

SUNDAY, JANUARY 4, 1920

**RED PLOT FOR REVOLT  
TO UPSET REPUBLIC IS  
NIPPED BY U. S. DRIV**

DENVER, COLO., SUNDAY, NOV. 9, 1919

**CHICAGO UNIONS DENOUNCE RED RAIDS;  
BOSSSES SEEN PLOTTING LABOR'S FALL**

ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, DENVER, COLORADO  
**THOUSANDS OF REDS BAGGED;  
S. THROWS OUT DRAG NETS**

Big Clean-Up of Undesirables  
Planned for Deportation; Ellis  
Ready Full of Prisoners.

# HISTORICAL STUDIES JOURNAL

Spring 2005 . Volume 22



University of Colorado at Denver  
and Health Sciences Center  
Downtown Denver

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Downtown Denver

University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center

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Front Cover:

Various headlines that were written in either the Rocky Mountain News or The Denver Post concerning the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920.

Credit: Daniel James Shosky.

Back Cover:

From left to right. League of Women Voters (top photograph), Rocky Mountain News (headline), New York World-Telegram and Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection located at the Library of Congress (atomic mushroom cloud), The Simon Weisenthal Center (Hitler Youth), Osage County Agritourism Council (map of Missouri).

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The editors dedicate this edition of the *UCDHSC Historical Studies Journal* to two outstanding professors, who are nationally noted as scholars and teachers and fondly and appreciatively remembered by their colleagues and students.



Credit: History Dept.,  
UCDHSC

**PROF. MARY SCHAEFFER CONROY**

Professor Conroy's distinguished career in mentoring students at the University of Colorado at Denver stretched from 1975 to 2005. After graduating from St. Mary's College with a B.A. in History & Humanities in 1959, she received a M.A. in 1962 and Ph.D. in 1964 in History with a certificate from the Institute of Russian & East European Studies at Indiana University. Her dissertation topic was *The Political Policies of P.A Stolypin, Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Russia, 1906-1911*. At the University of Colorado at Denver, she has taught popular courses in Russian History, Eastern Europe and Western Civilization. Dr. Conroy has been the faculty co-sponsor of the *UCDHSC Historical Studies Journal*, published annually since 1983.

Dr. Conroy is an internationally recognized expert on Modern Russia and on the Russian healthcare system and pharmaceutical industry. In frequent research trips to the Soviet Union and Europe, she has scoured archives, research libraries, and other sources of information in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Helsinki, and London. Dr. Conroy roughed it on the Trans-Siberia Railroad traveling from Moscow to Manchuria. She continues to be a popular lecturer for churches, many institutions of higher learning, and tour groups heading for Russia. Her books include *Petr Arkad'evich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Tsarist Russia; In Health and in Sickness: Pharmacy, Pharmacists* as well as *the Pharmaceutical Industry in Late Imperial and Early Soviet Russia*. Besides numerous articles and reviews, she will publish her newest book, *The Soviet Pharmaceutical Business During the First Two Decades* in 2005.

Prof. Conroy has lectured widely in Europe including Uppsala University in Sweden and various Moscow conferences with an upcoming talk at Bielefeld University in Germany in 2005.



Credit: Annie Donofrio

### **PROF. MARK STEWART FOSTER**

Fearless Foster walked into class dressed in a baseball uniform and carrying an 1870s bat. Unlike his most cherished team, the Chicago Cubs, and more like his alma mater, the University of Southern California where he received his M.A. in 1968 and Ph.D. in 1971, Dr. Mark S. Foster is going out on top. Professor Foster pried every piece of thought from his students to provoke a stimulating argument or structure a defense of an idea. He is retiring in 2005 after 33 years at the University of Colorado at Denver.

Dr. Foster has become well known nationally as a scholar of U.S. urban, planning, transportation, business and baseball history. His dissertation, *The Decentralization of Los Angeles During the 1920s*, concentrated on the beginning of urban sprawl in the City of the Angels. He has written three books on baseball: *The Denver Bears, From Sandlots to Sellouts*, *Home Run in the Rockies*, and *They Came to Play: A Photographic History of Baseball in Colorado*. He also authored biographies of major American business figures, *Henry J. Kaiser: Builder in the Modern American West*, *Castles in the Sand: The Life and of Times Carl G. Fisher* and *Henry M. Porter: Rocky Mountain Empire Builder*. Dr. Foster has appeared on radio shows, at conventions as a lecturer and on the History Channel.

Prof. Foster is best known for *From Streetcar to Super Highway: American City Planners and Urban Transportation, 1900-1940* and *A Nation on Wheels: The Automobile in American Culture Since 1945*. His next book, to be published in 2006, is *Citizen Quigg: Newton's Life of Service to His City, State and Nation*, about a prominent Denver Mayor and University of Colorado President.



