had to be extinguished. Accordingly, the members of Congress—the City Tavern's clientele—declared war, proclaimed independence, and fueled the army to violently rip the colonies from Britain's iron grip. The clientele who frequented The City Tavern had also signed their names to a document, which declared, “all men are created equal.” Equality, another core Enlightenment idea and central ethic of the American Revolution had been made possible in no small part by the presence of the City Tavern, that handsome building on Second Street.

The City Tavern was also a place of action-taking. Historian Daniel Boorstin perceives this bent toward action as inherent of the American Enlightenment. Boorstin speculates, “American thought has produced philosophes to restrain philosophy. We have allowed the mind enough play to keep it alive and aware of itself and yet seldom have allowed it to doubt the intrinsic virtue of action.” The American philosophe “expected not thought but action, not ideas but things to hold his society together.” Carpenter's
Hall and the State House were Congress’ laboratories for brewing colonial action. But might the reader acknowledge that improvised thoughts verbalized in a more casual atmosphere, like that provided in the City Tavern, could become concrete ideas presented in congressional meetings the next day? That ideas are prerequisite to action, and that ideas crowded its interior, make the City Tavern a contributor to the action-packed minutes of the Continental Congress and Constitutional Convention.

The congressional committeemen, acting by day toward a world-altering goal, were incapable of detachment come evening. How convenient that the City Tavern stood a short stroll east and offered meals for the fatigued, private rooms for thought collection, and the company of other delegates on which to test fresh ideas. The bull sessions of the evening comrades, increasingly of the cosmopolitan flair, were also ripe with republicanism, rebellion, egalitarianism, and action. The Enlightenment was lived in a most surprising venue.

**Taste Test: How Do Philadelphia’s Taverns Measure Up?**

Benjamin Franklin was comfortable in Philadelphia’s taverns. But he was also comfortable in the salon of Parisian salonnière, Madame Helvetius. It is not implausible, then, to suspect that Europe’s finest philosophes might have felt at ease around the oblong table of the Three Tuns or in the City Tavern’s back room. Why, then, do the taverns of colonial Philadelphia seem unacknowledged as institutions fostering Enlightenment discourse in the public sphere?

In the wake of recent historical reconsiderations of the Enlightenment movement, Philadelphia’s taverns gain significance. A new historical suggestion encourages viewing the Enlightenment not just as an age of light but also as an age of conversation. And what else did Philadelphians do in taverns but converse? In his essay, “Enlightenment as Conversation,” historian Lawrence E. Klein suggests that “the Enlightenment is defined now not by a set of doctrines but by a set of communicative practices, along with such concepts as conversation, politeness and sociability, which contemporaries used to comprehend their distinctive practices.” If the Enlightenment is defined according to a set of communicative practices, a few institutions emerge as the epicenters of discussion and debate. Klein lists the French salon, the English coffeehouse, and the Masonic lodge. What about taverns?

Inside a French salon, philosophes were part of an egalitarian, governed, social structure in which the salonnière kept order. At the salon, “networks of social and intellectual exchange were being developed to connect the capital with the four corners of France and the cosmopolitan republic,” and the salon “better represented and better supported the new Republic of Letters, whose aim was to serve humanity and whose project was Enlightenment.”

Likewise, English coffeehouses promoted free speech, provided newspapers, ignored hierarchy, and brewed insubordination. Coffeehouses “could be used to construct a new sort of order to replace the authorities of church and state.” Indeed, in England “the coffee houses were considered seedbeds of political unrest.” Salons and coffeehouses practiced and valued similar ideals, such as “political autonomy, publicity, and
worldliness of the society defined by conversation; reciprocity, mutual respect, and equality among members of it; and unity of spoken and written discourse in it,” and the perfection of such principles was a “project of Enlightenment which required both order and freedom, women and men, to achieve its end of advancing the good of society and humanity.”65

Early American Masonic lodges strived for a universal brotherhood and stressed the importance of equality and cosmopolitanism. Freemasons often met in taverns, testament to the adequateness and appropriateness of a tavern’s unique space. Masonic fraternity “powerfully expressed the ideas of the early Enlightenment, especially its order, simplicity and social harmony.”66 America’s first organized Masonic group was St. John’s Lodge in Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin was a Freemason.67

French salons, English coffeehouses, and Masonic lodges each adhere to specific criteria outlined by Jurgen Habermas in his The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society: 1) status must be disregarded altogether; 2) truth and meaning must be determined through thought and discussion, not from authority; 3) participants must be cognizant of their inclusion of a larger public and that they will often serve as the mouthpiece of that larger public.68 Each institution is an incontrovertible example of the public sphere.

And what of Philadelphia’s colonial taverns? Do they meet Habermas’ criteria? This paper has explored that question. Consider the first criterion. Whether the pre-1760 social variant or the post-1760 intellectual alternative, whether a Philadelphia politician was being interrogated by an artisan or John Adams was considering the opinions of a South Carolinian, Philadelphia’s eighteenth century taverns were indeed cosmopolitan. Status was always checked at the door.

Habermas’ second criterion requires that truth and meaning must be discerned independent of external authority. Firstly, the collective workings of individual minds uncovered truth and meaning. Local politics, educational interests, scientific discovery, and England’s continued abuses, for example, were topics freely pondered within the tavern. Secondly, the conversation and debate of the post-1760 taverns were not only liberated from, but blatantly assaulted powerful authority. The justification for the American Revolution was oft determined around the oblong table.

According to his third criterion, Habermas concludes that members of the public sphere must be aware of their inclusion within the larger public and their role and speakers for that body. In Philadelphia, particularly in the City Tavern, public houses hosted a determined few who represented the grievances, purposes, hopes, and plans of a larger public. The representatives voiced the core reasons for the American Revolution in Philadelphia—and in their home colonies—and penned it as well. What better mouthpiece for the American public than the Declaration of Independence? The Philadelphia tavern is an institution of the public sphere. All of Habermas’ criteria are satisfied.

As institutions of the public sphere, America’s heterogeneous taverns boiled with colorful personalities. In the fall of 1774, Philadelphia’s taverns had become particularly accustomed to John Adams’ various dispositions. Days before the First Continental
Congress adjourned, a cranky Adams often walked through tavern doors. By now, Adams often criticized his colleagues, saying, “There is no greater Mortification than to sit with half a dozen Witts, deliberating upon a Petition, Address, or Memorial.” Richard Henry Lee’s head was running, John Dickinson was timid, and worst of all, “Young Ned Rutledge is a perfect Bob o’ Lincoln—a Swallow—a Sparrow—a Peacock—excessively vain, excessively weak, and excessively variable and unsteady—jejune, inane, and puerile.”

It was time to go home. But first, like it or not, an annoyed Adams dined with his fellow congressmen for a final time. Appropriately, they gathered at the City Tavern. Many delegates would never see it again. Many, like Adams, would return in May 1775. When they did, the City Tavern, a prime representative of Philadelphia’s post-1760 public houses, would continue to provide an environment conducive to the completion of the Second Continental’s ambitious agenda. Hopefully, by then John Adams would be in better spirits, eager to use the tavern’s exceptional space to help fulfill the Congress’ goals. He and his fellow delegates, along with the City Tavern, had yet to play their biggest roles.
When my grandmother died a few years ago in her farmhouse outside of Windsor, Colorado, my aunts and I sifted through her collection of family photographs. In the oldest album, we came across a photograph of my father when he was a small boy standing next to an Army guard while German POWs worked the farm’s sugar beets in the background. It turned out that my grandparents saved dozens of photographs of the prisoners who worked on their farm. Most were group photos, but there were a few portraits of individual POWs who seemed to have made an impression on my grandparents. As I gazed on these mysterious photographs, I recalled the old family stories told around the dinner table and wondered about the smiling German soldiers who worked on northeastern Colorado farms. Why was there only one guard for so many prisoners? Were the prisoners smiling because they could talk with my grandparents in German? Who made the decisions that allowed prisoners to work? Surely, some of the prisoners were Nazis; were they allowed to work on the farms, or were they confined to a camp? Was there a process that segregated some prisoners away from others? These questions drove my interest in this aspect of World War II history.
Early in my research, I learned that my family were farmers like many others across the United States that contracted with the Army for POW labor. They hired prisoners to fill a labor shortage caused by the mobilization of the American home front. As the war industries geared up for the war, they pulled manual laborers away from the small towns and farms. One emerging solution to this labor shortage was to allow local farmers to hire POW work crews as replacement stoop laborers. However, before any prisoners would be allowed to work and associate with American civilians the Army had to decide which prisoners could work and which ones stayed in the prison compound. The Army wrestled with the problem of prisoner segregation throughout the war.

Racial segregation was not a new practice for the 1940s Army. Throughout the war, the Army maintained racially separate units; the African-American 332nd Fighter Group and the Asian-American 442nd Regimental Combat Team were just two examples. On the home front, the Army was also acting on its role in the internment of Japanese-American civilians; giving an internee’s national loyalties or political ideologies little consideration if any. If someone’s skin was black or if they had Japanese ancestry, the Army could racially place them in precise categories. When dealing with the German prisoners, the Army could not make such skin-deep racial determinations. On the surface, keeping captured German soldiers away from American civilians was simply a matter of determining ones national citizenship. However, the Army needed to segregate Germans from Germans. Another method was required.

Instead of relying on racial differences, the Army placed a prisoner’s political beliefs on an ideological continuum from Nazism to Communism. The government then used this determination as a basis for approving individual prisoners for increased contact with American civilians or relocation to specifically designated POW camps. The following analysis explores the Army’s political segregation of POWs; whether the Army developed a universal definition of Nazism, and what processes the Army used when prisoners were categorized and separated from their companions.

My focus is to specifically determine if the Army conducted any political screenings prior to transferring a POW from one camp to another. My analysis indicates that although an individual prisoner’s transfer was indeed based on his political ideology, the government failed to implement a systematic screening process that segregated POWs into defined groups. In short, I discovered the Army’s policies changed as it reacted to new information about its prisoners.

When America entered World War II, it was unprepared for the eventual internment of hundreds of thousands of captured enemy soldiers. American leaders quickly needed to establish a comprehensive POW program that addressed the confinement of potentially hostile soldiers and met the recently signed and internationally recognized agreements of the 1929 Geneva Conventions. The government charged the Army’s Provost Marshal General’s Office (PMGO) to implement the convention’s provisions concerning prisoners of war and maintain control and oversight of the POW camps. The camp system that emerged addressed the prisoners’ health and safety, utilized prisoners as replacement agricultural workers, and during the latter years of the war taught selected prisoners about American democracy.
The position of the PMGO also referred to as the Office of the Provost Marshall General, was created during the American Revolutionary War. During times of war, a general officer was usually appointed to command the PMGO, and his large staff numbered in the hundreds. Since its conception, the PMGO’s many duties included the custody of enemy prisoners and the criminal investigation of American soldiers. During the twentieth century, the PMGO conducted security investigations of personnel working on the Manhattan Project, and interned Japanese-Americans. Actual operation of the many camps flowed from the PMGO, through regional service commands, to the individual camp commanders. At the top of the chain of command, the PMGO was responsible for creating the many overlapping, and at times competing, Army policies related to prisoner segregation.

In response to the established national priorities of prisoner security (keeping POWs confined and ensuring their health), camp harmony, POW labor, and prisoner reeducation, the PMGO advocated for the identification and relocation of certain prisoners. Unable to rely on racial determinations the Army developed non-racial methods of determining a prisoner’s support for or against Nazism. To this end, the PMGO wrote policy letters and expository memoranda to subordinate commands about how to identify a Nazi or to support one or more national policies. However, the PMGO did not standardize a comprehensive methodology that facilitated the segregation of politically active POWs. Instead, the PMGO delegated the decision to segregate individual POWs to the American camp commanders. With the authority to make segregation decisions locally, individual camp commanders determined which national priority took precedence in their camps, and accordingly segregated the prisoners under their control. Although commanders were able to determine which prisoners remained in their camp, they still had to answer to the PMGO and maintain the national priorities of prisoner security and camp harmony.

Paramount to the national priorities the government had to implement the 1929 Geneva Conventions. Together the PMGO and the Judge Advocate General interpreted the Geneva Conventions and made final policy decisions related to the POWs. Integrated with the many agreements was the concept that the country that interned captured soldiers was obliged to continue to treat POWs as soldiers loyal to their country of origin and not as civilian or war criminals. Geneva dictated that POWs retained their military rank and chain of command while imprisoned, and remained citizens of their home country. This meant that the PMGO was not motivated to measure a prisoner’s desire to become an American. This is in stark contrast to the Japanese-American internee loyalty tests administered by the PMGO after Pearl Harbor. The conventions also established that POWs who attempted escape were acting out of a sense of military duty, and that if recaptured they were to be free from reprisals. The conventions required the capturing country to provide for the humane treatment of POWs. Furthermore, Geneva prohibited the use of prisoner labor near the front lines, or in war related industries, and formally recognized the long-standing military custom that commissioned and non-commissioned officers were free from coerced labor. Humane treatment required that POWs be fed with rations equitable to the civilian population and be allowed to remain in regular contact with their
home government and neutral parties, particularly the International Red Cross and Swiss Legation. With a few isolated exceptions, the PMGO embraced the spirit of the 1929 Geneva Conventions, especially the humane treatment of prisoners interned in America.

The Army strictly adhered to Geneva’s agreements, particularly the provision against using POW labor in war industries. However, American leaders also realized that enlisted POWs, and willing officers, could augment the country’s agricultural labor shortage. Therefore, the PMGO supervised rural German POW camps, away from major industrial centers, in all states except Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and Vermont. PMGO guidelines required that all camps be located within five miles of a railroad stop, and near agricultural areas where stoop labor was in short supply. In the end, the location of individual POW camps determined the camp’s environmental, labor, and political conditions under which the prisoners lived, even while the bureaucratic and operational infrastructure of the camps remained the same throughout the POW camp system.

The POW camps in Colorado highlight examples of how the Army operated these institutions and provide a point of departure to compare POW camps in other states. In Colorado, the PMGO built two large prisons near the cities of Trinidad and Greeley. A third large POW facility near Colorado Springs was built inside Camp Carson, which the Army later renamed Fort Carson. Dispersed throughout Colorado as many as twenty-seven smaller branch camps augmented the three main camps. These branch camps functioned as forward operating facilities because of their location near agricultural enterprises. Some of the branch camps operated year round while others supported seasonal labor needs, such as ice cutting or timber harvesting.

Although POW labor was a major consideration, the Army built Colorado’s largest POW camps to house POWs first. Providing POW labor was a secondary motive. Unlike the main camps, where the Army constructed the stockade, the communities that benefited from POW labor often provided the branch camp’s facilities. For example, the Great Western Sugar Company renovated their temporary worker dormitory in Longmont, Colorado to house the POWs who worked in the company’s sugar factory. Although these prisoners worked in a factory, as an agricultural product sugar fell outside of the definition of a “war industry.” In other areas throughout Colorado, towns adapted National Guard armories, hotels, warehouses, and even school gymnasiums to accommodate the prisoners. A two-pronged approach where the Army built the main institutions and the communities provided temporary facilities occurred throughout the forty-four states, whether the agricultural work was a peanut harvest in Georgia, clearing slash timber in New Hampshire, or thinning sugar beets in Colorado.

As the Army expected, the German POW population grew with each successive Allied victory in North Africa and Europe reaching 371,683 prisoners just before VE Day, which represented 83% of the POWs from all of the Axis nations. The PMGO’s highest priority at the beginning of the war was security, brought on by the fear of escaped POWs sabotaging American interests. By the end of the war, this fear became unfounded; the reality was that most POWs were more interested in
living out the war unscathed. Throughout the duration of the camp system, camp commanders reported only 2,671 escapes. The escape rate of .36% was slightly less than the .44% rate from U.S. criminal penitentiaries for the same period. While this statistic may indicate the Army’s tight security measures, the real reason was that the German POWs largely chose to stay in the camps, and in some isolated cases voluntarily returned to camp after a jaunt outside of the camp’s perimeter. Even so, the priority of keeping the men confined required no ideological segregation on behalf of the Army. All captured Germans became prisoners of war. Recognizing the low escape rate, the PMGO sought to reduce operating costs and minimize the number of American guards and camp administrators.

One German officer from Camp Trinidad, Colorado remarked, “We could sometimes leave [Base] camp if we gave our word of honor we would be back at a certain time. We could not go to town, but we could wander out on the hills and open prairie for nature studies.” In addition, when working outside of camp the same POW told the guards, “Turn around for a minute. We’re going for a little walk, but we’ll be back by 10:00 o’clock.” The low POW escape rate quickly led to a reduction of camp guards and subsequent reduction of security measures and standards, even to the point of allowing trustworthy POWs to lead their own work details. Yet not everything was congenial within the camps. The public façade of the camps revealed an orderly prison system. However, below the surface discord and animosity among the prisoners permeated the atmosphere. To maintain the national priorities the PMGO needed some sort of prisoner segregation.

Behind prisoner security and the humane treatment of the men, the PMGO’s other priorities in descending order were the operation of the POW labor program while using a minimum number of U.S. guards. It also did not provide any rations for the POWs that American civilians could not purchase. They also introduced a POW reeducation program. Ensured that prisoner labor did not conflict with the interests of civilian workers, and that the POW camps were located where there were labor shortages. Complying with all of these priorities ultimately meant that the prisoners were confined to camp for most of the time. Combating the boredom of prison directly led to many of the activities, largely recreational, in which the POWs participated. In time, the PMGO used a prisoner’s participation in or rejection of camp activities as evidence of that prisoner’s ideological stance on Nazism.

The PMGO evaluated nearly every prisoner activity as an indicator of an individual POW’s political leaning. Inside the prisoners’ compound, opportunities for sport and self-improvement became welcome outlets from the intense boredom of camp life. The introduction of a ball quickly led to the formation of intramural competitions. From soccer to softball, these games became more involved than just internal camp activities. In Colorado, POW softball teams from the Greeley and Trinidad camps competed against their camp’s guards and even local civilian teams. Athletics was only one of several recreational diversions available for the internees. Of all the diversions that the POWs participated in, three activities became barometers of political ideology and were exploited by PMGO authorities to collect evidence for political segregation.
First, a common form of prisoner entertainment was the screening of as many as two American movies per week; the prisoners preferred westerns and musicals.\textsuperscript{19} During the early phases of the POW system, when political segregation was not an issue, American commanders allowed the camp’s POW leadership to select the movies. The prisoners’ leaders often selected movies that portrayed American culture in a negative light, such as the lawless west or Chicago gangsterim. Later, as the POW reeducation program gained steam, the PMGO made the camp’s reeducation officer responsible for selecting the movies, which then portrayed a more positive America. These same officers also included reactions to the movies in their analysis for a prisoner’s propensity for reeducation or segregation to a Nazi camp.\textsuperscript{20} Second, along with the more passive activity of watching American movies, some POWs from the larger camps formed orchestras and theater troupes that then traveled to the branch camps to entertain the internees. The third key activity that became an indicator for a POW’s political ideology was the camp’s educational services, including camp libraries with thousands of donated texts.

A big hit with the prisoners, camp educational opportunities facilitated higher education for many of the men. Typical subjects for study included classes in German, English, history, geography, etc.\textsuperscript{21} The Army usually found qualified teachers from within the POW populations, and when needed brought American professors into camp to teach classes. Major American universities such as the University of Minnesota even accepted course work in German.\textsuperscript{22} Although the original purpose of the classes was to relieve boredom, these educational activities spread the idea of democracy, countering the POWs’ Nazi indoctrination.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, by the end of the war, many of these prisoners could communicate in English, then when repatriated to western Germany became part of the new intellectual class.\textsuperscript{24} Yet even with all the athletic and educational diversions within the camps, working on local farms became a principal activity for many of the POWs.

The process of obtaining prisoners for labor was not allowing farmers driving up to the gate of a POW camp and loading up a bunch of prisoners. The basic process was that local farmers contracted with the Army for prisoner labor at the going rate of civilian labor as established by local employment boards. The Army then paid each working prisoner eighty cents per day and used the rest of the proceeds, some 100 million dollars, to fund prison operations and the POW reeducation program.\textsuperscript{25} Even though agricultural labor was in short supply, not every POW worked outside of the camps. The PMGO needed to determine which prisoners were available for the work crews. For the duration of the camp system, the PMGO utilized established military traditions as the first level of prisoner segregation, although still not political segregation.

