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The University of Colorado Denver Historical Studies Journal (HSJ) has been a unique annual opportunity for students ever since 1983 to display scholarly research and engage in the invaluable craft of academic writing and editing. It provides student writers with an opportunity to hone their craft to professional academic standards. Student assistant editors have this chance to see what goes into the editing process. The senior editor is given tangible experience in various aspects of the complex editorial process as well as the requisite responsibility of pulling the entire project together. The HSJ is an important and impressive repository of scholarly research that showcases the outstanding work that University of Colorado Denver history students have produced. This year marks the 38th edition of the HSJ. It serves as a portfolio of a wide array of fascinating topics that present a diversity of research.

The articles in this year’s HSJ represent a wide range of students’ historical research. The topics the authors have written about include local Denver history and regional history of the North American West, and international and global history. The essays take the reader to places such as Hungary, Italy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Washington, D. C., Seattle, Washington, and the East Asia-Pacific.

Noah Allyn’s paper on the Eisenhower administration’s reaction to the Hungarian Revolution and the refugee crisis that ensued is a compelling account of how discrediting the Soviet Union and communism drove President Eisenhower to pursue Hungarian resettlement initially as a foreign policy. Allyn argues that the Administration circumvented immigration laws to establish a long-term blueprint for refugee resettlement. The second article, John Elstad’s “Back Channel Diplomacy,” opens with a vignette about United States Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons stranded in an Arizona desert repository. Elstad considers the connections that the F-16 “Vipers” had to United States – Pakistan diplomacy during the Soviet –Afghan War. Utilizing recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents on the transaction and concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development, he finds a network of interrelations among Washington, Islamabad, and the Afghan mujahideen pertaining to covert actions. James Stark provides military history. He explores the role of the 10th Mountain Division in helping to determine the outcome of World War II in Italy. Afterward it was slated for action against Japan. He tells of the 10th Mountain Division as a soldier’s story. Stark relates how the 10th Mountain division fit into Operation Downfall but was delivered from it by the atomic bomb. Daniel Harvey’s contribution is an inside story of the 1980s hardcore punk scene in the Mile High City. His article reveals the hardships that Denver punks faced keeping their hardcore punk scene together at a time when punk rock was not widely accepted locally. Nonetheless, the 1980s hardcore punk scene left a lasting impact on Denver’s underground music. In “What Happened to the Parades?,” Crystal
Huntley focuses on the splendid and spectacular Masonic and Templar conclaves in the West. During the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries the western cities of Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle hosted impressive gatherings of Masonic orders and Templars. Bringing back to the fore the history of extravagant parades and pageants that awed cities, she recounts a history of the significant presence of Masonic and Templar fraternities in the American West. Matthew Taylor’s historiographical essay considers how historians researching and writing about the American Revolution and slavery have engaged in an evolving discourse about the relationship between the two subjects. In his examination of three waves of historiography, he finds that the cultural context in which historians write has a significant impact on the arguments they make about the role of Black people in the War for American Independence.

It has been an honor serving as Editor this year. I appreciate that Dr. Tom Noel entrusted me with the responsibility of accomplishing this challenging task. A special thanks to Dr. Dale J. Stahl for his indispensable advice and supportive help in ensuring the publication of the HSJ this year. I give my gratitude to Candice Peters for her superb layout design and cover design as well as her enthusiasm for this project, and professionalism. I want to thank Dr. Gabriel Finkelstein and Dr. Stahl for their invaluable editorial contributions. They fine-tuned my work and that of the student writers and the assistant editors. My appreciation goes to Tabitha Fitzpatrick for her needed help. I thank the authors for this year’s fine collection of papers, and for their steadfast efforts in refining their work. They worked with me cooperatively and with unwavering commitment. The six authors taught me a lot of history. I value their informed contributions. I hope that in the editing process I imparted some insights to them. I would like to thank each of the assistant editors for their hard work. The HSJ could not have been accomplished without the dedication and editorial contributions of the assistant editors: Noah Allyn, Bianca Barriskill, José M. Carbón, Teresa Donahue, and Nick Ota-Wang. They each put in essential effort to accomplish this edition of the HSJ. I am grateful to Dr. Cameron Blevins, Dr. Ryan Crewe, Dr. Gabriel Finkelstein, Dr. Marjorie Levine-Clark, and Dr. William Wagner for submitting commendable student papers for consideration for publication. With much appreciation I thank my partner John W. Price for his crucial and steadfast technical support. He lent a much needed helping hand several times on this project.

The publication of the HSJ takes months of hard work and dedication. I thank everyone for their commitment, as this was truly a team effort. We accomplished the work during a pandemic. It was a privilege to work with authors, assistant editors, faculty advisors and History Department members, and CU Denver Design & Print Services in creating this edition of the University of Colorado Denver Historical Studies Journal. I wish them all the best.

Mark Alexander Ortiz
Editor
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

The Eisenhower Administration and Hungarian Refugees, 1956-1957

By Noah Allyn

Following the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union took control of Hungary, establishing a communist government in 1948. On October 23, 1956, eight years later, protests broke out in Budapest as students and workers rebelled in opposition to Soviet rule. Urged to continue resisting by the CIA-sponsored Free Radio Europe and reassured that the United States or the United Nations would soon provide support, Hungarian rebels took up arms as they awaited an imminent Soviet response.1 Worried about escalating Cold War tensions, the United States did not intervene, and within ten days the Soviet Army had crushed the rebellion. The Soviets killed some 2,500 Hungarians and imprisoned tens of thousands of others. Over the course of the following month, around 200,000 Hungarians fled to Austria.2

Utilizing visas allotted by the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that the United States would accept as many as 5,000 Hungarian refugees. Despite this gesture, Eisenhower’s failure to intervene militarily in support of the Hungarian rebels during the uprising led to a backlash from European allies, American media outlets, and anticommunist groups in the United States. A mere 5,000 visas would not satisfy critics, especially as the number of refugees in Austria continued to

Noah grew up in Skaneateles, New York. He attended Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts, where he studied U.S. Immigration history and graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in History in 2015. Although he arrived at Hampshire College with a penchant for history in general, Noah soon became interested in immigration history in particular due to its relevance in modern political discourse. After graduation, Noah worked as a tutor for an afterschool program in New York before applying for graduate school at CU Denver. Motivated by his academic interest in the West and his love for skiing, Noah’s decision to attend CU Denver was an easy one. He is currently a third-year graduate student, majoring in U.S. Immigration history/Twentieth Century United States history with a minor in Public History. He is also a Koch Fellow with History Colorado. Noah plans to write his thesis about Vietnam War refugee resettlement in the United States. He decided to write about Hungarian refugee resettlement for Dr. Ryan Crewe’s Global History course as this represented one of the first in a long line of Cold War era refugee resettlement efforts which included Vietnamese resettlement.
grow. Feeling pressure from American allies in Europe, yet hindered by restrictive policies of immigration and asylum, Eisenhower took a series of unprecedented steps between early November 1956 and the spring of 1957 to resettle 38,193 Hungarians in the United States.\(^3\) The refugee crisis, like the Hungarian Revolution itself, escalated rapidly, forcing American leaders to plan and facilitate resettlement as quickly as possible. It was within this short period that the Eisenhower administration laid the foundations for a new era of refugee resettlement as a policy of the Cold War.

Hungarians were not the first refugees to come to the United States. Various laws had permitted some refugees to come to the country since the end of World War II. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, for instance, led to the resettlement of some 400,000 refugees from Europe, while also allowing for the naturalization of approximately 1,000 Chinese immigrants on temporary visas.\(^4\) Yet, refugee laws during this period were problematic for a variety of reasons. Despite implementing a series of temporary laws intended to address Europe’s postwar refugee crisis, these actions remained bound to America’s extremely restrictive immigration policies, which would not be overhauled until 1965. Not only that, immigration legislation—and, by extension, refugee laws—reflected racialized conceptions of American citizenship, which heavily restricted the admittance of immigrants and refugees from countries outside of Northern and Western Europe. Despite this restrictive legislation, the Eisenhower administration eventually managed to circumvent these laws and admit tens of thousands of Hungarians. This was an unprecedented move for a presidential administration. It raises the question: why did Eisenhower take extralegal action to create a Hungarian resettlement program?

Refugee scholars have considered this question. In Safe Haven, David W. Haines underscores the impetus behind refugee resettlement beginning in the 1950s: “anticommunism has been crucial to virtually all refugee admissions up until the 1990s.”\(^5\) Indeed, Cold War foreign policy concerns dictated refugee resettlement, both for Hungarians and later groups. In Americans at the Gate, Carl J. Bon Tempo argues that Hungarian—and, later, Cuban—resettlement represented “important parts of larger Cold War foreign policy initiatives.”\(^6\) However, Bon Tempo rebuffs other scholarly interpretations, arguing that refugee resettlement was also “strongly rooted in political, cultural, economic and social conditions” inside the United States.\(^7\) This is especially so when considering the effects of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s on immigration and refugee policy, but Bon Tempo argues that “domestic political developments”—like the Red Scare and domestic anticommunism of the 1950s—also factored into refugee politics. Domestic factors certainly played a role in Eisenhower’s resettlement efforts, but foreign policy concerns—above all else—compelled his administration to take action.
While the main focus of this article is the Eisenhower administration’s response to the Hungarian refugee crisis, some historical context will aid in understanding the United States’ relationship to refugees and immigrants prior to 1956. Following that, this essay looks to the implementation of various refugee laws starting with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which provides context for Eisenhower’s unprecedented decision to circumvent immigration law. Shifting the focus to the fall of 1956, this reading explores various sources from the Eisenhower administration and the United States Army, such as correspondence and a televised documentary meant to garner support for resettlement. Likewise, newspaper coverage also sheds light on public opinion regarding refugees. Lastly, the article concludes with a reflection on the program’s successes and failures, as well as an assessment of its implications for American Refugee policy during the Cold War.

Considering that between 1948 and 2009 the United States resettled over four million refugees, 38,000 Hungarians may seem like a modest number. However, the United States’ handling of the Hungarian refugee crisis set multiple precedents that would endure for the following two and a half decades. Foreign policy concerns, namely that of discrediting the Soviet Union and communism in general, drove Eisenhower to pursue resettlement as a foreign policy in the first place. However, this was not the only precedent set by the administration. Among the most important concerns is how the Eisenhower administration managed to circumvent immigration and refugee law in the name of foreign policy. In short, the Eisenhower administration exploited the parole statute of the Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, which permitted the attorney general to temporarily admit foreign nationals. Eisenhower used this statute to permit nearly 30,000 refugees, all of whom eventually received permanent resident status.

The implications of these precedents are clear when one considers refugee resettlement projects that came later, such as Cuban and Vietnamese refugee programs. Bill Hing contends that “by 1980, 99.7 percent of the more than one million refugees admitted under the parole system were from countries under communist rule.” Eisenhower irrevocably changed the United States approach to refugee resettlement during the Cold War by forging a model for resettlement that circumvented immigration law, effectively giving the executive branch an unprecedented amount of power over refugee admissions. In addition to foreign policy and legal maneuverings, the government also had to navigate the court of public opinion. Despite the country’s recent history of anti-immigrant sentiment, the federal government succeeded in garnering widespread support for the program. In this sense, Hungarian resettlement also laid a blueprint for convincing the general public to welcome refugees of communism. By rethinking refugee resettlement as a form of foreign policy,
the Eisenhower administration, with the help of media outlets and the United States Army, effectively convinced the general public that refugee resettlement was not only the country’s humanitarian duty but also a propaganda vehicle in the ideological war against communism. The administration rushed to create an infrastructure for resettling refugees by collaborating with various nongovernmental organizations, a model that remained in use through 1980. What may have looked like a series of rushed decisions regarding an unfolding event would prove enormously consequential, reshaping the United States approach to refugee resettlement for decades to come.

BACKGROUND: AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS WITH REFUGEES

Refugees have an extensive history that long predates the 1940s. Nevertheless, World War II and, more specifically, the rise of the Third Reich, brought the issue of refugees to the forefront of political discourse, both in the United States and in Europe. On May 5, 1939, the MS St Louis, a German maritime vessel carrying some 900 mostly Jewish passengers, arrived off the East Coast of the United States. Although the ship’s passengers had originally planned to disembark in Cuba, they were denied entry upon arrival. The ship then proceeded to reroute to the American East Coast, hoping to find refuge there, but to no avail. President Franklin D. Roosevelt similarly denied the ship’s landing in the United States based on the recommendation of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Despite the fact that some 700 of them had registered for American visas and had received affidavits of support, the United States turned the MS St. Louis away. In a final effort the ship sailed for Canada, only to be rejected
once again. After returning to Europe, many of the passengers found refuge in Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium. In the end, however, 254 died at the hands of the Nazis.\(^1\)

The failure of the United States to allow the *MS St. Louis*’ passengers to disembark constituted, in hindsight, a shameful moment for a country that could have resettled some 900 people with relative ease. In the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration a picture of the *MS St. Louis* hangs on a wall to remind employees of the impact of their work and of the individuals behind policy decisions.\(^12\) It was not until after the war that leaders from around the globe took steps to address the issue of refugees. What emerged from the ashes of World War II, however, was not a comprehensive or permanent refugee policy on the part of the United States. Rather, Washington instituted a series of temporary policies beginning in 1946 that sought to resettle varying numbers of refugees within the existing immigration system. To understand the discourse around refugee resettlement, American immigration policies as well as public perception of immigration should be considered.

Immigration policies from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century reflected growing opposition toward unchecked immigration, especially in the case of non-Western European immigrants. As Bon Tempo points out, “immigration politics and laws provided the key backdrop to American refugee policies in the 1930s.”\(^13\) Although the country had accepted nearly 25 million immigrants since 1880, two opposing groups had also emerged during that period: the liberalizers and the restrictionists. However, the aftermath of the First World War gave the restrictionists an edge in the debate. Capitalizing on xenophobia, the restrictionists in Congress managed to pass a series of immigration laws.\(^14\) The Immigration Act of 1924, for instance, restricted immigrant visas from the eastern hemisphere to 165,000, while placing no quotas on those from the western hemisphere. Moreover, the legislation of the 1920s favored immigrants from Western Europe, while heavily restricting Southern and Eastern Europeans, and upholding the outright ban on Asians.\(^15\)

By the 1930s, American immigration laws “were restrictive, domestic political culture was anti-newcomer, and the nation had played little role in solving the previous two decades’ refugee problems.”\(^16\) The American restrictionist faction had prevailed during the 1920s and 1930s. However, the tide began to turn during the following decade, reflecting Americans’ shift away from isolationism during and after the World War II. Although the country’s immigration policies were not overhauled until the Immigration Act of 1965, liberalizers and advocates managed to find ways to resettle refugees despite the restrictions of the immigration system.

**LEGISLATING REFUGE**

After World War II, the restrictionist bloc against refugees and Jews remained strong. Because of this resistance, the first American refugee laws did little to renounce the racialized conceptions of belonging underpinning twentieth-century immigration law. Yet criticism of these refugee acts after the war also suggested that American politicians and the public increasingly viewed racialized immigration policies as out-of-touch. Frustration with these discriminatory refugee policies, as well as with the country’s inability to reform its immigration system, led the Eisenhower administration to take unprecedented executive action to circumvent these laws and resettle a significant number of Hungarian refugees.

An examination of the development of laws and rhetoric surrounding refugees after World War II helps to clarify Eisenhower’s decisions in 1956. In 1948, Harry Truman
signed the Displaced Persons Act, which was the first legislation dedicated to refugee resettlement. On its face, the law aimed to ameliorate the European refugee crisis; however, in practice it placed strict limits on the number of people who could enter the United States by deeming any person ineligible for an American visa who had entered a refugee camp after December 22, 1945, thereby effectively prohibiting the entrance of Jews who survived the Holocaust. President Truman denounced the Displaced Persons Act, asserting that “the bad points of the bill are numerous.” He continued, “Together they form a pattern of discrimination and intolerance wholly inconsistent with the American sense of justice.” Despite the influence of restrictionists and instances of blatant anti-Semitism in American political circles, Bon Tempo contends that “the political and cultural terrain, then, had shifted in favor of liberalizers.”

Through the late 1940s and on to the end of 1950s, liberalizers and restrictionists continued to battle over the fate of refugees. Although the restrictionists remained buttressed by American immigration policy, liberalizers eventually found ways to circumvent these obstacles with temporary provided loopholes.

The Displaced Persons Act, which expired in 1952, was replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, more commonly known as the McCarran-Walter Act. Again, the legislation was temporary and it neglected to establish a permanent policy towards refugees outside the realm of immigration policy. The McCarran-Walter Act upheld the controversial and discriminatory quota system, though it did remove racial qualifications for citizenship—a “symbolically significant gesture to racial egalitarianism” despite the fact that the quota system still heavily favored Western European immigration. The removal of racial qualifications—though understood by many as a stipulation that failed to address discriminatory immigration policies—nonetheless permitted the admittance of some Korean adoptees and spouses of American soldiers.

Though modest in terms of its impact on the immigration system as a whole, the McCarran-Walter Act included a caveat that ended up having significant consequences for refugee resettlement in the following decades. The law gave the United States attorney general permission to “admit refugees on a parole basis,” though parolees, according to the law, would not receive legal immigrant status. At the time, commentators assumed this to be a “shipwrecked sailor” section. In the early 1950s, a “group of escapees from the Russian-dominated Baltics had arrived in the United States aboard a small coastal sailing vessel;” this stipulation, in theory, would allow the United States to avoid “handing them, and others like them in the future, back to their Iron Curtain masters.” Unbeknown to commentators then, several presidential administrations took advantage of the parole section of the McCarran-Walter Act to resettle more than one million refugees from Communist countries by 1980.

Dissatisfaction with the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act quickly led to the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (RRA), providing an additional 214,000 visas, mainly for European refugees. The RRA helped to solidify the association between refugees and anticommunism. Moreover, it reflected concerns about “European political and economic stability and about America’s diplomatic reputation in the . . . Cold War competitions with the Soviet Union.” The debates surrounding the RRA also foreshadowed how refugee politics would play out in the domestic sphere. While it was clear that liberalizers and restrictionists alike “equated ‘Americanness’ with anticommunism,” the former argued that the United States should set up comprehensive screenings to resettle more refugees, whereas the latter argued that it would be unfeasible to weed out every communist refugee.
The McCarran-Walter Act and the Refugee Relief Act reveal that refugee policies had started to take on new meaning during the early 1950s. In the domestic arena, a new set of concerns emerged regarding refugee resettlement. Although refugee policies still operated within the confines of the immigration system, discourse surrounding refugees suggests that politicians increasingly viewed them in a separate light from immigrants. Whereas immigration policies had long reflected domestic concerns—both economic and social—the discourse around refugees suggested a new set of concerns related to foreign relations and escalating competition between the United States and the USSR. Overall, the refugee policies of the early 1950s foreshadowed the divergence of refugee politics from that of immigration. Refugee resettlement, unlike immigration, could offer the United States a strategic edge in the Cold War.

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AS FOREIGN POLICY

By the time Eisenhower took office in 1953, Cold War tensions had escalated throughout much of the world. American leaders found themselves in a precarious position during the mid-1950s, and especially after the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. American allies in Europe contended that the United States had “encouraged the rebellion through its propaganda,” while simultaneously failing to take action to aid the Hungarian revolutionaries. Likewise, the American anticommunist far-right accused the administration of failing to take decisive action to help its allies. For a candidate who had campaigned for stifling and even rolling back communism, this inaction towards a European crisis proved problematic for Eisenhower.

Despite widespread criticism, both domestic and international, the President knew he had to tread lightly so as to avoid war with the Kremlin. By the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in the fall of 1956, Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that the administration had found a happy medium that would both please its anticommunist allies and avoid agitating “delicate American-Soviet relations.” They thought that the best course of action was to provide financial aid to Hungarian rebels and open up a path to resettlement for a significant portion of the 200,000 refugees.

Eisenhower had his reasons for wanting to resettle refugees of the Hungarian Revolution. First, resettlement could, in the administration’s opinion, bolster the reputation of the United States among allies and domestic anticommunists. This was an opportunity for Washington to take concrete action, rather than merely providing ideological and financial support for the cause of anticommunism. Second, according to a confidential 1958 report, the CIA suggested that the refugee crises offered “an unprecedented opportunity for the collection of intelligence on a Soviet Bloc country.” While the administration did not publicly describe foreign intelligence as a motivation behind resettlement, the report suggested that this was a primary motivating factor. The report detailed the creation of a national security community “faced with the problem of exploiting a large, but indefinite number of sources.” Motivated by a genuine sympathy and admiration for the Hungarians and a determination
to take full advantage of the propaganda opportunity against the Soviet Bloc, officials were determined to provide as positive an experience as possible for the refugees.Officials promptly began discussing how they could go about resettling refugees in spite of the country’s immigration policies. Martin A. Bursten, a former journalist and Public Relations Director of the United Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, was an early witness to the Hungarian Revolution. In 1958, he published *Escape From Fear*, the first comprehensive account of the refugee crisis. According to Bursten, the Eisenhower administration held a series of meetings with representatives from each part of the Executive branch in the fall of 1956. While debates ensued about whether or not to admit refugees as “parolees,” the president’s first course of action was to publicly instruct the Coordinator of Relief of Hungarian Refugees and Chairman for the Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief Tracy Voorhees to “take extraordinary measures to secure the entry of 5,000 Hungarian refugees into the United States.” Because the RRA was set to expire by year’s end, the administration concluded that the agencies involved could reasonably process 5,000 refugees during the following two months. Furthermore, some 15,000 Hungarian refugees had fled to Austria by early November, and 5,000 refugees constituted a significant share of that total at that point. However, the number of refugees in Austria skyrocketed in November, leaping from 15,000 at the beginning of the month to 89,000 by November 27. Although the refugee program had begun issuing around 200 visas per day, this program clearly would be insufficient if the federal government hoped to resettle a significant portion of this growing population.