## PREFACE

The articles in this journal are, in the opinion of the editorial staff, the most outstanding work available by undergraduate and graduate history students at the University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center. The editorial staff also believes the *2005 University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center Historical Studies Journal* represents the variety of historical work done at UCDHSC.

Stephen Wright's essay *Manhattan's Child: Children, The Bomb, and the Politics of Fear* reveals the attitudes of America's children towards nuclear war. The essay demonstrates the effects of propaganda and politics on children after World War II.

Heather Thorwald's paper, *In a League of Their Own: Women and Grassroots Democracy on the Suburban Frontier* examines how suburbanization has affected the League of Women Voters.

Linnie Boteler's article, *Controlling the Future: Manipulation of the Hitler Youth* begins with the Hitler Youth in the early 1930s and traces them through the war years. She follows children through the camps where they were taught NAZI ways.

David M. Seaman's paper *The Palmer Raids: When America Burned Red* details the tactics used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U. S. Attorney General's office during raids to detain and imprison thousands of suspected anarchists and Red sympathizers in 1919 and the early 1920s. Seaman describes how these raids undercut the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution and reminds us how the on-going concern with national security threatens individual rights. David has worked with our editors to refine and revise his paper via e-mail while living in Berlin and Prague.

Sister Phoebe Schwartze, a Benedictine nun, writes about her family's immigration to Westphalia, Missouri from Westphalia, Germany in the early 1800s in her essay, *German Identity in Westphalia, Missouri*. She looks at street signs, religious functions, and German language publications that reveal the ethnic origins of this very early German-American community.

Thanks to the professors of the Department of History at UCDHSC for encouraging their students to submit their best work to the *Journal*. My fellow student editors and I also appreciate the effort student authors took to make their work publishable examples of the fine research and writing done in our history department.

Daniel James Shosky  
*Editor*



**MANHATTAN'S CHILD:  
CHILDREN, THE BOMB, AND THE  
POLITICS OF FEAR**

by Stephen Wright

**RHETORIC OF THE FREEZE**

In 1982 Helen Caldicott, the caustic head of Physicians for Social Responsibility, told *Family Weekly* that a recent survey of children done in Boston indicated that “almost all believed they would ‘never grow up, never get jobs, never get married or have children of their own,’ because they would ‘be killed in a nuclear war.’”<sup>1</sup> It was a theme Caldicott returned to in her book, *Missile Envy*, published two years later. According to Caldicott “Some psychiatrists think that one of the main reasons our children are dropping out, becoming part of the ‘me now’ generation, and are indulging almost universally in drugs and alcohol, is because of this total sense of pessimism about the future.”<sup>2</sup> Caldicott was correct in her assertion that children worried about nuclear annihilation. The question for social scientists was how much they worried and how this concern influenced their lives.

Above: This poster depicting the possible evil effects of plutonium on the world and asks the ultimate question (ca. 1970). Credit: Yanker Poster Collection located at the Library of Congress.

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*Stephen Wright received his B.A. in History from Metropolitan State College of Denver in 2000. Stephen is currently enrolled as a Graduate Student in American History at the University of Colorado at Denver. This paper was written for an Independent Study course with Professor Pam Laird, PhD. The paper evolved from Stephen's interest in the impact of nuclear weapons on politics, psychology, policy, and culture since 1997.*



Between 1961 and the end of the Cold War a number of studies were conducted to answer this question. They ranged from the overtly rhetorical to the academically sublime. Political agendas constantly influenced the discussion. The ghost of McCarthyism deterred some scholars from exploring of the issue. Conversely, other authors viewed their data through the prism of antinuclear activism. The nuclear freeze movement made selective use of the surveys to create political capital. It was an unfortunate tactic because a reevaluation of the scientifically conducted studies done between 1960 and 1990 demonstrates a positive correlation between political efficacy, nuclear fear, and political engagement. This new perspective on the thoughts and reactions of the children who lived under the threat of nuclear war may give us some insight into the minds of children growing up in the world after September 11, 2001.

## THE DUCK AND COVER GENERATION

In 1945 America's Manhattan Project successfully detonated the first three atomic bombs. The first, the Trinity test shot in New Mexico, had a yield of nineteen kilotons equal to nineteen thousand tons of TNT. The second and third detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had comparable yields. The *New Republic's* TRB was not alone when he wrote, "In a short week man learned that he had at last found how to blow himself up."<sup>3</sup> He was also wrong. The weapon was terrible, but not apocalyptic.