Throughout the war, POWs from the German army and navy lived in separate camps. Captured officers, who were exempt from coerced labor, lived apart from the enlisted soldiers, who provided the majority of the labor. Depending on their rank and proximity to the junior enlisted POWs the PMGO similarly segregated non-commissioned officers into separate camps, in Indianola, Nebraska or Douglas, Wyoming.\textsuperscript{26} It is not clear if the PMGO’s primary objective in service and rank-
based segregation was an accommodation of strong military traditions or an attempt to preempt inter-service rivalries. Either way the result of this form of segregation was a reduction in the cost of camp operations because the Army required fewer guards. Although all of the prisoners were German military, not every man was a German citizen or held the same ideologies as the German government. For these men, politics played an increasingly larger role in each camp. The segregation of prisoners based on their military standing continued unabated, while the political segregation went through two basic phases.

Early in the war the PMGO equated Germans with Nazis, meaning that anyone captured wearing a German uniform was therefore thought to be a Nazi, even though the Wehrmacht included soldiers from Austria and other European countries. Any subsequent separation of prisoners was based on military branch and rank. The PMGO’s early prejudice that every German POW was also a Nazi is somewhat different from the analysis of John W. Dower. He argues that the American public recognized that Europe’s ills were a result of Nazism and not an ethnic condition of the German people. Lumping Germans with the Nazi ideology was the closest that the PMGO came to racially or ethnically classifying German POWs. However, since the PMGO made no distinction at this time between the prisoners, it is ineffective to call the effects of such prejudice segregation. As long as the PMGO only wanted to keep German prisoners away from American civilians, the point is moot.

In 1943, the first major influx of POWs began arriving in the United States, mostly from the Afrika Korps. Since these prisoners arrived first, they indirectly affected the operations of the whole POW system by establishing norms of prisoner behavior and interaction with American guards. Most Afrika Korps soldiers entered the German military in the 1930s during the heady days of National Socialism and were some of the soldiers most thoroughly indoctrinated in the cause of Nazism. Furthermore, the Afrika Korps soldiers were captured before the widespread German defeats in Eastern and Western Europe. The vast majority of these soldiers remained proud of their accomplishments, despite their capture, and continued to believe until the war ended in the eventual victory of National Socialism. The combination of being first on the scene, their high morale, and sense of German efficiency, allowed the Afrika Korps POWs to establish efficient and orderly internal camp practices.

Initially, U.S. camp commanders recognized the benefits of allowing the Afrika Korps POWs the authority to regulate themselves inside the camp’s boundaries. Additionally, the PMGO was able to reduce US manpower requirements due to the prisoners’ discipline on agricultural work details. Inside the camps prisoners ran their own laundries and dining facilities, held military formations, and maintained their military customs and courtesies, which convinced some camp commanders to believe that Nazis made the best prisoners. As long as American authorities saw the prisoners living in a smoothly operating camp, they were willing to allow the existence of Nazism within the prison compound, especially since PMGO policy at the time made no distinction between Germans and Nazism. The price that American commanders paid for allowing Nazism was the violence perpetrated by Nazi fanatics to coerce those prisoners who were opposed to the Nazi ideology.
Inside the fence and underneath the placid exterior of an efficient camp, and without American knowledge or with at least tacit acceptance, the hard-core Nazis created and perpetuated a culture of intimidation. They maintained a power structure by organizing themselves like the Geheime Staats Polizei (Gestapo), and imposed similar political and emotional controls on the POW population as the Nazi government used on the general population in Germany. Until American authorities recognized the extent of Nazi influence, the politically mainstream and anti-Nazi POWs suffered under a Nazi reign of terror executed by their fellow internees.

After arriving in America, Nazi protagonists took full advantage of the 1929 Geneva Conventions to manipulate their fellow prisoners. Nazi POWs organized covert honor courts to impose judgments on internees acting against Nazi ideologies. Rulings imposed from the honor courts often carried threats to the accused prisoner’s family in Germany. Due in part to the repressive political atmosphere in Germany, the hard-core Nazi POW leaders convinced many mainstream POWs that what occurred while imprisoned in America would be relayed to Nazi Germany. The fact that the Geneva Conventions allowed for regular communication between POWs and their home government made these threats very real for the affected prisoners.

Nearly forty years after the war, Lewis Carlson documented Josef Krumbachner’s recollections of his camp’s political atmosphere. Krumbachner, a politically mainstream prisoner, recalled that the camp’s official POW representative told him, “You are in a German officers’ prison camp. Only National Socialist thought is allowed here. Anyone who disagrees should understand that in many camps traitors have already been removed from their barracks in the middle of the night and hanged from a post.” Krumbachner also recalled that the Nazi officers in his camp controlled the educational curriculum and threatened and/or attacked POW teachers that taught against the Nazi ideology. Besides holding honor courts, the hard-core Nazi POW organization maintained their control over fellow internees by monitoring their face-to-face communications and reading a suspect POW’s mail.

Although eavesdropping on conversations was easily accomplished in the confined spaces of a POW camp, reading the contents of a letter was more difficult. Always concerned about manpower costs, the PMGO authorized internees to work in the POW post office, which handled inter-camp prisoner mail as well as prisoner mail to and from Germany. The hard-core Nazi organization took full advantage of this opportunity to monitor politically suspect POWs from different camps. The reign of terror permeated throughout the camps to the point that some prisoners slept in their clothes, kept a club nearby, and used a bucket rather than risk a nighttime walk to the latrine. The confines of the POW camp distilled the terror imposed by the hard-core Nazis and made confinement more harrowing for the mainstream prisoners. Luca Felix Müller, who defected to the Allies in France, recalled that he “had enjoyed more political freedom in the traditional German Army than [he did] in an American POW camp.” At Camp Concordia, Kansas, a lack of direct American oversight of the internal camp atmosphere facilitated the occurrence of forced suicides of non-Nazi prisoners. Because the surface activities of a well run camp were accepted and
to some extent encouraged by the American commanders, the reign of terror by the hard-core Nazis was largely covert.

The public face of Nazi efficiency gave Nazi POWs a free hand to establish and maintain discipline according to their own standards. In his dissertation, Edward Pluth stated, “[a]s long as their camps appeared well run internally and the work program achieved results, many camp commanders, in spite of [future] directives, took little action to counter Nazi control. Here lay the crux of the problem.”\(^{40}\) As long as the camps met their objectives, the PMGO followed a mantra common in the sport of basketball - no harm-no foul. However, harm occurred. When American authorities finally grasped that the fight against Nazism in Europe included eliminating Nazism in POW camps, they started to make changes in camp operations. Specifically the PMGO started segregating the prisoners based on their political beliefs.

During the first phase of the POW system, when the *Afrika Korps* POWs were arriving in the U.S., a camp commander’s purpose for ideological segregation was the removal of a POW who caused unrest and inefficiency in the camp. This resulted in the segregation of politically active anti-Nazi POWs. The general term anti-Nazi is used here to describe a prisoner’s belief against Nazism, and although the PMGO grouped anti-Nazis together, their various ideologies ranged from communism to socialism to democracy. In the short term, this form of political segregation did resolve internal camp disharmony to the satisfaction of the American commanders, but simultaneously strengthened the influence of the Nazi POWs over their politically mainstream fellow prisoners.\(^{41}\)

The early naivety of the PMGO regarding the Nazism within the camps was corrected by the political segregation efforts later in the war. As mentioned above the PMGO initially believed that all Germans were Nazis.\(^{42}\) As the PMGO learned more about their captives, they placed more emphasis on the political segregation of prisoners. Throughout the war approximately forty percent of the total POW population held Nazi beliefs. Statistically the range of Nazi POWs in any camp spans from six to ninety percent, depending on the particular camp being examined.\(^{43}\) With the exception of the “particularly fanatic” *Afrika Korps*, the existence of Nazi POWs throughout the camp system matched the Nazism in the regular German military. Nazis comprised from ten to fifteen percent of the enlisted force. Although not apparently a prerequisite for promotion, the rate of Nazism increased with rank resulting in higher percentages of Nazi beliefs in the noncommissioned and junior officer corps. Senior officers, those above the rank of Major, were nearly all Nazis. Since their rank already kept them apart from other prisoners, they did not play a significant role in the political segregation of POWs.\(^{44}\) In general the PMGO eventually learned that “except for a hard core minority [the idea of] National Socialism held little interest to most soldiers.”\(^{45}\)

As experience with the POWs increased, the PMGO responded to several trends that built upon each other before expanding the segregation of POWs from military rank and service to a prisoner’s politics. Direct interactions with the prisoners by American teachers, medical personnel, news outlets, and especially the guards,
changed the PMGO’s earlier prejudice about Germans and Nazis. With the war’s progression, authorities also realized that the political inclinations of the Wehrmacht roughly matched the German civilian population, confirming that Nazi POWs were actually in the minority.\footnote{This change in opinion coincided with the recognition that some prisoners became victims of violent acts for speaking or acting against the camp’s dominant ideology. Although Nazis initiated most of the violence, they became the victims of anti-Nazi violence in camps where they were in the minority.} The resulting intimidation affected the morale within the camps, and in turn negatively affected the three main objectives of the camp system. Camp commanders, who wanted to eliminate prisoner violence, were also under pressure to maintain productive work details. They also began reacting to the demands of the PMGO’s new and classified POW reeducation program.

With a larger cross section of the Wehrmacht interned in America, the PMGO realized that the POW camps were more productive and safer when like-minded prisoners were interned together, adding momentum to the growing practice of political segregation. When the invasion of Europe began, more mainstream POWs flooded into camps dominated by the Afrika Korps, increasing Nazi violence against anti-Nazi prisoners. The launch of the reeducation program coincided with the arrival of European theater POWs and the increasing pressure to politically segregate prisoners. Before reeducation, camp commanders segregated prisoners who appeared to be the source of agitation, those usually in the minority position. After reeducation, the PMGO asked camp commanders to identify and relocate those POWs whom they thought would be amenable to learning about democracy, even if those prisoners were effective workers and members of the majority population.

Whereas segregation and relocations for camp harmony and labor had a public face, meaning that both the American civilian and German prisoner populations were aware of them, the reeducation program was classified. Camp commanders also demonstrated mixed responses to the segregation of POWs for the purpose of reeducation. Depending on the timeframe, some commanders accepted the idea of reeducation and were much more actively involved in identifying individual candidates. Other commanders wanted to maintain their camp’s labor program and resisted the relocation of compliant and hard working POWs. The huge success of the labor program competed with the emerging reeducation program and became the largest single barrier to a comprehensive political segregation of POWs.\footnote{The reeducation program also caused the focus of political segregation to change from relocating anti-Nazi prisoners to removing and isolating Nazi prisoners to specific camps. When Nazi prisoners were relocated, the political influences on mainstream POWs shifted. The director of the PMGO Security Division, Alton C. Miller, wrote that it is “more logical to screen out the Nazi than to remove the anti-Nazis from the ranks from the politically undecided or lukewarm group.”} Although the bureaucratic emphasis on segregation changed, the PMGO still did not streamline how it identified or categorized POWs.
The Army created two separate but overlapping schemas for categorizing POWs, one for relocations and another for reeducation. Centering on the relocation aspect of segregation, the PMGO pigeonholed POWs into three groups based on politics: N for Nazis, G for Germans, and A for anti-Nazis. Meanwhile, the PMGO attempted to classify POWs for reeducation. Prisoners were sorted into three other groups: Black for Nazis, Grey for followers of the Nazi party, and White for documented anti-Nazis. Speculation on the overlap between these designations suggests that the Army was trying to preserve the security of the reeducation program while giving a more public reason for relocations. By themselves the N, G, A and Black, Grey, White designations were well defined. However, the lack of a comprehensive PMGO policy allowed camp commanders to apply these designations anecdotally, based on their determination of the camp’s primary objective. Commanders still tried to maintain effective prisoner work crews by removing troublemakers. Nevertheless, when the PMGO realized that Nazi ideologies had taken root inside the POW camps, efforts to isolate Nazi POWs intensified.

Crucial to the PMGO’s segregation process was the identification of specific camps to house the different categories of POWs. For the duration of the POW system, the politically mainstream POWs remained in place since they made up nearly eighty percent of the prisoner population. Before 1944, prisoner relocations targeted the anti-Nazi elements. These prisoners were sent to one of three camps: Camp Cambell in Kentucky, Camp McCain in Mississippi, and Ft. Devens in Massachusetts.

Ft. Devens is unique because the PMGO interned many of the educated anti-Nazi POWs there. These prisoners produced the POW newspaper Der Ruf, with the PMGO’s support but not editorial oversight. Translated as The Call, the newspaper’s title referred to the calling of fellow POWs to rebuild post-war Germany, and participate in political dialogue; a practice repressed by Nazi Germany. The PMGO distributed Der Ruf throughout the camp system. Prisoners could purchase the newspaper for a nominal price using money earned while on work crews. How a prisoner reacted to Der Ruf became a sort of litmus test for his political ideology, by both the Nazis and American guards.

When the PMGO identified soldiers as committed Nazis during the initial prisoner-processing phase, they were interned at Camp Alva in Oklahoma; the only camp specifically designated for Nazi POWs. Camp Alva operated much like the classic POW camps portrayed in post-war American movies. The prisoners stayed confined within the camp at all times. American guards monitored the camp’s internal activities and the prisoners did not participate in the labor or reeducation programs. Although one of the largest camps in the U.S., the limited size of Camp Alva required the PMGO to reserve relocations there for the most politically extreme Nazi internees. Camp commanders could request that a POW be relocated to Camp Alva, but when the PMGO denied the transfer, the requesting commander had to deal with the Nazi prisoner in his own camp. In lieu of relocation to Camp Alva, some prisoners moved to facilities within the same command or between main and branch camps. In rare cases, a single prisoner who feared for his life, either at the hands of Nazi, or anti-Nazi
POWs, could request that the camp commander place them in protective custody, which usually meant solitary confinement. In spite of the initial camp assignment and before any prisoners could be relocated, American authorities still needed a method to distinguish Nazis from within the politically mainstream POWs.

One obvious identification feature that Americans initially used to segregate new prisoners was their rank. Other than by their rank, those prisoners identified as a member of the Schutzstaffel (the SS and Waffen SS), or the Gestapo, or had documented evidence as a Nazi leader, they joined the POWs sent to Camp Alva. Evidence of a POW’s Nazi membership came through screenings and interviews conducted by American and Allied intelligence analysts. However, initial screenings only identified the most ardent Nazis. Once a POW arrived in a mainstream camp, the PMGO needed other information gathering methods to determine an individual’s political beliefs. The Americans with the most direct contact with the POWs were the guards, who provided insight about individual prisoners.

After the Army recognized that not all Germans were Nazis, the PMGO published a “Fact vs. Fantasy” pamphlet for distribution to American personnel, particularly the guards. This pamphlet dispelled the prevailing American propaganda with facts that proved that most Germans actually held political ideologies that were not in lock step with Nazism. A particularly handy POW behavior that camp authorities looked for was the destruction of the POW newspaper Der Ruf; solely written and edited by POWs, and with the blessings of American propagandists. With the anti-Nazi slant of Der Ruf in mind, a guard in a mainstream camp could be certain that a POW was a Nazi if he destroyed copies of Der Ruf, or otherwise limited its distribution.

On occasion, some POWs would come forward to their guards and request American protection from fellow POWs due to threats of bodily harm. Usually these self-identified POWs thought of themselves as anti-Nazis, but self-identified Nazis also sought American protection. Throughout the segregation process, personnel from the Army’s intelligence directorate (G2) were the key U.S. officials who determined a POW’s politics, using standardized rank or duty determinations, anecdotal observations of camp behavior, or a POW’s self-identification.

From the moment of capture, all POWs underwent successive tactical intelligence interviews as they were transported away from the front. For German POWs interned in America this process was generally over when the PMGO processed them at their port of arrival on the east coast. So far removed from the front lines, the G2 interviewers in America were less concerned about gathering intelligence, and more interested in determining a POW’s politics, using standardized rank or duty determinations, anecdotal observations of camp behavior, or a POW’s self-identification.

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drafted into the 999th would fight and die for the Fatherland, these soldiers received little if any effective military training. In effect, the soldiers from the 999th tended to surrender to the Allies at the earliest opportunity. Since these POWs wore distinctive insignia, G2 interviewers easily identified these men as anti-Nazi.61 It was not until the G2 screened and interviewed members of the 999th that the PMGO identified the educated and politically active anti-Nazi POWs who actually wrote Der Ruf. Yet, determining a POW’s military unit was not always enough information to politically segregate a POW.

Sometime during the war, G2 analysts learned of a small tattoo, about the size of a dime, under the left armpit of some POWs believed to contain information such as the soldier’s blood type. Most importantly, Army intelligence analysts realized that only soldiers from the SS or Waffen SS had the tattoo. Since this was a surefire identification of a hard-core Nazi, the PMGO required that all prisoners be inspected for the telltale tattoo; camouflaged as a routine health check for lice. However, some POWs wanted to hide their membership in the SS so the inspection also searched for evidence of scarring or other forms of tattoo removal by either cutting or burning the skin.62 This tattoo inspection was the only physical means of identifying and politically classifying a POW. Most of the time PMGO officials had to actually talk to the internees before determining a prisoner’s political ideology.

Concurrent with the initiation of the Army’s POW reeducation program the PMGO created the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division (POWSPD); staffed with Army personnel specially trained and charged with identifying those prisoners with a political inclination toward democracy. Prisoners screened by the POWSPD teams were considered for relocation to Ft. Eustis, Virginia for an intensive reeducation program focused on teaching the tenets of American democracy. The PMGO deemed the following categories of prisoners ineligible for reeducation: officers holding the rank of major and above, members of the Nazi party, communists, POWs claiming non-German citizenship, POWs who would not be repatriated to the American zone of occupation, and POWs thought to be too old or too young.63 Selected prisoners were initially unaware of the reason for their transfer. However, upon their arrival at Ft. Eustis, a POW could refuse to participate in the reeducation program.
To accomplish this most comprehensive effort at politically classifying the POW population, the POWSPD established two-man teams assigned to each camp, and trained them to interview and screen the prisoners. Although focusing on finding prisoners for the reeducation camps, POWSPD teams also identified Nazi POWS who were ineligible for reeducation. During this round of interviews, prisoners were asked about not only their own political views but the views of fellow captives as well. Another tactic of the POWSPD teams was to place interpreters in the camp’s classrooms to monitor the political tenor of the curriculum. The teams also facilitated open-ended discussions with the prisoners and analyzed the content of the local POW newspapers other than *Der Ruf*. By combining all their gathered information, the POWSPD teams effectively classified individual POWs according to his political ideology. However, the POWSPD teams did not have the power to actually transfer a POW. Camp commanders retained transfer authority and considered the effect of a POW transfer on their camp’s priorities.

Sometimes the political segregation occurred by in-camp confinement. The larger camps utilized the guardhouse located outside of the designated prisoner areas. Similar to a town jail, the guardhouse contained several confinement cells reserved for disruptive POWs. For those men seeking American protection, such a confinement severely restricted their movement. Therefore, in-camp segregation was usually a temporary measure until the camp commander arranged for a more permanent transfer.

When the PMGO approved relocations, the effected POW was kept unaware of the time or reason for their transfer or their new camp’s location. This secrecy of POW movements was designed to protect threatened POWs as well as hamper the influence of Nazi organizations. Besides Ft. Devens, Camp McCain, and Camp Cambell, some particularly politically active POWs were sent to different camps for specific purposes. The PMGO relocated some anti-Nazi prisoners to Ft. Kearny and other smaller camps in Massachusetts for specific reeducation programs aimed at training the prisoners for post-war policing activities. These specially trained, pro-democracy POWs were prepared for an early repatriation to the American sector of occupied Germany to reestablish law and order. The largest contingent of POWs selected for reeducation participated in the accelerated reeducation program at Ft. Eustis, Virginia. The mainstream prisoners who attended Ft. Eustis’ crash course in democracy nicknamed it the “six-day bicycle race.” Along with the Camp Kearny POWs, these reeducated prisoners expected an early repatriation.