Bon Tempo writes that “no matter how quickly Hungarian refugees earned their visas, that pace could not match the flow of newcomers into Austria.” Nevertheless, by using a loophole in the McCarran-Walter Act, the administration found a way to admit much more than 5,000 refugees. The parole section of the 1952 Act—a supposed “shipwrecked sailor” stipulation—allowed the attorney general to permit “refugees on a parole basis,” though the law did not intend to allow for permanent resettlement of parolees. In December, Eisenhower authorized the parole of an additional 15,000 Hungarian refugees to the United States. This move “stretched American immigration law beyond belief” and handed “an unprecedented degree” of control of refugee policy to the Executive branch. This decision had enormous consequences for future administrations’ decisions regarding refugee resettlement.

Behind the scenes, Eisenhower personnel scrambled to orchestrate resettlement efforts. In a letter sent to Voorhees dated December 4, 1956, former president Herbert Hoover explored a series of issues that the United States would have to face in order to resettle some 30,000 refugees. Hoover, who had extensive experience in coordinating relief efforts, had been brought in as an outside advisor and played a major role in the shaping and facilitation of Hungarian resettlement. The former director of the American Relief Administration following World War One suggested that there might be consensus within the Eisenhower administration about the necessity of resettling Hungarian refugees: “the U.S. must take some part in the burden of
 Whereas this suggestion would likely have been controversial only ten years earlier, it exhibits a shift in how government officials were thinking about refugee resettlement in the context of Cold War politics. Hoover’s statement, after all, reflected a feeling among the general public and staunchly anticommunist politicians that Hungarian revolutionaries epitomized the anticommunist spirit and deserved American support. Refugee resettlement had become less a domestic concern wrapped up in debates over immigration and more of a foreign policy concern regarding the complicated relationship between Cold War allies and adversaries.

Hoover and Voorhees’ correspondence is also significant in what it reveals about the process of resettlement. Although Eisenhower, Voorhees, and other members of the committee appeared to agree about the necessity of resettling refugees as foreign policy, they remained concerned about how this could be achieved on a large scale. And they were right to be concerned. According to Haines, resettlement required “a level of social engineering virtually unknown in U.S. public administration.” In order to achieve this unprecedented project, Hoover stressed the need for significant collaboration between government agencies and non-governmental organizations, arguing that the United States would need to set aside around $50,000,000 to fund the “magnificent activities” of the “dozen or so voluntary organizations in the United States.” To ensure effective collaboration, Hoover believed it necessary to create “a strong central organization … made up of officials from various federal departments, as well as “some persons from civilian life.”

Concerned about inefficiency, Hoover also made numerous recommendations for voluntary agencies, suggesting the establishment of a “Refugee Relief Council” made up of leaders of non-governmental agencies. He thought that “the major burden of resettlement”—likely a reference to sponsorship, language barriers, and employment—should be taken on by the voluntary agencies under the leadership of the relief council, and that these efforts “should be, if necessary, financially supported by the American Refugee Association.” Although he was wary about “fraudulent or inefficient agencies,” Hoover’s vision of an American resettlement program relied mainly on non-governmental organizations for practical operations. The federal government, on the other hand, would provide funding and ensure cooperation between the various voluntary agencies. In this sense, Hoover and Voorhees laid out a blueprint for how the United States would facilitate resettlement for years to come.

**PORTRAYING RESETTLEMENT TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC**

During the post-war period, the United States engaged in the process of shifting away from the era of restrictionist immigration policy and isolationist thought. Nevertheless, this process did not occur overnight, and although government officials increasingly thought of refugee resettlement as a separate foreign policy issue during the 1950s, the general public likely continued to view immigration and refugee resettlement as intertwined matters. Eisenhower, adamant about the plan to resettle Hungarian refugees by late-1956, sought to ‘‘sell’’ the Hungarian refugees to the general public.” Utilizing multiple avenues of dissemination, he hoped to portray refugees as inseparable from the ethos of anticommunism—already a defining characteristic of the American identity by 1956—while also conveying Hungarian refugees’ humanity. The administration not only had to convince the general public that Americans should accept refugees based on their merits as good potential citizens, but also that doing so represented a patriotic duty in support of the Cold War effort of the United States.
In late 1956, the United States Army’s Pictorial Center broadcasted a 30-minute documentary titled “The Big Picture: Operation Mercy.” The 364th episode of a series that ran from 1951 to 1964, “Operation Mercy” provides insight into the government’s efforts to “sell” Hungarian refugees to the American people. The episode begins by explaining that “there is another side to the contribution of the American soldier to peace and goodwill: the human side.”

“The Big Picture: Operation Mercy” framed the efforts of the United States military to rescue Hungarian refugees in a humanitarian light. The main focus of the episode, however, was on the Hungarian refugees themselves. “The Big Picture: Operation Mercy” outlined a narrative of struggle and survival against communism, while making clear refugees’ association with anticommunist ideology. Footage of the freedom fighters in Budapest, combined with the swift and brutal Soviet response, conveyed the notion that Hungarian refugees fought valiantly for the cause of anticommunism. The narrator continued, “Freedom is a heady tonic that lifts the spirit.”

Although severely outmatched by the Soviet military, the Hungarians were driven by a longing for freedom and an end to Soviet oppression. Finally, “The Big Picture: Operation Mercy” solidifies the symbolic significance of Hungarian refugees as emblematic of the anticommunist struggle with the words of Eisenhower himself. “Budapest is no longer merely the name of a city; it is a new and shining symbol of man’s yearning to be free.”

This audio clip serves to reinforce the conception of Hungarian refugees as freedom fighters. Although the broadcast begins and ends by highlighting the symbol of refugees in the context of Cold War ideologies, it also made an effort to ensure that Americans would empathize with Hungarians. Displaying footage from the boats, the narrator spoke to the diversity of refugees’ occupations: “They were students and teachers; they were lawyers and doctors, and the wives of lawyers and doctors; shoemakers and machinists and masons, and those whose motto was ‘better late than never.’” Yet, the narrator also emphasizes the inherent challenges in abandoning one’s homeland, describing how all of the refugees “reacted the same way on the moment of farewell: what smiles there were, all at once, were gone.”

By highlighting their occupations, these statements likely intended to assure Americans that they were welcoming a group of people who would not burden society. More importantly, however, was this section’s emphasis on the transatlantic journey. The Army Pictorial Service framed the refugees’ Atlantic crossing, as well as their processing, in a way that would have been familiar to many Americans. It alludes to Hungarian refugees as an extension of a longer, idealized narrative of immigration to the United States, with the added element of anticommunism. Footage of the Statue of Liberty set against the backdrop of Manhattan served to reinforce the narrative of starting anew in America. Although the episode briefly comments on Hungarian culture and language, this was overshadowed by its emphasis on the idea that the refugees had abandoned everything in search of a better life: “the job was easy for the customs officers—these people had little to declare.”

Rather than highlighting the complexities of the Cold War and the refugee crisis in general, “The Big Picture: Operation Mercy” painted a picture of assailable refugees eager to adapt and thrive in American society. Ultimately, these aspects of the episode worked in tandem to place the story of Hungarian refugees within a broader narrative of immigration—one that many Americans could personally relate to based on their own ancestors’ stories of immigration.
To what degree “Big Picture: Operation Mercy” was responsible for “selling” Hungarian refugees to the American public is unclear. What is clear is that Americans generally saw resettlement as “a welcome humanitarian gesture” on the part of their government.\textsuperscript{51} Between the fall of 1956 and the winter of 1957, newspapers throughout the country conveyed a general sense of enthusiasm and interest in Hungarian refugee resettlement. The Washington Evening Star, for instance, featured pictures of Hungarian children above headlines such as “From the Heart of America … an answer to Hungarian prayers.”\textsuperscript{52} A newspaper article from Bluffton, Ohio, worried that refugees would not be resettled there due to the lack of local Hungarian speakers,\textsuperscript{53} while a Jewish newspaper based in Phoenix, Arizona, expressed concern for Jewish Hungarian refugees and commended the Eisenhower administration’s resettlement efforts.\textsuperscript{54} Considering the widespread public support for resettlement, it is perhaps not surprising that Time magazine gave the Man of the Year award to the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter” in 1956.\textsuperscript{55} Clearly, Hungarian refugees had won over the American public.

REFLECTING ON RESETTLEMENT

On December 31, 1957, Eisenhower announced the termination of the Hungarian resettlement program. Some 38,000 refugees had resettled in the United States. “Of the 38,000 refugees,” according to the official White House statement, “6,130 received immigration visas” before the expiration of the Refugee Relief Act, “the remainder were admitted into the U.S. under the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act [McCarran-Walter Act].”\textsuperscript{56} However, parole status, as part of the Act, did not guarantee permanent legal residence for the majority of Hungarian refugees. One month after his announcement about the termination of the refugee program, Eisenhower asked Congress to “enact legislation giving the necessary discretionary power to the attorney general to permit aliens paroled into the U.S., who intend to stay here, to remain as permanent residents.”\textsuperscript{57} It would take more than a year, but Congress eventually passed a bill in July 1958, allowing for parolees to apply for permanent residence.\textsuperscript{58}

The resettlement of Hungarians had proven to be a demonstrable success on multiple levels. The Eisenhower administration orchestrated and oversaw collaboration between various non-governmental organizations that were essential to the effective resettlement of refugees. Reflecting on the process in 1958, Bursten argues that the success of resettlement “was due to the machinery of the voluntary agencies, including the three large sectarian groups, CWS, CRS-NCWC, and United HIAS service [the Christian World Service, the
Catholic Relief Services-National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, respectively], each of which had a network of cooperating groups over the width and breadth of the country.” These non-governmental networks, in hindsight, represent one of the most enduring legacies of Hungarian resettlement, as future administrations would rely heavily on such organizations to facilitate larger refugee resettlement projects.

For the Eisenhower administration, the program was also a success in terms of reshaping the image of the United States, both internationally and domestically. By providing financial aid to Hungarian refugees and resettling a significant portion of them, the United States of America had managed to improve its reputation among its allies, while avoiding the rapid deterioration of the unstable relationship between the Washington and Moscow. This foreshadowed the use of resettlement as a foreign policy strategy as future administrations would similarly pursue refugee resettlement.

Given the country’s recent history of anti-immigrant sentiment and restrictionist policies, the Eisenhower administration could not have been certain as to the American public’s reaction to resettlement. Despite concerns, the general public’s reactions to resettlement were overwhelmingly positive due to a variety of factors. The short-lived revolution, which was broadcast in the United States “from its outbreak to its end,” made a strong impression on the American public. Millions of Americans tuned in, resulting in “an outpouring of enormous sympathy, which was reflected in the media.” Media coverage of the revolution, combined with President Eisenhower’s public addresses, solidified in American minds the idea that a significant portion of refugees had been freedom fighters during the revolution. In reality, as Steven Béla Várdy and Julianna Puskás estimate, “only some five percent of the refugees took up arms during the short-lived revolution and hence saw the need to escape to avoid persecution.”

Indeed, the 1958 “Report on Hungarian Refugees” also suggested that only a fraction of Hungarian refugees had been involved in the uprising. Nevertheless, the image of refugees as freedom fighters proved advantageous to building sympathy among the American public.

CONCLUSION

Hungarian refugees arriving at Camp Kilmer in late-1956 might have sensed an air of excitement. The entrance to the camp included a large arch that read, “Welcome to America” in both Hungarian and English. Army personnel greeted refugees in front of a backdrop of American and Hungarian flags, while journalists and filmmakers stood by to capture the event. The American public flooded officials with requests to sponsor Hungarian families, suggesting that the enthusiasm for resettlement was not restricted to politicians, military personnel, and journalists. Contrasting this with the arrival of the MS St. Louis eighteen years earlier, clearly the United States had undergone a rapid transformation regarding immigration in general and refugees in particular.

This sea change in American attitudes towards refugees occurred for a number of reasons. Most importantly, however, was the increased differentiation between refugees and immigrants. Contrasting immigration laws and refugee laws during the 1950s thereby helps to contextualize this shift in attitudes. Though the liberalizer camp had gained the upper hand since the end of World War II, debates over immigration remained contentious, and liberalizers would not succeed in dismantling the old immigration system until 1965. While politicians
simultaneously initiated notions about refugee resettlement as a strategic means of waging the Cold War, the federal government was taking steps to criminalize illegal immigration. The Bracero program and its series of bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico continued to import temporary Mexican laborers, while Operation Wetback in 1954 led to the mass deportation of as many as 1.1 million Mexican migrants. Whereas Americans and American laws had conflated immigrants and refugees in the immediate postwar years, the Hungarian refugee crisis signaled a divergent course for Cold War refugees as victims of Soviet rule and symbols of anticommunism. Consequently, powerful advocates could leverage this Cold War symbolism as a persuasive appeal to Americans who were otherwise opposed to increased immigration. The lack of widespread opposition to Hungarian refugee resettlement attests to the success of these efforts to frame refugees as inherently anticommunist.

The Hungarian refugee program became a blueprint for Cold War refugee resettlement. Although relatively modest in scale, it demonstrated that presidential administrations had the power to create resettlement programs, so long as such actions were framed as being in the best interest of American foreign policy. The Eisenhower administration also demonstrated how, with the help of media coverage, the government could avoid backlash to resettlement of refugees from communist countries. This, in short, remained the model for refugee resettlement until 1980, at which point the United States had resettled more than one million refugees as parolees.
John Elstad is a graduate student in the History Department at CU Denver. His emphasis of study is Twentieth Century European history. The idea for an essay on United States–Pakistan covert diplomatic relations during the Soviet–Afghan conflict originated from a course taken earlier in the Graduate History Program, Weapons of Mass Destruction taught by Dr. Greg Whitesides. Elstad’s primary research during the course brought to light recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents detailing U.S. weapon sales to Pakistan and U.S. intelligence community assessments of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program during the 1980s. His paper was submitted for a course in Global History taught by Dr. Ryan Crewe.

BACK CHANNEL
DIPLOMACY

United States–Pakistan Covert Relations During the Soviet–Afghan War

By John Elstad

F-16 FIGHTING FALCONS STRANDED IN THE DESERT

July 22, 1996 was a beautiful day to go flying. Six A6E Intruder aircraft departed from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington, on their final mission for the United States Navy (USN). Veterans of three decades of aerial combat and deterrence for America, these aircraft were winging their way into retirement, destination Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) in Tucson, Arizona. Known affectionately as the “bone yard,” Davis-Monthan AFB is the high desert repository for thousands of retired military aircraft. It is here that airplanes no longer deemed adequate for military service are interned, put through a special preservation process, and parked in a spacious desert aircraft parking lot, where the dry air and infrequent rain leave them in a near state of suspended animation. From this point they await their eventual fate – resale to a foreign nation, transition to target drones, cannibalization for parts, nomination as a static display, or scrapping.

As the flight of Intruders approached Davis-Monthan AFB, the aircrew flying these veteran airframes could see acres of mothballed aircraft, row upon row of Cold War veterans: F-4 Phantoms, B-52s, A-7 Corsairs, C-123 Caribous, etc. The A-6s landed and taxied to the aircraft
depot acceptance facility, the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG), located on the east side of the airfield. The aircraft were parked, shutdown, and maintenance logbooks handed over to AMARG personnel. The Intruders had officially concluded their naval service.

As this ritual was taking place, it was hard not to notice several rows of cocooned F-16 fighter aircraft parked adjacent to the AMARG depot facility. As a relatively new generation of fighters, they looked out of place when compared to the other retired war horses occupying the grounds. An interesting conversation ensued between the Intruder aircrew and AMARG personnel. It turns out these particular F-16s, also referred to as Vipers, were initially intended for delivery to Pakistan as part of a U.S. government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transaction. AMARG personnel mentioned that the aircraft were actually brand new when flown to Davis-Monthan a few years earlier, with each airframe probably having less than ten hours of flight time. Their understanding was that Pakistan had violated an international arms agreement of some sort and that Washington subsequently refused to hand them over, essentially holding the aircraft hostage. The irony of the whole deal was that the Pakistanis had already paid for them!¹

UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN - CONTENTIOUS SYMBIOSIS

The saga of the stranded F-16s in the high desert of southern Arizona is indicative of the often contentious relationship between the United States and Pakistan since the latter’s founding in 1947. The interests of these two nations have sporadically intersected over the decades, and when necessary, they have ramped up diplomacy to suit each other’s needs. One such occasion transpired in December 1979, when Russian military units rolled into Afghanistan to spark the beginning of the decade long Soviet – Afghan conflict. The United States at the time was in the midst of the Cold War and out of this situation emerged a chance for the Americans to bog down the Soviets in their own version of Vietnam. By enabling Afghan Freedom fighters, known as the mujahideen, to effectively fight the invaders, the United States could cause harm to the Soviet Union without spilling American blood.
The United States supported the mujahideen rebels with military arms and other supplies during the Soviet-Afghan war. This aid was routed through Pakistan. To ensure that this flow continued uninterrupted, Washington agreed to provide the Pakistan government with economic and military assistance. One of the most sensitive issues was Pakistan’s urgent request for new and sophisticated weaponry, including F-16 fighter aircraft, to ensure air supremacy over Pakistan’s principal antagonist – India. Behind the tale of those F-16s sitting in the Arizona desert, there is an entire complex story of great power politics and regional rivalries.

This study will focus on the diplomacy and behind-the-scenes activities that supported the continued use of transportation routes through Pakistan by the United States, primarily the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although there has been much written about the American involvement in support of the Afghan Freedom Fighters during this war, recently declassified documents, mainly originating from the U.S. intelligence services as a result of numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, tell of a more in-depth and complicated relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

Scholarship on the subject of United States-South Asia diplomacy during the 1980s explores the decisions made between the United States and Pakistan with respect to the impact of support for the mujahideen. However, the “why” of these decisions was limited due to the sources and information available at the time. Dennis Kux, for example, in his 2001 book, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000*, delves into several high-profile meetings between American President Ronald Reagan and Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. His analysis explains the result of these meetings; however, declassified CIA documents now provide insight to the in-depth preparation and strategy formulation conducted by Reagan and his advisors prior to these engagements. The secret material and intelligence utilized by Reagan and his staffers was still classified at the time of Kux’s research for his book.

In a similar vein, A. Z. Hilali in his *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, published in 2005, mentions India’s negative reaction to the United States selling F-16s to Pakistan and explains the quantum leap in defensive capabilities the Vipers would provide to the Pakistan Air Force. CIA documents examining this issue, which were not declassified until after the publication of his book; expand on India’s apprehension of the F-16 sale. With these materials now available, the direct relationship between the story of American support for the mujahideen and that of the India-Pakistan rivalry can be reexamined.