In the fall of 1952 the United States detonated the first hydrogen bomb. It had a yield of ten megatons equal to ten million tons of TNT. TRB had been vindicated. The United States and the Soviet Union both rushed to perfect the new weapon. The constant testing created a significant amount of radioactive fallout. It raised the level of strontium-90 in grain and milk and ignited a huge controversy over what constituted safe levels of radioactive contamination. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 signaled the beginning of the missile age. And the United States and the Soviet Union edged closer to the brink of nuclear war during the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Children were immersed in the culture of nuclear weapons. They were constantly inundated with images of the nuclear threat in films like *Them* and *On The Beach*. Some school districts issued their children metallic dog tags to help identify their bodies if they were burned beyond recognition in a nuclear war, and they practiced duck and cover drills in the hope that the dog tags would not be needed.

In the summer of 1962 Sibylle Escalona, a professor of psychology at Albert Einstein University in New York conducted a groundbreaking pilot study of 311 children from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. The children were asked to "think about the world as it may be ten years from now?" Seventy percent expressed anxiety about the possibility of nuclear war. The children's individual responses were understandably concerned considering the time in which they lived in. One eleven year old predicted that people would live underground. A fourteen year old responded by saying that there would either be complete peace or total destruction. Escalona argued that the threat of nuclear war exerted "a corrosive and malignant influence upon important developmental processes in normal well functioning children."<sup>4</sup>

Escalona's work was first appeared in pamphlet form in 1962. It was augmented by a larger study done by Milton Schwebel, a psychologist and professor of education at New York University. After the Berlin Crisis in 1961, Schwebel surveyed 3,000 students in upstate New York, New York City, and suburban New York and Philadelphia. The following year he surveyed an additional 300 students during the first week of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The study group consisted of students from elementary school to college with, as Schwebel noted, "a heavy concentration of junior high school students." All were asked if they thought there would be a war and what they thought of fallout shelters, a topic that became something of a preoccupation during the Berlin crisis.<sup>5</sup>

During the Berlin Crisis only forty-eight percent of the students surveyed expected the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve a peaceful solution, and they expressed a great deal of anger toward the possible fate awaiting them. Looking back at the study in 1982 Schwebel wrote, "They expressed bitter resentment against what some young people called the old men who have lived and who control the government" and "against adults in general for putting them in this position."<sup>6</sup>

What surprised Schwebel was how the students responded during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In that week, sixty-nine percent of the study group believed the crisis would end in a peaceful resolution, and the majority opposed fallout shelters.<sup>7</sup> As the author noted in 1963, "Brighter students and those in the upper grades, who were probably better informed than the average or dull students or those in the lower grades, were more optimistic about peace."<sup>8</sup>

In 1965 Schwebel concluded that the answers he received during the Cuban Missile crisis suggested that "at least some of the students were responding to something other than the realities of survival."<sup>9</sup> In this he had the support of another mental health professional, Dr. Robert J. Lifton, a Yale psychiatrist.

While America's fear of the bomb obviously existed from the beginning of the atomic age very little serious academic attention focused on its manifestations. One of the exceptions was Lifton work. Initially, Lifton studied the victims and survivors of Hiroshima and found that when the bomb fell, "they were aware of people dying around them in horrible ways but that, within minutes or even seconds, they simply ceased to feel."<sup>10</sup> In the subsequent publication of his study, and numerous books and articles that followed, Lifton argued that the bomb's destructive capabilities were so immense that they disrupted the victims' belief in personal, biological, and cultural immortality. The result was "psychic numbing," the inability to confront emotionally, or intellectually accept the thought of nuclear war. As a result, most people living under the threat of nuclear war were unable to contemplate thinking about the issue, let alone take any kind of individual or group action to remove the danger.

Of course there was a paradox in Schwebel and Lifton's assertions. It was hard to understand how the test subjects could be bitter and numb all at the same time. But Schwebel's study and his comments have to be viewed in the context of the political reality of the time.

## NUCLEAR WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

On the surface it seems odd that so little attention was expended on children's fears about the bomb. Throughout the atomic age adults were constantly polled about the issue. Bernard M. Kramer, S. Michael Kalick, and Michael A. Milburn delved into the Roper Center For Public Opinion's archives and found that between 1945 and 1982 polling organizations had compiled 489 items on the issue.<sup>11</sup> Three Gallup polls conducted in 1961 are somewhat illustrative of the trend in adult thinking during the Cold War.

In June of 1961 the Gallup Organization asked respondents if they were "very worried, fairly worried, or not worried about a war breaking out in which atomic weapons would be used." Twenty-two percent of those polled said they were very worried. An additional thirty-seven percent said they were fairly worried. A poll done in August of the same year found that eighty-three percent of respondents believed that their chances of surviving a nuclear war were "just 50-50, or poor." In October of 1961 Gallup asked, "If you had to make a decision to fight an all out nuclear war or live under communism-how would you decide?" Eighty-one percent replied that they would fight the nuclear war. Only six percent agreed to live under communism.<sup>12</sup> Adults shared nuclear fear with their children, but they rarely blamed the United States government for the arms race, at least not in public.