An unintended but still realistic reason for politically segregating prisoners was to simply get rid of troublesome POWs. Camp commanders felt the pressure from the PMGO to maintain an effective labor program and naturally tried to compose the most productive work details. When a single POW’s behavior, whether political in nature or just unruly, became detrimental to a well functioning work crew, camp commanders proceeded to transfer the POW to another camp. On occasion troublesome anti-Nazi POWs were mistakenly relocated to Camp Alva. Camp Stark in New Hampshire provides an example of a camp that tried to transfer its problems away. The majority of the POWs at Camp Stark were anti-Nazis, who advocated a variety
of ideologies and included politically active prisoners. Although anti-Nazi, they did not agree on any one political ideal and did not work well together. These POWs subsequently developed a reputation for failing to make their labor quotas. Their reputation spread and camp commanders deemed anti-Nazis as less desirable workers than the more homogenous Nazi POWs, or Nazi controlled POWs, who regularly met their quotas. The Camp Stark POWs led American officials to declare that Nazis were hard workers and were much easier to control than the rebellious anti-Nazis.69 This belief remained true as long as the Nazi POWs continued to be productive.

From 1943 to 1946, the United States operated an effective POW camp system. The PMGO successfully accomplished their top priorities of prisoner security, prisoner safety and health, the use of POW labor to relieve absent American agricultural workers, and the reeducation of selected POWs. Reacting to known and recently learned information about the prisoners under their charge, the PMGO developed several segregation measures. At first, the PMGO relied solely on traditional rank based segregation and separate officer and enlisted camps to accomplish their goals. However, as evidence of internal POW violence became common knowledge and was combined with the new requirement to reeducate some of the prisoners, the PMGO realized the necessity of political segregation. Although the PMGO wrote policy letters requiring camp commanders to identify the ardent Nazis in their camps and established a somewhat systematic interview and physical inspection process, the actual political identification and subsequent segregation of prisoners was not consistently applied throughout the POW camp system. Without clear and succinct orders from their superiors, local camp commanders looked to their own judgment to determine which PMGO priority was most important, and whether or not to segregate a prisoner accordingly. For some commanders, the pressure to maintain a productive POW labor program overrode other PMGO priorities including selecting POWs for reeducation. Even with these uncoordinated directions, American commanders realized over time that like-minded POWs were more apt to get along and be more productive in their confinement. In the end, the political segregation of a specific POW, in a specific camp, depended on the decisions of individual American camp commanders.
It was touted as a marvel of modern science. Convenient and efficient, this technological innovation could be purchased at a grocery store or local pharmacy. It was inconspicuous looking, but under its simple packaging it held the secret to more leisure, beauty or time with family. For women, this new technology would make their lives more efficient. It could cut down on the time needed for meal preparation, make their children happy and healthy, and provide more time with family. It could also make women rested and attractive. That is, if advertisers were to be believed. In reality, this wonder product was none other than manufactured baby food.

However commonplace this product currently seems, the early advertisements for baby food speak volumes about the ideals of the society in which they were created. The advertisements for manufactured baby foods evoke images of science, efficiency, and progress. These ideas not only inspired many Americans during the first half of the twentieth century, they were reflected in the advice that women were given regarding childrearing and housekeeping. Baby food manufacturers used these images and ideals of motherhood and reflected them in their advertisements. Companies such as Gerber and Heinz all contributed to the increase in popularity of manufactured baby foods among

Feeding Fears: Standards of American Motherhood in Baby Food Advertisements, 1930-1960

Kathleen Barlow
mothers between 1930 and 1960. These companies employed many advertising techniques that reflected several prominent cultural trends that sent very distinct messages to mothers. These advertisements helped to convince women that purchasing manufactured baby food was the best option for their child’s health and the most efficient use of their precious time. The various methods of advertising manufactured baby foods and the images portrayed in advertisements reflect several key social trends that had a significant impact on the way women viewed their roles as mothers.

**Doctors, Vitamins, and Infant Feeding**

*Science had once attacked the entrenched authority, but the new scientific expert became an authority himself. His business was not to seek what was true but to pronounce what is appropriate.*

1 – Barbara and Diedre English, 1984

During the middle and late nineteenth century, doctors began to take a more active role in infant feeding. As physicians and social reformers began to notice the substantial infant mortality rate in urban areas, many began to experiment and study infant nutrition. Many physicians believed that the infant mortality rate could be attributed to poor nutrition, especially among bottle fed children. Between the early 1870s and the 1930s, the infant feeding habits of middle-class white American women underwent a remarkable shift. Women went from almost exclusively breast feeding their infants in the late 1800s to frequently feeding their infants modified cow’s milk by the 1930s.2 Middle-class women’s infant feeding habits were further altered by the introduction and wide availability of canned solid baby foods. As infant feeding options became more complex, many women felt unable to discern the correct method for infant feeding. Some physicians compounded women’s insecurity by attempting to professionalize and consolidate the available advice on child care. Throughout the century, physicians became an important conduit for information and advice on childrearing. Physicians also became an important mechanism in the advertisement and acceptance of manufactured baby foods.

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century women who chose not to breast feed or could not breast feed had very few options. The only viable options that women had when selecting a method of infant feeding were to feed the child themselves, rely on a wet-nurse, or modify animal milk using recipes listed in home health manuals or given to them by family and friends.3 During the mid-eighteenth century, physicians began to take an increased notice of the high rates of infant mortality, especially in the urban areas of the United States.4 Physicians of the time believed that a vast majority of infant deaths could be ascribed to poor nutrition through either deficient breast milk or unsuitable artificial foods. Physicians began to search for an appropriate substitute for human breast milk by conducting scientific research into the most effective nutritional substitutes for infant feeding. The availability of these more “scientific” infant formulas, in conjunction with a societal predilection for seeking the advice of experts, led to more women feeding their infants with milk substitutes, and later, with canned baby foods. Indeed, the view that these foods were scientifically manufactured led many
women to believe that artificial foods were better than if not equal to breast feeding and creating baby foods in the home.5

Additionally, the discovery of vitamins and subsequent advertising of vitamin content in foods during the early twentieth century led some women to fear that their own milk would be nutritionally deficient. This fear extended past later infancy when women became concerned that the nutritional content of the vegetables they served to children suffered during preparation. Indeed, authors in the popular press warned readers that the method of cooking foods often stripped them of their vitamins.6 Doctors largely advised patients to eat vegetables and fruits with high-vitamin and mineral content as opposed to relying on vitamin supplements. As Rima Apple points out, “According to AMA [American Medical Association] articles, vitamin pills were within the purview of the physician, not the layperson.”7 She further elaborates that physicians had to “constantly remind the ‘befuddled consumer’ to ‘get his vitamins from the garden or orchard rather than the drug counter.’”8 Physicians took this same viewpoint with mothers when it came to infant feeding. Not only did authors and physicians advocate increasing the intake of fruits and vegetables for adults, but also recommended mothers feed infants certain foods in order to stave off diseases such as rickets, that were caused by a lack of vitamins. To physicians, the answers to the problems in the field of infant nutrition did not lie strictly with nutritional science. Many health professionals saw mothers themselves as a barrier to effective infant health programs. To these physicians, there was a fine line between giving mothers enough education so they could carry out physicians’ orders and giving them so much information that they could question the doctor’s advice.9

Efficiency in the Home

Now, as always, the most automated appliance in a household is the mother.10 – Beverly Jones, 2006

Women received advice from the medical profession, but they also could turn to home economists for ideas on how to run homes and raise children more efficiently. Pulling in influences of Taylorism and scientific management,11 home economists began to look at ways that women could cut down on time unnecessarily spent doing chores. Christine Frederick wrote about scientific management in the home as a way to eliminate the “drudgery” of housework.12 In an excerpt from her larger work The New Housekeeping, Frederick explains, “That efficacy gospel is going to mean a great deal to modern housekeeping… I am going to find out how these experts conduct investigations, and all about it, and then apply it to my factory, my business, my home.”13 Frederick is clearly referring to the fundamentals of Taylorism when she references effect and then describes her home as her factory and business. The concept of running the home as one would run a business or factory is important to the concept of scientific motherhood. This idea takes the major points of scientific management and extends them to housekeeping. Frederick applies this regimented “scientific” approach to her childrearing as well. She describes keeping her children
on schedules, which play into her larger scheme for scheduling all of her household tasks. She explains that women had access to the “best publications devoted to the science of home management. The finest specialists and experts are retained by these magazines to tell women how to care for their babies, prepare foods, how to economize and how to make clothing.”14 Frederick clearly expected women to refer to experts to instruct them on running the home. Her choice of words is particularly revealing. Frederick says that the role of specialists and experts is to tell women how to raise their babies and conduct other household matters.

Although Frederick would have expected women to accept the advice of specialists, many women did not accept the recommendations of professionals without question, and others did not have access to this advice. In a series of rural child care studies conducted by the United States Department of Labor Children’s Bureau between 1917 and 1921, the authors expressed concern for the health of rural children. The authors wrote that the rural mother “has no standard of comparison by which to measure her methods and achievements…however,… each year brings her closer in touch with better and more modern methods of home economics and household management.”15 While the authors were clearly concerned with the health of rural children, they acknowledged that rural women were open to and accepting of advice from experts. They clearly hoped and expected rural mothers to bring their child-rearing methods in line with the advice of home economists and health experts.

Although Taylor was certainly not alone in his ideas, his name became synonymous with scientific management. So while Taylor did not create ideas of “scientific motherhood,” they did speak to larger cultural trends in American middle-class society. Ideas of science and efficiency can be seen in the literature of the years leading up to Taylor as well as in many subsequent years. As in Christine Frederick’s The New Housekeeping, women were expected to follow the advice of professionals without question. These ideas were popular with home efficiency experts well into the nineteen-fifties. The authors of Management in the Home: Happier Living through Saving Time and Energy, written in 1959, reiterate the same messages that women had been receiving for most of the twentieth century. “Homemaking is a job,” the authors tell the reader. “To the wife, it [home] is a work place. It is her dream house…A well managed home is necessary to a happy family life.”16 In a clear nod to the tenets of Taylorism, the authors explained to the reader that scientific management got its start in industry and by observing the motion and time used to complete each task, efficiency experts developed simpler and “more satisfying ways of working.”17

Frederick and other home efficiency experts also advised women to use labor-saving tools and appliances to increase household efficiency. In the rhetoric of these experts, appliances and labor-saving devices became the tools of the home management trade. Frederick argued that appliances and labor-saving devices allowed women to function in a more time-effective manner. While the devices themselves would not make women more efficient, they would save an already-efficient worker more time. Advertisers often marketed manufactured baby foods as a product that would save women time, much like any other labor-saving device. Historian Glenna Matthews examined changes in the role of housewives due to industrialization in her work,
Matthews argued that as industrialization transformed factory work and business, so too did it change the way women and men looked at roles in the home. Many experts looked for ways to increase the efficiency and productivity of the home. Matthews argued that as new time-saving technologies became more available to middle-class women, the skill required to perform these tasks was diminished. Matthews argues that women’s reliance on the advice of experts and time-saving technologies created a paradigm in the 1920s in which American women needed the assistance of experts in order to run their homes correctly. To illustrate this Matthews traced the impact that industrialization had on trends in cooking during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Matthews contends that industrialization had a noticeable impact on food production, including the canned vegetable industry. Companies such as Del Monte used advertisements to assure women that their canned foods were superior to the canned goods that women could produce in the home.

Home efficiency experts were not the only scientifically trained experts whose advice women were expected to follow. Historian Rima Apple also noted that during the interwar period, the time in which manufactured baby foods were gaining in popularity, “The idea of scientific motherhood...consisted of a dominant physician and an obsequious mother.” Physicians chided mothers who would attempt to follow anyone else’s advice. Many high-profile physicians began to think of motherly love and instinct as dangerous to the health and psychological well-being of children. Advice manuals geared toward mothers reflected the idea that motherly instinct needed to be curtailed in favor of more scientific methods of child rearing. According to these professionals the responsibility of raising children was too vital to be left to mothers who were not properly educated on scientific child rearing. Anthropologist Maxine Margolis examined the changing role of American mothers between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries through prescriptive literature. Margolis points out that many of the popular child care manuals during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries focused on the dispassionate, more scientific approach to child care. G. Stanley Hall, a noted psychologist, argued that women needed to be specially educated to react to their children. Apple also noted that many physicians began to use rhetoric that condoned the ideas of scientific motherhood, highlighting the importance of “scientific and medical expertise and experts in the healthful rearing of children.” Another influential expert was John B. Watson, author of the 1928 manual Psychological Care of Infant and Child. Watson warned that too much “mother love” led to children being “over-coddled.” He argued that “we rarely see a happy child is proof that women are failing in their mission.” Margolis noted that Watson was not alone in his views. The Children’s Bureau, a United States government organization, presented views similar to those of Watson in a 1925 pamphlet entitled Child Management. Child Management warned mothers that “the very love of the mother prevents her from successfully fulfilling the obligation of parenthood.” Physicians were not the only ones portraying this view of mothers. Advertisers used this heightened rhetoric in advertisements to medical professionals as well as in advertisements aimed at mothers.
How these trends are reflected in the advertising of Baby Foods

You can tell the ideals of a nation by its advertisements.\textsuperscript{30} 
– Norman Douglas, 1917

The advertisements for artificial baby foods, particularly those for canned vegetables, emphasized medical care, science, vitamins, and efficiency in order to play on mothers’ views of what it meant to be a good mother. Professionalized medicine, along with other cultural trends such as industrialization, encouraged Americans to view science as “the ultimate authority.”\textsuperscript{31} This adulation of science as a cultural trend allowed the medical profession to assume an increased stature and respect within middle-class American society.\textsuperscript{32} Advertisers recognized that by equating their product with science and gaining the acceptance of health professionals, more Americans would trust and purchase the product.

Baby food manufacturers such as Gerber and Heinz utilized physicians and women’s increased reliance on them in order to promote products. Advertisers and medical professionals warned women that they lacked the knowledge to make responsible choices regarding their children’s diet. By the turn of the twentieth century, authors advised mothers by saying, for example, that “mothers must learn that they are ordinarily in no position to decide for themselves upon so important a question, and they should gladly follow the lead of physicians who are making constant efforts to put these matters on a safe and scientific basis.”\textsuperscript{33} After a generation of such messages, many women accepted these ideas. Rima Apple points out that by the nineteen-teens and nineteen-twenties “the ideal of an information seeking mother was rapidly disappearing, to be replaced with the model of the mother dependent on the physician.”\textsuperscript{34} That is not to say that women did not continue to seek advice on health matters; rather, the images in society and prescriptive literature encouraged more women to consult physicians on matters of childhood nutrition. As this became widely accepted among middle-class women, companies began to advertise to and through medical professionals.

Many times, the advertising tactics of baby food manufacturing companies included sending professional references to physicians and others involved in the healthcare of children. All of the prominent baby food manufacturers used publications such as educational pamphlets and nutritional charts as a means of advertising the benefits of their product. While much of the information in these publications and nutritional charts was useful to physicians, they were obviously not sent out simply as a reference aid. These publications and charts had the duel goal of providing a useful reference while also serving to keep the name of the company in the minds of physicians. For example, a 1937 nutritional chart put out by the Research Department of the Heinz Corporation includes information that was “prepared expressly for medical, dental, and dietetic specialists.”\textsuperscript{35} Not only did these charts include information such as the nutritional composition of nuts, cereals and fruits, they also provided similar information for the Heinz products. Throughout the body of these nutritional charts, the authors provided other facts such as “Toxicological Aspects of Diet,” which included four main
causes of food poisoning, including botulism. The authors asserted that botulism “generally develops from the incomplete sterilization of vegetables and meats in home canning...” 36 They continued, “The mortality rate is very high.” 37 Of course, the authors reminded the reader, “Scientific methods and control of sterilization as practiced by progressive food manufacturers has almost completely eliminated botulism traceable to such commercially packed foods.” 38

Baby food manufacturers such as the Heinz Corporation also reinforced views of motherhood to doctors that echoed messages that women received from manufacturers. Through the nutritional charts that corporations provided to medical professionals, manufacturers reinforced the idea that women could not be trusted to make decisions regarding nutrition without the aid of an expert--in this case, a medical expert. The Heinz Corporation reminded health care professionals that “‘Instinct’ cannot be relied upon in the selection of the best foods, particularly with children. A reasonable amount of discipline and intelligence should be exercised in the selection of a good diet.” 39 As could probably be expected, the authors also emphasized the “scientific control” that the baby food manufacturers exercised over the food packaging process. 40 In addition to being more sanitary, they asserted that this “scientific control” allowed them to create more “wholesome and sanitary” foods that “preserve vitamins that are sensitive to air destruction.” 41 To draw health professionals to the conclusion that recommending Heinz baby foods was the most nutritionally responsible thing they could do, the authors of these nutritional charts also pointed out the dangers of too many raw vegetables and fruits. 42 They warned that “[m]oderation should be exercised in the use of raw vegetables...In general, vegetables, eggs, and meats are more nutritious when cooked.” 43

These nutritional charts are also interesting in that the authors emphasized the scientific aspects of not only the production of the food, but of the entire company. Apparently, the Heinz Company believed that doctors would be more likely to recommend their product if it appeared to be more scientific. This reliance on the ideas and rhetoric of science pervaded much of the discussion of motherhood and medicine during this time. To prove the scientific emphasis of their company, the Heinz Company placed an organizational chart in their nutritional charts entitled “Science in the H.J. Heinz Company” This chart outlined all of the ways that “science” shaped the 57 varieties of Heinz. Each aspect of production and testing is titled with a name that sounds scientific. These charts and pamphlets were readily available to doctors and other health professionals. Often, baby food companies would submit their pamphlets and charts for inclusion in the publication section of medical journals such as the Journal of the American Medical Association. While these publications are clearly labeled as being produced by a company, the inclusion of these charts and pamphlets among other medical publications implied that the research contained within the baby food company publication was as valid as that produced by other organizations.

Advertisers carried scientific appeals into other aspects of their advertisements. Gerber, as well as other baby food manufacturers, placed advertisements in the Journal of the American Medical Association. These advertisements highlighted the
fact that Gerber’s was on the list of the American Medical Association Committee on Foods’ Accepted List. Advertisements then quoted their own submission to the AMA, thereby implying that the AMA agreed with the assertion that their cooking process “effect[s] a greater conservation of the rich mineral salts and vitamin elements than is possible when the same vegetables are cooked in the presence of oxygen in an open vessel.”44 The advertisement also asserts that this cooking process “affords the variety required for a balanced vegetable feeding schedule rich in tooth, bone and body building vitamins.”45

As companies were advertising to medical professionals, they were also advertising to the lay population. Many physicians objected to this mode of advertising and saw it as an affront to the medical profession. Advertisers responded to these criticisms through advertisements. The Mead Company, maker of the milk substitute Dextri-Maltose, advertised themselves as the “strictly ethical house,” meaning that they “omit directions, advertising matter, etc.”46 Gerber, on the other hand, explained their direct advertising by saying, “Gerber advertises…so that mothers will cooperate with you.”47 This type of rhetoric allowed the manufacturers to attempt to justify lay advertising under the guise of allowing the doctors to focus on more important things.

Advertisements, which were published in trade journals such as the *Journal of the American Medical Association* and geared primarily to physicians, portrayed women in a negative light. These advertisements reflected the feelings held by many physicians in regards to women. Historian Rima Apple explains that “[b]y the 1920s and 1930s, then, with the further consolidation of the medical profession, with the coalescence of medical specialties such as pediatrics, and the cultural authority of medicine at its height, physicians presented an image of supreme self-confidence.”48 This self-confident, perhaps condescending, image is perfectly embodied in an advertisement for the Mead Johnson Company. The advertisement presents the reader with a silhouette of a doctor and a woman. In the caption the woman says, “Doctor, I want to stop nursing my baby—.” However, in the text of the advertisement, she is explaining that she must go back to work for economic reasons. In the advertisement, the doctor responds, “I haven’t much respect for the mother who won’t nurse her baby.” The advertisement is meant to appeal to the healthcare professionals. By conceding that breast milk is best, they are acknowledging the conventional medical knowledge at the time. The advertisers then offer their product, Dextri-Maltose, as a scientific alternative to breast milk when women would or could not nurse their babies. Gerber also portrays these ideas in a New Year’s advertisement in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*. The advertisement extols the virtues of the physician: he is patient, works long hours, often does not ask for payment. In addition, he also knows what is best for the women who come to his practice.49

The images of the doctor and science were also important in advertisements to mothers. The ideas of scientific motherhood advocated that women listen to professionals when it came to most issues of housekeeping. The same held true for women who were raising children. Advertisers were quite adept in the playing off of these ideas and insecurities with women. Advertisers used images of doctors and
scientific rhetoric to assure mothers that babies were receiving proper nutrition. The Mead Johnson Company used a 1947 advertisement for Dextri-Maltose to convince women that “[b]abies supervised by physicians are better babies.” Heinz urged women to “[l]et your doctor—not relatives or well-meaning friends—answer questions directly concerning baby’s health.” In a similar vein, Gerber encouraged women to seek the advice of physicians by saying, “[g]ive your baby the benefit of competent individual medical advice.” In another advertisement Gerber portrayed a situation where the stress of choosing a diet for a child was causing stress to the family. In the illustration a husband warns his wife, “We are taking advice from too many people… I don’t want my son turned into a laboratory rat or my wife turned into a nervous wreck.” He continues to talk sense into his wife by telling her, “We’d better stop right here and now! Let’s do just what we would about anything else on which we’re confused and ask someone who knows. The doctor plans diets for lots of children… let’s get his advice and follow it.” In each of these examples, advertisers were asserting that medical supervision by a doctor was far preferable to advice they might receive from a neighbor or family member. In fact, the general tone was disdainful of those who do not seek the advice of a medical professional. In the case of the last Gerber advertisement cited here, the authors applaud the father’s stepping in to protect his wife and son against the non-professional outside advice: “Sensible Father. He sees that the simplest way to settle this very common problem is to help his wife enforce the rule that all matters regarding baby’s diet are to be turned over to a doctor.” In most cases, advertisements then described how these same medical professionals highly recommend their infant foods. Heinz told women, “He’ll [the doctor will] tell you when to start baby on delicious, highly nutritive Heinz Strained Foods.” Gerber, on the other hand, had “famous physicians and pediatricians” who agreed, “Gerber was best for babies.” In a print advertisement marking the two-year anniversary of the Gerber Company, the company claimed that over 40,000 doctors had written to obtain samples. This simple statement carried the implication that many doctors approved of Gerber foods rather than just requested the samples.