At a rare moment in time and place, the American desire to battle the Soviet Union utilizing an Afghan proxy intersected with Pakistan’s quest to catch up to India in the South Asian nuclear arms race. This may be the most significant aspect of the relationship between Washington and Islamabad during this time of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development and brinksmanship. Although Pakistan’s government realized an outright request of support to develop a nuclear weapon was not possible, nonetheless other American military aid would free up resources to pursue that goal. Like two reluctant partners, Washington and Islamabad would play off each other’s desires to achieve their own national goals.
Jimmy Carter occupied the White House when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up the proxy communist government in Kabul against a growing insurgency. Carter and his advisors initially decided to counter the Soviet assault with public condemnation, economic sanctions in the form of a grain embargo, and eventually a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. It was at this time the initial impetus for arming Afghan Freedom Fighters started. Initially these efforts were inadequately coordinated and lightly funded. Carter had conducted a less bellicose approach to foreign policy early in his presidential term. This was about to change in a significant way. Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter to become the 40th president in a landslide election in November of 1980. The spigot for numerous CIA covert operations around the world was set to open up to maximum capacity, and it included funding for military aid flowing to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Reagan had a more assertive agenda than did his predecessor with respect to waging the Cold War more aggressively. This was referred to as the “Reagan Doctrine.” Basically, this meant not settling for containing the expansion of communism, but rolling it back wherever the United States could bring its influence to bear.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan also had reasons to support the mujahideen in their battle with the Soviet invaders. The countries shared a common border in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP). If the Soviets defeated the Afghan insurgents, what would stop them from continuing their offensive and
coming after Pakistan next? Soviet tanks could roll through the province of Baluchistan (Balochistan) coming into proximity of the Gulf of Oman. Also, with the seaside city of Karachi, Pakistan had something the Russians had been pining for since the time of the tsars: a warm water port with access to the Indian Ocean.6

Another reason for the Pakistan government, and President Zia in particular, to support the Afghans was the enhanced potential for a lucrative relationship with the United States. Zia was the leader of a poor country with a large population and limited natural resources. He saw the possibility for positive outcomes in an association with the Reagan administration and its desire to ally with Pakistan in support of the Afghan rebels. Zia could solidify his position as president by bringing in economic and military aid that would be popular with his constituency. Thus, he could achieve two objectives at once, making things better for himself and his country.7

Early on, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) levied an artificial limitation on support to the Afghan rebels by requiring all furnished military equipment to be of Soviet origin, including small arms like the AK-47 assault rifle. The CIA agreed to the arrangement as it would build the case of plausible deniability for Zia’s regime and the Reagan administration. Following combat between the Soviet Army and Afghan rebels, the detritus of war remaining on the battlefield would be Soviet-style weaponry, implying that the mujahideen were using captured Soviet arms to wage their war of resistance.8 To support this effort the CIA turned to Egypt. Cairo had developed a cordial rapport with the United States following a decades’ long relationship with Moscow. The CIA procured Soviet made arms, plentiful in the Egyptian military, and sent them to Pakistan.9

In another effort to distance himself from potential Soviet accusations of collaboration, Zia attempted to minimize the American presence in Pakistan. As Chief of Army Staff, Zia-ul-Haq rose to the top political position in his country as some leaders of newly emerging, post-colonial nations had, by a coup d’état. Forcing out President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Operation Fair Play, the code name for the coup in July 1977, and amid civil unrest, Zia assumed control of Pakistan with the support of the army.10 To maintain power, he directed the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, similar to the American CIA, to surveil potential political enemies, including members of the Pakistan Communist Party.11 To lead the ISI, Zia appointed Akhtar Rahman Khan, a close confidant from his military days.12

As soon as arms shipments entered Pakistan territory, custody would be turned over to the ISI. Other than minimal support from a handful of CIA advisors, American involvement abated for a time. Hilali contends, “The CIA transported weapons to Pakistan, mostly by sea to the port of Karachi, and then the ISI loaded the cargo onto heavily guarded trains, which carried it to Islamabad, Peshawar, and the border town of Quetta. Peshawar, the provincial capital of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP), was the principal conduit for external weapons … the ISI established ‘more than 100 depots’ for weapons in Afghanistan and Pakistan and used ‘more than two hundred different routes’ to supply mujahideen groups.”13
BALANCING ACT

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration initially made overtures to Zia with respect to providing support to the mujahideen. Such efforts were hampered by Carter’s anti-authoritarian tendencies that had kept him averse to the ruthless dictator. Consequently, Zia decided to wait until possibly a new administration was in place to move forward with his initiatives. In January 1981, Reagan was sworn into office, and with Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX), an influential member of the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee leading the charge, covert action to furnish Afghan anticomunist resistance fighters with military equipment accelerated. Initially the goal of this effort was to try to kill as many Soviet personnel as possible. Thoughts of actually defeating the Soviets were deemed infeasible. By late 1979, the Muslim guerrillas were being referred to as mujahideen, or Freedom Fighters. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the western press grasped this moniker. Both used it for propaganda purposes. What better way to promote those fighting communist oppression, not only in Central and South Asia, but globally? The Arabic term was used liberally for the remainder of the Soviet-Afghan struggle. Afghanistan’s mujahideen were exceptionally diverse. They arose out of local militias and were led by regional commanders or warlords who independently took up arms across Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union. Mujahideen included ethnic Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and others. Some were Shi’i Muslims sponsored by Iran, while most factions were made up of Sunni Muslims.

As the military endeavor was getting underway, the Reagan administration started to address how American activities would affect the overall geopolitical balance in South Asia, and correspondingly, the world stage. This was not going to be simply a matter of just supplying arms to the mujahideen; there were other political and diplomatic sensitivities on regional and global levels that needed attention. Islamabad, Kabul, Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington had interests affected by this undertaking. Consequently, diplomacy would be complicated.

The United States and the Soviet Union had been in a Cold War for several decades when the USSR invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet Army entered the country to prop up an Afghan communist puppet government led by Babrak Karmal, and to ensure communist influence was maintained in this vital region of South Asia. Washington immediately protested and, eventually, saw this as an opportunity to use the Afghan rebels to fight a proxy war.

One of the easier aspects of the entire effort as it turned out was persuading the Afghan rebels to fight against the Soviet invaders. Despite the Soviet Army having an overwhelming superiority in weapons technology and professional training, the mujahideen were enthusiastic, almost fanatic, in their resistance. They would likely continue fighting with or without support from outside sources.

Pakistan was the linchpin to this situation. Located strategically between India on the east and Iran on the west, its location favored American interests with respect to access to Afghanistan. Iran would have been the best choice before 1979, but the United States had recently lost its key regional ally early...
that year when an Islamic Revolution overthrew the Imperial government of the Shah of Iran. Despite being small in geographical size and struggling economically, Pakistan held a strong hand and would excise a high price to those wanting access to the north. India also played into the script due to New Delhi’s antagonistic relationship with Islamabad. On good terms with the Soviet Union since Jawaharlal Nehru’s ascension to leadership as Prime Minister in 1947, New Delhi exhibited a strong independent streak. India had its problems, including trying to cope with one of the most densely populated societies in the world. Having crossed the nuclear threshold in 1974, India held a position of regional military power in South Asia; however, a complicated relationship with its neighbor to the west was constantly festering. If it was going to accomplish its goals in Afghanistan, the United States had to take India’s concerns into consideration, along with those of other nations in the region.

**INDIA AND PAKISTAN**

The Pakistan-India relationship was contentious. While the U.S. and the USSR had been at odds since the late 1940s, the Pakistanis and Indians were simultaneously conducting a cold war of their own. Pakistan was partitioned from India in 1947 during the dismantling of Britain’s overseas colonial empire. The process of the British relinquishing control and handing power over to the Pakistanis and Indians was messy. British authorities made controversial decisions about the partition seemingly without adequate input from the two provisional governments or their respective national leaders: Pakistan’s Muhammad Ali Jinnah and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru. With the British departure, the two nations were in a state of conflict. With a predominate Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, there was much friction over religious differences, including displaced populations of Muslims and Hindus who found themselves on the wrong side of the newly drawn borders. This hostility was punctuated by numerous military clashes, including three major wars, mainly over disputed territory in the Kashmir region.

Islamabad had an unquenchable desire to develop a nuclear weapon. India had crossed the nuclear threshold on May 18, 1974 with the detonation of an atomic device on the Pokhran Test Range in northwestern Rajasthan Province. The Pakistanis pursued their own nuclear weapons development in response, fearing potential “nuclear blackmail” by their neighbor. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions had not yet come to fruition, but India and the rest of the world knew, or had strong suspicions, that Islamabad was trying hard to achieve nuclear weapons status.

Moreover, the United States had responsibility as a world power to adhere to the growing international pressure against the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 1970s and 1980s saw a groundswell throughout the world, especially in Western Europe, of limiting, and in some areas, abolishing nuclear weapons. Agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) were in place. Further, the international community expected the leading world powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, to abide by their provisions. The NPT, for example, declared, “The NPT non-nuclear weapons states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and . . . agree in exchange to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” The NPT was ratified on March 5, 1970, with 188 nations signing on. Five nations, however, refused to sign, including Pakistan and India.
PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND F-16s

In order to get aid to Afghanistan, the United States had to go through Pakistan. This would not be easy. Islamabad held a strong hand and would drive a hard bargain, especially with a country as wealthy as the United States. Zia strived to attain superior conventional arms transfers to gain a military advantage over India. At the top of the wish list were F-16 fighter aircraft. Underlying negotiations for aid and assistance would be an unspoken truth. This was the contentious issue whenever Washington and Islamabad discussed proposals for arms sales. The U.S. Congress, which had oversight authority of security assistance and bilateral agreements involving arms transfers, was paying attention. With initiatives on nuclear non-proliferation, the United States would not countenance Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.23

One of the more controversial aspects of both the F-16s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development was the issue of nuclear weapons delivery. Although India had detonated its first nuclear device in 1974, as of the early 1980s India’s military had not yet pursued production of a nuclear weapons stockpile nor developed a weapons delivery platform for an atomic weapon. India’s ballistic missile development program was in its infancy, and a viable nuclear warhead tipped ballistic missile capable of targeting Pakistan would not come to fruition for at least another decade. But the Indians knew the F-16s that Washington had recently sold to the European countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were capable of delivering nuclear weapons.24 With the Pakistanis hard at work seeking to fulfill their own nuclear ambitions, the combination of an F-16 delivery capability mated with a nuclear warhead would put India in an untenable position. All these factors would have to be considered as part of the delicate balancing act the Reagan administration would have to manage as negotiations with the Zia regime moved forward. Outside of Pakistan and India, a nuclear arms race in South Asia was the last thing anyone wanted.

With Pakistani desires and Indian apprehensions in mind, U.S. intelligence services initiated an assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program and the impact of selling Islamabad F-16s. This was undertaken with the Reagan administration’s overall goal in mind of placating the Pakistanis while not giving them such a huge military advantage as to embolden them either to attack India, or worse yet, have New Delhi feel so threatened that India would attack Pakistan. Within eight months of Reagan’s inauguration, the CIA had produced, with the support of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and intelligence branches of the Departments of State (DOS) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDT), a secret assessment of India’s understanding of, and potential responses to, Pakistan’s nuclear program and the ramifications of the Pakistan Air Force’s acquisition of Fighting Falcons.
The classified document, titled *India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan*, concluded:

The US proposal to sell F-16’s to Pakistan is now being associated by New Delhi with the potential Pakistani nuclear threat. Reporting received since 7 June, when Israel used F-16’s to destroy a reactor in Iraq, indicates that high-level officials in the Indian Government are genuinely alarmed about F-16’s going to Pakistan.

India fears that, with the F-16, Pakistan has the capacity to counterattack effectively against some Indian nuclear facilities. Moreover, it fears that a rearmed Pakistan backed by a US commitment will become more adventurous and hostile towards India.

The Indian Government probably is concerned its options are narrowing, that its contingency plans for stopping the Pakistani nuclear program by force could not be implemented without inviting reciprocal attacks, which, if conducted with F-16’s, could not be adequately thwarted by existing Indian air defenses.

Armed with this assessment, the Reagan administration began to move forward with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Weighing their options, Reagan and his advisors coordinated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, e.g. the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Pakistan and General Dynamics, and the State Department, and the Zia government, establishing an agreement to start selling F-16 aircraft to Pakistan with certain caveats. One of the biggest stipulations, intended to mollify Indian concerns, was that the aircraft be sold without the ability to carry and deliver nuclear weapons. Indeed, so sensitive was this particular topic that almost a decade after the initial deliveries of F-16s to Pakistan, DOS was still placating the U.S. Congress, stating in 1989 that no F-16s purchased by Pakistan previously were configured for nuclear delivery, and furthermore, Pakistan was not allowed to modify any of the F-16s without express consent from the United States. The Pakistanis were displeased with this arrangement, but their desire to acquire the aircraft prevailed. In December 1981, Zia’s military government signed an agreement for the purchase of 40 F-16s. The first group of six aircraft was delivered ten months later, in October 1982.

As efforts to arm the mujahideen and provide aid to Pakistan progressed, Zia and Reagan planned to meet in December, 1982. This engagement was arranged to bring clarity to the goals and objectives of the ongoing effort, a meeting of the minds so to speak. Although this meeting is referred to in secondary sources, there is now declassified information about Washington’s posturing based on recently declassified documents prepared for the meeting.

**PRESIDENT ZIA GOES TO WASHINGTON**

President Zia headed to Washington D.C. knowing what he wanted to accomplish. A dictator, he was rightly accused of human rights violations by the Carter administration; however, this had problematized relations between the two presidents. Zia and Reagan though saw an opportunity to renew the mutual relationship between their countries based on the circumstances they found themselves in.
In preparation for this meeting, the State Department, in cooperation with several U.S. intelligence services, produced a secret document to inform Reagan on the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development efforts. A briefing by CIA analysts was scheduled in conjunction with the President’s review of the assessment. The secret document was titled “Conveying U.S. position on Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program to President Zia during his December visit.” This briefing, now declassified, included a segment dealing with strategy, and how Reagan could approach Zia with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The sticking point was that, in accordance with the numerous nuclear non-proliferation treaties in existence, the United States would have to suspend aid to Pakistan if it could be proven that the Pakistanis were developing a nuclear weapon. The briefing document is sui generis in that it includes portions written in first person and incorporates the analyst’s logic and thought processes on how and why other analysts made their recommendations. (Italicized words are this author’s emphasis). The four options presented to Reagan were:

**Option 1.** Zia is told that if the program to procure components and to develop and manufacture a nuclear explosive device continues, or if international safeguards are violated, the U.S. will terminate economic and military assistance to Pakistan. . . . We should not . . . pursue this option unless, if necessary, we intend to follow through and terminate aid.

**Option 2.** Since Option 1 presents the President with a stark and difficult choice, we might consider a variation in which the President would tell Zia that the continuation of efforts would cause us to reassess our relationship with Pakistan. While reminding President Zia of the recent delivery of six F-16’s, the President would point out that during any reassessment, we would not be in a position to continue deliveries of any major military equipment.

**Option 3.** The President tells Zia that if the program to procure components and to develop and manufacture a nuclear explosive device continues, or if there is unsafeguarded reprocessing, it would seriously jeopardize our ability to provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan. This option would increase the pressure on Zia to restrict Pakistan’s nuclear weapons-related activities without binding the Administration to any particular course of future action.

**Option 4.** Zia is told by the President that the U.S. remains concerned about the direction of the Pakistani nuclear program, that it has carefully considered Pakistan’s assurances on its nuclear activities, and that violation of those assurances by a nuclear test … would force the U.S. to reconsider its assistance programs. This course . . . would permit the Pakistanis to carry out unsafeguarded reprocessing (which they are about to begin) and to procure components and machinery for fabrication of components of a nuclear device (which they are continuing to do). Proponents of this option believe there is a strong possibility that Pakistan would agree to this formulation and abide by it. Unlike the other Options, this course avoids . . . a continuation of present Pakistani activities . . . proponents believe this course alone can avoid a near-term confrontation between the U.S. and Pakistan.29
The analysis of the Options in this document is striking. It is readily apparent that the U.S. intelligence services were well aware of the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program. In Options 3 and 4, the intelligence analysts identify alternatives for the president short of terminating aid to Islamabad, despite Pakistan violating International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards.

Reagan and Zia met at the White House on December 7, 1982. As Kux states, “Zia and Reagan met alone for 20 minutes in the Oval Office before joining their senior advisors in the cabinet room for another half hour of talks. In their private session, Reagan raised concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program. That same day, a White House spokesperson stated that President Zia assured President Reagan that Pakistan’s nuclear program was strictly for peaceful purposes only, and that the administration believes Zia is telling the truth. However, Reagan kept to himself a statement Zia later passed to him in confidence—Muslims have the right to lie in a good cause.

Zia also used his highly publicized visit to Washington D.C. to improve his image with the international news media. Kux mentions, “Skilled at public relations, an ever-smiling and amiable Zia handled himself adroitly on Capitol Hill and with the press during his stay.” Although Afghanistan was the main focus of questions, Pakistan’s president maintained his composure in the face of often hostile queries regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program and its human rights record. Meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he repeated ‘emphatically,’ according to Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD), that Pakistan was not seeking a nuclear weapon.

STALEMATE

With an agreement in hand, Washington and Islamabad moved forward in their support of the mujahideen. The United States also delivered economic and military aid to Pakistan, with the much-anticipated F-16s delivered on schedule, so that by 1987 the order of 40 Vipers were in the Pakistan Air Force inventory. With military equipment consistently reaching the mujahideen, the war in Afghanistan stalemated.

The Afghan Freedom Fighters started to utilize unconventional tactics similar in some respects to those used by the Viet Cong against the Americans during the Vietnam War. The Soviets occupied the cities of Afghanistan, while the insurgents controlled the countryside. When moving military units from city to city, the Soviets traveled in armed convoys, and this is when the mujahideen frequently attacked. When the Soviet soldiers did attempt armed incursions into the countryside, the Afghans would often refuse to confront them openly, disappearing into the hills and valleys that dominated the landscape.
The U.S. government continued the battle on other fronts, leveraging international media outlets to put pressure on the Soviet government by highlighting examples of violence perpetrated by the Soviet Army on Afghan civilians. A flow of administration officials, cabinet members, and legislators with media in tow, paraded to Afghan refugee camps that had cropped up just across the border in Pakistan’s NWFP. Though the conditions of the camps were deplorable and their refugees rife with hunger and disease, they made for humanitarian stories and good press.

**ENTER THE STINGER**

October 1986 brought about a game changer in the war: first operational use by the mujahideen of the American made, shoulder mounted, surface to air Stinger missile. The Stinger missile system was state of the art, highly technical, and successful in shooting down Soviet aircraft, especially the Mi-24 Hind ground attack helicopter. The Hind had become the cornerstone of Soviet military tactics in Afghanistan. With its weapon system of rockets and cannon, it would fly at low altitude destroying targets and terrorizing Afghan civilians and combatants alike.

However, getting the Stinger missile into the hands of the mujahideen required overcoming obstacles, including the fact that the Stinger was an American produced weapon and its discovery on the battlefield by the Soviets would be problematic. Zia initially dragged his feet in allowing the Stinger missile system to be routed through Pakistan. Up to this point CIA-supplied armaments were refurbished Soviet weapons, which gave Zia and Reagan plausible deniability with respect to involvement in supporting the mujahideen. Zia assumed he had enough problems of his own without provoking a Soviet blowback against his regime.

Zia was not the only source of resistance to the introduction of the Stinger. On the American side, opposition was at first stiff from Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, who worried that captured Stingers could be reversed engineered by the Russians. However, by this stage of the war U.S. aid to the Afghans was by and large an open secret. After considerable debate, the Reagan administration relented and overrode DoD and intelligence community concerns about releasing the Stinger to the Pakistan Army and Afghan rebels. By late summer of 1986 Stingers were on the battlefield, and Soviet aircraft, particularly the Mi-24 Hind helicopters, started falling from the sky in alarming numbers. The Soviets were at a crossroads.

A change in attitude about the war’s status had started to build in 1985. Up to this point there was consensus among the American intelligence services that the best possible outcome in Afghanistan was deadlock. Afghans bleeding the Russians white without any American soldiers getting killed remained the goal. However, despite a significant buildup in Soviet troop presence, the Russians were not making appreciable gains in Afghanistan. A feeling emerged among the American advisors

![Mujahid (Freedom Fighter) with shoulder mounted Stinger missile system](https://www.google.com/search/Mujahideen/Stinger/Images)
that the mujahideen could, if not flat-out win the conflict, force a Soviet withdrawal.\textsuperscript{40}

Another factor materialized at this time. It was a change in leadership at the top of the Kremlin. Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the USSR in 1985. He was a different breed than the old Stalinist hardliners that preceded him, such as Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov. Gorbachev listened to the media outside of the Kremlin and wanted to bring the Soviet Union more into line with the rest of the world. He was about to get his chance.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{A CHANGE IN THE TIDE}

As the war in Afghanistan tilted against the Soviet occupiers, Moscow began to look for options to extricate itself from its misadventure. A military solution seemed increasingly remote, as conventional tactics became less productive. Airstrikes against insurgent camps on the Afghan – Pakistan border had become costly due to Pakistan’s use of their FIM-92 Stingers and F-16s, which were capable of shooting down hostile aircraft straying into Pakistan’s airspace.

The Reagan administration realized that the Soviets were back on their heels, and in response, accelerated efforts to aid the mujahideen and to manipulate the international press. Deliberate attempts to expose Soviet Army atrocities continued, with images of slaughtered Afghan women and children reported by the media.

With pressure mounting on all sides, and seeing no end in sight, Gorbachev authorized negotiations for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Meetings ensued in Geneva, Switzerland, on conditions for an end to the Soviet occupation. After much dialogue, the Soviets started a gradual withdrawal in April 1988, slowly transitioning security responsibilities to the communist proxy government in Kabul. In February 1989, the last Soviet troops departed Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{42}

Following the exit of the Soviets, Washington began the process of redefining the American role in South Asia. The Soviet Union collapsed shortly after exiting Afghanistan and with it went much of Pakistan’s geostrategic significance. Washington reduced aid to Islamabad and Pakistan had to look elsewhere for a strategic partnership, China for example. In 1990, during the George H. W. Bush administration, irrefutable evidence surfaced publicly that Pakistan was resolute in pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon, which further dampened relations with the United States. Worse yet, these revelations triggered sanctions of the Pressler Amendment. This legislation had been passed in the U.S. Congress requiring annual certification that Pakistan did not have, or did not make progress toward acquiring, a nuclear weapon.\textsuperscript{43} Penalties of violating this amendment included a requirement that the United States freeze all military aid to Pakistan, and at the time that included an order of twenty-eight F-16 aircraft already on the books; aircraft the Zia military regime had contracted and paid for.
CONCLUSION

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war was essentially one of circumstance and convenience. To achieve geopolitical aims in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration essentially turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program while supplying the Pakistan military with advanced conventional weaponry that suited it well in its dispute with India. This aid, however, was not given carte blanche. Declassified CIA and DOS documents reveal the Reagan administration was well versed in Pakistan’s desires, as well as Indian and Soviet concerns.