To some extent this was due to a genuine fear of communism. In the era of Stalin's purges, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet bomb, this was not hard to understand. Some psychologists have argued that the issue had less salience with responsible adults who were preoccupied with careers and family issues. Many adults also lacked the political efficacy needed to confront the issue. In 1987 Susan Fiske, a professor at the University of Massachusetts, reviewed the various studies and articles written about adult reactions to the bomb. She found that "the inaction of ordinary citizens was not at all surprising, because most people most of the time pay scant attention to politics and almost never engage in political activity."<sup>13</sup> This was especially true in a time when the political currents simply battered responsible adults with careers and families into political orthodoxy.

## THE 1950s AND THE RED WITCH-HUNTS

In November of 1954 the United States Senate voted to condemn Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. He died in 1957. Unfortunately, the era of communist witch-hunts to which he lent his name lived on. In 1960 Connecticut Senator Thomas J. Dodd began investigating the possibility that The Committee For A Sane Nuclear Policy was harboring communists. Norman Cousins, the editor of *The Saturday Review* and SANE's cofounder, attempted to purge the organization of leftist elements. His action crippled the organization, and became one of the primary reasons the new left of the 1960s distanced itself from the old.

Betty Friedan, the author of *The Feminine Mystique*, went to great lengths to hide her past affiliation with radical organizations and the Popular Front. As Daniel Horowitz noted in Friedan's biography, "When she emerged in the limelight in 1963

HUAC [House Un-American Committee] was still holding hearings, the United States was pursuing an anti-communist war in Vietnam, and J. Edgar Hoover was wiretapping Martin Luther King Jr. ostensibly to protect the nation against communism.”<sup>14</sup>

Americans in academic fields faced the same threat. As Doris Miller, a psychologist and former New York University student later recalled, “Red-labeling lived on, and many decent people stretched their limits of rationalization to justify not protesting government policies.” This was especially true of the large number of psychologists who worked for the government. Miller remembered that in the early 1960s, years after McCarthy’s demise, her colleagues could still be “summarily dismissed” for voicing their concerns about government policies.<sup>15</sup>

Miller’s comments were supported by the research of Paul Lazarsfeld, Wagner Thielens, and the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University. In 1955, a year after McCarthy’s condemnation, Lazarsfeld and Thielens surveyed 2,451 social scientists including 141 psychologists from a wide variety of colleges and universities across the United States. They found a great deal of anxiety and self-imposed censorship. As the pair wrote in 1958,

*Consider the instance of one Midwestern teacher who said, If you’re in a college where the administration policies are designed to play up to certain economic interests, then criticism of those interests, even if just, may place the individual professor in a bad light which may be reflected in his personal advancement.*

The professor’s solution was to publish only “technical articles.” A historian who responded to the survey decided to “play it safe by stopping his book with 1945 when the Cold War began.” Another historian decided not to start a history of China. A few respondents “preferred simply not to publish at all.”<sup>16</sup>

The political culture also created complications for the logistics of research. Studies cost money, and as Schwebel noted in 1986, “Studying the effects of the nuclear threat is regarded, in some quarters, as being dangerously close to being unpatriotic. This factor is not one to encourage funding by government agencies or certain foundations.”<sup>17</sup>

While the unfavorable political climate was certainly one reason for the dearth of research, Schwebel and Escalona’s reactions to their own studies were also political manifestations of the political culture in the early 1960s. The ghost of Joseph McCarthy still haunted liberals, but the political climate was changing.

Liberalism had accomplished great things under Roosevelt and Truman, not the least of which was the preservation of American capitalism. The Red witch-hunts of the 1950s shattered the extreme left of America’s political spectrum and discredited the liberal agenda. Liberals remained on the defensive during the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration. In 1960, John F. Kennedy, the young Senator from Massachusetts, took his place.

Kennedy was firmly committed to the Cold War and militaristic containment. He was also, in theory, domestically progressive. His election created a sense of new possibilities in the ranks of the political left. Todd Gitlin, a participant and chronicler

of his times believed that the end of the Eisenhower “interregnum” and the ascension of John F. Kennedy signaled a renewal of liberalism in the in the United States. He also believed that the liberalism of the previous era was “enough to launch the next generation,” but “not enough to keep them.”<sup>18</sup>

By the time Kennedy took office a New Left was emerging. It ranks were filled by the sons and daughters of communists and liberals who had been battered into silence during the 1950s, and those whose lack of affiliation with any red-tainted organization had saved them from the purges. It had no particular affection for communism, the Cold War, or containment. And it held the old left in some contempt. Where older progressive organizations like SANE failed with newspaper ads and rhetoric, the New Left hoped to succeed with direct action. College students were beginning to sponsor free speech movements and express concern about the nation’s policy in South East Asia. Suburban housewives were joining the Women’s Strike For Peace to protest the rising levels of radioactivity in their children’s milk. Even college professors were beginning to speak out.