The emphasis on science did not end with the companies’ focus on the acceptance of the medical profession. Advertisers also emphasized scientific production methods as well as the actual beneficial qualities of the food itself. Vitamin and mineral content was just as important to lay advertising of baby foods, as it was in companies’ advertisements in trade medical journals. While with trade advertisements, manufacturers focused on more technical nutritional information, they also thought that women wanted to feel as if they were feeding their children the best possible food. Print advertisements from the Heinz Company asserted that in Heinz’s packaging process, “Vitamins and minerals are preserved in a high degree by scientifically cooking finest-grade fruits and vegetables….” Gerber too used “scientific methods” which “prevent oxidation and reduce loss of vitamin values.”

In addition to describing the processes the foods went through before reaching the supermarket, advertisers included many pictures of the factory, factory workers, and machines. These images bolstered the discussion of the food as scientific and
more sanitary. One Gerber advertisement described the quality control that Gerber products were put through. The company proudly explained that workers must go through a “[h]and, nail, and general appearance inspection twice daily.”

Advertisers knew that women wanted to do the best for their babies as well as run their home as efficiently as possible. A print advertisement for Gerber asserted that “Ready-to-Serve, Unseasoned, Specially Prepared Strained Vegetables” are best for babies” and “best for mothers” because “they bring the mother the assurance she is doing the best thing for baby.” Not only do the companies contend that they can produce better strained vegetables than can be produced in the home, they also free mother from hours of daily kitchen drudgery. The appeal to women to use canned baby foods as a time saver is echoed in Heinz Company advertising. One Heinz advertisement depicts a baby yelling, “Come out of the Kitchen, Mother!” before addressing the reader by saying, “There is so much puttering around with pots and pans in our house that I hardly ever get to see my mother. She should spend more time with me, and less in the kitchen.” Clearly, the message in these advertisements is meant to make women feel as though spending the extra time straining vegetables for baby actually makes them worse mothers because they are spending time in the kitchen that could be used to interact with their children.

Baby food advertisements also implied that using manufactured baby foods would not only make women better mothers, but better wives as well. These advertisements addressed two main aspects of a woman’s relationship with her husband. First, the images and text of many baby food advertisements portray a father who is almost supervising the mother’s progress in her career. The Heinz Company instructs women to “Ask-your doctor-your grocer-your husband… Take a poll of all the authorities you know. Ask them what is the best strained food for baby.” The message to women is that men are “experts” on the best baby foods, although why this would be is unclear. This image reoccurs in several companies’ advertising campaigns. Moreover, husbands were also used as an image to make women question their attractiveness. In an advertisement in *Ladies Home Journal*, Gerber seemingly addressed an advertisement to “Puzzled Fathers of Rather Young Children.” The advertisement, which although speaking to fathers is clearly aimed towards new mothers, begins by telling “puzzled fathers,” “If you have had to exchange a charming wife for a tired mother who spends endless hours in the kitchen dutifully scraping, stewing, and straining vegetables for your child—you’ll be glad you read this story.” The implication is that women who use Gerber baby foods will have more time to preserve their looks and please their husbands.
These advertisements reflected three main ideals of motherhood. First, they addressed the scientific concepts of efficiency to which women were expected to ascribe. Baby food advertisements also promised to save mothers time so they could foster fruitful relationships with their children. Perhaps just as powerful, they suggested that spending extra time in the kitchen was making wives less attractive to their husbands now that they were “tired mothers.”

Equally important to the scientific image of baby foods was the means of production.Advertisements and booklets often included images of the companies’ factory. These images are particularly important because they are meant to prove to women that their babies’ food has been handled in a scientific and hygienic manner. In a promotional booklet put out by Gerber, readers follow the production of baby food from field to factory. The booklet emphasizes quality control, inspections, sterilization, and technology. This “mechanical magic” added to the desired image of Gerber as a company that “provided a great boon” to infants and mothers. Throughout the booklet, the authors portrayed Gerber’s baby foods as an important technological achievement that was born during an “age that rumbled with innovation.”

Change in Infant Feeding Habits

As trends in advertising, as well as larger cultural trends regarding medical care and scientific motherhood continued between the 1920s and 1950s, prevalent ideas regarding infant feeding also changed. Although such changes cannot be attributed strictly to the baby food industry, the increased availability, consumer awareness, and consumer trust in such products undoubtedly affected their consumption patterns. Throughout the early twentieth century, the prevailing norm was to feed infants an exclusive milk diet during the first year of the child’s life. However, many women were unable or unwilling to continue nursing for the prescribed amount of time. Variations in feeding advice can be seen in “Child Care in Rural America,” a series of government studies published between 1917 and 1921. These studies were undertaken in rural areas in Kansas, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Montana and Mississippi. Each of the studies contained a section on infant feeding practices. In North Carolina, between 1913 and 1918, the study’s author found that all of the recorded one-hundred fifty-seven children born had received breast feeding. Commonly, infants were breast fed until thirteen or eighteen months and received supplementary “tastes” of solid food after three or four months. The author of the Montana study noted “Montana mothers…were for the most part wise about withholding solid foods during the children’s early months.” The foods the author mentioned as qualifying as a solid food included gravy, milk thickened with flour, crackers and cereals, in addition to “the food one usually considers solid.” While outlining the feeding practices of women in these rural counties, the studies also advocated for a larger network of public health nurses and physicians. One author noted that some women in rural Montana “received with surprise the advice to consult a physician about such a thing as feeding a baby.” Although the women surveyed in these studies are not necessarily the middle-class women that were targeted in advertising in *Ladies’ Home Journal* and other lay magazines, the comments of the
health care professionals reveal much about the accepted viewpoints on child care at the time. These norms were also set forth in the advice literature aimed at middle class women. The influential L. Emmett Holt, a physician and author of popular childrearing books, outlined very specific feeding regimes in his guide *The Care and Feeding of Children: a Catechism for the Use of Mothers and Children’s Nurses.* Holt’s advice is laid out in a question and answer format but the answers are authoritative in tone. He did not find it necessary to explain the reasoning behind the answers. He clearly expected women to follow his advice without question. Holt, whose manuals were very popular, advised mothers to begin feeding their children cereals around the tenth or eleventh month with vegetables to follow around the eleventh or twelfth month. Just a few years later the authors of *Scientific Nutrition in Infancy and Early Childhood: for the Student and General Practitioner* instructed medical students and physicians to introduce solid foods and well-cooked vegetables around the fifth month of life. By 1947 authors were recommending “vegetables should have an important place in the diet after the first few months of infancy.” The most extreme end of the spectrum occurred in the 1950s with some doctors advocating that infants be fed cereals and vegetables within days of birth.

Some authors argued that this shift from exclusively milk-based infant diets to those supplemented by or replaced with solid foods, in many cases canned baby foods, was brought about in part by the advertising of these foods to women and their physicians. Historian Amy Bentley argued that by

*playing on parents’, especially mothers’, anxieties about the well-being of their infants, presenting medical doctors as the ultimate baby experts, and positing the uncontested assumption that commercially prepared foods are superior to those cooked at home, Gerber advertising in the 1930s successfully imbued its products with qualities of exceptional purity and wholesomeness, convenience and modernity, and scientific efficiency.*

Home efficiency experts also recommended the use of canned baby foods in order to save time for housewives. The authors of the 1959 manual *Management in the Home: Happier Living through Saving Time and Energy* advised housewives to use commercially manufactured baby foods because “[c]anned baby food saves hours of preparation and is just as good for the baby as freshly cooked vegetables. In fact, it may be better, for the companies that prepare it are careful to use only the choicest vegetables with high vitamin content and low-spray residues.”

**Conclusion**

Clearly, by the late 1950s commercially manufactured baby foods were well known and widely used by middle class American mothers. The advertisements for these products were instrumental in their acceptance by mothers and physicians. Advertisers used the anxieties of middle class mothers as a starting point for their advertisements. Women, who wanted to be rested, refreshed, scientific, modern, and good mothers, were expected, they were told by advertisers, to utilize manufactured baby foods.
Not only did baby food companies portray the idea that manufactured baby food was convenient, they also made it appear to be more nutritionally complete than any homemade option. These advertisers contributed to a striking change in infant feeding habits during the first half of the twentieth century. As the century began, most infants were fed exclusively breast milk or a modified milk substitute. During the 1950s, many babies were introduced to fruits and vegetables early in infancy.

Although commercially manufactured baby foods remained popular throughout the twentieth century, many mothers and health professionals began to turn away from these products as new trends in infant feeding and care became more popular than the tenets of scientific motherhood. Consumer skepticism during the 1970s and controversy regarding the advertising of manufactured baby foods has tarnished the reputation of many baby food companies. Current skeptics of Gerber, for example, claim that the famous Gerber Baby misleads women about the appropriate age to begin feeding babies such products. By some estimates, the Gerber baby portrays an infant aged between two and four months old. This image gives the subtle message that children this age should be eating solid foods. Most physicians currently place the age that children should be introduced to solid foods at four to six months.79 As in the past, some people believe that baby food companies’ advertisements seem to pay lip service to the role of a physician providing guidance with infant feeding, but the information and images given in print ads encouraged women to feed their young children commercially manufactured baby foods. Because of this, many skeptics argued again that baby food companies should be limited in the types of advertising in which they can engage.

The reputation of baby food manufacturers has also suffered due to the scientific community’s concern over these companies’ international marketing campaigns. As women in the United States turned away from artificial methods of infant feeding, baby food companies began to look for other markets. Makers of infant formulas came under increased scrutiny by the international community due to the fact that they marketed products to women in poverty-stricken areas of Africa who may not have had the proper means of sanitizing water and bottles. This negative publicity helped to further undermine American women’s trust in these companies.80

Baby food companies also drew fire from the United States government for false advertising. The long-standing relationship between doctors and commercial baby food manufacturers has also been called into question. In 1995, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) charged Gerber with misleading advertising. Gerber ads claimed that four out of five doctors preferred Gerber baby foods.81 However, researchers proved that only four out of five doctors who recommended any baby food brand recommended Gerber.82

In response to these criticisms, baby food manufacturers have been forced to adapt their advertising to fit new ideas of motherhood. A recent study done by the United States Center for Disease Control (CDC) concluded that more than 77% of all infants born between 2005 and 2006 were breast fed for some period of time. That percentage showed a marked increase from the 60% of infants who were breast fed in 1993-1994.83
While the incidence of infants being fed breast milk has increased, canned baby foods have remained popular for older infants. Companies such as Gerber and Heinz have increased their offerings to include foods aimed at older infants and toddlers, as well as new lines of organic foods and breast feeding accessories.

While advertisements do not depict the reality of life for most American women between 1930 and 1960, they do reflect many of the ideals held by consumers during that time period. Without addressing the concerns that were common to middle class American women at the time, the companies would not have been able to market their products effectively. Because of this, advertisements for manufactured baby foods provide an illustration of the ways that women were expected to think about themselves, their role as mothers and their relationships to their families. These advertisements also provide scholars of this era with a valuable source for examining the ways technologies designed for domestic life, such as baby food, were presented to women. In subsequent years, advertisers have shifted the rhetoric and images in baby food advertisements to better fit the visual and political lexicon of their times. No doubt future scholars will be able to examine current advertisements and expose commercially approved ideals of today’s society.
American Zen:
How Ceramic Craft Becomes Art in the West

Sam Smith

“A good artist is a good craftsman.”¹
– Peter Voulkos

The production of ceramics is one of the oldest and most spiritual crafts known to human kind. It is primal in every way, from its raw materials, mother earth and water, to its hardening through intense, 1,000 plus degree fire. Few would argue the significance of pottery in human and art history, yet it was not until the 1950s that the medium grew into a respected art form, distinct from utilitarian craft. More interesting, this shift was begun not in Paris, New York, or London; but in Bozeman, Montana by an upstart World War II veteran with a budding interest in arts and crafts.

The shift began in England when the Industrial Revolution prompted massive changes in society. By the mid 19th century, the machine age was in full bloom. With it came tremendous advantages for industry as machines could now do what humans and animals had done before, often faster and cheaper. Men and women across Europe left farms to

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¹Attributed to Peter Voulkos.
seek opportunities in cities as factory workers. It was one of the biggest technological advancements in human history, but it was not without its downside.

In the belief of some, the Industrial Revolution had put up a barrier between human beings and their own individual creative impulse, which, in turn, had a dehumanizing effect. The factory system, while mass-producing cheap goods for sale to the general public, was pumping out a lot of low quality household goods compared with the folk-art traditions of the past. In some circles, the goods seemed to focus on ostentation rather than function, and quantity over quality.²

Populations were increasing in England faster than ever before. Workers were attracted to cities, which sprang up or grew around factories. The living conditions in the growing cities were notoriously unsavory, but working conditions were often worse. Factories could be dangerous, unhealthy, poorly ventilated, noisy, dirty, damp, and not well lit. It was common for workdays to last more than twelve hours, six days a week. Within this backdrop the Arts and Crafts movement arose.³

Social critics in England, like art history Professor John Ruskin at Oxford, equated the quality of design with the quality of the society that made it. In the 1850s, he called for a return to the dignity of human labor as seen in pre-industrial, medieval times.⁴ Another influential founder of the movement was the designer William Morris, a theology student turned art student under Ruskin, who also railed against dehumanization by industry and the excess of the Victorian age.⁵ Ruskin and Morris believed handmade items were not just better in terms of quality, but morally better as well.⁶ The Arts and Crafts movement rooted in the thinking of Ruskin and Morris traditionally dates from the early 1870s to the beginning of World War I, but its influence in art and design are still widely felt today.

The purpose of the movement was three-fold. Firstly, it sought to provide quality, handmade household goods to the common people. Secondly, the movement sought unadorned beauty in simplicity in a form-follows-function way, in large part influenced by Japan’s newly open trade door and widely admired pre-industrial folk art. And thirdly, it sought to get skilled artisans working communally in a system similar to craft guilds of the past.⁷ It was an ethos whose goal was to produce designs “for the people and by the people, and a source of pleasure for the maker and the user.”⁸ In his 1882 lecture, Art and the Handicraftsman, Oscar Wilde summed up the movement in these terms: “By having good designs you have workmen who work not merely with their hands but with their hearts and heads too.”⁹

The Arts and Crafts movement spread from England to the rest of industrialized Europe and eventually made its way to the United States. In the U.S., the movement focused on the intrinsic beauty of an object, like that of the wood grain in a piece of furniture, or in the basic form of a ceramic vase. Machines used in production were not rejected out of hand, for they brought down costs, ideally allowing the regular person to afford these goods. Rather, the movement sought a return to quality that many saw disappearing at the dawn of the modern age. There were a few reasons for the decline of ceramics as a craft in the United States.

Handmade folk pottery declined as pressure built upon potters to produce more work at a higher quality. Press molds began to be used in the production of pie plates
in Pennsylvania, extruders (a hand-powered machine used to make clay coils) and transfer prints (painting done on paper then applied to clay bodies) also became popular in the early 19th century. The adoption of mechanical aids in handcrafted ceramics became even more vital to the survival of potteries after the Civil War. The U.S. population increased as it recovered from war and continued to industrialize. Likewise, so did demand for tableware and household items. The result was that studios that could produce heavy volumes of work survived and the smaller craft potters failed commercially.\(^{10}\)

Unskilled work replaced skilled work in pottery, and the use of stencils replaced most hand brushed decoration. Ceramic jugs also became less important in food storage. The advent of mass produced glass canning jars, because of their quality and efficiency, further hastened the decline of American pottery.\(^{11}\) The potteries that remained produced work in the ornate Victorian style, but the nation’s 100th birthday would mark a turning point.

It was not until the Philadelphia International Centennial Exhibition in 1876 that the Arts and Crafts movement made inroads into American ceramics. Thirty-six countries displayed the best clay work their nation had to offer. The Americans were outclassed, except for a little noticed batch of hand-decorated ware from a ladies pottery club that called their work “china painting.” It was the only American work that showed a sparkle of invention.\(^{12}\) The European potters on display had adopted the simplicity of Asian potters. The medallions and floral motifs of the Americans looked overworked compared to the simplicity and uncluttered appearance of the Japanese potters and the Europeans they and the Arts and Crafts movement influenced.\(^{13}\)

Being used to Europe as tastemakers, American potters immediately began to rethink the surface decoration of their ceramics. Interestingly, at a time when American self-worth was expressed through its burgeoning industrial might, world taste had moved against mechanization in favor of the simplicity of handcrafted objects.\(^{14}\) Thus the art pottery movement, an outgrowth of the Arts and Crafts movement, took hold in 1876.

On the assembly line, decorators, often unfamiliar with clay and its limits, would not always skillfully decorate the potter’s work. But this era was ending, and quality began to replace quantity in terms of American product. Meanwhile, industrial, banking, and railroad money fueled a growing upper middle class who demanded new products.\(^{15}\) Like their European counterparts, they turned away from ornate Victorian styles. American housewives proved receptive to Ruskin’s philosophical idea that household environments influenced ethical and moral values. Women who wanted to raise their families in tasteful, proper surroundings spurred the demand for new magazines like *Ladies Home Journal*, *Good Housekeeping*, and *House Beautiful*, which all debuted between 1883 and 1887 as the Arts and Crafts movement flourished.\(^{16}\)

Just as the ceramics from Japan changed the direction of European pottery when first displayed in Europe at the London International Exposition of 1862, the 1876 Philadelphia Exposition changed America’s pottery direction. The first pottery association began in Cincinnati, Ohio, soon after the Exposition. It was led by Mary Louise McLaughlin. She began the china painting movement in the United States and
wrote a well-received book on the subject. China painting, which became popular with women in England in the 1850s, was a method where undecorated pottery called “blanks” were hand painted with simple, asymmetrical designs. McLaughlin stated that the objective of the china painters should not be to decorate an object but to “bring out the beauty of the form.” Her argument was that Victorian pottery concealed natural form instead of enriching it.17

McLaughlin also began another movement in American ceramics. Inspired by a French under glazing technique invented in 1871, she attempted to recreate it by painting slips on freshly made, damp pottery. She wrote a book on the technique and began teaching it. Unfortunately, she remembered her class as “a wild ceramic orgy during which much perfectly good clay was spoiled and numerous freaks created.” Deciding that the failure of her class was due to lack of student skill and discipline, she invited the twelve best ceramic artists she knew of to start another pottery club in 1879. It lasted sixteen years and set a new standard for craftsmanship.18

One of the gifted potters McLaughlin invited was Maria Nichols. Unfortunately, her invitation never arrived. Feeling snubbed, she began her own pottery club, Rookwood, a year later. Female art societies continued to spring up and artists such as Louis Comfort Tiffany were recruited to teach them.19

In Boston, another group of potters, the Robertson family, were producing high quality pottery. Upon the death of their patriarch, James Robertson, two of his sons went their own directions. Hugh Robertson stayed in Boston trying to reproduce the Chinese single color glaze work of the T’ang and Ming dynasties. This substantially pushed the art pottery movement further. Alex Robertson moved to San Francisco and began Roblin Art Pottery with his wife in 1891. The 1906 earthquake essentially put Roblin out of business and destroyed the majority of its work. A few pieces donated to the Smithsonian Institute still remain.20

In the meantime, McLaughlin’s rivalry with Nichols diminished and her pottery group joined the Rookwood group. Nichols hired William Watts Taylor as Rookwood’s business manager in 1883. Under Taylor, Rookwood became the dominant force in American Art Pottery. In this era, glazing was far removed from science. Kiln temperatures (which can greatly affect glaze coloring) were very difficult to regulate and many of the most interesting glaze colors were the result of happy accidents. In an effort to keep innovating and retain market dominance, Taylor hired a pharmacologist who became the first American ceramic chemist. He then hired a Japanese decorator and sent another chemist to Germany who returned with Seger cones, invented in Berlin by Hermann Seger in 1886. These pyrometric cones melt at a specific temperature in a kiln, giving the kiln operator a visual indication of the temperature inside. This allowed for greatly improved temperature regulation, thus making glaze effects more scientific. And Taylor made another great contribution to American pottery by sending one of his gifted young decorators, Artus Van Briggle, to study ceramics in Paris in 1893.21

Van Briggle returned to Rookwood in 1896 but contracted tuberculosis. This prompted him to move to the drier climate of Colorado Springs two years later, angering Taylor and Rookwood. Here he became a leader of the ornamental glaze
movement (along with Grueby and Louis Comfort Tiffany) which was started by Hugh Robertson and his Dedham group. A late comer, William Gates in 1900 jumped on the bandwagon in Chicago and produced his famous dark green Teco (an abbreviation for terra cotta) ware. Grueby admired the matte glazes of the French, which Gueby and Tiffany first saw at the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbia Exhibition, which featured Art Nouveau works. Soon, matte finished, monochromatic green and blue colored art pottery was in vogue. Fierce competition left Louis Comfort Tiffany (whose work was produced by his father Charles at Tiffany & Co., which specialized primarily in silver and jewelry) and Van Briggle the champions of art pottery and ornamental glaze. Interestingly, and a comment on their significance, both the Tiffany and Van Briggle companies are still in existence.