Taking these matters into consideration, the Reagan administration took a nuanced approach, in a sense playing both sides of the table, on several matters, including the decision to proceed with delivery of F-16s to the Pakistan Air Force, while not including the equipment necessary for these aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. Reagan also invited Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the White House for talks in 1982. In 1985, along with an Oval Office meeting, he held a state dinner for her son Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Reagan had a good sense of Pakistan’s nuclear program prior to his meeting with Zia in December 1982. He was prepared and ready with several options when conducting one-on-one, behind closed door diplomacy and attendant diplomatic discussions with Zia. As the Soviet–Afghan war ground to a stalemate, CIA assessments revealed the Russians were floundering as they tried to disrupt United States-Pakistan cooperation. This information emboldened the allies to increase support for the mujahideen and hastened the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

At a strategic level, Islamabad indirectly used American assistance during the Soviet-Afghan conflict to continue development of a nuclear weapon. With large amounts of American economic aid pouring into the country during the 1980s, the Zia regime discreetly funneled resources to initiatives such as development of a nuclear triggering device and machining nuclear bomb cores.44 While consistently claiming to the international press that no such effort was in progress, Islamabad deliberately and methodically took the steps necessary to further the goal of nuclear weapons development. The activation of the Pressler Amendment and subsequent cessation of aid from the United States in 1990 did slow Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development, but it did not stop it. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan joined the nuclear club by detonating an atomic device at the Ras Koh testing facility in Baluchistan province.45

And what of those 28 F-16s sent into limbo at Davis-Monthan AFB as a result of the Pressler Amendment sanctions taking effect in 1990? After unsuccessful attempts to either sell or lease the aircraft to other international customers, it was decided to deliver the F-16s to the USN. The seafaring branch of the U.S. military would use the F-16s as aggressor aircraft at their Fighter Weapons School (FWS), more commonly known as Top Gun. Here the Vipers would play the role of enemy aircraft in the training of Navy fighter pilots.46
After the F-16s had been delivered to the Navy’s FWS, the Clinton administration had to decide what to do about paying back Pakistan for aircraft that Islamabad was not going to receive. In 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with President Bill Clinton for diplomatic talks. Clinton decided to refund the Pakistan government the $470 million in cash of the total $610 million Islamabad had laid out. The balance of the refund was partially in the form of agriculture products to be shipped to Pakistan. Eight years after the Pressler Amendment went into effect and military credits were suspended to Pakistan, the issue was resolved amicably.47 Though there were some armament and military equipment deliveries, they were not the remaining F-16s.

On September 11, 2001, Muslim extremists hijacked four commercial passenger airliners and used them to attack iconic American landmarks and targets, including the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C.-Arlington, Virginia. In the aftermath of these terrorist attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies determined they were the brainchild of a Muslim extremist named Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Al Qaeda had numerous training camps in Afghanistan.

The George W. Bush administration launched negotiations with the Government of Pakistan headed by President Pervez Musharraf. Foremost was a call for permission to allow American troops and associated military equipment to transit through Pakistan in order to conduct combat operations against Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province.48 Similar to the situation in 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Musharraf negotiated with the Bush administration. The Pakistan Armed Forces assembled a list of military aid and arms transfer requests in exchange for granting American wishes. Political and diplomatic names had changed, but the game was the same. At the top of Pakistan’s military hardware requirements list was a call to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter aircraft.49

After much deliberation, hand wringing, and gnashing of teeth amongst the power brokers in Washington D.C., the request was approved.50
INTRODUCTION
Ed was firmly entrenched within the fortifications he had constructed just hours earlier. Awaiting an enemy action, he peered out into the darkness prepared for the worst. As tensions mounted in his mind over the fight that loomed ahead, Ed’s wife awoke and realized that he was no longer in bed. After a frantic search, she discovered his fortifications in the front yard of their suburban home. Ed was suffering a flashback of his combat experience with the 10th Mountain Division during the Second World War, and his wife was terrified. After years of working with a behavioral therapist, Ed was able to talk about some of the experiences the war had emblazoned on his brain, resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Ed’s flashbacks reveal a dark recollection of the horrors of war that many men returning from World War II were loath to discuss with anyone.1

Ed’s traumatic combat experience had come as a soldier in the 10th Mountain Division, which was founded the day after the United States entered World War II in 1941. The leader of the National Ski Patrol lobbied U.S. Army chief of staff, George C. Marshall, to create

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a division of the U.S. Army that would be proficient in mountaineering. After completion of their training high in the mountains near Leadville, Colorado, the 10th Mountain Division was sent to the European Theater of Operations (ETO) to engage Nazi Germany in control of a defensive position in the Apennine Mountains of Italy known as the Gothic Line. With the Germans considering that it was impenetrable, the Gothic Line was one of the strongholds that the 10th Mountain Division was created to surmount. It proved to be a costly campaign in terms of casualties. War in Europe devastated American military forces, which struggled to advance against the tenacious German Army (Wehrmacht). Allied troops, including the men of the 10th Mountain Division, were exhausted at the end of the war in Europe. They deserved respite, but combat against the Japanese loomed. The U.S. Army ordered the 10th Mountain Division to the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) to invade Hokkaido, one of the Japanese home islands along with Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku. On their way to refit for invasion, something quite unexpected happened—the United States Army Air Forces dropped the first atomic bomb (“Little Boy”) on Hiroshima. The decision had come from the top: Harry S. Truman, President of the United States. When Japan surrendered almost four weeks later, the 10th Mountain Division returned home. This paper tells of the relationship between the atomic attack and the experiences of the 10th Mountain Division.

Historians who have considered the use of the atomic bomb against Japan have usually focused their consideration on leadership to understand why the United States deployed such a terrible weapon against the civilians and soldiers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As recently as 1995, Gar Alperovitz argued that the use of the bomb against Japan was not necessary to save the lives of American soldiers because Japan was already a defeated nation. He claimed that Truman and his advisors were more concerned with intimidating Premier Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union with American nuclear hegemony following the end of the War. In contrast, J. Samuel Walker concluded that atomic bombs were employed to bring about a speedy end to the war, although the Allies could have achieved victory through conventional bombing and blockade. While there is merit to this position, Michael Kort has countered that Walker could provide no timeline for a Japanese surrender under conditions of siege, and that any delay to the end of the war would have killed hundreds of thousands from disease, starvation, and exposure. James Robert Maddox argued in 2004 that the bomb’s use was Truman’s best option to avoid incurring heavy American casualties in an invasion of the Japanese archipelago. Similarly, Richard Frank, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and Sadao Asado have all agreed that Japan was actually not on the point of surrender. Moreover, in 2017, D.M. Giangreco rebutted the contention of the likelihood of atomic diplomacy, citing evidence of American and Soviet cooperation against Japan at the end of World War II.

Most of the scholarship on the decision to drop the atomic bomb has focused on top levels of civilian and military leadership in both Washington and Tokyo. This paper adds to the discussion by including voices from ordinary soldiers. There has been little substantive scholarship regarding the 10th Mountain Division’s relevance to this debate despite the fact that it was tasked to spearhead the planned invasion of Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Honshu in the Japanese archipelago.
Examining postwar interviews and documents reveals that the men of the 10th Mountain Division supported the use of atomic bombs against Japan. They were ordered to invade the Japanese home islands, but to successfully defeat the Japanese, the men would need to fight at an extreme level, both physically and mentally, which was nearly impossible given their exhausted condition at the conclusion of the War in Europe. The Empire of Japan had millions of combat-hardened soldiers, who were well-armed and well-entrenched behind hardened fortifications and prepared to die in defense of their Emperor. Looking at the use of the atomic bombs from the perspective of the soldiers and through the accounts of the men of the 10th provides another view of the atomic blasts that were targeted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This neglected perspective reveals how physically damaging the war had been on the men of the 10th and that they needed time to heal before being thrown into another theater of war in East Asia. Evidence substantiates how injurious the war had been to the men psychologically by considering their outlook on combat and the trepidation and depression sweeping through the ranks. Examining the two theaters of war from the soldiers’ perspective provides for a better understanding of why these soldiers supported deploying an atomic weapon against Japan.

A DIVISION BORN IN THE MOUNTAINS

The 10th Mountain Division was the brainchild of Charles Minot Dole or “Minnie” as he was commonly known. As the president of the National Ski Patrol, Dole observed that if Americans were going to be successful in their prosecution of World War II overseas or should it ever come to defending the mountainous territory of the northeastern United States, they needed to have a mountain division. One need only consider the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40 to see how a well-trained mountain division could inflict significantly more damage than a traditional ground army division. The Russians invaded Finland in 1939 with nearly a million soldiers, but due to their deftness in mountain warfare, the Finns fought the Russians to a standstill with only 150,000 men until the Red Army overwhelmed them by sheer numbers. In fact, the United States would have been a solitary country fighting the war without a mountain division. With that understanding, Dole began writing letters to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. It was Marshall whom he convinced that the Army needed a division that could be trained in the particular skills required to fight in the mountains, which included mountaineering, skiing, and outdoor survival techniques. Marshall stipulated that the division would have to be a volunteer unit recruited by the National Ski Patrol (NSP)—a civilian organization. In recruiting the 10th Mountain Division, the NSP selected a diverse group representing a cross section of men who were
These men came from across the country and from disparate walks of life. Some, like the Dartmouth Ski Team with their coach, came with an Ivy League education and existing skills in skiing. In addition, the 10th Mountain Division recruited some adept European immigrants with skiing backgrounds who had recently come to the United States. Other volunteers came from the mountains of the western United States—like Robert Vigil who had grown up ranching in mountainous terrain of New Mexico. The Division would be trained for fighting in the European Theater as soon as possible. Yet by their unique training, the 10th Mountain Division would potentially become the ideal cohort to invade the mountainous Japanese home islands.

**THE DAMAGE BEGINS**

This Division did not undergo standard boot camp Army training but rather a strenuous high-altitude conditioning in extremely cold temperatures. The Army utilized revolutionary equipment developed by private industry which was tested simultaneously with the training of these men. An example is the mummy sleeping bag, which originated in cooperation between the Sierra Club and the Army’s equipment supplier. The men of the 10th conducted drills in subzero temperatures for weeks at a time. Serving in the 86th regiment of the 10th Mountain Division, Charles Hunt recalled that “in the winter, it was a regular thing for the temperature to drop 10 to 30 degrees below zero.” This rigorous preparation was only the first of many hardships that the men of the 10th Mountain Division would count themselves fortunate to survive, revealing the tremendous strain of combat training.

The discipline instilled into the men of the 10th at Camp Hale in Pando, Colorado was the most stringent in the Army. Not only did they find themselves in extreme conditions at the high-altitude camp, but they did so as experimental participants. The idea of a mountain division was new to the Army; it had to develop the training, equipment, and doctrine as it went along. As a result, the men often suffered because of failures in these areas. For example, the 10th Mountain Division conducted six weeks of field exercises in the spring of 1944 called the “D-Series” maneuvers. The “D” in the “D-Series” maneuvers stood for Division and meant that the entire Division took part in the exercises. Fifteen thousand men participated in war games. They ate and slept outside in the snow and frigid temperatures for six weeks. These conditions were the most extreme of any training maneuvers performed by the U.S. Armed Forces. On one night alone, a hundred men were evacuated with frostbite as temperatures dipped as low as 50 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. Men suffered from high-altitude sickness, ski related fractures, frostbite, and worse. In fact, the training endured by the 10th Mountain Division in Colorado produced the largest percentage of casualties of any military training camp in the country, with one of the maneuvers reaching staggeringly high casualties of 30 percent. Harvey Wieprecht described how he chose to take guard duty all night when the temperature dropped to 50 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, for fear of freezing to death in his sleep. He remembered many men leaving the Division with the serious injury of frozen lungs during the “D-Series” maneuvers. Physical demands were already attriting many of the men in the 10th Mountain Division, and it was only the first training phase of their Second World War experience.

If the rigors of preparation at Camp Hale had not been enough, General Ridgely Gaither in Washington decided that when soldiers were finished with their mountain training, the 10th Mountain Division should go through the normal Army boot camp to prepare for non-mountain combat. With this additional requirement, the soldiers
of the 10th were mustered, stripped of their mountain equipment, and shipped by rail to the hot and humid environs of Camp Swift, Texas. At Camp Swift, the men were issued new equipment and began their flat land military training with new instructors, unfamiliar barracks, different uniforms, and a dissimilar climate. Moving from the cold mountain temperatures of Camp Hale, Colorado proved to be an extremely challenging adjustment. The men performed 25-mile marches with equipment to acclimatize for low altitude combat readiness. Hunt recalled that it was not unusual for the temperature to range between 105- and 110-degrees Fahrenheit with high humidity and an abundance of insects. After six months the physical demands and mental strain of combat preparation at Camp Swift had exhausted the Division and brought low the esprit de corps.

Morale ebbed throughout the ranks. One of the Division’s experienced mountaineers, James A. Goodwin, said, “Frankly, I was terribly depressed during my basic training. I was so miserable as a matter of fact that I eventually volunteered to be a janitor for the barracks.” Harvey Wieprecht and Floyd Erickson echoed Goodwin’s sentiments, stating that morale was low for the entire Division following the training that they had performed at Camps Hale and Swift. The Army was acutely aware of the link between low morale and higher rates of PTSD and attempted to mitigate the damage. Officers at Camp Hale designed exercises to boost the men’s morale and went so far as to define morale for the men as “the confidence of each man in himself, his equipment, and his fellow soldiers.” The War Department went even further, assigning a highly credentialed neuropsychiatrist to the 10th Mountain Division in the person of Major Lewis Thorne. Thorne had concurred that neuropsychiatric casualties from PTSD were much lower in military units where the morale was high.

Theoretically, strenuous, and prolonged training was required to give soldiers the ability to kill in a multiplicity of circumstances, but training had its price. Hew Strachan has noted that one of the main functions of training is to prepare soldiers for war by hardening them and that the process by which this is done is at cross purposes from the civilian society from which those soldiers are drawn. In other words, the Army used training to break down the men’s humanity to the point where they could kill with consummate efficiency and win the war for the sake of a free society. Yet the long-term consequences from the severe training were complicit in the onset of PTSD as exemplified by Ed. The 10th Mountain Division was not made up of ace soldiers, yet they were trained to kill as if they were elite irregulars, and the consequences of that incongruity had detrimental effects upon the men’s psychological conditions.

INTO THE WAR
After a grueling trip across the Atlantic Ocean in which the men endured extremely cramped quarters and rough seas, the 10th Mountain Division arrived in Naples, Italy and began preparing for combat. The first assignment was prohibitively difficult and had been attempted previously by elements of General Mark Clark’s 5th Army three times without success. The order was to attack and capture Mount Belvedere and then capture all the high ground to a position east of Tole, Italy. This stronghold was held by elite Alpine divisions of the German Army, whose troops were combat veterans. The 10th Mountain Division, in contrast, had a paucity of combat experience. When General Lucian Truscott asked the commander of the 10th Mountain Division if he thought that he could carry out the order, General George Hays replied, “I don’t know, but if we do, I don’t think that I will have any Division left.” Hays devised a daring plan that would require four separate companies of men to climb approximately 2,000 feet of
sheer mountain cliffs without being detected, move behind the enemy positions on the ridge, and occupy the high ground in preparation for a dawn attack. The cliffs the men had to ascend were so difficult that even after a week of scouting by some of the world’s best climbers, no passable route was found. This prompted Hays to remark, “Now this is a Mountain Division, trained in the Rocky Mountains; surely they can find how to climb up that Ridge.” After another week of scouting, this elite team of climbers came up with four routes, but they could only be climbed if the men remained undetected by the enemy. The climb would have to be done silently at night.

Andres Vigil, a Hispanic communications specialist assigned to make the climb up that Ridge on the night of February 18, 1945, described how it had to be done. It was a technical climb made with ropes, and to secure the ropes to the mountain, pitons were driven into the rock using gloves between the hammer and anchor to muffle noise. In this manner, 800 men from four companies stealthily night-climbed and successfully sneaked past the German positions to the high ground above the cliffs. Vigil recalled how a German truck had surprised the group in the middle of the climb, and one of the climbers dived off the rock and onto the truck driver to keep the Division from being detected by the Germans. Vigil explained that German prisoners captured during the night climb had to be sent with Division escorts back down the mountain to headquarters without alerting the German forces. With the high ground held by the Americans, the attack began at dawn and the 10th captured the heights above Mount Belvedere known as Riva Ridge. The Germans launched multiple counter attacks to try and regain the vital ground that they had thought was unclimbable, but the four companies held their positions, allowing the attack on Mount Belvedere and Mount Moska to move ahead as planned. The men of the 10th Mountain Division were successful in their objectives, but they also sustained heavy casualties: 192 killed in action, 730 wounded, and one prisoner of war. The loss of their comrades weighed heavily on those who survived.
**BRAIN DAMAGE**

In his work on the effects of combat on veterans, psychiatrist Larry Dewey discussed the effects of losing comrades in battle. He noted that psychiatrists looking at the 8th Air Force in World War II showed that 95 percent of the men who had completed their missions between 1942-43 exhibited the same symptoms as those men who were treated for acute PTSD. When looking at possible triggers for the onset of PTSD, Dewey observed that the death of a friend or family member often caused pain “too much like that previous horrible pain of losing beloved comrades in battle.”

When the men of the 10th lost their beloved comrades during their first combat action, they suffered psychological damage, affecting their future functionality. Dewey observed this first-hand with his patient Ed who had fought in Italy with the 10th Mountain Division. Nevertheless, at that point in the war, there was no alternative for the men but to keep fighting.

A deeper look into Ed’s combat experience reveals the sort of psychological trauma that often results due to PTSD. As a highly trained scout sniper in the 10th Mountain Division, Ed would go ahead of his regiment and perform reconnaissance missions. On one of these missions, he came upon an American soldier who had been disemboweled and left for dead. The injured soldier pleaded with Ed to kill him out of mercy. Ed placed his hand over the suffering soldier’s nose and mouth until he died. Sometime later, Ed was captured by two German soldiers and taken back to a woodshed behind enemy lines. In fear for his life and convinced that he was about to be tortured by the two men, Ed saw an opportunity when one of the soldiers left to attend to something else. Alone with the other soldier, Ed spied an ax, seized it, and before the German could defend himself, drove the ax into the head of his captor. When the second soldier returned, Ed attacked him with the ax in a gruesome fight that left Ed traumatized. Horrific events like those in Ed’s combat experience were widespread in the 10th Mountain Division’s campaign to capture Italy and win the war in Europe. Although physically capable of fighting in the war in Europe, Ed was injured psychologically and suffered from his injuries for the next forty years.

**A COSTLY CAMPAIGN**

The 10th Mountain Division pressed on with its mission. The German Army had set up its defense in the Italian Apennine Mountains to protect the strategically important Po River Valley. In defending this valley, the Third Reich was attempting to preserve the ability to keep its soldiers fed. Presumably the sooner the 10th Mountain Division could take that valley, the sooner the war could end. General Hays knew that keeping the Germans off balance with a continued drive into the mountains was the only way to keep the casualties in his Division tolerably low; therefore, he requested permission to keep his men advancing against the Germans. The General Staff denied his requests until the rest of the 5th Army could catch up and move into position, forming a continuous line of attack with the 10th Mountain Division. To Hays’ dismay, it took more than a month for the rest of the 5th Army to form up on the line and continue the attack. This delay provided the Wehrmacht the time it needed to move the 334th Infantry Division into a well-fortified position, complete with artillery support and the 94th Division in reserve. Surprise had been lost, for the Germans knew precisely where the 10th Mountain Division would attack. Nevertheless, Hays began the attack at 0945 (9:45 A.M.) the morning of April 14, 1945, with a feint to the north to keep the enemy soldiers off balance and prevent them from launching a counterattack into his
Division’s flank. Despite the 10th Mountaineers’ best efforts, the entrenched German troops had the advantage. There was nothing the men of the 10th Mountain Division could do but press on into the melee and force the Germans out of their defenses. It took seven days of some of the war’s hardest fighting to drive the Germans out of the Apennines. It cost the 10th Mountain Division 1,500 casualties.

Outpacing the rest of the Allied forces in Italy, Hays’ mountain troops wasted no time in confronting the enemy where they could be found. Hurrying through the northern Apennines toward Lake Garda, Hays determined that the 10th Mountain Division would press the fight before the enemy had time to reorganize their position. When the Division reached the Po River, instead of waiting for the 5th Army Engineers to construct a bridge to cross it, the American general sent his men over in small boats before the Germans could position troops to oppose them. Not only did the 10th Mountaineers cross the river without heavy casualties, but they also forced the surrender of over 500 German soldiers.

In another engagement, the 10th Mountain Division was pinned down in a series of tunnels that went through the mountains around Lake Garda. Instead of sending his Division over the mountains, Hays ordered his artillery to be loaded with white phosphorous and fired on the German positions, so that his men could keep the attack moving. Hays and the 10th Mountain Division aided the 5th Army in the long hard slog of the Italian campaign, never once relinquishing the territory that they had captured.

The price of that success was extraordinarily high, with approximately a third of the Division taken in casualties and the remainder of the men physically and mentally fatigued.