### **PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL AGENDAS**

Looking back at the early 1960s Doris Miller remembered meeting Schwebel at “meetings, marches, and teach-ins sponsored by Psychologists For Peace, Scientists on Survival, and the Scientists Committee on Radiation Information.”<sup>19</sup> It was the beginning of his life long commitment to anti-war activism, and it was reflected in his writing. When Schwebel published his findings in the *National Education Association Journal* in 1963 he did not simply report his conclusions. He also urged teachers to “identify themselves and the nation with settlement of conflict through peaceful means, and to teach students to give thoughtful consideration to differing and dissenting viewpoints.”<sup>20</sup>

This was radical thought at the time, and it certainly represented a political agenda. Escalona and Schwebel had each hoped to illustrate to the nation and the government that the arms race was creating bitter, terrified children who despaired of any future at all. When a majority of the best and brightest of those interviewed actually expressed optimism about the future, Schwebel assumed that there had to be malevolent forces at work. The terrifying thought of nuclear war must have psychologically numbed the respondents.

Before the issue could create any real controversy, it was buried by the progression of historical events. Paul Boyer, the dean of America’s nuclear culture historians, has labeled the period between 1963 and the late 1970s as “The Big Sleep.”<sup>21</sup> According to Boyer the issue almost disappeared from the nation’s perception for over a decade. As evidence of this he cites the dramatic drop in periodical articles, novels, movies, and television programs devoted to the subject. Boyer’s reasons for this lack of attention are legion. Among the most important were the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty of 1963 that removed the threat of radioactive fallout from the public’s attention, the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union that created the impression that the issue was being mitigated by diplomacy, and the Vietnam War, a very real crisis that simply upstaged the theoretical issue of nuclear war.<sup>22</sup>

Additionally, there was another purely political reason for the lack of research. Public opinion research does not exist in a vacuum. The relevance of a study like Schwebel's was, in reality, political. It illustrated the possibly negative effects of American's defense policy on a specific group of Americans. The group it sought to protect had no power because they did not vote. Even if they had been enfranchised at the time, the issue disappeared from the horizon of most Americans from 1963 until 1979. It would take several violent international events and a new, antagonistic presidential administration to bring it rushing back into the headlines and American's consciousness.

### **THE GREAT COMMUNICATOR AND A NEW GENERATION OF NUCLEAR FEAR**

Nuclear fear did not truly regain its relevance in the public's mind until the end of the Carter Administration. The hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were quickly followed by the election of Ronald Reagan, massive rearmament, and continual rhetorical references to "limited nuclear war" with the "evil" Soviet Empire. Nuclear fear soon became fertile ground for research done in a significantly different political climate. While most Americans still refused to countenance unilateral disarmament, a majority did support the "Nuclear Freeze" movement.<sup>23</sup>

Schwebel and Escalona's studies were finally reexamined. In 1982 the pair presented the findings of their old studies to a symposium sponsored by the Physicians For Social Responsibility (PSR). PSR was not new to the Reagan years; it was an old organization resurrected by Helen Caldicott, an Australian born pediatrician practicing at Harvard. The organization's focus was educating the public to the grim physical realities of nuclear war. It was a completely logical message made partisan and strident by Caldicott who liked to inform her audiences that "it was a mathematical certainty they would be dead in four years if Ronald Reagan was re-elected." She was fond of calling Reagan a "wimp," and telling high school students that "if the arm race was not stopped they would never grow up."<sup>24</sup>

When Escalona presented her study to PSR, she said growing up with nuclear weapons "fostered those patterns of personality functioning that can lead to a sense of powerlessness and cynical resignation."<sup>25</sup> And Schwebel said, "The heightened threat of annihilation [during the Cuban Missile Crisis] nourished an irrational optimism, an insistent need to believe that there would be no war, nourished, that is, a denial of the obviously greater possibility of war."<sup>26</sup>

This was the perfect message for Caldicott and PSR. Not only could Caldicott and her fellow physicians make the very rational argument that using the weapons would be tragic, but armed with the insights of Schwebel and Escalona, they could also argue that the mere threat was destroying the mental health of America's children. It was a sound political tactic, and it was supported by the work of John Mack. This Harvard psychiatrist was the most public and prominent imitator of Escalona and Schwebel during the 1980s. Mack and colleague William Beardslee surveyed seventy-five students at two Boston area high schools in 1978 and 1980, giving them a host of



questions dealing with nuclear war and nuclear power. Mack had a tendency to blur the distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. This lack of distinction was evident in the survey.