After the 1893 Columbia Exhibition, American Art Nouveau went its own direction in a style art historian Kristen Keen called “structural naturalism” that emphasized vertical lines created by images of stems, vines, and fern fronds. In this era, signatures began to adorn the bottom of studio pieces. Importantly, Art Nouveau in America, running concurrent to the Arts and Crafts movement, was not especially concerned with the social reforms originally put forth by Ruskin and Morris in England. The art pottery and ornamental glaze movement would last until World War I and be supplanted by the Art Deco movement.

Art Deco, influenced by the discoveries of King Tut’s tomb, Mayan ruins in Central America and their respective design schemes, began to be reflected in art. This also produced a new investigation of Native American design patterns, which had been ignored by many as too primitive up until the 1920s. The Depression hobbled the ceramics industry, but the Works Progress Administration put ceramic artists back to work. A new renaissance in small-scale ceramic sculpture took place through World War II, though the Depression era work often had a light-hearted, cartoonish feel. American ceramics was largely ignored and was losing prestige, looked upon largely as bric-a-brac. The close of World War II, thanks to an influx of art students supported by the G.I. Bill, would take ceramics in a completely new direction. Finally, pottery would be stripped of its craft status and elevated to art.

The problem with ceramics, as a medium within the Arts and Crafts movement, is that it failed to develop much in the years after World War I. That is, production pottery in places like the Van Briggle Studio in Colorado Springs simply did by hand (pressing clay into molds and glazing fired work) what machines could do more efficiently. Where industry can produce an approximation, there is no art. Along with weaving and glass, ceramics was one of the last of the crafts to grow up and be considered art. This began at the close of World War II with the entrance of ceramic titan Peter Voulkos onto the stage.

Fleeing Turkish upheaval in Greece in 1921, Harry Voulkos fled Thrace to take a job as chef at the Bozeman Hotel in Bozeman, Montana. A year later, his bride, Efrosine, through an arranged marriage, joined him from the isle of Lesbos. They had five children together, their second being Peter. When Harry lost his restaurant during the Great Depression, he took a job west of Bozeman at the Bordan Hotel in Whitehall. Harry only made it home on Sundays. Henceforth, Efrosine ran the household.
Peter rebelled and frequently skipped high school in favor of shooting pool and fishing for trout. His mother frequently dragged him out of the pool hall by the ear. Not much of an academic, Peter did show promise in art and shop classes. The Depression brought grim economic realities to the Voulkos household. Luckily, Peter was able to find work mopping at the pool hall and ice cream parlor, delivering newspapers, and as a bellman at the Baxter Hotel. He worked very hard at concurrent, multiple jobs and gave all of his earnings to his mother. In this era, he learned the lessons of hard work and interdependence among communities and family. This spirit, undoubtedly, shaped his attitude toward work and working together in various art studios. With few prospects after graduation and a lackluster academic career, he left home in 1942.

Hitchhiking to Portland Oregon, Peter Voulkos found himself working in a factory casting iron fittings for Liberty Ships as America entered World War II. Here he learned skills helpful in his sculpture career that later followed. In 1943 he was drafted into the U. S. Army Air Corps as a nose gunner in Saipan. Lucky to be alive, he returned home with the promise of a G.I. Bill funded college education he otherwise would not be able to afford.

His Army vocational testing revealed little aptitude for medicine or law, but stated he held promise at manual skills like art. Being a night person, Voulkos half jokingly said on occasion, “I heard that artists don’t have to get up early in the morning.” He enrolled at Montana State College as an art major in 1946.

Voulkos claimed to never have been to an art museum in his life before college. Yet he took to painting right away under the tutelage of abstract painters, Jessie Wilber and Robert DeWeese. They exposed him to masterwork reproductions and he studied the few available art books in the school’s library. He had no interest in clay and tried to avoid the mandatory two-course ceramics requirement that would allow him to graduate.

Frances Senska, just out of the Army WACS had just finished her ceramics training at the University of Chicago. Teaching her first class, she tread lightly knowing students like Peter were less than enthusiastic about clay. But Peter fell in love with clay the moment he first touched it, befriending the studio’s night watchmen so he would look the other way as he snuck in through the basement window to work all night after his shift at the Burger Inn.

When he arrived, the studio had no equipment. The class started completely from scratch. This included students digging their own clay from nearby mud banks. Voulkos stated, “I didn’t realize at the time you could buy a bag of clay so I spent my weekends digging it up and processing it.” The Burger Inn, where he worked at the time, was situated next to a service station. Here he asked truck drivers about where they got all the clay on their tires and he followed the lead. Peter would go on to use native clays and earth slips and glazes like few others. His clay mixtures would become renowned for their simplicity and durability, as would his use of natural tones and dearth of traditional glazes. Voulkos was literally making up his own rules for ceramics and making his own discoveries. In the process, he was establishing himself as a force in the craft world.
One year after his first course in ceramics he won first prize in the 15th National Ceramic Exhibition, sponsored by the Syracuse Museum of Fine Arts in New York State. Here he showed two vases and a lidded jar with inlaid drawings aided by the use of the wax resist technique, which he borrowed from the world of batik and printmaking.34

Voulkos graduated in 1951 and pursued his Masters of Fine Arts at California College of Arts and Crafts (CCAC) in Oakland, California. The choice of CCAC was guided by the fact that it had one of the only ceramics faculties in the western United States. Pursuing a thesis on lidded jars, he won first prize again at Syracuse in 1951 and began to attract attention from the ceramics world. Graduating in 1952, he returned to Bozeman, Montana. Hearing that a brick maker in Helena might be interested in building a pottery studio, Peter and fellow potter, Rudy Autio, drove out to meet the owner, Archie Bray, Sr.35

Voulkos’ former teacher at Montana State, Frances Senska recalled, “Peter needed a studio to do ceramics full time and heard about the brickyard…[Archie and Peter] hit it off immediately.” Bray allowed Peter and Rudy to use his equipment and teach classes. In return, the two worked for Bray making salt glazed bricks in his factory. The three of them, along with Kelley Wong, built the pot shop that would become world famous and still draws the best potters today.36

At the Bray brickyard (now the Archie Bray Foundation), production pottery would become Peter’s livelihood. This involved a process where wheel-thrown crockery was spun off the throwing wheel into useful domestic items and sold for use in family kitchens. When Peter told his mother that he was a potter, she responded indignantly, shouting, “What! A maker of pots and pans! I thought you were going to be an artist.” In the early 1950s, fine art (architecture/painting/sculpture) and craft were very clearly separate entities, especially where ceramics was concerned.37

In 1952, the potters Shoji Hamada from Japan and Bernard Leach from England, paid the Bray studio a visit. Accompanying them was Soetsu Yanagi, co-founder of the Mingei movement, which sought to revitalize traditional Japanese crafts. The three of them had set out to observe pottery studios across the United States. This visit would prove to have quite an impact on Voulkos.38

It was winter in Montana, and Peter took Hamada into the mountains to do some watercolor landscapes. The paint froze on Hamada’s paper. He welcomed the effect. Voulkos was deeply impressed by his use of this accident. The Japanese artist...
treated it as a positive event in his artistic endeavor. This marked Vouklos’ pivotal initiation into Zen philosophy, which Hamada continued to share. The Englishman Leach, who studied extensively in the Far East, also shared his Zen philosophy with Vouklos, emphasizing that the Zen aesthetic grew out of life and not out of design, and that an art product is a diary of a journey, not a striving for an intellectually held visual principle. Later that year, Peter won top prize in the national Decorative Arts and Ceramic Exhibition in Wichita, Kansas; as well as, prizes in regional shows in the west.

In the 1950s, it was widely accepted that the wheel-thrown work of Vouklos was beyond compare. “His surface decoration was inventive and masterful. Thrown pieces showed speed, clarity of form, and sureness of touch that would mark his later work,” remarked former Craft Horizons magazine editor, Rose Slivka. Younger potters from around the country came to the Bray brickyard to work with and learn from Peter. A very real spirit of camaraderie developed between Peter and his visitors, much the way the Arts and Crafts movement envisioned in the 19th century, with masters and apprentices working together as peers in a give and take relationship. In the workshop, the potters used any tools necessary to create their works. “Sewer pipes, rusty nails, dentists (sic) tools, sand paper—whatever it took.” Vouklos was not guided by any sense of Puritanism regarding clay. “I love machines. They perform miracles,” he said.

The year 1953 proved to be a huge leap forward for Vouklos. That summer he was invited to teach a three-week workshop at Black Mountain College in Asheville, North Carolina. This highly esteemed, though short lived, art institution put Vouklos in touch with the nation’s artistic vanguard in various fields, who at the time were creating a new artistic vision in American culture. He befriended abstract painters Jack Tworkov, Esteban Vicente, and Pop artist Robert Rauschenberg. Composers and musicians, including John Cage, Stephan Wolpe, and David Tudor, the dancer Merce Cunningham and the poet, Charles Olson, also became friends of Vouklos through Black Mountain that summer. Perhaps the most important in Peter’s trajectory was his new friendship with the poet and potter M. C. Richards.

Richards would bring Vouklos back to New York with him that summer after their stints at Black Mountain College. Black Mountain College gave the self-proclaimed Montana farm boy a fresh outlook on art and a new attitude that welcomed experimentation, adventure, and a spirit of action. Living briefly on the Lower East Side of New York City put him in the heart of an artistic fervor centered around the Cedar Bar, where the action painters of New York met every night. Here Vouklos would meet Franz Kline and Willem DeKooning, leaders of the New York School of action painters. At the end of that summer, he returned to Montana a changed man.

In 1953, Archie Bray, Rudy Autio, and Peter Vouklos built the largest high fire kiln for studio pottery in the U.S. Very few books on ceramics existed at the time and potters had to learn from one another by traveling and observing others directly. When Vouklos and Autio held workshops, ceramists from all over the west would attend. The best of them would stay on to teach their own workshops.
Marguerite Wildenhain was one such teacher. A true master of Bauhaus pottery, Wildenhain had emigrated to the U.S. just before World War II and started an important studio in California. She spent five weeks teaching at the Bray in 1953. Voulkos acted as her assistant. Wildenhain considered Peter extremely gifted. Interestingly, she, along with other famous potters, would grow to despise the work of Voulkos and rebuke it publicly a few years later as the direction of his art shifted entirely. Wildenhain and fellow Bray resident, F. Carlton Ball, would both cancel their subscriptions to *Craft Horizons* magazine in bitter protest of praiseworthy articles about his abstract ceramic work and that of his emulators in 1961.46

The year 1954 marked another turning point when Millard Sheets invited Voulkos to start the ceramics department at Los Angeles County Art Institute, also known as Otis. He accepted. Rudy Autio, meanwhile, took a job teaching at the University of Montana in Missoula. A year earlier, two gifted young potters from the University of Colorado, James and Nan McKinnell, had met Voulkos at the Bray. When their friend and fellow University of Colorado potter, Paul Soldner, asked them to recommend a school where he could pursue an MFA in ceramics, they suggested he study with Peter at Otis. It would be the beginning of a very productive and inventive time for them both. The pair went on to do nothing less than liberate ceramics from perhaps 30,000 years of tradition and push the medium into an explosive, expressive, revolutionary realm.47

Los Angeles in the 1950s was overflowing with post war wealth, and was a city in desperate need to establish itself as a place of culture. It sought recognition and respectability, and as such, art galleries began to rapidly sprout up. The galleries would further curiosity and daring in the new boomtown. Los Angeles sought to be the West Coast equivalent of New York, and was in terms of diversity and hunger for art. Only a month after Voulkos moved to L.A., Paul Soldner joined his new teacher. The two of them voraciously visited the galleries in search of inspiration.48

At this time, Voulkos was making the switch from production potter to ceramic artist. It was a conscious effort as Peter recognized that he had a different job to do, as he was now part of an art school. Adding fuel to his artistic fire was his recent encounters with the New York school of abstract artists. He wanted to push his medium to the absolute maximum. Leaving craft behind at the Bray to teach art at Otis allowed Voulkos this freedom.

Otis, meanwhile, had nothing in terms of a ceramic studio besides an empty basement. Peter and his only student, Paul Soldner, built the entire place themselves. Otis did not advertise that it had a ceramics department; Paul had found it only
through his contacts, the McKinnells. Soldner stated in 1995, “We built everything—the wheels, the kilns, the tables and the shelves, everything. And it is still there.” The moment Paul hit town, he remembered them hitting the galleries together. “We drank it in. We went to the galleries all the time,” he recalled. Peter and Paul immediately became friends and peers. In the tradition of Arts and Crafts again, the relationship was not the typical one of teacher and student. In fact, as a teacher, Voulkos never gave a formal assignment or lecture. His students simply worked beside him and explored their own artistic vision.

Voulkos and Soldner completed the studio after two months of work. Otis began advertising its ceramics department and local potters from the University of Southern California and Scripps College in Claremont began to drop by, attracted by their respect for Voulkos. Soon word spread and people began to hang out at the studio, both students and non-enrollees. Many became regulars and included non-artists just there to observe the creative explosion that was taking place. One of these people was a math teacher from L.A. City College named Fred Marer. Marer noted that there was an “amazing energy 24 hours a day, seven days a week atmosphere.”

Marer would go on to become the spokesman for the group, a sponsor, friend, enthusiast, and their provider of coffee. Being the only collector at the time, he ended up with over 900 pieces of the group’s work, which he said, “no one was even slightly interested in buying.” The group made art for its own sake and threw most of it away to preserve valuable studio space. Marer went on to donate his collection to Scripps College, kept for years in the garage behind his apartment, rather than fund his golden years with his priceless works so far ahead of their time.

The work coming from Voulkos in 1954 was big. It was non-functional. It was ugly. And it changed the art world. Five years after Voulkos first touched clay, he took pottery from the craft ghetto into the world of fine art. He described his classes at Otis thus:

“We'd all go to the class, and then the first thing we'd do is go off in three cars, driving around town, going to see whatever there was to see in the galleries, drinking coffee and talking. We'd look at a new building going up or a show in a museum. Then we'd talk some more. Then we'd go to work. My purpose was for students to become aware not only of everything around them but of themselves, to find themselves, to get to the point where they felt they were the complete center of the universe and everything worked around them. Then they could go ahead and work.

Voulkos and his followers were under the influence of their new discoveries like improvisational jazz, West Coast abstract painters Clyfford Still and Mark Rothko, and Zen Buddhism. On the Voulkos process, Rose Slivka reflected: “He freed his students from technical dogmatism and the limitations of traditional methods. Whereas the ceramics medium had been too precious or too humble or too industrial, too laden with technical taboos and virtuoso traps to encourage artistic freedom, Voulkos challenged the medium and dared to push its limits.”
The Voulkos studio basement at Otis emitted a contagious spirit of revolution in art and became the West Coast equivalent to the New York Artists’ Club and places like Cedar Bar. It was creative, it was fun, and it attracted followers like nothing else on the West Coast at the time.56

The art itself that Peter was making was a lot of wheel-thrown forms, sometimes up to a hundred, stacked on top of one another, slashed with knives, cracked, punched, scratched with nails, and scrawled on with Peter’s unique graffiti in simple earth tones or black slip. Glazes were virtually ignored. The huge “stacks” he became famous for could reach up to seven feet. In 1956, Voulkos, along with fellow artists Paul Soldner, John Mason, and Malcolm McLain, used an astonishing 30,000 pounds of clay. Still the group could not give their work away as it was considered worthless and disdained by so many in the traditional pottery community.57

Yet the group knew they were onto something revelatory. John Mason, a ceramic artist who shared a private studio with Voulkos said, “It was obvious that [Peter] was ahead of almost anyone I knew…The thing that fascinates me about this period is that it had been proceeded by a time when there was not enough technical information to continue the craft in a vital way after it had been bypassed by the industrial revolution and industrial products and procedures had taken over the craft tradition.”58

Voulkos and his adherents were in fact, reinventing ceramics and they knew it. But they sought to recreate it in a different way, and take it out of the straight craft tradition mold. There was a common feeling among the bunch. Every discussion of clay seemed to involve “the future of pottery, of the craftsman, the artist, and there was always a desire to do something greater, more profound, more adventurous, more creative,” remembered John Mason.59 It was a singular quest to push clay farther and to its literal and figurative breaking point.

The ceramics coming out of Otis was more than Abstract Expressionism with clay. It was a reaction against the bias toward ceramics itself that, in turn, reexamined the history of pottery and common attitudes about it. The inherent doubt that ceramics could be considered art was shattered by Voulkos at Otis. He took the medium to places tradition would not let him. The art world noticed and the Los Angeles County Museum of Art gave Voulkos a solo show in 1955.60

The same year he was the only American to win a gold medal at the International Exposition of Ceramics in Cannes, France, albeit for a more traditional work from 1953.61

Voulkos and his followers worked for the sheer joy of pushing clay into new, non-functional, artistic territory. Referring to his time at the Bray as a production potter, Voulkos claimed to have been bored. “I could do it and read a newspaper. We can’t go on repeating—we are not an age of potters like the Greeks. The community doesn’t need us. It’s the responsibility of industry to do repetitive production. I know I can do it. That was the trouble.” Voulkos had rejected the old ways and seen its obsolescence. As he sought to elevate ceramics to art, people noticed, and it made some of them angry.62
One such person unhappy with Voulkos, his work, and his teaching method was the man who hired him, Millard Sheets of Otis. Conflict was frequent and vociferous between the two. When a submission for a student ceramics show, juried by Sheets, featured a piece with the unforgettable phrase, “F*** You” scrawled on it, clearly (if subtly) dedicated to Mr. Sheets, the jig was up. Following Voulkos’ most prolific period, 1958-1959, he was asked to resign. The Department of Decorative Art at the University of California, Berkeley immediately snatched him to start their own ceramics studio. Students flocked to him. The same year he won the Rodin Prize at the Paris Biennale and the silver medal at the Second International Congress of Contemporary Ceramics in Ostend, Belgium.

In the years 1958 and 1959, Voulkos was at one of his creative highs, “making brashly expressionistic stoneware of monumental and heroic vigor,” and, deconstructing vessels that were “earthy, sensual and charged.” The influence of his western upbringing is evident in the titles of his pieces like Sitting Bull, Black Butte Divide, and Camelback Mountain. He made seventeen major sculptures in this era, the smallest being Burnt Smog at just under three feet. The largest was his masterpiece, Gallas Rock.