Another War Awaits

When Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, the men of the 10th Mountain Division, like the rest of the Allied forces, were unfit to begin the process of war anew in the East Asia-Pacific region. One of the few scholars to write on that subject is Paul Fussell, who was a second lieutenant in a rifle platoon on the front lines. In an article combining his first-hand account of the war with a historical argument, Fussell explained that he was physically fatigued to the point where he would collapse when he jumped out of the back of a truck. The injuries to his back and knees were severe enough to have him adjudged disabled upon his return stateside yet not severe enough to preclude him from combat in the invasion of Japan. Fussell claimed that he and his entire 45th Infantry Division were in no condition to invade Japan as they had been repeatedly decimated, requiring three reconstitutions of the Division due to the number of casualties it had sustained. The American soldiers necessary for the invasion of Japan were fatigued and exhausted physically and mentally following the intense combat with the highly
trained German Army. Nevertheless, as these soldiers were not required for the occupation of Germany following Berlin’s surrender, they were ordered to prepare for the invasion of Japan.50

Some might reason that the men of the 10th Mountain Division were among the freshest, most extensively trained, and best qualified soldiers to invade the Japanese archipelago of any Division in the Army. They might argue that because the 10th Mountain Division was one of the last Divisions to enter the European Theater, its men had not had the chance to fully utilize their skills and training.51 While the Army had invested significant resources into the 10th Mountain Division, it had also suffered enormously high casualties. In fact, rather than reinforcing an argument that the 10th Mountain Division could have realized its potential with the proposed invasion, it suggests the opposite. If the 10th Mountain Division is used as a benchmark from which to judge the condition of the U.S. Army, those who argue that invasion was a preferable alternative to end the war are faced with a daunting reality. In reviewing the exhaustion of the 10th Mountain Division’s men coupled with the considerable Division level casualties of 5,146 out of approximately 15,000, the situation becomes clear. If the 10th Mountain Division was one of the best that the United States could field for the invasion of Japan, the prospects for the rest of the Army would have been dismal indeed.

With the end of hostilities on the continent, the Allied command divided the soldiers into two groups: those who would occupy Germany and those who would invade Japan. For the 10th Mountain Division, the invasion of the Japanese home islands was the next mission, and they left Europe posthaste. The Japanese had defended key locations in the Marianas Islands, such as Saipan and Tinian, practically to the last man, and this had a significant impact on the expectations of American military planners and soldiers alike.52 The military planners adjusted their casualty projections into the millions based upon the ratios of American to Japanese casualties. The latest figures from the Islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa placed the casualty ratio between 1:1.25 and 1:2 American to Japanese casualties,
respectively. At that rate, not including civilian resistance, the total 6,465,435 Japanese armed forces personnel who surrendered at the end of the war would have exacted an estimated average, from these ratios, of 4,200,000 Allied casualties. The soldiers’ knowledge of the casualty figures from Japan’s historically unparalleled fighting explains why many did not expect to survive the next phase of the war. Among the most costly battles were those for Saipan and Tinian in June and July, 1944, and in the U.S. Sixth Army’s invasion and recovery of the Japanese occupied Philippines in battles in Leyte, Lingayen, Mindoro, Manila, and Bataan from October 1944 into February 1945. But it was the Battle of Iwo Jima fought in February and March of 1945, and the Battle of Okinawa which began April 1 and ended on June 22, 1945, that were the two that lingered uppermost in the minds of the soldiers and military planners, alike.

World War II was half over in the minds of many of the Americans who had fought in North Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic, still the most difficult, horrific, and deadly fighting yet would come. With millions of armed Japanese soldiers and tens of millions of partially armed Japanese civilians preparing to defend Japan, the estimates of American casualties had climbed unacceptably high. The Japanese Imperial Armed Forces still had pilots and planes ready for combat. Furthermore, the Japanese had ordered the execution of all enemy prisoners of war. Those numbers had not been figured into the casualty estimates by American war planners, nor was the resulting psychological anxiety of the American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines upon learning of the reality of the invasion. From the perspective of the exhausted 10th Mountain Division as an expeditionary force, there was little hope of living in facing an army of Japanese dug into their home defenses, willing to fight to the last man, and ruthless in their treatment of prisoners. For the 10th Mountain Division, whose assignment was the first wave of the invasion, called Operation Downfall, casualty estimates predicted that it could be a lost Division.

Japanese military planners at the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) had begun redirecting military resources for the invasion of Japan after the Allied breach of the Marianas Islands and the loss of Saipan. The IGHQ had its own well-planned deadly counter-operation Ketsugō (“Decisive Operation”), the core of which was to kill as many Americans as possible. The IGHQ considered that the critical American weakness was the inability to sustain extremely high casualties. Thus, its intent was to break the will of the American people to sustain such high casualties so that the war could end with a negotiated settlement that did not lead to a foreign occupation. Contrary to what some historians have described as a defeated enemy, the Japanese had conserved 12,740 aircraft, 18,600 pilots, and 1,156,000 barrels of aviation fuel for the coming American invasion. Beginning with the first part of Operation Downfall called Operation Olympic, the Allied invasion force planned landings on the island of Kyushu to establish a beachhead from which to conduct operations. What Allied planners had failed to grasp was that their hopes of eliminating the remaining Imperial Japanese Army Air Force on the ground had become a near impossibility due to the kamikaze platform it had adopted, which required no airfields for return landings. Japanese strategists had secreted aircraft throughout the countryside and decentralized the fuel supply to ensure operational capability. War Department reports with their highest casualty estimates calculated that to defeat the Empire of Japan, Allied troops would have to kill somewhere between 5 and 10 million Japanese; whereas the IGHQ considered the number would far exceed such calculations and could reach 20 million Japanese lives lost in the defense of the Japanese archipelago. Both Japanese soldiers and civilian citizens had long prepared for the defense of the Empire of Japan and for most, surrender had never been an option.
The U.S. Army was in the process of moving forces from Europe to the Pacific in what promised to be the largest invasion force ever assembled.59 Before an armada of ships could be assembled to deliver that gargantuan army, another plan, which had begun years earlier, matured.60 President Roosevelt had invested two billion dollars of research and development into an atomic weapons program ahead of Germany and Japan. The Manhattan Project produced two functional atomic bombs by late July 1945, and when President Truman learned what his late predecessor had achieved, he wasted no time in giving the Japanese government an ultimatum. When the government of the Empire of Japan refused to surrender, Truman ordered the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Since that fatal moment of August 6, 1945, at 8:15 A.M. plus 17 seconds, historians scrutinized the leadership of Truman, who made it a point to take responsibility, immortalizing the phrase, “The buck stops here.”61 Perhaps Truman’s insistence upon taking responsibility is the reason historians have rarely looked at this event and the end of the war with Japan from the soldiers’ viewpoint.

CONCLUSION

Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were ordered to refit for the invasion of Japan before they received news of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. As the B-29 bomber, Enola Gay, dropped the first atomic bomb, the men of the 10th Mountain Division were at sea, and they left a record of the decision they would have made if it had been up to them. Captain Albert Jackman, one of the men responsible for preparing the 10th Mountain Division for the invasion of Japan, said, “There are many people who feel that it was a crime and a mistake to drop those bombs, but I don’t know of anybody in the 10th Mountain Division who felt that it wasn’t the thing to do.”62 Many men believed they had barely survived the Second World War in North Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic only to be faced with increasing odds that they would not survive it in East Asia and the West Pacific. Thus, when they heard the news that the bombs had been dropped, some shouted for joy and some reflected soberly on the sacrifice they would no longer be compelled to make.63 The men of the 10th Mountain Division experienced deliverance because there would be no need for Operation “Olympic” or Operation “Cornet,” the second part of Operation Downfall, which anticipated a planned massive invasion force of the island of Honshu. There would be no need to execute Operation Downfall and its colossal invasion plans of Imperial Japan along with all the ensuing combat, fighting, suffering, killing, and death it would entail.

Instead of the debate continuing to focus on why high-level American leadership made the decision to drop the atomic bombs, a consideration of and focus on the evidence of the soldiers’ mental and physical fatigue is relevant and consequential. It is the missing voice that is needed. The 10th Mountain Division and many of the war-weary veterans of the European Theater could agree with Captain Jackman that dropping the atomic bomb “was the only answer.”64
On April 14, 1984, the underground venue Kennedy’s Warehouse at 2389 North Broadway in Denver hosted its last show with an all-local bill featuring Peace Core, Acid Ranch, Legion of Doom, and Immoral Attitude. This show marked the end of an era. At first it seemed no different than any other of Kennedy’s shows, but it was the end of yet another short-lived punk venue in Denver. After securing only yearly leases from Van Schaack Realty, even though a five-year lease was sought, Nancy Kennedy’s venue was closing. Tom “Headbanger,” who exclusively booked shows at the venue, recalled the situation, “It’s almost as if they had a plan to lease it out to someone else the whole time.” At night’s end, fights broke out and punks at the show began to tear down the building. This maelstrom of punk angst displayed the energy that the Denver hardcore scene possessed. It functioned as a metaphor for how the scene would be a revolving door.¹

Kennedy’s Warehouse was a short-lived locale ran and financed by Nancy Kennedy with shows booked exclusively by Tom Headbanger. Its one year of operation was not easy going. From the start the venue faced financial issues and converting an old auto body shop into a functioning locale was not cheap. Expenses to keep the place heated, safe, and working prevented it from opening until the winter of 1983. Few patrons wanted to go to shows during the winter, so the venue quickly faced problems.² Operating as an all-ages venue and unable to draw a crowd during the week, Kennedy’s Warehouse eventually closed.³ This was not the only place to fall victim to an early departure as Denver’s hardcore punk scene continued to find it difficult to secure its footing during the 1980s.
Denver’s hardcore punk scene experienced its ups and downs much like any other in the nation. Although it found itself in a city that takes pride in its local arts and music, the hardcore punk scene and the underground at large were not generally accepted by city residents. Nonetheless, the Mile High City experienced a flourishing subculture that drew influence from around the country but struggled to create its own identity. Denver’s underground scene celebrated a DIY ethic manifest in a number of ways, including the production of fanzines, self-released albums, and non-traditional shows.

Various factors account for a thriving punk scene. Scenes owed their existence to the DIY ethic that played a constitutive role in resource mobilization and other organizational aspects of a social movement. Politics was a part of punk. From 1983 through 1984 scenes across the United States hosted a Rock Against Reagan festival in an effort to prevent his reelection. While Denver did have its own thriving DIY scene and political ideology it was not enough to hold the scene together. This reveals an interesting difference between other successful hardcore scenes such as in New York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., and that of Denver. Each of these urban scenes applied the DIY ethos to further their own scene and give it significance. This included record labels like L.A.’s SST Records, D.C.’s Dischord Records, and venues like New York’s CBGB. These entities gave hardcore punk bands the ability to record and spread the culture and fostered the overall popularity of hardcore. Not having a prominent venue or label, however, stunted the growth of hardcore in Denver.

Denver shared similarities with other major cities in its presence of violence. Steven Blush, Dewar MacLeod, and Johnathan Williams have found that violence was part of hardcore scenes. Violence created an uneasy perception of hardcore as outsiders perceived punks as “criminal, vicious, and dangerous.” This perception rippled through the country, including in Denver, as violence tended to follow aggressive music.

As Denver is a city that celebrates local music, presumably hardcore could break out of its niche. This niche thrived but operated as a revolving door as many became jaded to punk. While the hardcore scene of the 1980s had its own marginal version of success, it did not realize its potential as a sustainable scene. To understand this in some detail, this article considers Denver’s location, unsustainability, and violence, and how they all impacted the hardcore scene that did not achieve its potential in the 1980s decade.

THE NEW SCENE

By the end of the 1970s, punk rock was already established in Denver, but something new was coming down the pipe. Hardcore punk is considered the more aggressive form of punk rock that “extended, mimicked, or reacted to Punk; it appropriated some aspects yet discarded others. It reaffirmed Punk attitude and rejected New Wave . . . for extreme kids.” Both musicians and historians alike consider the California band Middle Class’s 1978 single “Out Of Vogue” the first hardcore release. In Denver, Tom Headbanger was key to introducing this fresh new style of punk rock. The name “Headbanger” was one that he gave himself, being inspired by the Motörhead fan club name. His nickname came prior to metal fans being known as head bangers to the public. Though he aspired to be a metal promoter, Headbanger found it hard to book metal bands cheaply, as he could not afford large production costs and bands needed financial guarantees. Having heard the Dead Kennedys’ 1981 single, “Nazi Punks Fuck Off,” Headbanger decided that punk was “heavier than metal, the culture was scrappier, and bands, conveniently, were willing to play for free or dirt cheap, because so few venues were booking them.” With this being the case, the city’s hardcore punks were ready for their introduction to Denver’s music scene.
While there had been a pre-existing punk scene in Denver during the late 1970s, hardcore was new, different, exciting, and wild. Older punks were in their twenties or thirties and the scene was more alcohol-centric. But what made the introduction of hardcore thrilling was the driving force of youth in the scene. Many young people (mostly teenagers) in the hardcore scene were disillusioned suburban kids who were attracted to punk through a number of avenues such as friends and co-workers, hearing classic punk bands like the Ramones, or visiting record stores like Wax Trax. They helped hardcore grab hold in Denver and got kids into it. That said the change from classic punk to hardcore did not happen suddenly. Bands like Rok Tots helped bridge the gap between older style punk and the newfound hardcore scene as they were a part of both eras. Rok Tots worked in both scenes, being older figures, while bringing the edge that hardcore required in Denver.

Rok Tots was the bridge, but local promoters like Tom Headbanger and Jill Razer, and allies like Nancy Kennedy, the scene’s beloved “den mother” of sorts (she was one of the few parents who would let hardcore kids stay at her house), also helped establish hardcore in Denver. Kennedy started Kennedy’s Warehouse as a place for her son Tom (guitarist of Child Abuse) and other young people to play music. Duane Davis was another essential ally to the scene, as he is the owner of Wax Trax and ran Local Anesthetic. These individuals, along with bands such as Frantix, became some of Denver’s prominent figures of the era. They were further aided by the adoption of a DIY mindset.

Denver’s DIY ethos helped the underground get its footing. An essential aspect of the scene was self-published fanzines. Fanzines were essential for many scenes in the late twentieth century, as many worldwide enjoyed them. Nationally, zines were essential for spreading news, politics, art, poetry, where to find group gatherings, etc. Headbanger made two short-lived fanzines: Rocky Mountain Fuse and My Degeneration. Fuse was a play on the Rocky Mountain News which Headbanger had been fired from. Both of these fanzines covered local bands, shows, and also did reviews. There were other zines in Denver such as Local Anesthetic (also a record label) that covered much of the same content. In Denver, zines could either be traded or bought through the mail or at stores like Wax Trax in Capitol Hill. Zines also allowed scenesters to be more tapped into which local bands to support and shows that were taking place. These shows happened in warehouses, basements, football field gates, the Capitol lawn, and junkyards.

The junkyard shows were some of Headbanger’s most memorable. In 1985, Headbanger could not find a venue for German quintet Einstürzende Neubauten (“Collapsing New Buildings”), so he hosted it in a junkyard. The band was notorious for their use of junk in their performances and Headbanger thought that the junkyard, while an odd place, would work as the perfect venue for the group. He designed tickets from animal bones that he spray-painted black. He produced and sold 100 tickets for the event. There were not many shows held at the junkyard, but they did express that the DIY spirit was alive and well in Denver.

Another interesting show was 1984’s Music for Action. Music for Action was Denver’s version of Rock Against Reagan, and featured bands such as Reagans Youth (New York), Peace Core, and Acid Ranch. Music for Action was intended to be a Rock Against Reagan concert, but the promoters did not trust the Rock Against Reagan team and suspected that they would not arrive on time, so the name was changed. The Rock Against Reagan team was in fact late to the show that day. Overall, what these types of shows displayed was the energetic drive of the underground, and the DIY ethos celebrated by local scenesters.
With the introduction of hardcore came the classic punk rock look. This style included mohawks, leather jackets, ripped pants, etc. In the beginning of the hardcore scene, if two people did not know each other yet looked similar, they were more likely to become friends. Interestingly, Headbanger thought that since Coloradans value the outdoors so much, they would sport a different uniform of flannels and hiking boots, not the stereotypical punk look. Headbanger thought this would be the case with Denver’s geographic location, but the influence from outside scenes dictated the style that Denver punks displayed. Adopting this proposed “uniform” might have helped in making it less easy to separate the punks from the non-punks and avoid ostracism by those outside the scene. That said, the adopted uniform from outside scenes helped establish a sense of community and oneness that allowed Denver punks to connect. Unlike with dress, isolation and geography shaped the Denver scene by impacting how booking agents booked shows and bands planned tours.

THE ISLAND EFFECT

Denver’s location created a sense of isolation for its music scene. Denver is often called an island or, as John Menchaca states, it’s an “area of nothingness that isn’t quite the West or the Midwest, and most certainly isn’t either of the coasts.” To some, the term “island” is meant in an endearing manner as they love the isolation, while others like Headbanger think this created a more difficult situation for sustaining the scene. Geographical distance made it difficult to bring bands in initially. It was even more of an issue for Denver bands that wanted to tour as it was anywhere from eight to twelve hours away by car from the nearest major market. This made it difficult for bands trying to tour. By only offering one major city in the region, many touring acts would skip Denver entirely, opting instead to move closer to the California market. Bands did not want to stop in Denver because they knew that they would make less money playing in a smaller market. Dead Kennedys on the other hand, would frequently play in Denver. Jello Biafra (lead singer of Dead Kennedys) who was born in Boulder, Colorado, recognized the importance of playing in the Mile High City. However, many touring bands that played in the city typically did so on weekdays, which caused frustration for fans. Playing during the week in Denver meant that these bands could go to Texas or California and make more money in a larger scene. This did not necessarily mean that all bands skipped Denver, as many popular hardcore and punk bands like Black Flag, The Clash, and The Ramones did play shows put on by Feyline, a professional artist.
management and concert promotions company. Smaller promoters like Headbanger still got larger bands such as Misfits, Suicidal Tendencies, and Discharge to play their shows but getting people to come was not necessarily easy.

Pulling in bigger bands from other scenes was rewarding for smaller promoters like Headbanger. These shows were important because bringing in larger bands would typically draw a larger crowd and help pay for future shows that he would lose money on. Unfortunately, due to competition with other promoters who were not necessarily promoting for a living or were friends with an out-of-town band, promoters like Headbanger would not make money themselves. However, having connections to other scenes was beneficial. For some promoters, like Bob Rob Medina, they would call bands through ads posted in magazines, and express why they wanted the bands to come to Denver. Soon, other promoters came in from outside of Denver trying to bank on the new bustling scene. These outside promoters received the sobriquet “carpetbaggers” by Headbanger. An example of a “carpetbagger” group was Front Range Assault that relocated from San Francisco to move in on the local scene. Unfortunately for them, they did not find much success in Denver and stopped trying to promote shows after only one year. This displayed the difficulty of booking shows at the time. Luckily over time, such hard work by local promoters was not necessary to draw bands to the scene. Though that change had occurred, there were still issues that plagued Denver’s scene.

UNSUSTAINABILITY
Bands from other cities began to come to Denver but the issue of retaining spots for them to play was another matter. Many venues in the city were not welcoming of hardcore and would not host the shows. This left promoters in a predicament. They would go on to opt to have bands play in non-traditional locales like the aforementioned warehouses, basements, and other miscellaneous spaces. For the legitimate venues, it was not necessarily easy to operate either. If they were willing to host the shows, there were often concerns of hosting all-ages events. An abundance of young scenesters created a problem as they could not be in bars. Some venues were 3.2 bars, which allowed eighteen-year-old teenagers to come into the bars and drink lower grade beer. Actual all-ages shows did happen at these venues, but Headbanger stated that underage people were required to be “physically separated and there had to be a licensed police officer on site to enforce the separation,” which made hosting these shows harder.

Venues that did not operate as bars were more accessible for underage kids to attend but found it harder to turn a profit. Lack of profit and of a large market proved difficult for these venues.

One place that struggled in Denver was Kennedy’s Warehouse. Kennedy’s was an all-ages venue that operated for a brief one-year stint from 1983-1984. It suffered a similar fate as others in Denver, as many venues were unable to keep their doors open for long. Kennedy’s Warehouse opened initially as a space for Nancy Kennedy’s son and other local kids to have their own space to play music, but Kennedy’s faced issues from the word go. The city shut down the venue before it even opened, stating that they needed an occupancy license. This would not be the last issue; the building itself had to be brought up to code. Codes that needed to be met included covering brick walls with 7/8” sheetrock, covering all steel beams with drywall to avoid collapse, adequate plumbing, and eliminating the building’s space heater. Because of all of these issues, the venue did not open for six months. By the time Kennedy’s Warehouse opened, it was winter. Nancy had to rent propane heaters to heat the place, which added another cost.
Along with this, pipes would burst, and bands would not tour through as often. When the doors finally opened, it was hard to attract people to come to shows because it was too cold out. Once open, Kennedy’s had frequent shows, but it was hard to get kids to go because, according to Headbanger, “they didn’t want to go every fucking night.” Without getting people to go regularly, the price of operation was too costly. By the end, their leasing agent would not allow them to renew their lease and they closed their doors after their final show on April 14, 1984 (See Figure 2). The show featured all locals and ended in attendees tearing the place apart. Booking and promoting continued to be difficult in Denver after Kennedy’s Warehouse closed. It and other entities of Denver hardcore were affected similarly.

Bands, venues, and record labels that were widely celebrated and supported in Denver’s underground did not last long due to either a lack of agenda or planning. Many bands, for example, did not have a sense of direction when becoming a band other than wanting to play shows. This attitude mirrors the punk rock ethos of being anti-commercial and anti-mainstream, and by not wanting to achieve stardom. This ideology was not exclusive to Denver, as Ian MacKaye of Minor Threat and Dischord Records stated, “Our appearance was so offensive to people that it made us realize how disgusting the mainstream was, and we were glad to be outside of it.” Some Denver punks practiced being anti-mainstream through their dress, as many would wear mismatched thrift store clothes along with the punk uniform, as was the case with the band Anti-Scrunti Faction (ASF) from Boulder.