The questions included: “What does the word ‘nuclear’ bring to mind?” And, “Do you think your city could survive a nuclear attack?” In the discussion section of the study Mack asserted that, “The results of our questionnaire survey strongly suggest that children are deeply disturbed about the threats of nuclear war and the risks of nuclear power.” It is hard to imagine that Mack actually read his own study because the answers given by the children are concerned rather than “disturbed.” A few even saw nuclear weapons as “important to the balance of power,” and “necessary for our national security.”<sup>27</sup> Despite this, Mack’s work was cited in the *Boston Globe*, *The Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists*, and in 1983 he testified before Congress.

Mack’s work also generated a good deal of criticism from both ends of the political spectrum. Joseph Adelson, a professor of psychology at the University of Michigan, and Chester E. Finn Jr., a professor of education and public policy at Vanderbilt, used the pages of the neoconservative publication *Commentary* to voice their opinion. They called Mack’s work “amateurish” and “consisting of anecdotes rather than data.” They complained that Mack, and his most fervent supporter, Robert J. Lifton, had never been trained in empirical research. And they argued that Mack had focused on children from “the better neighborhoods of suburban Boston.”<sup>28</sup>

Adelson and Finn’s comments could be ignored as partisan political rhetoric, but Robert Coles, another Harvard psychiatrist and supporter of the Nuclear Freeze movement, agreed. Coles interviewed 108 children over a period of years and wrote, “The more I talk with children, the more I think social class and economic background and the parents values are extremely important in determining the degree of concern children have about nuclear war.” Coles found little interest in the subject in the ghetto, or in working class families, and he worried that, “there has been political use made of the research.”<sup>29</sup>

These were valid criticisms. Mack’s study was anecdotal, and the sample was not very diverse. When the Cold War abruptly ended, Mack turned his attention to the abduction of humans by space aliens, a subject that defied anything more than anecdotal research. Fortunately, there were more scientifically conducted, apolitical studies about children and the bomb, and they confirmed the part of Schwebel’s work that Schwebel chose to disregard.

## **THE REALITIES OF NUCLEAR FEAR**

In 1983 John M. Goldenring, a professor of pediatrics at New York Medical College, and Ron Doctor, a professor of psychology at California State University, Northridge, surveyed 900 twelve to nineteen year old students in Los Angeles, California. They asked the students to list three things they worried about and then rate a list of twenty worries. Thirty-one percent of the respondents said that they were “very worried” about nuclear war. This was expected. What may not have been as expected was that Goldenring and Doctor found that “those who were most worried about nuclear war

turned out, in general, to be less anxious than their peers and to display indications of better adjustment and greater self-esteem.” They also found that those most worried about the issue had better grade point averages, spent more time discussing the issue with their parents, were well informed about the threat, and “**were more optimistic** about preventing nuclear war [Authors emphasis].”<sup>30</sup>

The study’s authors did not find a difference in the level of concern based on sex, ethnicity, or socioeconomic background, though they did admit that the sample consisted of “more professional, middle-to upper-middle class children than would be found in California or the U.S. population as a whole.”<sup>31</sup> When Schwebel was confronted with the same data in the 1960s, he labeled it “irrational optimism,” but the research from the 1980s seems to indicate another interpretation.

Three years after the Goldenring study, Scott Hamilton and the Department of Psychology at Colorado State University published the results of a survey conducted to find out if there was any correlation between nuclear fear and depression, anxiety, or drug use. The survey included 1,043 eighth graders and 739 twelfth graders “answering an eleven item worry inventory embedded in a multidimensional drug-use survey.”<sup>32</sup> Hamilton and his colleagues found little to indicate that the threat of nuclear war was having a detrimental effect on the mental health of America’s youth. The group acknowledged there was growing evidence to indicate that those who were most worried about nuclear war also “seemed to talk the most about it, actively seek out information on the subject, and feel a stronger sense of optimism that a nuclear catastrophe can be prevented.” They wondered if the nation was doing a disservice to its youth “by not formally discussing these important issues simply because we are afraid they will become too worried or that the topic appears too complex and too controversial.”<sup>33</sup>

Hamilton’s conclusions were supported when Greg Diamond, a doctoral student in psychology at the University of Michigan and an Angus Fellow at the Survey Research Center, and Jerald Bachman, a Program Director at the Survey Research Center, analyzed a large amount of data compiled by the Monitoring The Future Project, an organization that surveyed between 17,000-18,000 high school seniors a year. Diamond and Bachman were attempting to find links between nuclear anxiety and mental health and how much the incidence of nuclear anxiety had changed over the decade.<sup>34</sup> They found a distinction between “worry,” which increased significantly between 1975 and 1982, and “despair,” an emotion that remained relatively stable during the same period. More importantly, the data indicated that “worry correlated positively with interest in government and social issues and with an inclination to participate in the political process.”<sup>35</sup>