This two-ton monster was commissioned by Dr. Digby Gallas and his wife Julia in 1959. Intended for the garden of their new home being built in Los Angeles, Dr. and Mrs. Gallas paid Voulkos $200 in advance for a piece similar to the ones they had seen in a gallery a few years earlier. Peter’s style had since evolved, or maybe more correctly, devolved. When the work was unveiled in 1960, Dr. Gallas turned white and told his wife, “It is the ugliest object I have ever seen in my whole 53 years,” but after contemplating it for six months, he came to fall in love with it. Julia Gallas noted it completely changed his outlook not only on art, but on life. Julia Gallas donated the piece to the University of California, Los Angeles after the death of Dr. Gallas. It stands today in front of the Frederick S. Wight Gallery.

Voulkos explained the work of this period: “I was trying to learn to throw big hunks of clay—100 pounds or so to make a two-foot cylinder with a thick bottom. The basis of those sculptures is the core cylinder inside with other cylinders going in different directions to take the weight off the slabs.” Ugly or not, Peter was doing things with clay that had never been done before. Even abstract painters took notice. Leonard Edmondson, Richards Ruben, and Emerson Woelffer all dropped by to visit the Voulkos pot shop and have spoken about the influence his work had on their own.
While the West Coast was abuzz with Voulkos fever, the aloof New York art world still thought of itself as the top of the heap. In 1960, Voulkos showed at The Museum of Modern Art as part of the “New Talent” series, even though he had been taking top prizes internationally and domestically for seven years. Peter went on to teach at the University of California, Berkeley until 1985, winning commissions for ceramic and bronze work along the way, including a 1967 piece in front of the San Francisco Hall of Justice, and pieces outside the Oakland Museum of California and the Berkeley Art Museum (which used to be his studio at Cal). These pieces were cast in bronze, which Voulkos came to prefer for his larger-than-life outdoor work, in part for its durability versus fragile clay stoneware.

Nearly every leading ceramic sculptor in America today either studied with Voulkos or worked alongside him. A recent visit to the Vance Kirkland Museum of Decorative Arts in Denver revealed such. Here work is on display from many of those mentioned in this writing, including Soldner, Wildenhain, Leach, and the McKinnells. When asked if Vouklos was included in the collection, Director Hugh Grant said, “I wish.”

Upon his death in 2002, the University of California noted that few major museums in America have not featured his work. Abroad, his largest collections can be found in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, the Stedelijik Museum in Amsterdam, and the National Museum of Modern Art in Kyoto. He was the recipient of six honorary doctorate degrees, received three fellowships from the National Endowment for the Arts and one from the Guggenheim Foundation. Voulkos received the Louise Nevelson Award from the American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters in 1992, and in 1997, the College Art Association of America presented him with the Artists award for Lifetime Achievement.

There is, unfortunately, less formal art criticism than one would expect on the work of Voulkos and the abstract ceramic sculptors that followed in his footsteps available in the mainstream. Work in clay is still widely ignored by the public and some in the art world. While it is common to come across the work of Abstract Expressionist paintings from the 1950s and 1960s in major museums, few people have seen the work of Peter Voulkos and those he worked beside in person. In an interview with Rose Slivka, a leading biographer of Voulkos, Fred Marer stated that he cannot understand the snobbish attitude toward American clay and why something is not considered art just because it is made of clay. There are many
possibilities for the oversight. Perhaps sexism, as women play such a significant role in the art pottery movement, or maybe the remains of the once fearsome rivalry between the western and West Coast art world versus the elite in New York is to blame. Another explanation may be, in the words of the ceramic sculptor Joanne Burstein, “we have not fully absorbed what we have witnessed so far [in American ceramics].” But likely it is what William Morris protested as the Arts and Crafts movement began in England: “that the teaching of art has been corrupted by elites since the Renaissance that create an artificial distinction between high arts [painting and traditional sculpture] and applied arts [everything else].” No matter the reason, among the clay community, no giant stands taller than Peter Voulkos in taking ceramics from craft to art. Perhaps the wider public will one day know his name.
“We were young, we were reckless, arrogant, headstrong—and we were right. I regret nothing.”¹ The words of Abbie Hoffman, one of the most intriguing and controversial characters of the Vietnam antiwar movement, encapsulate the feelings that a generation of Americans shared throughout much of the 1960s and into the early 1970s. America was waging an unpopular war in Vietnam and had been for far too long. As political stake, financial demand, and combat casualties increased, so too did dissent on the home front. People of every class, age, race, gender, and religion united from across the country to apply pressure on Washington to remove its devastating military presence from Southeast Asia. As American foreign policy spiraled out of control, the masses gathered through protests, marches, demonstrations, and teach-ins to voice their disapproval. The Vietnam antiwar movement was the largest and most influential of its kind since the inception of this nation. At no other time in United States history had so many of its...
citizens openly castigated the government and its activities. However, the effectiveness of this collective effort is still a point of contention today.

The extensive historiography of the antiwar movement reflects a variety of interpretive approaches pertaining to the movement, as well as differences in scholarly evaluation of the movement’s entirety. Many historians have shown how the movement transformed American culture and created an image for a generation of baby boomers, while others have traced its history and argued about its effects on the American war effort. Still others have asked whether the movement affected government policy and if the opposition succeeded or failed in its mission to end the Vietnam War. Revisiting a handful of the overarching queries prevalent in a representative sample of the scholarship exposes the mercurial course of the antiwar movement. Therefore, piecing together this patchwork of protest requires analysis of what historians have defined as the origins of the Vietnam antiwar movement, what points they consider as the movement’s progressive peaks and to what varying degrees these climaxes affected the decision-making of Lyndon Johnson (LBJ) and Richard Nixon. And finally, what these scholars’ beliefs are regarding the movement’s ultimate impact on the direction of the Vietnam War.

The polarized responses herein suggest that historians have followed the trails of several concurrent movements; investigating numerous disparities of an antiwar movement nearly as complex as the conflict it opposed. Antiwar activity during the Vietnam era caused a great stir in the public sphere of the United States, while demonstrating the tenacity, purpose, and cohesion necessary to advance reform in this country. Thus, a closer look at the historiography of the Vietnam antiwar movement reveals several lessons learned from this era of activism, as well as situations that create a discordant relationship between the American leadership and the American citizenry. Rethinking these authors’ assessments of widespread dissent, especially during the current wars in the Middle East and a crippling economic crisis, suggests that America must raise its collective voice to ensure the fulfillment of the promise of change.

Seeds of Solidarity

An analysis of the Vietnam antiwar movement is incomplete without reference to the work of Charles DeBenedetti and Melvin Small. Small has carried the scholastic torch of the Vietnam antiwar movement through his prolific body of work that explores the subject from multiple angles. Both DeBenedetti and Small have been leaders in the field since they were active participants in the antiwar movement, and the amount to which they are cited in this essay is illustrative of their commitment to the cause.

DeBenedetti’s An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era, completed in 1990 by assisting author Charles Chatfield, charts the course of the antiwar movement from 1955 to 1975. It shows that while the actual war may have been fought in Vietnam, the essential battle took place on home soil. This power struggle began in the 1950s with the establishment of the multi-faceted peace movement. Comprising a wide assortment of liberal internationalists and radical pacifists, the peace movement generated support through collective concern about the United
States’ precarious Cold War policy and the desire to see disarmament reached through negotiation. In what becomes a common theme in the antiwar movement to follow, the purpose behind the peace movement was evident, but it lacked unity and direction.

In spite of differing motives, by the mid-1950s there were four major groups advancing the peace movement. The American Friends Service Committee and The Fellowship of Reconciliation were two such groups whose pacifist missions allowed them to mediate between the many dissenting antiwar groups that rapidly sprouted in the years to follow. As DeBenedetti explains, the Montgomery Bus Boycott greatly aided the pacifist cause. It placed the civil rights issue on the national scene while altering radical pacifism into a political force capable of connecting civil rights with the peace movement. A euphoric feeling of hope swelled throughout the country, which the antiwar movement eventually used as a catalyst for support. By founding the journal Liberation, future antiwar leader David Dellinger created an opposite effect. The publication gave radical pacifism a revolutionary wing and delineated the differences between radical pacifists and other peace groups. According to DeBenedetti, Dellinger’s efforts effectively framed the fragmentation of ideals that would eventually frustrate the antiwar movement.

As Melvin Small notes in his 2002 book Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America’s Hearts and Minds, college campuses became a breeding ground for social activism. The formation of the SLATE party at the University of California-Berkeley in 1957 allowed young activists to congregate through a multi-issue organization that raised awareness for racial integration, peace, and social justice. Organizations of this type empowered young people to stand up against wrongful authority and to strive for moral equality, which would prove to be two critical ingredients of the antiwar movement’s recipe for success. However, despite the nationwide growth in activism, DeBenedetti argues that by 1960 the peace movement had failed to gain popular support for its main agenda of disarmament and termination of the Cold War. The Easter Peace Walk of April 1963 was the first instance in which some pacifists were shifting their attention to American involvement in Vietnam. Small recalls that although the demonstration was supposed to be in support of the nuclear test ban, a small contingent of antiwar demonstrators were present, posing a dilemma for a democratic rally: the organizers were in no position to deny the right of participation of a group pushing a meaningful but different agenda. In recurring fashion, the opposition handcuffed its own efficiency by setting such liberal standards for involvement and failing to provide concrete explanations of the movement’s goals. DeBenedetti reinforces this claim by contending that in 1963 the peace movement was all very distant, abstract, and almost otherworldly. Save for a coterie pushing the values of peace and civil rights, the new radicalism that swept the nation was primarily concerned with domestic politics of race and poverty. Rather abruptly, their aim expanded as the definition of intervention was tried in Vietnam.

DeBenedetti and Small each agree that the origins of the antiwar movement are directly linked to the 1950s peace movement. No one has openly disputed this view, but other historians have traced the genesis of the movement both well before and
beyond the 1950s. In *Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement*, Adam Garfinkle details the history of “adversary culture” in twentieth century America to identify the underlying antecedents of the antiwar movement. Religious pacifism, peace activism, and Leftist radicalism repeatedly coalesced throughout history to shape this “adversary culture.” In other words, the Vietnam antiwar movement was preceded in style and form by the collective reactions to World Wars I and II, the Great Depression, and the dawn of the nuclear age and civil rights. As such, the Vietnam War did not represent the first case in which various elements of the “adversary culture” bonded together to voice national dissent against the government. Garfinkle uncovers more of the movement’s origins by noting the formation of the first radical student organization in 1905, the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, which was founded by Upton Sinclair. It served as a prototype organization for the American Student Union of the 1930s and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); the latter played a pivotal role in maintaining a student base throughout the entire antiwar movement.

To better understand the makeup of the majority of the antiwar movement’s participants and their motives, Garfinkle probes the 1950s youth culture. This demographic enjoyed an era of invincibility and affluence unrivaled by any other period in history. Domestic prosperity of the 1950s prompted the rise of consumerism, suburbia, and technology among other social and economic changes. The result was a generation of American youth who believed that progress was inevitable and that no Commander-in-Chief would ever lie to the public about America’s intentions abroad. This was the reason, Garfinkle believes, that the civil rights movement had such a demoralizing effect on this generation.

As it matured, denizens of the 1950s youth culture witnessed the racial injustices prevalent in America. They experienced the power of protest, felt the pain that many state governments had inflicted upon generations of blacks, and became filled with rage. They demanded answers to probing questions, sensing that a deteriorating situation at home signaled a potentially worse one overseas. However, Garfinkle did not credit the transformation of the 1950s youth into socially conscious members of society as the sole reason the antiwar movement developed with such ferocity. Several independent variables made it a possibility, but as he suggests, “the civil rights struggle was by far the most important and most proximate catalyst for the Vietnam antiwar movement.” In sum, he views the origins of the antiwar movement as a coincidental emergence of the peace movement and the civil rights movement. Aside from these precursors, moreover, he asserts that something else would have roused the activist spirit within this jaded generation.

Offering a unique take on the origins of the opposition, David E. Levy overlooks the people, places, and events that acted as precursors. His main concern is the distinctive circumstances of the war that led to such widespread inquiry and division. In the 1995 edition of his book, *The Debate Over Vietnam*, Levy questions the assumptions shaping debates about America’s actions in Vietnam. Specifically, he focuses on the manner in which the whole nation “was absorbed in weighing the
wisdom, the necessity, and the morality of the war.”¹⁷ His purpose is to understand and explain the antiwar movement, not to pass judgment. He believes maintaining balance while arguing the controversial issues stemming from the Vietnam War is attainable because enough time has passed since the war, allowing proper perspective to develop through hindsight.

Levy asks how and why the American people responded to the crisis in Vietnam through such dissident thought and action. The answers to these questions reside in the controversial circumstances that fostered the overpowering dissension. He contends that the antiwar movement was the result of moral objection to the war, which derived from three separate but related issues. The first involved the war’s legality. Levy asserts that an illegal war can never be morally justifiable, and due to several violations of the Geneva Accords the United States was involved in an unlawful military conflict.¹⁸ The second point of contention stems from the fact that the United States supported a corrupt regime in South Vietnam under Ngo Dinh Diem.¹⁹ Finally, many considered the brutal nature of the fighting as unfair, unjust, and immoral.²⁰ Add to these an obscene amount of deception that flowed freely from Washington regarding American policy and performance in Vietnam, and the result was a population leaning heavily towards an antiwar stance.

Like others before him, Levy also notes the impact of the Civil Rights movement and 1960s culture on the antiwar movement. Civil rights protests were instrumental in creating a template for contesting authority and decision making in Vietnam. The culture of the 1960s had created scattered sub-communities actively protesting several causes. In time, the antiwar cause gave these differing factions reason to unite. Moreover, organized action on behalf of change was already a part of the collective conscious in the early 1960s, and the antiwar movement was able to feed off of this prior activism to enlist support and set in motion its ambitious agenda.²¹

A final interpretation of the origins of the antiwar movement is fleshed out in Tom Wells’ The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam.²² Many historians have disputed this work due to its fulsome assessment of the movement’s effectiveness and ability to manipulate American leaders and their policies in Vietnam. It is worth mentioning that Wells’ self-proclaimed definitive history of the antiwar movement does not begin until 1965, when he identifies the seeds of the movement. As others illustrated, the antiwar movement began long before American combat troops were engaged in full-fledged battle in Vietnam. Nonetheless, Wells highlights the growth of student-run activist organizations throughout 1965 as the primary vehicle for future antiwar activity. He contends that SDS and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) were most responsible for realizing the potential of the antiwar movement and for mobilizing its message.²³ Both of these groups identified the potential in organizing large, legal demonstrations to help recruit working-class protesters, as well as previously silent skeptics of the war in search of a setting in which to voice opinion and no longer feel marginalized.²⁴ Without the influence and direction of these two embryonic student organizations, the whole host of others that developed in their wake would never have gotten off the ground, let alone become vital institutions aimed at manufacturing and disseminating critical antiwar sentiment.
The variety of analyses explored thus far proves that the origins of the antiwar movement resided in a range of sources. The activism bred in the civil rights and peace movements, as well as in the “adversary culture” and student run organizations contributed significantly to the foundations of the antiwar movement. Pinpointing when, where and if this activism actually prospered is another debatable point for the authors under review.

Progress through Protest

With an extensive history of internal conflict and foreign intrusion, Vietnam had never been a major part of the average American’s conscious. Throughout the mid-1960s, when American servicemen began departing in droves to Southeast Asia for indeterminate reasons, people in the United States began to pay close attention. By 1966, American soldiers were dying at an alarming rate in the jungles of Southeast Asia, and Americans begged to know for what reasons these troops had sacrificed their lives. Throughout college campuses, in churches, on street corners, and even in the Senate, a voice of dissatisfaction with the United States’ military efforts in Vietnam became more audible, and the people behind it more visible. The antiwar movement was in full swing, but historians have long debated if this burgeoning opposition actually gained enough momentum to influence the decision-making of the Vietnam War’s two most powerful proponents, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon.

The earliest citation of a climax in the Vietnam antiwar movement is offered by Charles DeBenedetti, who regards the first half of 1966 as a period when the movement reached an unmatched liveliness and breadth far beyond its narrow organizational base. One of the major reasons behind this vitality was the growth in liberal dissent among American clergy leaders. The formation of Clergy and Laity Concerned allowed the antiwar movement to recruit a demographic with the unique capability of reaching the core of American idealism. In churches across the country, clergy members increasingly voiced open criticism of the Vietnam War. Melvin Small argues that the presence of prominent religious leaders at rallies and demonstrations legitimized the movement for many Americans, which greatly contributed to the rising strength of the opposition.26 In addition, other constituencies began to take action against the war: lawyers, union leaders, social workers, writers, women, and war veterans. Despite their differing aims, a broad portion of the nation now considered itself a part of the dissident population. DeBenedetti highlights this growth in the antiwar movement’s participation to show that it was effectively recruiting the masses. However, this broadened reach cultivated organizational and ideological predicaments that would become the hallmark deficiencies of the antiwar movement.27

Prior to many of the major demonstrations that historians consider to be triumphant and influential on policymaking, a significant voice of dissent arose in the US Senate. Levy contends that during the years 1966-1967, Senator William Fulbright provided the most effective support for the antiwar movement hoping to carry out its mission through the dignified and socially acceptable setting of the Senate.28 In Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars, Frank E. Vandiver corroborates Levy’s claim that
Fulbright’s immense prestige and position of authority convinced Americans that an honorable alternative existed to the current policies in Vietnam. As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Fulbright validated the antiwar movement at a time when it desperately needed endorsement from the higher-ups in Washington. His initial attempt at persuading Congress to advocate for change met with little acceptance. However, as antiwar sentiment rose in the public sphere, Fulbright persistently pushed a military withdrawal during Foreign Relations Committee hearings and slowly his colleagues began to change their opinions on policy in Vietnam. His efforts signaled a high point of antiwar activity for the older, more reserved crowd, which was similarly distraught as the succeeding generation over the Vietnam War, but which lacked a platform to voice their genuine disdain.

Other scholars maintain that 1967 was the year in which the antiwar movement rose to unparalleled prominence. Tom Wells, the most ardent advocate of the antiwar movement’s triumph, believes this was a watershed year because of the success of the Spring Mobilization and the March on the Pentagon. In spite of cold, dreary conditions, an estimated crowd of three hundred thousand gathered in New York City’s Central Park on April 15, 1967 to share in their opposition to the war. At that point, the Spring Mobilization was the largest antiwar gathering in United States history and its success, Wells argues, hinged on a new component of resistance: draft card burning. About one hundred seventy young men destroyed their cards that day, inspiring others in the coming months to resist the draft while strengthening the resolve of antiwar demonstrators near and far. A smaller, simultaneous gathering in San Francisco added to the antiwar movement’s growing attendance. According to Wells, the demonstrations proved two major points to the White House: the antiwar movement had established a political identity in the country’s conscious, and its activists could no longer be cast off as a minority population of radicals.

Melvin Small agrees with Tom Wells’ assessment of the Spring Mobilization for garnering nationwide support of the antiwar movement. The Spring Mobilization was the most impressive antiwar demonstration to date and a crucial turning point for the movement because it reinvigorated many activists who returned to their communities and pursued grassroots techniques to advance the movement. More importantly, the spring of 1967 provided much needed momentum for critical rallies scheduled in the fall. The eventual March on the Pentagon showed the entire nation the type of energy, determination, and resiliency that the antiwar movement was bringing to the forefront, while confirming its presence on Washington’s radar for many years to come.