While punk is inherently anti-commercial, anti-mainstream, and anti-establishment, other limitations played a major role in the scene’s lack of growth. There were a few small, locally run record labels in Denver, but none stayed in operation long enough to support the local scene. During the 1980s there was Local Anesthetic, a label operated by Duane Davis. Local Anesthetic was short lived, releasing local albums from 1981 to 1985. These included releases from Bum Kon, Your Funeral, and Frantix, whose 1983 EP “My Dad’s a Fuckin’ Alcoholic” was an essential release of the scene due to its impact on and representation of Denver Hardcore punk (it has since been repressed by Jello Biafra’s record label Alternative Tentacles). Headbanger speculated that Local Anesthetic and others failed because they did not release a local compilation of all the local hardcore bands.

Figure 2: “Last Show!! Peace Core, Acid Ranch, Legion of Doom, Immoral Attitude.” Featuring epitaphs of aspects of the scene that many disliked, including Nazis, positive punks, posers, and rock stars. This flier would also function as Kennedy’s epitaph as this would be the final show held there. Also, the flier states that people should boycott the St. Louis band White Pride’s upcoming show on May 5, 1984 at Packinghouse. Flier by Tom Headbanger. Credit: Trashistruth.com (1984 Fliers).
Donut Crew Records of Boulder later released three “Colorado Krew” compilations, which represented the local bands of the scene from 1988-1990. Bands and labels alike found it difficult to get their records pressed to vinyl. Such difficulties were experienced by Your Funeral, whose 1982 “Evil Music” was rejected by a vinyl pressing plant in Wyoming for being too “disturbing.” \(^{36}\) Many bands like the Lepers, Happy World, and Dead Silence self-released their records, but none of them were picked up by labels or recognized outside of Denver. \(^{37}\) There were no long running labels in Denver that supported hardcore, and there was no money running through the punk scene to support a label or the hardcore artists. Most bands were not fortunate enough to record their songs. They could not afford the price of studio time given the lack of cheap recording studios in the city and were unable to release music. As a result, several bands are remembered through the flyers they are printed on and the memories of surviving scenesters. This lack of funds made it hard for musicians to not only support themselves as artists, but to preserve their legacy as Denver hardcore bands. Lack of a financial backing in the hardcore scene created long-lasting issues, but other major conflicts would drive punks away from the Denver scene.

**VIOLENCE AND INTERNAL CONFLICT**

Generally, hardcore punk harbored a more aggressive following due to the nature of the music. The Mile High City was no exception. While not unique to Denver, hardcore violence is typically associated with Punk or other aggressive music. Much of this violence is displayed at concerts. Slam dancing (a form of dancing where crowd members deliberately collide into each other) became popular and was prominent in the scene. This was not necessarily well liked, as some did not welcome getting slammed into really hard while slam dancing. This was not their only worry, as many began to take it past the point of slam dancing and began intentionally harming other people at the shows. There are members of the 1980s scene who have said that violence played a large part in their falling out with punk, and it is why they stopped participating. \(^{38}\)

Interestingly though, according to Headbanger, they did not actually do anything to stop the violence. These members of the scene were called...
“Positive Punks.” They were concentrated in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Denver. At shows, Headbanger passed out questionnaires that asked what peoples’ “gig gripes” were with the scene. Of the forty individuals that responded to the survey, half of them stated that they wished that there could be something done about the violence at shows. This came as no surprise to Headbanger, as he had previously stated, “don’t complain about the scene; change it.” In a separate article, he opined that if the twenty people who were complaining about the five people causing problems actually did something about what they were complaining about, they would see results. With Denver’s scene being modest, it was harder for members of the scene to control violence at shows (especially when nobody stepped in to stop it) whereas other cities such as D.C. were successful in doing so. If more had stepped in to actively stop violence in Denver, fewer members of the scene would have left, and there could have been more substantial growth that was similar to other major cities. This idea was easier said than done in Denver.

Denver’s underground lacked policing. This meant that individuals were not stepping up to protect others from being injured at shows. Occasionally, however, there would be police officers at the shows. Unlike other scenes though, Denver’s punks did not experience a large amount of police violence or brutality. Police shut down events or venues at times, such as when they closed down the GAGA Club in 1983. In most cases, the police did not intervene with the scene. Headbanger recalled that he could not “remember a time where a cop beat anybody up for being punk in Denver. The only time someone got beat up was if they gave cops an attitude.”

Denver’s relationship with cops varied from other scenes like Los Angeles, where police would frequently break up shows and beat up attendees for simply being there. Henry Rollins, lead singer of Black Flag, said that police would, “put guns in your face” and that Los Angeles punks were “scared of cops.” Doing this and the police’s tendency to “practice riot control” were common examples of extreme force that were carried out in Los Angeles in 1981. This violence would continue in the Los Angeles scene well into the mid-1980s. In Denver, hardcore punks’ less antagonistic relationship with police would continue.

Venues at bars periodically used Denver police officers for security. This typically happened because some places required a police officer for the show to go on or to separate young kids from the drinking area at an all-ages bar show. Promoters both then and now agree that nobody in their right mind would use a cop if it were up to them. The police were also used to stop people from doing drugs. Typically, cops were more confused by slam dancing, but did not see it necessary to harm any of the concertgoers for having a good time (see Figure 4).

Outside sources contributed to issues within the scene but were not the biggest source of violence. While punks were bothered for their appearance and were attacked or called derogatory names such as “faggots,” people bothering them were not a part of the scene. Name-calling and harassment was common for Boulder punks (especially women), as fraternity members at the University of Colorado were often the most troublesome. These external factors were not the worst violence or harassment that Denver punks faced. Many scenesters claimed that fellow punks were the primary source of violence at shows.
One group in particular that went to shows with the intention of harming people was the skinheads or “skins.” The skinhead movement originated in England during the 1960s. It was sparked by social alienation and strived for solidarity for members of the working class. Though originally apolitical; the movement attracted those who were extreme nationalists, far-right violent racists and neo-Nazis. In many scenes, including

Figure 4: Punks Dancing at Kennedy’s Warehouse. Photo one displays the inside with graffiti covered walls and pad covered pillars. Photo two shows punks dancing to the band ASF.
Credit: Duane Davis.
Denver, there was not an abundance of skins at first. That would change as national zines began covering skins. There came skinhead resurgence by the mid-1980s where many punks emulating what they read or saw, became skins themselves, and caused violence in the scene. Skins in Denver were not just coming to shows to single out people of color or other minority groups. Some scene members, like Nate Butler, felt that it was especially difficult to be openly homosexual in the scene. It became even more difficult upon the skins’ arrival. Denver skinheads were well known for coming to shows to mess things up for everyone else and to harm people. Skinheads behaved like this in other cities, such as New York; as Harley Flanagan observes that skins were, “less about fashion and ‘dancing’ and more about street fighting and just being hooligans.” Although Headbanger and many others were friends with skins in the scene, he took issue with them because they were, “hurting people that were in the same community as them and people that they identified with.” That said, skins were not the only instigators of conflict in the scene.

Cliqués also presented issues in Denver. These cliques or “factions” were typically represented by which part of town the scenesters were from, or what high school they went to. Prior to the factions dictating relationships in the scene, many bonded because they were hardcore punk rockers. Other rifts existed in the scene. The band Anti-Scrunti Faction (ASF) was an all-female punk band from Boulder that typically bullied the “non-punk” girls or “Scrunti” of the scene. These “Scrunti” were typically girls that dated members of a band and would only participate in the scene as long as they were dating that member. Headbanger also stated that some were just as afraid of them as they were the skins. To others like Dean/Don Lipke and the Kenosha Punks, the “Scrunti” were described as “good looking and accessible.” Other types of bullying occurred in the scene for those that did not look a certain way or were new members to the scene. These people were typically labeled as posers, but they would eventually be accepted into the scene if they stuck around long enough. Being in the scene long enough gave members the right to label other newcomers as posers. This continued as many people left and new kids joined the underground.

Many left the scene due to violence, and so too would Headbanger. While at one of his shows on November 15, 1984 at Packinghouse, he tried to break up a fight and was beaten up so badly that he booked shows less frequently and eventually stopped while other promoters like, Jill Razer, went on to be one of the more prominent promoters in the scene. Headbanger’s exit from the scene was a common occurrence as many others would eventually move on from punk. Some of his pursuits after his punk rock tenure included touring with Psychic TV, starting Denver’s chapter of Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth (TOPY), and eventually moving out of Colorado.
CONCLUSION

While the 1980s scene was an exciting and dynamic time filled with pulsating energy, Denver’s hardcore punk scene would not make or leave as large of an impact as it did in other major cities during the 1980s. Due to Denver’s location, unsustainability, internal strife, and violence, the hardcore scene was never truly able to reach its full potential as a thriving and successful scene in the Mile High City. Denver was an unsuitable host for the growing hardcore scene compared to D.C., New York City, and Los Angeles. That said, a foundation for future generations remained to learn from so as to not repeat the mistakes that happened in the 1980s. Hardcore and punk operated as a revolving door giving outlet and expression to be angry about something. And, undeniably there will always be a young and excited audience that wants to keep the exhilarating energy alive and flowing.

As the antithesis to over-produced mainstream rock bands of the late 1960s, the 1970s, and 1980s, as well as rock bands known for their complicated musical techniques and cerebral compositions, hardcore punk took its hold as underground culture and music. The hardcore punk movement sprouted a network of local bands in Denver and across the United States. Raw, minimalist, spontaneous, expressive, and aggressive, hardcore was more accessible to teens as it was basic and relatable and seemed as though anyone could pick up an instrument and form a band. Harmonically minimal, hardcore punk was fast, loud, and hard. It was rock that displayed an aggressive attitude. Hardcore was its own thing. It gave expression to alienated youth. The 1980s provided the catalyst for the fury and dissent of hardcore. It was a decade marked by rapid change that was reflected by growing unrest and teen angst. Youth wanted to see change in their environment through the musical equivalent of a punch in the face.

As for Headbanger, he and many others have moved on from Denver’s hardcore scene, which still lives through other entities. Wax Trax continues to sell records to fans eager to discover new music. Labels like Donut Crew Records are now defunct, but others such as Convulse Records offer a collection of Denver bands. Adam Croft started Convulse to preserve the history of Denver’s hardcore scene by supporting bands such as Goon, Faim, and Product Lust. There are now many functioning DIY spaces for hardcore to continue to thrive, namely Seventh Circle Music Collective. When hosting shows, both Croft and Aaron Saye, the founder of Seventh Circle Music Collective, claim that the scene now polices itself much better than the 1980s hardcore scene had. With these road guards in place, hardcore punk in the Mile High City lives on.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PARADES?

The Masonic and Templar Presence in the West, 1880-1960

By Crystal Huntley

A four-year-old boy named Walter Cary Wilcox was already without a father. He sat next to his mother as she lay dying from yellow fever. An epidemic that had taken over New Orleans in 1878 had killed approximately 500 people in twenty days.¹ After she died, a gold watch with a Masonic symbol was found among her possessions and was given to the boy as a keepsake. Little did he know then that the same gold watch was his golden ticket. It helped move him across the country to California and even saved his life. The Masons, a well-known male fraternity that predates the American Revolution, had a network of lodges established across the United States that aided the boy on his journey.² The Grand Masonic Lodge of New Orleans was notified of Walter and his watch. It then alerted various lodges west of the Mississippi River. The Masons helped the child travel by train with a tag around his neck. The tag contained all the needed information and all expenses paid for his journey. He arrived at his grandmother’s in Oakland by late October.

Crystal was born in Kearney, Nebraska. She has lived in Colorado since she was very young. She is a recent CU Denver graduate with a Bachelor’s degree in History and a minor in Nonprofit Management. She plans to become a grant writer for a nonprofit organization that focuses on historical preservation. She would like to thank Dr. Greg Whitesides and Dr. Rebecca Hunt for their excellence in teaching and inspiration as well as Dr. Cameron Blevins for his encouragement and assistance with this paper. Crystal enjoys reading and researching historical times and topics especially ancient history, the American Revolution, and politics. Crystal has been published in the Colorado Encyclopedia for her work on Albina Washburn (1837-1921), an advocate for women’s suffrage. Crystal found a striking photo of one of the Templar statues illuminated during the 1913 Denver conclave in the digital archives of the Denver Public Library. This photo captured a moment in history that she was unaware of. She has had an abiding interest in the Masons and Templars, and knowing the photo had been taken in Denver inspired her to learn more about local history and its connection to the Freemasons. Crystal is a proud mother of a five-year old daughter and a loving wife to her high school sweetheart.
Walter became known as “The Mason’s Boy” after he arrived in California. The Grand Masonic Lodge of F. & A. M. (Free and Accepted Masons) helped care for him with stipends and looked after him when he was ill.3 Nathan Spaulding, the General Treasurer of the Lodge, adopted Walter after the boy’s grandmother died in 1888. The attention he received ensured that he grew up educated, had a steady career, and rise in the community. Wilcox himself became a Masonic member of the Oakland Lodge No. 188. He acknowledged the Masonic influence in his life when he said, “My only hope of reciprocating this matchless kindness is by living up to the standard of the teachings of the Order, and by doing unto others as you have done unto me.”4

MASONIC EXPANSION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
The watch helped unlock a world of privilege and influence provided by fraternities such as the Freemasons and Knights Templar. Masons and Templars are similar in structure. They focus on civic and moral duties but vary on their religious practices depending on if they follow Catholic or Protestant doctrines, or simply believe in a higher power.5 Presently, they are generally considered kindred. Often members of one are members of the other depending on the organizations within each state.6

Revolutionaries such as George Washington (Fredericksburg Masonic Lodge #4), Benjamin Franklin (Grand Lodge of Maryland), and Paul Revere (Grand Lodge of Massachusetts) are only a few of the Freemasons of the early United States.7 What is less well known is the strong presence of Freemasons in the western part of the country. As pioneers shifted westward in their quest for gold and silver, and land, Masonic and Templar lodges created a network along the way to help guide, protect, and provide for other Masons on their journey. The westward expansion by Masons and Templars boosted membership, which in turn also increased their presence and prestige.

These fraternities displayed their spirit in huge gatherings referred to as conclaves, which included extravagant parades down largely decorated city streets annually or triennially. These elaborate celebrations featured prominent members in their finest attire, swords, and all, marching with precision, displaying their pride and success. Alas, these resplendent displays simply became memories of the good old days. Membership numbers for Masons and Templars have been declining rapidly from the 1960s, which calls on scholarship to determine why.8 The focus of this paper is centered on the grandeur of the conclaves that took place in major western cities near the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. It also considers some of the possibilities for the decline in Masonic and Templar membership and influence in more recent times.

Masonic and Templar fraternities produce social capital. Robert Putnam elaborates on the concept, defining it as “trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.”9 Masons and Templars created networks that people could rely on for help. A notable example of this is when an earthquake shook San Francisco in 1906, the Masonic and Templar commanderies across the nation...
created a relief network that donated funds for the city’s recovery. A commandery from Pennsylvania alone donated $5,585.75; as a network they donated $48,331.38 in all. The more social capital the Masons and Templars created, the larger their influence flourished. Roger Burt explains that the influence of the Freemasons and Templars “have been regarded as providing some of the most powerful and influential networking systems … they have been shown to be capable of bridging the filial, religious, political, and social structures on which other networks were commonly based, and to have been highly influential in the promotion of civic engagement and the formation of social capital.”

As the network of trusted individuals arrived in California, they began to set up headquarters known as lodges. Masonic lodges were established in mining towns as early as 1850, including a grand lodge that was ensconced in Sacramento that same year. Masonic pioneers who crossed the mountainous terrain of Montana also formed lodges in mining camps. The first group of people to set up assistance networks in Virginia City was the Masons, who established a lodge there in 1866. By 1900, fifteen lodges had spread across the state and thrived in cities such as Butte.

**CONCLAVES IN THE WEST**

At the turn of the twentieth century, prominent Western cities bid against one another to host fraternal celebrations called conclaves in hopes of outdoing each other. Many accounts highlight the excitement expressed by those who witnessed these events in cities like San Francisco, Denver, and Seattle. The governing grand lodges and local commanderies from all over the nation made a pilgrimage to celebrate their brethren in ceremonial arms and to acknowledge their success. *The Los Angeles Herald* proclaimed that the “pageant of Knights Templars at San Francisco will be the most brilliant thing of the kind ever chronicled on the Pacific Coast.”

The article continues that Templars from the East as well as from Oregon will be in attendance and that it will be “the largest, most intelligent, most impressive and most influential body of men ever welcomed at one time within the confines of the State.” San Francisco hosted a six-day conclave in August of 1883. It was the first city west of Chicago to hold the event.

The city had predicted that “almost half the population of the Coast will pour into the Golden Gate” area over the course of the celebration. This was also the first conclave...
where the Grand Commandery of North Carolina was in attendance. This demonstrated the continued growth and the establishment of Masonic fraternities across the nation as well as just how far some Masons were willing to travel. The hosting cities of these conclaves looked forward to the revenue that they provided considering the number of visitors who needed food and lodging.

With the presence of numerous members and spectators, many wanted to know the nature of the event. The parade and its decorations were considered to be the highlight of the conclave. Members were dressed in honor attire displaying colors and well-earned medals. Some men walked the parade route, and some rode on horseback. A Masonic newspaper in Portland, Maine claimed that 5000 Templars joined in the parade, and the drill competition “showed nothing but good feeling.” Trophies that were elaborately decorated with precious metals, stones, and figurines were awarded for best drill performance. First place for the San Francisco 1883 Conclave went to a family from Louisville.

Outside of the parade several speeches were given to recognize the accomplishments of the different appointed governing lodges in each state, also known as Grand Lodges or Grand Commanderies. There were also a number of private balls and banquets over the course of the multi-day event. Internal business matters, such as elections and the review or changes to policies and procedures also took place during these conclaves. During the 1883 San Francisco conclave, Grand Master Benjamin Dean accredited the full “Ritual of Malta,” which refers to a solemn rite practiced by the Order of Malta, a much older Knights Templar order. This ritual had been debated in previous years at other conclaves because of its ambiguous origins and its possible derivation from a different ancient order. San Francisco won the bid to host the Triennial conclaves three more times, the last one being in 1949. This kept the event routinely in the West over the next several decades.

Denver hosted the next Western triennial conclave in 1892. The Herald Democrat claimed that 100,000 people were expected to turn out for the event. A Knights Templar commandery from Pennsylvania (No. 36) made the pilgrimage to Denver and also published a book about its members’ journey. Clifford Allen recorded the journey beginning with the day the train left for Denver on July 15, 1892. He mentioned that the trip would be longer since they were going to arrive on the Pacific coast first to sightsee and later arrive in Denver. He also described the hustle and bustle of the anxious Knights and their wives as they converged at Broad Street Station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to await their departure.

Allen’s book provides a unique perspective on the reception of the Masonic wives during conclaves. The conclaves primarily focused on the fraternal Masonic members and their representation of themselves and their lodge, but it appears the wives were also treated respectfully even though women could not join at this time. Allen noted shortly after boarding the train that a bouquet of corsages had been brought on board and one was to be given to each lady making the journey. Allen stated that this “lent a brighter complexion to the
He observed the stops that occurred each day and mentioned the Knights who boarded the train. Allen also documented the need to change the clocks back as they progressed west.28

When Allen arrived in Denver, he noticed that the city was crowded. The train he was on stopped fifteen miles short because all of the tracks were packed.29 Allen’s commandery stayed in a residence across from the “pointed end of the Brown Palace.”30 The parade took place on August 9, 1892. Allen described how proud he was to see the banners of his commandery and how they displayed “liberal expressions of admiration.”31 He stated that the parade took about two hours, but later in the evening the Knights and their wives danced in the streets to the music played by the same bands that had performed in the parade that morning.32 Denver had put on quite the display for its guests. Allen described the “grand” arches hanging over the streets as well as the “illumination of the city, by means of colored incandescent globes and the electric light was one of the greatest sites that has been witnessed on this continent.”33 This was a remarkable comparison and high compliment to Denver since it was still such a young city in 1892. Moreover, it was compared favorably to other elaborate conclaves of the East Coast.

Though the conclave in Denver only lasted for three days, the Templars still conducted regular business. One order of business was that the “holding of commandery meetings” should not occur on Sunday since it went against their own “civil laws.”34 Given that the Templars are primarily a religious fraternal order, and that some Masonic orders have spiritual ties, it was surprising that this decision had not been made earlier. Allen mentioned how impressed the Templars were with the
“Mile High City” given that it only had a population of 150,000; yet Denver managed to accommodate an extra 100,000. He stated that, “The feeding, lodging, and entertainment of the multitude were apparently perfect.” Allen’s detailed account of his journey and the conclave provides scholars and readers with insights into what happened and explains why the event mattered.

Railroad companies were keen to take advantage of the successful Denver conclave by providing souvenir booklets to the visiting Templars. The books contained popular scenic destinations in Colorado that the Templars should not miss on their journey or when they decided to return. Sites like the Holy Cross and Garden of the Gods are mentioned in detail with pictures. Allen made note of seeing the Garden of the Gods on his way to Denver.