Diamond and Bachman’s findings were not unique. A smaller study conducted by Dr. Margaret Garrett Locatelli as part of her doctoral dissertation reached a similar conclusion. As Dr. Locatelli noted, “Those who indicated that they worried especially strongly about nuclear war and considered it to be a more imminent threat than others did were more likely to report high levels of antinuclear activism.”<sup>36</sup> Locatelli initially interviewed twenty-one people between the ages of seventeen and forty, and then an

additional sixty-six enrolled at universities in New York. She specifically interviewed subjects who supported a nuclear freeze, and she included an instrument to measure the political efficacy of her respondents. Predictably, Locatelli found that those who scored lower on the efficacy scale reported “significantly lower levels of antinuclear participation.”<sup>37</sup> It was an eminently logical way of shaping the debate, and it completely demystified the entire discussion.

From the beginning of the nuclear age to the end of the Cold War we were all held hostage by the threat of nuclear weapons. Intellectuals, politicians, and statesmen always wondered why Americans did not turn out en masse to protest this lamentable fact. Academics like Lifton, Escalona, and Schwebel who had an ethical, rational concern for the safety of the human race came to believe the answer could only be found in the immensity of the issue. In their view, the weapons were simply too terrible for the average American, especially young Americans, to contemplate. The lack of protest could only be explained if Americans were in denial, numbed, or irrationally optimistic. Locatelli’s study proved that the answer could be found in the mundane ramifications of America’s political culture, and the fact that many Americans had an extremely tenuous connection to that culture.

Between 1957 and 1959 Robert Dahl, a political science professor at Yale, conducted a meticulous investigation of the political culture of New Haven, Connecticut. In answering the question of “who governs” in one particular city, he hoped to create greater understanding about “American politics,” and “democracy itself.” Political scientists considered the study a landmark, and Dahl’s insights can certainly further this analysis.

What Dahl found was that most Americans had little or no interest in politics. As the author noted, “In New Haven as in the United States one of the central facts of political life is that politics—local, state, national, international—lies for most people at the outer periphery of attention, interest, concern, and activity.” In fact, Dahl concluded that Americans find anything political “remote, alien, and unrewarding.” Dahl came to believe that, “Instead of seeking to explain why citizens are not interested, concerned, and active, the task was to explain why a few citizens were.”<sup>38</sup>

The answer to Dahl’s question was political efficacy or political confidence. If citizens believed their efforts could influence the political system, they had a much higher tendency to participate in the political system. And, as Dahl wrote, “the more one participates actively in local affairs the more confident one is likely to be in one’s capacity to be effective.”<sup>39</sup> Of course the reverse was true of those who did not participate because they “never acquired the skills, familiarity with the system, and associations that might build up confidence.” Dahl also found that political confidence was strongly linked to “possession of middle-class attributes and resources: a college education, above average income, and a white collar occupation.”<sup>40</sup> Education was particularly important.

In 1983 Tom R. Tyler and Kathleen M. McGraw from the department of psychology of Northwestern University published the results of a questionnaire they distributed to members of a Chicago-area antinuclear group and a Chicago-area survivalist group. They asked respondents to supply information about their behaviors,

beliefs, background characteristics, behaviors toward surviving or preventing nuclear war, their political and social orientations, and their views on their own political efficacy.<sup>41</sup> When the pair analyzed the data, they concluded, “those who felt efficacious were more likely to feel nuclear war was preventable, and that those with high levels of income and education were more likely to engage in antinuclear behaviors.”<sup>42</sup> A new structure for nuclear fear begins to emerge when this mass of research is evaluated along with Coles’s criticism of Mack’s work.

Robert Coles was certainly right in his assertion that the concerns of parents would influence their children’s perceptions of the nuclear threat. After taking that as a starting point, it is important to evaluate the social and economic circumstances of the parents. Every opinion poll conducted during the Cold War contained a percentage of people who had no opinion on the issue, or probably any issue. As Margaret Locatelli wrote in the preface to her study, “Plainly, of course, there are some Americans who are simply ill informed and are not aware of the threat.”<sup>43</sup> Others put their faith in deterrence. During the Cold War this was a significant portion of the population. It may also have been a function of education, as Tyler and McGraw clearly found in their sample.