Critical to the advancement and legitimization of the antiwar movement, The March on the Pentagon was consequential due to the massive descent of dissidents on the nation’s capital, as well for the disparaging headlines the march fetched in the national media. As a result, historians have labeled the march as everything from a total disaster to an overwhelming success. Over the course of a weekend in late October 1967, renowned activists David Dellinger and Jerry Rubin led an estimated one hundred thousand dissidents. They demonstrated in prominent settings such as the Justice Department and the Lincoln Memorial before making a final stand at the Pentagon. Civil
disobedience and violent altercations erupted throughout the three days while the fighting spirit of the antiwar movement remained evident the entire time.\textsuperscript{34}

Garfinkle provides a complimentary commentary of the result of the March on the Pentagon, for he believes it was an epochal event that gave participants a valiant sense of moralistic achievement. Moreover, the antiwar movement drew confidence from the success of the march as it yielded much needed reassurance in the power of protest.\textsuperscript{35} In light of the media’s tendency to focus on peripheral, revolutionary characters, Small asserts that the march was ultimately successful due to the worldwide attention it brought to the antiwar movement. More importantly, the movement maintained its goal not to oppose the American soldiers fighting in Vietnam, but rather the men in power in Washington who put them there.\textsuperscript{36}

A pacifist and regular demonstrator during the war, David McReynolds remembers the March on the Pentagon as a success for different reasons.\textsuperscript{37} The fact that it was a legal and mostly nonviolent episode proved that the movement had made great strides. What most impressed McReynolds was the human wave that literally broke through the fences surrounding the Pentagon and occupied federal grounds for a substantial period of time.\textsuperscript{38} Wells agrees that this style of visible pressure made Washington more uneasy about the increasing dissent on the home front. The tumultuous event portrayed a divided nation mired in internal conflict, when the actual war was being fought halfway around the world. In addition, the march was much larger and longer than intelligence officials had envisioned, resulting in an angry and embarrassed contingent of high-ranking officials.\textsuperscript{39} The March on the Pentagon is generally viewed by scholars as a victory for the opposition because it finally confronted Washington’s constant bullying and deception, sending a powerful message to the rest of the world that America was at war on its own soil as well as in Southeast Asia.

DeBenedetti offers the most critical evaluation of the March on the Pentagon, describing it as a memorable event, but one that did not have a positive effect on the antiwar movement. In his view, the march was dominated by demonstrators who used vulgarity, violence, and sanctioned communist participation. As a result, he feels the movement suffered from its own internal dilemma as the media emphasized the secondary participants, such as hippies and black power advocates, who jeopardized the credibility of the antiwar movement while pushing their own agendas.\textsuperscript{40} Regardless of DeBenedetti’s lackluster assessment of the March on the Pentagon, it is clear that the event had a profound effect on the general attitude and conception of the antiwar movement. It is typically remembered as a high point for antiwar activity in 1967, one that capitalized on the energy of the movement and paved the way for the success of the Moratoriums of 1969.

On October 15, 1969, as many as two million Americans gathered in over two hundred cities and towns to collectively oppose the Vietnam War. The vast majority of the participants were working class adults, void of obscene chants and violent aggression, armed only with their quiet dissatisfaction with US military involvement in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{41} The Moratorium gave the average American citizen the opportunity to peacefully demonstrate their disapproval. The media treated the event favorably,
and the only violence worthy of news coverage took place in Washington, the site of one of the largest of the nationwide gatherings. Wells believes the culminating event of the day epitomized the true spirit and purpose of the Moratorium: a solemn march from the Washington Monument to the White House. Thousands of demonstrators proceeded ten and twelve abreast, holding candles while a drum roll sounded for those who had died in Vietnam. The Moratorium was an epic moment because the antiwar movement overcame its own history of organizational and directional problems to unite millions and perhaps force the government to re-think the course of the war. For an entire day, this peaceful approach enveloped the nation and brought a temporary armistice to the war at home, while demanding an end to the war in Vietnam. It was a day filled with triumph and one that Washington could not ignore as leading activist groups scheduled another Moratorium and the March Against Death for the following month.

The March Against Death on November 13, 1969 kicked off a memorable weekend of antiwar demonstration in the nation’s capital. The marchers gathered near Arlington Cemetery, each one holding a placard with the name of a US soldier killed in Vietnam, and slowly walked the four miles to the White House. This somber stroll through the freezing rain appropriately set the tone for the largest single antiwar gathering in the movement’s history, which would take place two days later at the Washington Monument. Despite dull speeches and an incident in which a few radicals attacked the Justice Department, this massive demonstration, Levy contends, was dignified, sobering, and effective, a prime example of the deepening discontent with the war. McReynolds recalls that the profoundly moving march from Arlington to the White House took away from the militant edge, which threatened to ruin the event and it gave the demonstration a more meaningful feeling than simply listening to speeches. Many scholars consider the fall of 1969 as the point at which the antiwar movement’s energy and passion had reached its climax and limit of effectiveness. There were impressive antiwar demonstrations in May 1970 and April 1971, but by that point the movement had become even less cohesive and more fragmented, leaving historians to ponder the extent to which these major events, combined with constant campaigning and lesser known antiwar demonstrations, affected Presidential thought and action.

Prosperity’s Pull

President Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon received the greatest amount of criticism for American involvement in Vietnam, and rightfully so. They made stubborn, uncalculated decisions and placed the country in serious economic and political jeopardy. Thousands of Americans, along with an exponentially larger number of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians, were dying due to their decisions. As a result, the two leaders became the focal points of the antiwar movement. The historians under review have not made it their place to argue if Johnson and Nixon necessarily deserved the treatment they received, but they have questioned the Presidents’ responses, or lack thereof, to the steady stream of dissent that flowed into Washington.
DeBenedetti feels that despite the recalcitrant personalities of Johnson and Nixon, there were instances where organized protest constrained their conduct towards the war. Largely out of fear of exacerbating domestic division, LBJ refused to mobilize the country by activating reserves. Finally convinced in 1968 that the nation would not accept a protracted war, Johnson placed a limit on it and then chose not to run for reelection.\(^47\) For Nixon, 1969 was a difficult year because he desperately wanted to deliver a military knockout to North Vietnam, but the high level of antiwar activity forced him to back off of his aggressive plans. In turn, he made a concerted effort to undermine and destroy the movement by shrewdly spinning dissent as violence, thus rendering the legitimacy of protest a political issue.\(^48\) Above all, both men found themselves entrenched in a battle for the political center of the country, a contest that DeBenedetti claims the White House lost, but one in which the antiwar movement could not claim victory.

Small’s conclusions on the antiwar movement’s ability to manipulate Presidential decision-making are similar to DeBenedetti’s, but he elaborates on the immediate effect of the Moratorium. Nixon was both impressed and worried following the first Moratorium because it had been such a peaceful affair attended by so many average Americans. Operation Duck Hook, a massive bombing campaign targeting North Vietnam, was set to launch on November 1, 1969. However, Nixon anticipated the negative response that an escalating move would invoke from the masses, and thus ordered against the operation.\(^49\) Instead he delivered his famous “Silent Majority” speech two days later, in which he outlined his plans for achieving peace with honor through steady troop withdrawals and the implementation of Vietnamization.\(^50\) Upset with the media’s respectable portrayal of the Moratorium, Nixon lashed out at the movement and its supporters in the media, who he felt were hindering his ability to earn an unattainable victory in Vietnam. Small highlights the delusional aspect of Nixon’s character to show how the movement began exposing his flaws as it crept further into his fragile psyche.\(^51\)

Jeffrey Kimball, author of *Nixon’s Vietnam War*, and Frank Vandiver offer the most comprehensive look at the how the antiwar movement pressured Johnson and Nixon. Both men have researched each of the President’s relationship with and response to the Vietnam War.\(^52\) Vandiver highlights LBJ’s distaste for the teach-ins because they promoted an alternative to the President’s foreign policy. The antiwar rhetoric pouring out of them was contaminating college campuses with an anti-establishment attitude. LBJ believed student groups like the SDS were largely infiltrated with communists, and he accused outspoken congressmen like Fulbright of “sniping from the sidelines” for their opposition to the course of the war.\(^53\) More than annoyed by antiwar activists, LBJ felt betrayed because he viewed himself as the most fervent rebel of them all; Johnson’s devotion to civil rights and social activism had made it possible for people to take to the streets and legally demonstrate for whatever cause they deemed worthy.\(^54\) Vandiver fails to cite any immediate effects that the antiwar movement had on Johnson’s decision-making, but he does suggest that the movement took a psychological toll on LBJ, leading to his fatigued and despondent attitude about the
war. A critical void in Vandiver’s analysis is the notion that the incessant pressure from the opposition led to LBJ leaving office after his first full term.

Before his in-depth look into Nixon’s controversial orchestration of the Vietnam War, Kimball recalls how the antiwar movement had affected the Johnson White House and set the stage for Nixon’s response to the opposition. He believes that the Johnson Administration’s concerns were not necessarily the product of antiwar protest, for they were more worried about the growing cost of the war, the military strain of a larger commitment to the war, and Soviet and Chinese intervention in Vietnam. The evolving dissent led Johnson to reevaluate General Westmoreland’s expensive search and destroy strategy and to consider a halt of the bombing in favor of negotiation.55 At the very least, Kimball feels that by 1968 the antiwar movement had performed three vital functions that would haunt the Nixon White House: it provided alternative analysis to the waging of the war by questioning its causes, logic, morality, and possibilities for withdrawal; its grassroots approach called out the leaders in Washington, clearing a path for members of Congress and other policy makers to voice dissent without causing great disruption; and the words and actions from countless protesters and demonstrations led to a collective feeling of war weariness from the general public.56 Despite the aforementioned evidence of success, Kimball asserts “The antiwar movement’s actual impact on the US war effort was complex and hard to gauge,” a realization that nearly every author on the subject would certainly share.57

Kimball’s thorough examination of the tenuous relationship between Nixon and the antiwar movement provides several examples where the movement likely forced the President to alter his Vietnam policy. Despite the movement’s relative quiescence during Nixon’s first six months in office, the President and his closest advisors had been quite distracted by the movement’s efforts. Like his predecessor, Nixon was especially displeased with campus protests and teach-ins because he felt they had a corrosive effect on the support of his policies. Nixon viewed these antiwar protesters as nothing more than “draft dodging rubble” who had been misinformed by their professors. Over time, they challenged his authority, impeded his military movements, stunted his policies, and above all else made it difficult for him to sleep at night.58

The Moratoriums disrupted Nixon’s though process because they were the first occasions in which nationwide demonstrations directly targeted him. At this point, he vowed not to let the movement affect his policies. Rather, he turned the tables on the opposition, arguing that an event like the Moratorium, with its open resistance, would prolong the war by sending Hanoi the message that the US was not behind the war effort.59 Vice President Spiro Agnew quelled Nixon’s fear that a successful second Moratorium would doom Washington’s ability to wage war. The press followed Agnew’s strict warning not to cover the event, causing “a great sigh of relief” within Nixon’s inner circle.60 In response to the antiwar events of the fall of 1969, Nixon embarked on a public relations campaign highlighted by a heavy dose of Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) propaganda. This scheme successfully countered the antiwar message because it allowed Nixon to brand activists as “unpatriotic dissidents.”61
Kimball introduces information contained in Nixon’s private record to show how personally impressed the President was with antiwar activity and its great potential to persuade public opinion. Nixon’s declining approval rating, which was a corollary of effective antiwar demonstration, led him to cancel the escalating military action of Operation Duck Hook. Moreover, Kimball cites Nixon’s celebrated “Silent Majority” speech as the ultimate political counter to the antiwar movement. The President masterfully turned the blame onto the movement for criticizing the war and attempting to defeat the United States, a task he proclaimed the North Vietnamese could never achieve. Nixon’s televised speech is viewed as a crucial victory against the movement, which stopped in its tracks at a time when antiwar sentiment controlled the country’s consensus feeling on the Vietnam War. In short, Kimball argues that the Nixon Administration “dodged a big bullet” in the fall of 1969.

Throughout the later stages of the war, Kimball believes that the antiwar movement had a decreasingly effective role in manipulating Nixon’s policy in Vietnam. In 1972, a year marked by a reemergence in widespread and numerous demonstrations, Nixon remained “impervious to the movement’s arguments about the war’s immorality and folly,” his only concern being the growing threat of Congressional control of his foreign policy. However, in his conclusion on the antiwar movement’s effect on Nixon, Kimball backpedals, asserting that the dissent both inside and outside of the government immediately affected the President, for it influenced his decision to withdraw troops from Cambodia and to place increased confidence in the uncertainties of Vietnamization.

Tom Wells presents the most insightful recollection of how Presidents Johnson and Nixon took an active interest in the antiwar movement by exploring their concern about particular demonstrations and the procedures they employed to curtail dissent. For LBJ, the increase in antiwar activity in 1967 forced him to expand government surveillance of activists. In preparation for the March on the Pentagon, the Administration created a vast domestic intelligence network that probed the organizations and individuals involved in planning the rally. On high alert in the days leading up to the event, Washington did everything in its power to stifle the political effectiveness of the movement’s planned siege of the Pentagon. Johnson’s suspicion of foreign involvement in the rally became extreme, for he was adamant that communist infiltration occupied a key component of the movement. LBJ’s paranoia is a direct reflection of the Johnson Administration’s inability to properly identify its antagonists, as well as evidence of the mental toll that the movement was taking on the President.

President Johnson’s approval rating began to reflect the consensus feeling following the March on the Pentagon. For the first time, more people felt that US intervention had been a mistake than did not. Only thirty-five percent of Americans looked favorably on Johnson’s management of the war. Thus, the antiwar movement’s growing popularity propelled Johnson to embark on a public relations campaign to persuade the country that victory was in hand in Vietnam. Through the Administration’s “Success Offensive,” Johnson summoned General Westmoreland from Vietnam for a slate of morale-building speaking engagements throughout the country. Westmoreland’s recollection from a meeting with LBJ during his visit illustrates the dramatic affect that
both the war and the antiwar movement were having on the President. “He told me
that he didn’t think he would run for reelection, and he attributed that to his health.
He was carrying a tremendous burden. He realized that he was losing public support
for the war.”68 In addition to the personal grip it had on LBJ, Wells concludes that
the antiwar movement: inhibited Johnson from increasing air and ground activity
in Vietnam; fed the mounting discomfort that many members of Johnson’s inner
circle were feeling about the conflict; and that ultimately, the overwhelming domestic
antiwar mood convinced LBJ to reverse course in Vietnam in 1968.69

Wells’ assessment of Nixon’s relationship with the antiwar movement is similar to
his previous judgment of Johnson’s, for he believes on several occasions the movement
casted Nixon to substantially shift his Vietnam policies. Like others, Wells argues that
the Moratorium directly influenced Nixon to renege on his threat to Hanoi that the
US was poised to carry out a massive military strike.70 Additionally, the movement
shaped Nixon’s premature decision to withdraw US forces from Cambodia in 1970, it
couraged decline in US troop morale and performance, put pressure on negotiation
to peacefully end the war, and motivated Congress to cut off funding for the war. Above
all, Wells suggests that the antiwar movement promoted the Watergate Scandal because
it prompted Nixon’s decision to deceive Congress by secretly bombing Cambodia,
effectively spinning a web of lies, which undermined his credibility as a leader and
slowly corroded his political career until his resignation in 1974.71

Ultimate Impact

Each historian under review has carefully studied the Vietnam antiwar movement,
identifying its effectiveness, impact on policymaking, lasting legacy, or in many cases all
three. What all agree upon is that the antiwar movement spanned at least twenty years,
gained support from conscientious citizens all across America, helped create and sustain
an anti-establishment counterculture, and most importantly, tested beyond measure the
nerve of the United States government. Fittingly, each author has forged a final opinion
based on the movement as a whole. Despite where they stand on the issue, the scattered
reflections appropriately mirror the elusive nature of the Vietnam antiwar movement.

Melvin Small’s final conclusion on the effectiveness of the antiwar movement rests
somewhere between the activists who pompously claim to have stopped the war and
the former government officials who believe the only ones influenced by the opposition
were the communists in North Vietnam.72 In addition to rerouting Johnson’s and
Nixon’s plans following the March on the Pentagon in 1967 and the first Moratorium
of 1969, the antiwar movement rattled the Presidents because it forced them to analyze
Hanoi’s perceptions of the movement. While the enemy was likely encouraged by
growing dissent in the United States, it did not lead directly to an American military
defeat.73 The copious amounts of antiwar demonstrations, marches, spokespeople,
and campaigning in print and televised media certainly shaped public opinion.
In due course, Small believes Washington felt it was locked in a serious battle with
the antiwar movement for the hearts and minds of Americans. However, by 1973
neither the government nor the movement emerged victoriously in the battle for the
home front.74
Unlike Small, DeBenedetti’s final analysis of the movement is less ambiguous, for he believes the antiwar movement ebbed and flowed at the same pace as American military success and failure in Vietnam. “The antiwar movement reacted, expanded, or contracted in intensity as US policy in Indochina varied.” A major inefficiency within the movement was that activists drew on various constituencies and therefore failed to establish a concrete ideology, organization, or coordinated leadership. Between 1967 and 1971, antiwar activists congregated haphazardly in an effort to reverse US military policy in Vietnam, but they disagreed on what that meant exactly. As a result there were several antiwar movements, not an antiwar movement. The movement did have two major effects on American society: it brought into view all domestic conflicts and demanded the government give them highest priority, and it fostered social reconstruction, particularly at the local level where voluntarism blossomed in support of the opposition. Church meetings, teach-ins, and candle light vigils all reflected the growth in activism at the local level. Lastly, DeBenedetti declares that the critical issue of the antiwar movement was the purpose of the American people. It did not force the US military to quit the war as planned, but rather identified the choice to either speak up and oppose the war or remain silent, as the essential issue behind American foreign policy and national identity.

Adam Garfinkle’s closing comments on the antiwar movement reflect the school of thought that perceives the antiwar movement as a failure. He argues that the movement had a modest effect on US policy making in Vietnam prior to the election of LBJ and after the reelection of Nixon. Therefore, from 1965 to 1972 the movement achieved nothing concrete according to its own expectations, and if anything helped the Administrations to coerce the broadest segments of American public opinion into relative reticence. He adds that the United States pulled out of Vietnam because of failed diplomatic, administrative, and military strategies, not because of antiwar activism or Washington’s fear of it. At the very least, the movement forced a stasis in LBJ’s policy and perhaps helped quicken the conservative withdrawal of military activity during Nixon’s second term. In his final analysis, both the government and the antiwar movement harbored good intentions, but both failed miserably in their execution. The antiwar movement never came close to inflicting the same degree of harm that the failed policies of the government did, but it is “fairly clear that neither the movement nor the government did anybody in Vietnam any good at all.”

In his essay on pacifism and the antiwar movement, David McReynolds offers a brutally honest assessment of the movement from an activist’s perspective. He states that the movement won and lost on the greatest stage because it was a youthful, often foolish movement, but the fact that it created such a widespread, feverish response to the atrocities of the Vietnam War speaks volumes about the American people. The small groups of pacifists who exhibited sound organization and strayed from tired, dogmatic approaches played a significant role because they suppressed violent uprisings, which in McReynolds’ opinion was the most damaging aspect of the antiwar movement. On the other hand, the movement did not change the course of future American foreign policy because the government proceeded to get involved in
the affairs of remote places such as Central America, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. “The Vietnam antiwar movement performed good work with good people.” 82 That much is true, but it has not kept America from exporting a unique brand of terror packaged in the promise of capitalism.

In congruence with his glowing evaluations of various aspects of the antiwar movement, Tom Wells presents an optimistic analysis of the antiwar movement’s overall impact. As the catalyst of antiwar sentiment, the movement played a pivotal role in restricting, deescalating, and ending the war. 83 The array of activists who fought tirelessly against Washington to provoke withdrawal can take solace in a hard-earned victory, Wells concludes, but the emotional toll it took on these figures and the country as a whole does not provide reason for celebration. Wells concedes that the movement did not prevent the deaths of two million Vietnamese and fifty-eight thousand Americans, but believes the influence it had on the government is immeasurable. Had the antiwar movement not reacted, the death and destruction that ravaged Southeast Asia would have been exponentially greater. 84

Maintaining the middle ground throughout his entire debate on the Vietnam War, David Levy proffers the most succinct but, in retrospect, least compelling conclusion on the antiwar movement. The greatest accomplishment of the movement, Levy suggests, was that it forced future presidents to be much more careful about committing the nation to untenable situations abroad. 85 In light of America’s two current wars in the Middle East, it appears that this proclamation did not take root in American foreign policy making in the twenty-first century.

A scholarly analysis of this nature makes it difficult to form an overall conclusion on the Vietnam antiwar movement. There is significant evidence provided by the historians’ research to support numerous claims regarding the movement’s origins, successes, failures, impact on Presidential decision-making, and affects on the outcome of the Vietnam War. At a minimum, the antiwar movement was important for the United States because it enabled its citizens to openly defend their constitutional right to disagree with government policy. It is clear that the movement did not accomplish this feat in the most effective manner, but it provided a shocking reminder to Washington of the definition of a democracy while forcing the nation’s leaders to seriously consider alternatives to waging unpopular wars for unspecified reasons.