Denver again hosted the Triennial Conclave in 1913 which was larger than the one before. According to The Telluride Journal, there were at least 25,000 to 30,000 Templars in the city which drew a crowd of at least 175,000 people. All of the city’s hotels had been booked, leaving thousands of people to stay on train cars. The City and County of Denver had built a grandstand that seated 30,000 for people to view the parade. The stand filled completely. Denver also had spent $50,000 on decorations and lights that included lighting for a grand Templar statue on horseback. Fifty-four bands accompanied the Knights in the
parade.\textsuperscript{38} The \textit{Telluride Journal} claimed there were over 275,000 Knights Templars across the country at the time of the conclave and that membership was increasing. However, only so many from each lodge or commandery could attend. By 1923, just two years prior to the Triennial conclave in Seattle, the Iowa Grand Commandery claimed there were 2.7 million Masonic members.\textsuperscript{39}

Seattle hosted the next triennial conclave of the West in 1925. \textit{Masonic News} indicated that the Knights Templars planned on spending $200,000 for the event.\textsuperscript{40} \textit{The Seattle Times} reviewed the events of the conclave, stating that the city had hosted 30,000 marching Knights Templars that summer and delivered another spectacular parade.\textsuperscript{41} Along the parade route were banners, wreaths, and 700 torch globes. Seattle similarly welcomed the Templars with a magnificent arch ninety-five feet tall with a large illuminated cross on top.\textsuperscript{42} The architects, Henry H. Hodgson and Herbert Blogg, also constructed a faux castle that was used as the Masonic headquarters during the conclave.

According to the Seattle Land Preservation Board, the temporary structure was made to look incomplete yet contained ramps and drawbridges, giving it a medieval appearance that connected the Templars

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to their origins. Much like the previous conclaves, unique items and souvenirs were available during this event. A spoon made of silver and enamel had a unique design that combined the Templars’ imagery with iconic symbols of Seattle such as Chief Seattle and a nod to the timber industry there at the time.

**DECLINE FROM GRACE**

Following the Seattle conclave, many of the hosting cities were located on the East Coast or in the Midwest, with exception of San Francisco and Denver. The popularity of the conclaves was reflected in the increasing membership numbers of the Masons across the country in the 1930s through the early 1950s. Men continued to be allured by the secrets and formalities of Masonic Orders. Apart from enjoying the social camaraderie of the lodges, they obtained insurance benefits that were not yet provided by the government. By the 1950s there were just over 4,000,000 Freemasons. Unfortunately, over the course of approximately fifty years their numbers fell to only a million. Some 50,000 Freemason memberships are lost every year. At that rate they will soon be at their lowest numbers since the Civil War. One would think that with the increasing American population after World War II that membership would be on the rise; however, forty years after the Seattle conclave, numbers had already begun to drop below the four million mark. After WWII, some men returning home from the war joined fraternal societies to make connections for work and also bond with other veterans to retain feelings of brotherhood. This brotherhood provided many with a sense of purpose in their communities. But change was coming. By the 1950s these veterans found good jobs. They switched their focus to family life, homes, large yards, domestic chores, and leisure time on the crabgrass frontier. Perhaps too as membership that was predominately White plateaued prior to the onset of the Civil Rights movement, minorities likely felt excluded. In the present-day, Masonic and Templar fraternities continue to be saddled with a deleterious reputation of being less accepting, thereby making exclusion itself a possibility for fraternal order decline.

The secretive past of Masonic fraternities has invited much speculation. Presumably such attention would attract interest, yet memberships continue to decline. Conspiracy theories have not attracted potential new Freemasons. Perhaps because rituals and practices that were once safeguarded have entered the spotlight this has caused some of the allure to be lost. The result of which is fewer wanting to join.

An additional possibility for their decline could be age and the lack of time or interest among younger generations. Freemason numbers are declining because the average age of members is older, and when older Masons are gone, there are not many recruits to replace them. The lack of recruits can be explained by the technological advancement of television and other media, where people tend to
focus their time rather than joining fraternal organizations. As time passes, younger generations spend more time, often in solitude, staring at screens and communicating virtually rather than interacting in person. The Masons rely on personal interaction to recruit and retain members. They also rely on membership dues to pay for their activities and to promote their organization. A downturn in members means less funds and a diminution of activities and presence. Fundamentally, the waning of fraternal organizations is related to the overall decline of other forms of associational life, including religious congregations, sports clubs, and volunteer societies.

Some scholars believe that fraternal organizations such as the Masons and Templars are démodé and simply have not adapted to a changing world. Their networks and their volunteer actions have not evolved to the modern trends. J. C. Herbert Emery contends that “decline was a product of the inability of fraternal orders to compete with the development of alternative venues and opportunities for socializing and recreation in American society.” Simply put, the world passed by these Masonic fraternities once needs and interests began to be met by other types of organizations, activities, interests, attitudes, lifestyles, and socializing.

That Masonic fraternities have not adapted to changing social trends contributes to the inability to raise funds for conclaves or parades. The fraternities may be less funded, yet some prominent people of contemporary times are members, such as John Hershey, Buzz Aldrin, and John Elway. Lack of gender inclusivity could play a role in membership decline. Women were the heart of volunteerism decades ago, but as women entered the work force, they had less time for volunteer groups. This affected male only fraternities since the wives created their own sororities to run jointly with the Masonic ones. Moreover, in the 1950s the number of married women entering the labor force increased. A recently suggested reason for Masonic membership decline is that the decrease in numbers itself is not being addressed as a concern by Masonic or Templar fraternities. By not doing enough to change course they seem to be accepting a diminished stature.

Fraternal orders once had the numbers to stage sizeable conclaves with gatherings that awed cities. They planned elaborate parades and expressed great pride in their lodges, orders, and fraternities. Individuals like Walter Wilcox, who experienced their assistance and influence firsthand, went on to join a Masonic fraternity to not only express his gratitude, but to do his part for the community and the future of fraternities. Triennial conclaves from long ago made the Masons and Templars look like royalty, and they were treated as such in the early conclaves of the West. In more recent years, conclaves take place in small hotel banquet rooms where fewer members participate in them. Newspapers, regardless of whether they are in the East or West, hardly mention the conclaves. Cities no longer welcome Masons and Templars with hoopla and elaborately decorated arches or illuminated statues acting as welcoming guardians to greet them. Banners and symbolic ornaments do not hang on light posts anymore. The parades with distinctive visual images and rousing sounds of thousands of men marching in unison with clanking swords, displaying colors and medals of gallantry and honor are no more than echoes of the past.
In 2019, the *New York Times* published the 1619 Project. The project aimed to place slavery and Black experiences at the center of American history, and included the controversial claim that “colonists decided to declare their independence from Britain . . . because they wanted to protect the institution of slavery.” This decision, according to the project’s contributing author Nikole Hannah-Jones, was “conveniently left out of our founding mythology.”¹ For many Americans, the 1619 Project was their first exposure to a narrative about the nation’s founding that identified the preservation of slavery as a cause of the American Revolution. Critics of the 1619 Project, including politicians and pundits, argued that the 1619 Project was an attempt to cancel the founding fathers. Historians, such as Sean Wilentz, James McPherson, Gordon Wood, Victoria Bynum, and James Oakes, flatly rejected the claims of the 1619 Project, particularly the claim that colonists who became Americans fought in the American Revolution to preserve slavery.²

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Matthew is a graduate student at the University of Colorado Denver. His major concentration is the History of the North American West, and his minor theme is race. He teaches History and Geography at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Early College in Denver Public Schools, and has been an educator for the past nine years. This article was initially written in 2017, and has been updated to reflect changes in the national discourse surrounding the 1619 Project, race, and the American Revolution. Matthew’s interest in this topic developed after he read *The Counter-Revolution of 1776* by Gerald Horne, and wondered what other historians had written about the role of race, slavery, and slave resistance in the American Revolution. He would like to acknowledge Dr. Marjorie Levine-Clark for her masterful instruction.
While the feud over the 1619 Project has played out on the internet, on cable news, and in public conversations, historians researching the American Revolution and slavery have engaged in an evolving discourse about the relationship between the two subjects for some time. Historians ignored the influence of slavery in the Revolution for nearly two centuries. Beginning in the 1940s, and accelerating in the 1960s and 1970s, historians explored slaves’ agency, and the relationship of slaves to the causes and course of the American Revolution. Historians’ understanding of the relationship between the American Revolution and slavery has continued to evolve. In recent years they have been analyzing the causal relationship between slavery and the War for Independence.

Historians began exploring the relationship between slavery and the American Revolution nearly eighty years ago. They have developed the historiographical field in three major waves which occurred in the 1940s, the 1960s through the 1980s, and from 1991 to the present. A common trend in the scholarship is that enslaved people were not passive—they were historical actors who reacted to the context they lived in and acted as they could to
shape the world around them. This stance suggests Marxist thinking likely influenced the positions of historians of all three waves. The most significant change in how historians have written about slavery and the American Revolution is the extent to which they connected the actions of White patriots in 1776 to their fear of enslaved Black people. Historians’ interpretations of the relationship between slavery and the founding of the United States have evolved alongside changes in how Americans understand race and racism—from the Jim Crow Era to the modern day. Each wave of historians built upon the work of previous historians to arrive at positions that assign greater agency to enslaved people, and which ultimately cast the institution of slavery as a contributing factor to the causes of the American Revolution.

THE FIRST WAVE: BRING YOUR GUNS TO “WORSHIP THE PRINCE OF PEACE”

When Herbert Aptheker wrote *American Negro Slave Revolts*, published in 1943, he suggested that historians and the general public accepted the myth that enslaved people were content with a life of bondage. Aptheker established his purpose as trying to shed light on the extent to which the enslaved resisted their condition by acknowledging that “no thorough, documented study” of this facet of American slavery existed. Thus, he set out to provide such a study. Not only did no detailed study of this topic exist, historians instead adopted the narrative of social memory by portraying enslaved people as docile, and generally content in slavery. Aptheker stated that historians assumed that slaves’ dominant traits were “meekness or docility.” Historians of the early twentieth century promoted the same myths about enslaved people as enslavers had during the antebellum period. When one considers the context of 1943—Jim Crow laws and the persistence of sharecropping—it seems plausible that this version of social memory was accepted in order to support the social order that existed in the United States prior to the modern Civil Rights movement.

Aptheker challenged the assumptions of historians by establishing three key themes that historians in the second and third waves explored further. The first is slaves’ agency and resistance; the second is the reaction of white colonists to slave resistance; and the third is racial hierarchy. An anecdote from Aptheker’s work demonstrates his treatment of the first and second themes. He cites an eighteenth-century source that details how enslaved people had spread rumors that the newly appointed Colonial Governor in Virginia had been given orders by the king to free all enslaved Christians. The slaves planned an insurrection believing their enslavers had kept them in bondage against the new Governor’s orders. The authorities executed four slaves, and declared that because the insurrection was to occur during Sunday church services white men would carry guns when they “went to worship the Prince of Peace.” While previous historians viewed slave resistance as both rare and generally inconsequential, Aptheker provided numerous stories like the aforementioned that demonstrates that enslaved people did resist their condition: They listened to news and rumors, they kept abreast of political change, and they took action as they could to alter their condition. Not only were acts of resistance more frequent than previous historians had thought, but also they were more significant. In this instance, Aptheker demonstrates that slave resistance prompted a reaction from the colonists of Virginia—a decree, based on a fear of enslaved people, to carry guns to church. To suggest that slaves possessed agency and that their agency affected colonial society was a bold claim to make in 1943.
Elsewhere in his work Aptheker examined the origins of racial hierarchies in America, which he attributed to slavery—another bold claim at a time when many Americans attributed racial inequality to “survival of the fittest” or divine decree or happenstance. In order to maintain the system of slavery, Aptheker notes that the “slaveocracy” encouraged a belief in Black inferiority and instituted strict legal codes to control slaves. Later historians would further build upon Aptheker’s work, but he had established the viewpoint that colonial society’s elites developed a racial hierarchy and legal structures to control enslaved people. His evidence implies that White society felt a need to control the enslaved population because enslavers feared the agency of the people they enslaved. By suggesting that slave resistance was both common and significant, Aptheker’s examination of enslaved people’s resistance laid the foundation for later historians to examine the relationship between slave resistance and the American Revolution more explicitly.

THE SECOND WAVE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS INSPIRATION FOR RESISTANCE

Historians of the second wave built upon Aptheker’s work in examining slave resistance, reaction to resistance, and the construction of racial hierarchies. They also focused on two themes Aptheker was silent on. The first theme is the relationship between Blacks and the American Revolution. The second is a progress narrative that emphasized how the rhetoric of the Revolutionary period (1765-1789) provided the burgeoning anti-slavery movement in the colonies and the early years of the United States with the rhetoric to speak against slavery. Historians of the second wave continued along the controversial line of inquiry that Aptheker established, but also presented a more patriotic narrative than he had.

Slave resistance and agency remained a key theme in the work of second wave historians. In 1961, Benjamin Quarles discussed Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation of 1775, which offered freedom to slaves willing to serve the Royal British military. Quarles notes that many slaves in response took up the offer and acted as agents for their own liberation by seeking to join the British. Gerald Mullin, in his 1972 work, *Flight and Rebellion*, also examined Dunmore’s rationale behind the Proclamation. Mullin notes that in 1772, Dunmore reported to London that in the event of a war with Spain, the British should expect the Spaniards to attempt to turn enslaved people against their masters. The Spanish, Dunmore speculated, would find an eager audience among the enslaved population. In their examinations of Dunmore’s Proclamation, both Quarles and Mullin built upon the theme of enslaved peoples’ agency established by Aptheker—they viewed slaves as actively responding to the political climate in which they lived, and that their resistance even shaped British policy during the war in the form of Dunmore’s proclamation.

In his seminal 1968 work, *White Over Black*, Winthrop Jordan explored a similar phenomenon by investigating how white colonists responded to slave resistance. Much of Jordan’s contribution to the discourse centers on how he placed slave resistance in the context of the fear that it created amongst colonists. He described revolts by enslaved people as occurring with just enough frequency to remind society that they happened and that the next one was likely not far away. This persistent fear shaped the mentalité of the colonial and revolutionary periods. Jordan’s emphasis on
the angst that many white colonists lived with adds credence to later historians who asserted that a fear of enslaved people contributed to the causes of the Revolution, although Jordan did not make this claim himself.

Jordan further probed the mentalité of colonists by analyzing how they responded to enslaved people who had escaped with new slave codes intended to control slaves and white colonists themselves. Jordan states that, “Getting the slaves to work efficiently was the owner’s problem, but runaways affected the safety of everyone … and the very discipline upon which slavery rested.” In response to the threat of runaways, and other slave resistance, colonists developed slave codes—a fact acknowledged by Aptheker in 1943; yet Jordan interpreted the slave codes in a new light. “While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Negroes,” Jordan states, “a slight shift in perspective shows the codes in a different light…. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes were for the eyes and ears of slave owners…. It was the white man who was required to punish his runaways.”

This passage gives important insight into the mentalité of enslavers—the legal structure created to perpetuate the system of slavery not only created a hierarchy, it relied on white citizens acting to enforce that hierarchy. Jordan added nuance to the ways that historians thought about slave resistance by emphasizing the fact that the legal structure helped to cement a widespread fear of black people.

While historians of the second wave expanded upon Aptheker’s arguments about racial hierarchies, slave resistance, and responses of Whites to said resistance, they also explored different facets of the relationship between America’s founding and the institution of slavery. Quarles’ analysis of the relationship between slaves’ sense of agency and the American Revolution in his 1961 work, The Negro in the American Revolution, set the tone for other historians’ analyses in the second wave. He emphasized the rhetoric of the Revolution by noting that Thomas Jefferson’s language in the Declaration of Independence “held a great appeal for those who considered themselves oppressed.” Elsewhere he noted that Revolutionary ideals led to a decline in the importation of slaves and movements for emancipation. He concluded his work with a sentiment that is typical of historians’ writing at the time by stating that, “Ultimately the colored people of America benefited from the irreversible commitment of the new nation to the principles of liberty and equality.”

He echoed his own arguments in a 1983 essay entitled, “The American Revolution as a Black Declaration of Independence.” In this essay he argues that the rhetoric of the Revolution “inevitably appealed to a group such as the blacks,” and concludes stating that, “the Revolutionary War can be termed a black Declaration of Independence in the sense that it spurred black Americans to seek freedom and equality.” The crux of his argument is that slaves were inspired to resist their condition by a revolution that claimed liberty and equality as two of its core tenets. Mullin reiterated the points made by Quarles with his focus on what the revolutionary movement meant to the enslaved. In his analysis, Mullin suggested that the “assimilates” (slaves born in the colonies, rather than Africa) were better able to challenge “their masters’ … sense of security” than African born slaves. He suggested this was because the “assimilates” had a deeper understanding of colonial society and the American Revolution. Mullin, like Quarles, attributes the revolutionary spirit of 1776 with infecting and inspiring even the enslaved in a manner that led them to resist their oppression. Like Aptheker, Quarles and Mullin assigned agency to slaves. They contended, however, that the actions of their oppressors were ultimately the key factor in shaping their agency.

Jordan presented a rather different interpretation of the relationship between
revolutionary rhetoric and the eventual end of slavery, yet his analysis was still rooted in a patriotic narrative. He notes that in the buildup to and in the course of the Revolution, Quakers (Society of Friends) developed a strong anti-slavery movement that resulted in Pennsylvania’s gradual end of slavery. Elsewhere he asserted that the spirit of the Revolution influenced the national conscience to the point that even conservatives believed that slavery should be abolished and notes that during the Revolution “no one in the South stood up in public to endorse Negro slavery.” The work of later historians would demonstrate the absurdity of Jordan’s claim that the American Revolution created a uniform abolitionist spirit across the colonies. Furthermore, it is ironic that Jordan portrayed the same colonial Whites who created institutional racism as willing to allow the Revolution to challenge their support for slavery.

Duncan MacLeod’s 1974 work entitled, Slavery, Race and the American Revolution, arrived at an ambivalent conclusion regarding the relationship between the American Revolution and its importance for enslaved people. Concluding his work, he argues that the Revolution represented the “first great onslaught” against slavery, while also noting that for enslaved people the American Revolution denied them rights and led to the development of “positive racism.” When MacLeod used the term “positive racism,” he was describing a system of racial hierarchy and White privilege that benefited Whites at the expense of Blacks. MacLeod argued this point most clearly in his introduction while analyzing what Jordan wrote in White Over Black. MacLeod counters that Jordan downplayed the impact that the Revolution had in cementing slavery and racism in the United States. MacLeod argued that in order to justify the rhetoric of the Revolution while continuing the institution of slavery, Americans needed either to adopt an anti-slavery position or to develop a belief system that justified slavery. Whereas Jordan had extolled the virtue of slave owners who had ceased to publicly defend slavery during the Revolution, MacLeod argued that their silence was accompanied by a change in their mentalité. Slaveholders would now need to rely more firmly on racist justifications for the preservation of slavery. The primary difference between MacLeod and his contemporaries is that he recognized the regional character of the American Revolution and its relationship to slavery. The Revolution, according to MacLeod, resulted in two diverging perspectives on slavery that aligned closely with the regional dependence on it.

David Brion Davis served as a link between the trends that defined the second and third waves of this historiographical field in his 1983 essay, “American Slavery and the American Revolution.” Davis argued that the character of the Revolution may have accelerated the pace of abolition. Because the Revolution was based on a “wholly unprecedented ideology,” it enabled slaves to do more than simply resist their oppression. By arming them with the Revolution’s rhetoric, he suggests that the Revolution allowed slaves to challenge “the general principles justifying slavery.” Davis extended his argument that the Revolution possessed anti-slavery characteristics, which enabled the enslaved to eventually abolish the institution. However, he introduced into the historiography a consideration that slavery possibly continued for a longer duration than it did if Britain had retained control of the Atlantic seaboard of North America. By introducing this view, Davis served as a bridge between the historians of the second and third waves, which I distinguish by the radically different interpretation that historians writing after the 1980s would offer regarding slavery and the American Revolution.
THE THIRD WAVE: EXPANDING INTERPRETATIONS AND THE SLAVE REPUBLIC

Silvia Frey’s 1991 history titled, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age*, is the first work in this historiographical field to conclude that there was a direct link between the possibility of emancipation and the causes of the American Revolution. In her analysis of Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation, she examined sources that demonstrated how Virginians responded to the proclamation. She claimed that the Continental Congress itself declared that Dunmore’s Proclamation was an attack on civil society in Virginia and recommended that the colony form a new government.\(^29\) According to Frey, Dunmore’s decision to issue the Proclamation was heavily influenced by slave resistance which gave him grounds to believe that his offer would induce further slave opposition. Likewise, she suggested that the slave resistance that “both preceded and accompanied” Dunmore’s decision drove many colonists to become American revolutionaries.\(^30\) In her conclusion Frey noted that, “Neither British policy nor practice involved actual emancipation, but it raised the specter of emancipation and … became a critical variable in propelling white southerners toward independence.”\(^31\)

Frey pointed to the colonists’ reactions to Dunmore’s Proclamation, particularly those in the South, as proof that they were motivated to revolution by a fear of emancipation. More importantly, Frey argued that Dunmore’s Proclamation would not have been proclaimed without slave resistance that made the policy of granting freedom to runaway slaves a realistic option for Dunmore and the British. According to Frey, if the American colonists’ reaction to Dunmore’s proclamations were ripples in a pond, then slave resistance was the rock that created them. Frey contended, contrary to the perspectives of second wave historians, that enslaved people showed a propensity to act in their own interest without taking inspiration from the rhetoric of the American Revolution.