History does not repeat itself but it often times highlights analogous situations, which can serve as a guide for avoiding the repetition of mistakes. As America is mired in two wars in the Middle East and an economic crisis rivaling the Great Depression, the absence of large public demonstrations demanding troop withdrawal and the creation of jobs for the mounting unemployed is troublesome. Has America lost its activist fervor so prevalent during the Vietnam era? Either the experience of the Vietnam antiwar movement suggests it is not worth the effort, or the same grassroots activism that recently elected an African American President will shift its focus to help restore America’s diplomatic and financial credibility. While the answer to this previous question resides well into the future, there is enough genuine hope in the latter proposition to believe it is possible.
Culture, Stone and Technology
The Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building
Dana EchoHawk

Culture, Stone and Technology

“You have noticed that everything an Indian
does is in a circle, and that is because the Power
of the World always works in circles, and
everything tries to be round.... Our lodges were
round like the nests of birds and these were
always set in a circle, the Nation’s hoop, a nest
of many nests where the Great Spirit meant for
us to hatch our children.”

Hehaka Sapa (Black Elk) of the
Oglala, Lakota Nation

According to Native American belief that everything
tries to be round, it is appropriate that the architectural
blueprint for the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health
Building exemplifies three circles. Recognizable by the
round tipi towering above the roof, it stands beautiful and
dignified on the University of Colorado Anschutz Medical
Campus. A circular wall of sandstone graces the west side.

Photo Credits: Unless otherwise noted: Dana EchoHawk

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documentary work and her undergraduate degree in Visual Cultural Journalism. She prepared her
paper for Professor Tom Noel’s Fall 2008 Western Art and Architecture course.
“T” shaped windows with eight corners instead of four recall the southwest native building tradition, and the “Council Ring” plaza and traditional-style arbor adorn the east main entry of the building. Native cultural designs are etched around the circumference of the building and blend into a surface of local stone masonry to create a sheltering structure for modern medical technology. The Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building is home to the TeleHealth projects administered by the American Indian and Alaska Native Programs (AIANP). Inside, blessing stones are placed around the perimeter of the circular Rotunda, and a Medicine Wheel is embedded in the center of the floor. The wheel, inlaid with colored stones hand selected and native to North America, exhibits the four sacred colors of black, red, yellow and white. These are symbolic of the four directions of nature, lifecycles, and the interdependence of all things in the Universe. Thus, the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building (NCB) connects circles of stone with circles of culture, providing an encircling protective structure for the technology and programs that benefit Native Americans in their rural homelands today.

The history of the NCB is recent. This paper relies largely on primary sources in addition to articles and the Internet.

Planning the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building

The story of NCB begins in 1995 when Congress tagged Fitzsimons Army Medical Center for closure. Before the federal government could condemn the 577 acres to decay, Aurora Mayor Paul Tauer suggested that the Department of Defense make a Public Benefit Conveyance of the acreage to the University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center (UCDHSC). UCDHSC was housed in a cramped 32-acre campus near downtown Denver. “It’s phenomenal,” said Tauer. “I would classify Fitzsimons as the single biggest project in the city. Not only will it bring in new jobs and new investment but it will spur redevelopment for that entire area.”

This decision set in motion discussions for a new Native American Health Sciences building. Initially estimated to cost ten million, the total eventually soared to over 13 million dollars. Realizing that funding would be required before construction of buildings on the new medical education campus could be planned, Judith Albino, president of the University of Colorado at that time, approached U.S. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell with the request of going to Congress for the needed funds. To that date, the largest congressional appropriation of funds for a medical facility had been two hundred and fifty thousand for a veterinary research hospital. The scope of the UCDHSC campus would far exceed that meager amount. Undaunted, Senator Campbell agreed to spearhead the effort and was instrumental in securing nearly $30 million in federal funds for Fitzsimons campus development before retiring from the U.S. Senate in 2005. A portion of the funds were dedicated to what was called the American Indian and Alaska Native Programs, Programs for Public Psychiatry and TeleHealth/Education facility. In April 2000, the University of Colorado (CU) Board of Regents unanimously voted to name this building after Senator Campbell. In a press release, Chancellor
James Shore said, “Congressional support for this project and the overall vision of the Fitzsimons project has been achieved through the dedication and commitment of Senator Campbell. A project of this magnitude could not be achieved without this significant federal support.”

**Designing the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building**

Once funding was secure, the CU Board of Regents established the Oversight Subcommittee to award and oversee the architectural contract. Three of the members included former Chancellor Vincent Fulginiti, Chancellor James H. Shore and Dr. Spero Manson, a nationally noted specialist in Native American Health. The Subcommittee selected M+O+A Architecture Partnership of Denver Colorado from numerous other competing firms. Bob Outland, founding principal and majority partner of M+O+A is a member of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma. During the proposal phase, Outland assembled a design team that would be sensitive to what proved to be a unique style of merging cultural Native American belief systems with architectural design. The team included:

- Design Consultation: Medicine Root, Inc.
- Interior Design: Gallun Snow Associates, LLC
- Contractor: Haselden Construction, Inc.
- Civil Engineer: S.A. Miro, Inc.
- Structural Engineer: S.A. Miro, Inc.
- Mechanical Engineer: Gordon Gumeson, Inc.
- Electrical Engineer: Roos Szynskie, Inc.
- Landscape Design: CIVITAS
- Technology Consultant: Technology Plus, Inc
- Geotechnical Engineer, Marc Cleveland, CTL/Thompson, Inc.
- General Contractor/Construction Manager: Haselden Construction, Inc.

Together, this team understood that for many Native Americans a built structure was a physical and spiritual representation of the universe. Therefore, to bridge cultural and geographic diversity, M+O+A “chose to highlight the architectural heritage of three predominant regional Native American groups,” the Southwest Pueblo groups, the Plains tribal culture; and the Northwest and Alaska Natives.”

In the article “Designing the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building”, Margie Snow, interior designer for the project was quoted. “The total project was conceived inside and out around the Native American customs and beliefs.” Forming the building’s public spaces, the design incorporates three major complete circular spaces, all aligned on an axis with winter solstice sunrise.

**Council Ring:** The first circular space is the Council Ring outside the east main entry of the building. It is reminiscent of a council ring from the northern Plains culture symbolizing connection to earth and is defined by log posts that frame the circular arbor. As explained later, it has a permanent non-landscaped circle of sacred earth at its core.
Rotunda: The Rotunda, an atrium at the interior center of the building, spans the height of all three floors and is the second of three circles that define this unique facility. Combining the Plains architectural theme with Northwest traditional motifs, seven Douglas fir logs, reminiscent of both tipi lodge poles and totem poles, soar over 53 feet to a skylight and capstone. The Medicine Wheel at the center of the floor represents the four sacred directions and actions of the “two-legged” humankind. Colorado fieldstone surrounds the Medicine Wheel. Inset along its perimeter are the blessing stones, etched with the names of key participants in the June 2000 Ground Blessing Ceremony that preceded construction.

Auditorium: The Auditorium is another of the three circles that define the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building. Built in a southwestern style, the exterior evokes Pueblo images, specifically of the Kiva, a sacred gathering place. Providing seating for 100, it is acoustically efficient, and even softly spoken voices are easily heard at its center. Blending Native American architecture with state-of-the-art technologies, the Auditorium enables multiple, distant parties to meet through real-time interactive videoconferencing. Laptop computers may be used from virtually every seat to share information at the press of a finger. In December 2003, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center Chancellor James H. Shore, MD, and his wife Christine donated $100,000 to support construction of the Research Complex II building at Fitzsimons. In recognition of the gift, the Auditorium was renamed the Shore Family Forum

Auditorium Rooftop: The Auditorium Rooftop is an open-air gathering place. American Indian and Alaska Native people gather in a variety of public places to celebrate their community. Thus, the rooftop of the Auditorium has been constructed to invite visitors and occupants to enjoy their connection with one another and with the building. The 210-degree vista offered from the center of the rooftop provides clear views of Pike’s Peak to the south and, to the immediate west, Longs Peak. The adjacent sandstone walls echo material found in local cliff dwellings.

“The building was a unique engineering challenge: all the circles and curves were aligned with reference to a point completely outside of the building.” The point referred to is a central point in the middle of a cement pad to the west of the building. Having astrological significance, all elements of the building were oriented to this point.

Native Beliefs Merge with Architectural Features

Although appreciative of the use of natural stone, masonry and other natural materials found in the NCB, some visitors might miss the significance of design and materials that are harmonious with Native beliefs. It is important to discuss Native American beliefs as they relate to the unique architectural features of this building.
“The challenge and objective of M+O+A was to design a facility that incorporated the state-of-the-art technology and communications tools and techniques of the TeleHealth and American Indian programs with the grace and dignity of Native American culture, values and spiritual considerations. It was important to embody in some tangible way some of the key elements of the Native American culture and way of life – respect for the earth, influence of earth and sky, traditions, ceremonies, and diverse architectural traditions. The built forms of the building and landscape needed to reflect the spiritual, aesthetic and cultural integrity of the people the facility is intended to serve.”

**Solstice Alignment:** Most significant, as mentioned above, M+O+A took great care to situate the building in reference to seasonal solstice. Facing east, the Rotunda aligns with the Winter Solstice to allow the rising sun to shine axially into the three-story atrium from a giant skylight at the pivotal topmost center of the peak. In keeping with a tradition held by many tribes, the main entrance to the building is on the east, facing the morning sun. “Solstice and equinox are important to Native tribes. It was appropriate to direct the eastern side of the building to align with the winter solstice when the sun is at its lowest point on the horizon. This represents regeneration and renewal for Native people.”

**Native American Spirit:** The skylight of the rotunda is surrounded by a tipi form on the roof made of fabric on a steel frame. This large element is visible on the exterior of the building, giving greater presence and identity to this small building surrounded by a campus of larger buildings. It glows at night as if there were fires burning within, symbolizing the Native American spirit high on a mesa.

**Native American Values:** All three floors open to the Rotunda to reinforce the earth/sky relationship. The seven Douglas fir logs extend upward at an inward angle from the floor to the skylight above. The poles symbolize the seven values universally important to Native American people, love; honor; respect; courage; honesty; reciprocity and family. Space between the seven poles is divided into twenty-eight divisions. Twenty-eight is the number of segments in the Native American medicine wheel.

**Wakan, a Moving Spirit:** Three hand-picked granite boulders are placed outside near the main entrance on the east. The largest was core drilled and a hidden water pump supplies water from below. This represents an endless stream of life sustaining water delivered by the earth. This water feature and seating areas express the concept of a broken circle, saying, “indeed, nothing is perfect.” In a memoir dated January 25, 2000 to M+O+A, Ben Sherman, lead consultant from Medicine Root, Inc., suggested the water feature.
“It is my belief that a water feature should be incorporated into the landscaping of the UCHSC “Native American Building” for the following reasons. Water was thought to contain a great and mysterious force. Its movement was, like the wind, was thought to be wakan, or holy, and possessed of a special moving spirit. Whether it was a trickling stream, a powerful river, or a quiet lake, water was another meaningful expression of the Creator’s marvelous powers.”

The above descriptions of Native American beliefs illustrate the historic uniqueness of the NCB design process and the extreme care and consideration given to cultural sensitivities by the architectural team. This process has not likely been typical for other medical facility architectural design plans.

Construction on the NCB began in November of 2001 and was completed with a grand opening on September 13, 2002. Prior to construction, Native Americans traditionally blessed the site. Although the invitation and promotional cards given to attendees refer to a ground breaking, Native people attending the ceremony remind all that, there was no “ground breaking” ceremony, as the idea of “breaking” the earth is contrary to Native American beliefs and tradition. Instead, there was a “ground blessing” ceremony.

Prior to occupancy, John Emhoola, a Kiowa Arapaho elder, blessed the building again in a ceremony where soil from four Native American nations was sprinkled into the earth of the Council Ring. Mixed with Colorado soil, the soil came from cardinal points in the United States: Nome, Alaska; Miccosukee Reservation; Passamaquoddy area in Maine; and Feather River, California. This mixture of earth remains untouched and uncovered at the core of the Council Ring. Spero Manson, Ph.D., a UCDHSC psychiatry professor, founder of AIANP, and member of the Pembina Chippewa Tribe, led the committee that oversaw the building’s design and construction. He explains, “The design of the building blends a modern academic setting with the longstanding cultural beliefs of American Indian and Alaska native people.”

“Growth usually means paving over acres of land. But since humanity’s connection to the earth is of fundamental importance to Native American communities, Manson insisted building plans include a round circle of exposed ground in the middle of the council ring. Four native communities from New York, Florida, Alaska, and California each sent 16 ounces of soil, which were then mixed with a sample from Colorado “to keep us connected with Mother Earth and remind us that our world is really not one of asphalt and cement but of the earth in which we are rooted.”

Architecture and Native American Health Science Programs

The NCB is the center of Native American mental health care and research in Colorado. Dr. Manson explains, “new technology will provide us with the means to bridge gaps in geography and culture that often frustrate our otherwise best attempts.
to promote the health and well-being of Native Americans,” 13 Under Dr. Manson’s management, AIANP administers TeleHealth and TeleEducation programs. These impressive programs employ telecommunication technologies to address high priority health-related service, education, and research needs of American Indian and Alaska Native communities. Rooms are equipped with media equipment that enables doctors to provide, through state-of-the-art teleconferencing features, counseling and therapy to patients in remote areas just as if it were a face-to-face session. There are no physical treatment rooms at the NCB, but treatment is provided through the convenience of direct video conferencing to tribes across the country. “Without the TeleHealth programs, these Native Americans would not be receiving any treatment,” Dr. James Shore said. “We’re working with isolated, rural communities, revolutionizing the way we provide healthcare, research and education.”14 Since the building opened, AIANP has implemented numerous other programs. The newest addresses diabetes treatment and prevention, “The Special Diabetes Program for Indians.”

Interior Layout of the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building

To accommodate the AIANP TeleHealth programs, M+O+A Architectural Partnership researched not only Native American architecture design and materials, but also tradition and culture as they relate to communities, relationships and healing. These components are the focus of AIANP programs and the interior of the building was designed to accommodate the state-of-the-art technology outlined by Dr. Manson. Relying on M+O+A documentation, the following describes the technical rooms located in the building.

The NCB has 45,396 gross square feet building area. It is a three story, steel frame construction with brick and stone veneer building with pre-cast concrete detailing such as circular sun motifs and stair-stepped geometric designs that symbolize clouds to many Pueblo cultures.

TeleHealth and TeleEducation: The administrative offices of the TeleHealth and TeleEducation programs are housed on the second floor along with the technological ‘heart’ of AIANP. A clinical studio employs T1 and ISDN transmission technologies to link with American Indian and Alaska Native communities as far away as Alaska, South Dakota, Washington and Arizona.

American Indian and Alaska Native Programs: Though found throughout the building, the third floor houses the majority of faculty and staff in AIANP. Its mission is, “to promote the health and well-being of American Indians and Alaska Natives, of all ages, by pursuing research, training, continuing education, technical assistance, and information dissemination within a biopsychosocial framework that recognizes unique cultural contexts.”15

Technology/Training Rooms: A video control room includes video equipment, routers, and recording units to facilitate videoconferencing. Programs originated from within the building or from outside can be connected to any room through the distribution system. Another suite consists of multimedia production. A production lab, training room, video editing and a sound recording studio serve multimedia development and audiovisual support for CD/ROM/DVD distribution and digital
archiving activities. This technology supports programs that focus on 1) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Native American veterans; 2) complicated problems of aging among Alaska Native elders; and 3) on the difficult challenges presented by Native American children who suffer from serious emotional disturbance.

Social/Cultural Uses of the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building

In addition to TeleHealth programs, the Rotunda is a great hall for ceremonial and programmed events. During a week in November 2008, the University of Colorado Museum of Natural History held a fund raising event with the Toh-Atin Gallery from Durango Colorado, hosting a Navajo rug auction. Hung from the second floor balcony, a black and grey Two Grey Hills hand woven wool rug dominated the more than 100 other rugs. The setting was ideal for patrons who leisurely strolled through the Rotunda to view and purchase their choice of rugs.

Another event on November 14, 2008, honored artist Howard Terpning and his wife Merlies. Terpning, a member of Cowboy Artists of America, has received over forty awards for his artistic and passionate paintings of Native Americans. Terpning spoke at the event, which continued into the evening as a drum group, their rhythm, and voices echoing to the top of the Rotunda, sang traditional Plains tribal honoring songs. Although a non-Native, Terpning’s work is accepted and admired by Native Americans and his paintings hang throughout the building. Dr. Manson spoke to the audience in praise of Terpning and stated, “Art brought completeness to the building. Terpning’s work is graphically correct and vividly accurate to daily tribal life.”

Knowing he wanted to paint since he was six years old, Terpning told the crowd he strives for an honest portrayal of Native People. His work depicts nighttime gatherings around fires, Cheyenne mothers, and Native American men on horseback and often portrays historic events. In his subject’s faces, the emotions of hate, fear, laughter or love are identifiable. Before he begins to paint, his method is to read everything he can find regarding a historic event. Once familiar, he then visits the location to walk, sit and reflect on how it might have been.

Terpning relayed the following story of working on a piece titled “Digging In The Sapa Creek”. The painting told the historic story of the Cheyenne, having escaped confinement on a reservation in Oklahoma and traveling north to their homelands. When they reached Sapa Creek in northern Nebraska, they were attacked by the U.S. Army Cavalary and had dug into the bluff for a fight spot. One of the men was a Cheyenne Medicine Chief called Red Tailed Hawk. He was given this name because a Red Tailed Hawk often flew above him. At the site, there were no markers, and no one knew for sure, but an old sheriff who claimed he knew where the “dig” was, took Terpning to a possible location. As he walked the area, he looked up and a Red Tailed Hawk circled above. He knew he had found the right location.

Terpning states his goal is, “to put Native American’s (sic) in the right setting and landscape and to educate this generation and future generations to what it was all about. I think it is important to tell the story of the Plains Indians because we share
their heritage and history. The history of the West is the only history America has that is uniquely our own.”

America will cling to history as presented through the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building. The building and its art is now part of Colorado’s history. Through the use of native materials reflective of cultural designs from multiple western tribes, this building serves as a beautifully built structure of current western architecture. For young Native Americans, they may find their ‘future’ through the Nighthorse Campbell Native Health Building. To quote Senator Campbell, “I would hope that this building will inspire youngsters to become involved in medicine. We have very few Indian doctors. There’s a future for our young people in medicine.”

Thus, stone, culture and technology merge and for generations to come the NCB will serve the purpose, as found in the words of Hehaka Sapa (Black Elk) of the Lakota Nation, “Our lodges were round like the nests of birds and these were always set in a circle, the Nation’s hoop, a nest of many nests where the Great Spirit meant for us to hatch our children.”
Notes

PREFACE


THE ENLIGHTENMENT

and Philadelphia’s Eighteenth-Century Taverns

Shannon Sharkey

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The Political Segregation of German Prisoners of War in America, 1943-1946
Andrew Streeb

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**FEEDING FEARS:**

Standards of American Motherhood in Baby Food Advertisements, 1930-1960

*Kathleen Barlow*


This topic is widely discussed in works such as:


7 Ibid., 8.

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11 In his 1911 work, *Principals of Scientific Management*, Frederick Taylor advocated compartmentalizing the production process in factories, and in all businesses, so that individual workers were responsible for a single task as opposed to multiple steps in the production process. The Taylor system focused primarily on increasing productivity, efficiency and rational behavior. While Taylorsim was accepted in some circles and decried in others, this method left its mark on many aspects of American working life. Please see: Merritt Roe Smith and Gregory Clancy. “Introduction to: Inventing Efficiency: Scientific Management, ca 1900-1940” *Major Problems in the History of Technology*. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 267-268.

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CATCHING UP WITH THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT:
Evaluations of a Dissident Society in Motion
Daniel Knowles

2 Charles DeBenedetti was Professor of History at the University of Toledo. DeBenedetti’s career ended abruptly in 1987 following a brief bout with an aggressive brain tumor, but his work left an indelible mark on the compilation of the history of the antiwar movement, to the point that he is cited and revered by nearly every other author under examination. Melvin Small is a Distinguished Professor at Wayne State University, where he has spent the majority of his career.
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_Dana EchoHawk_

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**FEEDING FEARS:**

Standards of American Motherhood in Baby Food Advertisements, 1930 -1960

*Kathleen Barlow*


**AMERICAN ZEN:**

How Ceramic Craft Becomes Art in the West

*Sam Smith*


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**CATCHING UP WITH THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT:**

Evaluations of a Dissident Society in Motion

*Dana Knowles*


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**CULTURE, STONE AND TECHNOLOGY:**

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