Betty Wood’s arguments in her 2005 work, *Slavery in Colonial America, 1619-1776*, marked a departure from the interpretation of second wave historians in two important ways. First, her work distinguishes the third wave historians from second wave historians who attributed a primarily anti-slavery spirit to the Revolution. In her chapter, “Resistance and Rebellion,” she concluded that slave resistance increased during the American Revolution in all of its forms, including running away and defiance, because slaves viewed the Revolution as “their best chance yet of securing their permanent freedom from bondage.”\(^32\) According to Wood, the chaos of the Revolution provided better opportunity for enslaved people to escape bondage than the political or rhetorical achievements of the American Revolution.

Second, Wood expanded upon MacLeod’s assertion that Americans’ attitudes toward slavery varied by region, to include the suggestion that regional dependence on slavery was the primary motive of many slaveholders to join the Revolution. In her chapter, “Critiques and Defenses of Slavery,” she acknowledges that even in Virginia where slavery was firmly entrenched, some degree of anti-slavery sentiment existed amongst some of the most politically influential men, including Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, and George Mason.\(^33\) In the southernmost colonies—Georgia and South Carolina—Wood argued that the moral ambiguity with which other colonists viewed slavery did not exist and that the political elite of Georgia and South Carolina made their support for the Revolution contingent upon their demands to preserve slavery.\(^34\) Wood suggested that the American Revolution was similar to the Civil War in that the slaveholding elite (at least in Georgia and South Carolina) committed to the war in order to retain the freedom to own people.
Beginning in the 1990s, historians had advanced an increasingly critical view of the American Revolution. Nevertheless, Alan Gilbert’s 2007 work, *Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence*, balanced the patriotic interpretations of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with the more critical ones advanced by Frey and Wood. Gilbert expanded upon the dominant narrative of the second wave of historians in this field with an analysis of two factors that gave the Revolutionary War an anti-slavery character: first, the writings of American patriots that argued for extending the blessings of liberty to the enslaved; second, George Washington’s decision to offer liberty to the enslaved in exchange for military service. He concluded his analysis asserting that “pragmatism conspired with principle to advance the causes of both independence and emancipation.” However, the dominant interpretation in Gilbert’s work corresponds more closely with that of Frey and Wood.

On the subject of slave revolts Gilbert quoted Jordan who stated that, “only the blind could be free from fear,” and he connected the fear that white colonists faced directly to the “unmistakable movement on the part of the British government toward the abolition of slavery.” Furthermore, Gilbert argues that two revolutions existed during the war between Britain and its former American colonies—the first was the Patriots’ Revolution and War for Independence, and the second was the slaves’ Revolution for Emancipation. The first was in part inspired by the second, according to Gilbert, who, in accordance with Wood, suggested that Dunmore’s Proclamation and the slave resistance associated with it had caused a shift in the loyalty of the once “Loyalist southern elite toward the Patriots.” Gilbert advanced the argument that the Revolution relied on the support of former colonists who joined it because of fear of enslaved people, their resistance, and the possibility that they would be liberated.

Gerald Horne arrived at conclusions that, among academic historians, align most closely with the critical perspectives put forth in the 1619 Project. Horne asserted in his 2014 work, *The Counter-Revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America*, that American independence was neither “inevitable” nor was it “a positive development for Africans … most particularly.” As a further challenge to patriotic narratives, Horne stated that historians need to reconsider the American “creation myth” which he suggested was actually the story of the world’s first “apartheid state.” By invoking the terms apartheid and counter-revolution, Horne argued that the American Revolution and its aftermath produced an explicitly racist society designed to protect the right of White Americans to profit from the labor and oppression of enslaved people.

Horne has argued that the slave trade and its proliferation following the Glorious Revolution in 1688 enabled enhanced economic growth and also expanded trade networks that made independence feasible. His explication took the arguments advanced by Frey, Wood, and Gilbert, which suggested that some Americans were motivated to rebel against Britain based on their views of slavery, and added to them the perspective that the economics of slavery formed the basis of the entire Revolution. Shifting from social and political history to economic history, Straughton Lynd and David Waldstreicher argued in 2011 that economic factors were the primary causes of the Revolution. Horne’s argument echoed their assertion that the expanded colonial economy made independence possible. Taken together, these two viewpoints suggest that not only have historians narrowly attributed too much influence to ideological political freedom as the driving force behind the Revolution, but also that political freedoms were desirable because they could lead to control of an economic system based on the enslavement of Black people.
Horne continued the discussion of racial identities that both Aptheker and Jordan had explored in their earlier works. He stated that “the settler population could be clinically diagnosed with an advanced state of paranoia. But, as the saying goes,” he continued, “paranoids can have real enemies too; and such was the case for mainland settlers confronted by rebellious Africans determined to overturn the system they had been dragooned to build.” In such a paranoid state, “the equivalence between African and slave and African and foe continued to build, a sobering development and not a predictor of racial harmony on the mainland.” Horne’s contention extended previous arguments about the development of racial identities by maintaining that racial hierarchy, and the fear of Black people, drove White American revolutionaries to declare independence. The theme of racial hierarchy has been present in the historiography since Aptheker’s work in 1943, and for third wave historians it presents a crucial outlook in examining how a fear of slaves may have motivated the American Revolution.

Since Quarles work in 1961, most historians discussed both Dunmore’s Proclamation and the Somerset decision in their work. Somerset (1772) was a court case in England which declared that ‘on English soil, no man was a slave.” In his analysis of Somerset and Dunmore’s Proclamation, Horne argued that for colonists to take the drastic step of rebellion “against the Crown required a pervasively profound threat to the colonists’ status quo.” He further suggested that slaves seeking liberation perceived a far greater chance of gaining it by siding with the British in a potential conflict. Thus, there were Black Loyalists, many of them former slaves, who served in the British Army with dedication. Furthermore, Horne added that through the actions of slaves in “Manhattan 1712, Antigua 1736, Stono 1739, Manhattan 1741, Florida Maroons, Jamaican Maroons, and the countless other instances of resistance, slaves represented a threat to the colonial status quo.” Horne suggested that the American Revolution was an effort to protect colonists who had become Americans from slaves’ liberation or even its eventual possibility, let alone inevitability, funded with profits earned by exploiting enslaved laborers, with the purpose of continuing this system in perpetuity. In short, 1776 marked the beginning of a counter-revolution aimed at preserving the social and economic order, more than it marked the beginnings of democratic revolution. This argument is the latest in this stream of historical inquiry, but it would not be possible to make without the contributions of previous historians who had established the agency of slaves as actors for their own liberation and certainly as more than a footnote in the American Revolution.

CONCLUSION

The cultural context in which historians write has a significant impact on the arguments they made about the relationship between slavery and the American Revolution. Each generation of historians writing about this relationship has pushed society’s boundaries to allow for increasingly critical arguments about the Revolution and for arguments that are more inclusive of the role of Black people in the struggle for independence.

Aptheker openly acknowledged that he challenged the dominant mode of thinking concerning the status of slaves in his book. In 1943—during the era of Jim Crow laws in which some Americans born at the end of the Civil War and during Reconstruction were still alive and wielding power in America—the social memory which preached that slaves were docile and content in slavery was a powerful force in shaping Americans’ views of the institution. By writing a thoroughly researched history of slave rebellions...
in the buildup to the Revolution, Aptheker presented a challenge to the traditional beliefs that some Americans held and used in order to suppress Black peoples’ rights.

Historians’ work in the second wave would not have been possible without Aptheker’s research that opened the door for further inquiry into the relationship between the actions of slaves and the American Revolution. Historians of the second wave confined their arguments to suggesting that slave resistance in the American Revolution was a continuation of the spirit of liberty that originated with Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington. Considered in the context of the Civil Rights movement their interpretation affirms the political action that many Black Americans were taking at the time. In the spirit of liberty inspired by the American Revolution, Black people were claiming and using the rights guaranteed to them by said Revolution to advance the causes of liberty and equality. It seems fitting that in such a context, historians viewed slave resistance in the American Revolution through a similar lens.

Historians of the third wave writing since 1991, have advanced interpretations of the relationship between slavery and the American Revolution that would have been impossible a generation earlier. I argue that this is because of the nature of the Civil Rights movement in which the general trend was for Civil Rights groups and leaders to appeal to the shared history of Black and White Americans, in which the commonly accepted narrative of the Revolutionary experience was an inspiration for people desiring liberty and equality before the law. With the modern Civil Rights movement having simultaneously succeeded in granting increased political freedom for Black people, yet failing to produce a society in which opportunity existed equally for people of all races, the narrative of America’s benevolent founding came into question. Horne acknowledges this when he argues that continuing discrimination “stems in no small part from [enslaved Africans] consistent and staunch opposition to the capacious plans of slaveholding rebel … elites.” For Horne, the oppression that Black Americans face is not an example of hypocrisy that betrays America’s core Revolutionary values—it is an expression of those values, which historians need to interrogate and challenge in a modern, diverse society.

Rethinking the past is important for the functioning of a democratic society, and the historiographical field concerned with slavery and the American Revolution is steeped in a tradition of challenging conventional narratives. Aptheker challenged cultural perceptions of Black people in his work; second wave historians reconsidered the relationship between slaves and the Revolution; and the third wave historians have now reconsidered the nature of the entire Revolution. A national discourse on this historiography will not solve all the problems that historians examine, consider, present, and evaluate on this matter. Nevertheless, a critical discussion of the role that a fear of Black people and a desire to profit from their forced labor played in creating the United States could help shine a light on the lingering effects of racism in American democracy and society.
The public discourse concerning the relationship between the American Revolution and slavery has continued to evolve since the publication of the 1619 Project. Historian Sean Wilentz objected to the claims made by Hannah-Jones in the 1619 Project that on the eve of the Revolution British elites were beginning to turn toward abolition, and that the *Somerset* case and Dunmore’s Proclamation were evidence that they would soon end slavery in their North American Atlantic seaboard colonies. Yet in an article published in *The Atlantic*, Wilentz states that Dunmore’s Proclamation likely “stiffened the resolve for independence among … rebel patriots,” and that some Loyalists may have been motivated to switch sides. This acknowledgement suggests that Wilentz might be somewhat in agreement with historians like Horne and Gilbert and the authors of the 1619 Project, in that how Americans viewed the future of slavery was at least a factor in the Revolution. However, Wilentz maintains that the evidence provided by the 1619 Project does not support Hannah-Jones’ claim that, “one of the primary reasons the colonists decided to declare their independence from Britain was because they wanted to protect the institution of slavery.” The historiography regarding slavery and the American Revolution demonstrates that there is room for reasonable disagreement about the relationship between slavery and the American Revolution amongst academic historians.50

For far too long historians ignored the influence of slavery on the American Revolution. Such is no longer the case in recent historiography as slave resistance and racial identity during the War for Independence are significant matters historians consider. Some have done so now for more than half a century. By examining the relationship between slavery and the Revolutionary period, historians explored ways in which enslaved people demonstrated agency. There is increased focus on the interrelationships of slavery to the causes and course of the American War for Independence. Thus, in research in the historiographical fields of the American Revolution and Slavery, greater attention is now given to those enslaved people who became agents for their own liberation.
A Blueprint for Refugee Resettlement
The Eisenhower Administration and Hungarian Refugees, 1956-1957
Noah Allyn


13. Bon Tempo, 12.


15. Bon Tempo.

16. Bon Tempo, 16.


22. Martin A. Bursten, Escape From Fear (Syracuse University Press, 1958), 54.

23. Bursten.

24. Hing, 124.


26. Bon Tempo, 44.

27. Bon Tempo.

28. Bon Tempo, 64.

29. Bon Tempo.

30. Bon Tempo, 60.


32. Coriden, 88.

33. Coriden, 86-87.

34. Bursten, 56.

35. Bon Tempo, 70.

36. Bon Tempo.


38. Bon Tempo, 60.


40. Haines, 7.
41. Voorhees, 14.
42. Voorhees.
43. Haines, 16.
44. Bon Tempo, 74.
45. Bon Tempo.
55. Pastor, 199.
58. Bradford, 27.
59. Bursten, 166.
60. Pastor, 199.
61. Pastor.


**Back Channel Diplomacy**

United States - Pakistan Covert Relations During the Soviet - Afghan War

*John Elstad*

1. Personal recollections of author.


5. Hilali, 145.


8. Hilali, 118.


32. Kux, 289.

33. Kux., 268.


40. Kux.

42. Hilali.


44. Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, 310.


47. Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, 351.


50. Markey.

**Deliverance**

The Atomic Bomb and the 10th Mountain Division

*James Stark*


12. Walker.


14. Erickson, Audio, Part 1 - 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Digital Collections.


23. Now extinct, the town of Pando, Colorado was located along the banks of the Eagle River between Red Cliff and Leadville.

24. George F. Earle, “History of the 87th Mountain Infantry in Italy” (The Denver Public Library, 1945), 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Collections.
25. Feliu, *Soldiers of the Summit*. The “D” in the “D-Series” maneuvers stood for Division and meant that the entire Division took part in the exercises. The men participated in war games, ate, and slept out in the snow and frigid temperatures for six weeks. On one night alone, 100 men were evacuated with frostbite as temperatures dipped as low as 50 degrees below zero Fahrenheit.


29. Hunt, Audio, Part 2 - 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Digital Collections.


31. Wieprecht, Audio, Part 3 - 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Digital Collections; Erickson, Audio, Part 2 - 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Digital Collections.


35. Charles Wellborn, “History of the 86th Mountain Infantry in Italy” (1945), 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History Collection, 4.


40. Maurice Isserman, “Mountain Men: On Italy’s Peaks, the Newly Fielded Alpine Troops of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division Fought a Deadly Uphill Battle,” World War II 34, no. 5 (February 1, 2020): 32–42.


42. Dewey, 10.


44. David R. Brower, “Remount Blue: The Combat Story of the Third Battalion, 86th Mountain Infantry, 10th Mountain Division,” 1948, 35, 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History Collection.


46. Hays, 55.

47. Isserman, “Mountain Men.”

48. Welch, “The 10th Mountain Division Training from the Ground Up.” The official casualties for the 10th Mountain Division during the Italian campaign were 4,154 wounded and 992 killed out of approximately 15,000 men.


51. Sanders, The Boys of Winter, 117.

52. Giangreco, Hell to Pay, 162.


54. Giangreco, Hell to Pay,107.

55. Giangreco, 103.

56. Giangreco, 53.

57. Giangreco, 143–45.

58. Giangreco, 221.


64. Jackman, Audio, Part 1 - 10th Mountain Division Records - Denver Public Library Western History/Genealogy Digital Collections.

**Mile High Hardcore**

The Story of Denver’s Hardcore Punk Scene During the 1980s

*Daniel Harvey*

1. Tom “Headbanger”, Interview by Daniel Harvey, March 10, 2020, Interview 2.

2. Headbanger.

3. Headbanger.


9. Tom Headbanger, Interview by Daniel Harvey, April 29, 2020, Interview 5.


11. Tom Headbanger, Interview by Daniel Harvey, March 21, 2020, Interview 3.


16. Tom Headbanger, Interview 1, March 5, 2020.


18. Tom Headbanger, Interview by Daniel Harvey, March 5, 2020, Interview 1.


20. Tom Headbanger, Interview 1, March 5, 2020.


23. Tom Headbanger, Interview 1, March 5, 2020.


29. Tom Headbanger, Interview 1, March 5, 2020.


34. Medina, *Denvoid and the Cowtown Punks*, 112.

35. Tom Headbanger, Interview 4, April 5, 2020.


41. Tom Headbanger Hallewell, Declaration, 1982, file 36, box 1, Tom Hallewell Papers, The Denver Public Library’s Western History/Genealogy Department.


43. Tom Headbanger, Interview 2, March 10, 2020


46. Medina, *Denvoid and the Cowtown Punks*, 113 and 129.


50. Medina, *Denvoid and the Cowtown Punks*, 75


52. Tom Headbanger Interview 2, March 10, 2020.

53. Headbanger.


58. Aaron Saye, Interview, April 7, 2020.
What Happened to the Parades?
The Masonic and Templar Presence in the West, 1880-1960
Crystal Huntley


2. The Freemasons is a male fraternal organization that at least dates back to 1717 England. According to the Massachusetts Freemasonry website, the organization may have been started as far back as 1390 when stonemason guilds were established. Similar Masonic symbols have been found in those records. Masonic Service Association of North America, “History of Freemasonry,” Massachusetts Freemasonry, accessed October 25, 2020, https://massfreemasonry.org/what-is-freemasonry/history-of-freemasonry/


6. It is worth pointing out that Masons and Templars do have different histories. Masonic traditions stem from stonemasons as mentioned previously. Knights Templars were soldiers who protected people on their pilgrimage to the Holy Land during the Crusades. The Templars were disband by the Catholic Church in 1307. Lodges that exist today do not claim to have direct descendants of the original Templars, but many dress or practice as close as they can to the original order. Jennie Cohen, “History of the Knights Templar”, A&E Television Networks 2020, Updated on September 3, 2018. https://www.history.com/news/who-were-the-knights-templar-2.


18. Redmond, Triennial Conclave, 75.


22. The Triennial Token, “Meetings,” 204; Redmond, Triennial Conclave, 77.


25. “Knights Templar,” Herald Democrat, Leadville CO, August 2, 1892, https://www.coloradohistoricnewspapers.org/cgi-bin/colorado?a=d&d=THD18920802.2.9&e=-------en-20--l--img-txlN%7ctxCO%7ctxTA--------0-----


27. Allen, Pilgrimage, 4.


29. Allen, 177.

30. Allen.


32. Allen.


34. Redmond, Triennial Conclave, 81.

35. Allen, Pilgrimage, 181.


38. Telluride, “32nd Triennial, 1913; Allen, Pilgrimage, 177.


40. Masonic News, University of Michigan, 30.


# Agents for Their Own Liberation

*An Historiography of Slave Resistance, Racial Identity, and the American Revolution*

Matthew Taylor


5. John H. Arnold, *History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 85. Arnold discusses Marx’s influence on historians, and notes Marx’s sentiment that people are shaped by their context, and simultaneously shape their context. Historians of all three waves within the historiographical field in question include some perspective on how slaves were shaped by their context and how they also transformed the times in which they lived, which reveals Marxist influence on their interpretations of the past.


7. Aptheker, 16.


Oxford University Press, 1972). Each of the historians listed can be categorized as advancing a progress narrative regarding the relationship between slavery and the American Revolution.


17. Quarles, 42 and 50.

18. Quarles, 200.


20. Quarles, 301.


25. MacLeod, 8.


30. Frey, 80.

31. Frey, 326.

33. Wood, 81-82.

34. Wood, 85.


37. Gilbert, 5.

38. Gilbert, 257.


41. Horne, 4 and 20.

42. Horne, 62.


45. Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, 37; Mullin, *Flight and Rebellion*, 131; and MacLeod, *Slavery, Race and the American Revolution*, 122. Each of the three historians listed examined the Somerset case in their work, but to a very limited extent relative to Horne, who uses this case throughout his work and as one of his primary pieces of evidence to support his argument.


47. Horne, 229.


A Blueprint for Refugee Resettlement
The Eisenhower Administration and Hungarian Refugees, 1956-1957
Noah Allyn

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Back Channel Diplomacy
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John Elstad

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**Deliverance**

The Atomic Bomb and the 10th Mountain Division  
*James Stark*


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Crystal Huntley


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Agents for Their Own Liberation
An Historiography of Slave Resistance, Racial Identity, and the American Revolution
Matthew Taylor


Deliverance
Men of the 10th Mountain Division at Ease
Credit: 10th Mountain Division Resource Center, Denver Public Library

Men from 87-C Ready to Begin D-Series Winter Maneuvers
Credit: 10th Mountain Division Resource Center, Denver Public Library

Back Channel Diplomacy
Pakistan Air Force F-16 “Viper”
Credit: Almasdarnews TFI Post

Face-covered Militants Pose with RPG and AK-47
Credit: AP Photo/Allauddin Khan

Agents for Their Own Liberation
The Ex-Slaves and the Black Loyalists
Who Fought with the British
Credit: History.com Kurt Millet/Stocktrek Images/Alamy Photo

Jube Savage American Revolutionary
Painted by Gordon Carlisle
Credit: Concord Monitor.com

A Blueprint for Refugee Resettlement
Hungarians with Destroyed Statue of Joseph Stalin
Credit: ru.pinterest.com/jhnssk/hungary-1956

Time Man of the Year: The Hungarian Freedom Fighter

What Happened to the Parades?
Welcome Arch: Second Avenue Decked Out for a Last Hurrah at the Seattle Conclave 1925
Credit: Paul Dorpat, The Seattle Times

Welcome to Denver Display on 14th and Champa During Knights Templar 32nd Triennial Conclave August 12-15, 1913
Credit: George L. Beam Denver Public Library Special Collections.

Mile High Hardcore
Anti-Scrunti Faction (ASF) Performing at Kennedy’s Warehouse with Some Punks Slam Dancing
Credit: Duane Davis Wax Trax Facebook Page
https://www.facebook.com/Wax-Trax-Records-192564244298/photos/10158139650094299

Bad Circus Playing at Kennedy’s Warehouse
Credit: Duane Davis Wax Trax Facebook Page
https://www.facebook.com/Wax-Trax-Records-192564244298/photos/10158139362269299