For many Americans the issue was certainly a concern, but it was a concern that did not have great salience in their lives. Coles’s long interaction with his subjects taught him that children from poor families did worry about the issue. They watched television and had a “heightened sense of awareness.”<sup>44</sup> He also found that, “Class persuasively tells us what really counts in life.”<sup>45</sup> During his interviews with children in Boston’s predominantly black Roxbury neighborhood, he found their primary worries were “dope and coke, and a future of no work at all, and bold, hungry rats that knew no fear.” The working class father of another subject responded, “You ask me what my big worries are, day after day. It’s whether I have enough cash to fill up my gas tank after the bills are paid.”<sup>46</sup>

Working class and economically disadvantaged families who were simply struggling to survive had more immediate concerns than the threat of nuclear war. In addition, their perception of their place in America’s political culture limited their ability to confront the issue with political action. When Schlegel R. Lyons polled 2,868 black and white fifth through twelfth graders in Toledo, Ohio in 1970, he found that African-Americans “felt less efficacious in high school than whites felt in junior high, and were about as cynical toward politics at the elementary school level as white children were in high school.”<sup>47</sup> This was hardly due to the threat of nuclear war. It was a realistic reaction to a political system that prevented African-Americans from being completely enfranchised until the 1960s.

Scott Haas, a Cambridge psychologist, and one of the more level headed commentators in the debate, conducted his own survey in the early 1980s using sixty high school juniors from western Connecticut and Massachusetts. He found a strong class bias in the answers with working class students placing the economy and unemployment ahead of the threat of nuclear war.<sup>48</sup> Haas argued that, “Poorer children may appear to be less concerned about the arms race because they don’t see any way to translate their concern into action. It’s the same way they feel helpless about many aspects of their lives.”<sup>49</sup>

For those children who represented the “most worried” in these studies, the fear of nuclear war motivated them to become politically engaged. They had the time to worry. They could share their fears with their parents, who were also in a position to devote time to the issue. They perceived the issue from an educated perspective because they had the resources to research it. But most importantly, they had faith in their ability to change the political system that created and maintained the threat.

There is absolutely no evidence that large numbers of children from any economic or social class were psychologically numbed or in denial. They dealt with it based on the situations they occupied in life. And when the issue is evaluated accordingly we might, as a nation, gain some perspective on the past, and the future.

## FROM FEAR TO ACTION

Some of the children who had grown up with Sputnik, the hydrogen bomb, and radioactive fallout did translate their concern into action. In June of 1962 a small student organization known as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) drafted an official statement of their concerns and political goals. One of the primary concerns students voiced in drafting the Port Huron Statement was the “enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence on the Bomb.” As Tom Hayden, Richard Flacks, and the other students wrote, the bomb “brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract ‘others’ we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time.”<sup>50</sup>

Some historians have called the nuclear imagery in the statement “rhetoric.” But in the light of the data collected by Schwebel and his colleagues this is doubtful. These were the Manhattan Project’s children. As Todd Gitlin, one time president of SDS wrote,

*There may not have been a single master fear, but to many in my generation, especially the incipient New Left, the grimmest and least acknowledged underside of affluence was the Bomb...We grew up taking cover in school drills-the first American generation compelled from infancy to fear not only war but the end of days.<sup>51</sup>*

The Port Huron Statement begins with the words, “We are the people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort.” While less than five percent of “this generation” took part in the student movement, it was an accurate statement about the young men and women who took part in the protests and demonstrations of the 1960s.<sup>52</sup> They were the children of affluence. In fact Sociologist Robert Flack has labeled the movement, “A revolt of the advantaged.”<sup>53</sup> They were highly educated. And as psychologist Kenneth Kenniston wrote in 1967, “As might be expected of a group of politically liberal and academically talented students, a disproportionate number are drawn from professional and intellectual families of upper middle-class status.” Kenniston also found that these students generally had liberal parents who had higher incomes and more education than the parents of active student conservatives. Kenniston believed they were “political optimists.”<sup>54</sup>

Kenniston's description of these political activists obviously matches the data compiled by Schwebel in the 1960s and the studies conducted in the 1980s. On a more anecdotal level, it also matches the lives of activists like Hayden and Gitlin. Both were bred in at least modest comfort, though Hayden's youth was significantly more modest. Hayden and Gitlin were both influenced by their liberal parents. They possessed intelligence, talent, and a tremendous belief in their ability to change the system.

Before they came to the attention of the American public for to their opposition to the war in Vietnam, both Hayden and Gitlin used their sense of political efficacy to protest the arms race. Hayden voiced his concern in the Port Huron Statement and in the pages of the *Michigan Daily*. Gitlin protested with Tocsin, a fairly moderate student organization that joined forces with other student groups to protest the Kennedy Administration's policies during the Berlin crisis.

For both men the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a time of psychological numbing. It was a call to action and more radical solutions. Gitlin found himself being drawn away from Tocsin and toward the more radical SDS. And as Hayden and Flacks wrote after the crisis, "The priority today, as never before, is power. Unless we can penetrate the political process, by direct participative means then it is unlikely that even modest changes in foreign policy will be effected in the near future." The pair went on to urge their compatriots to take part in "serious research, sustained community education, direct demonstrations," and they called for "desperate optimism and massive involvement in local Democratic or independent campaigns by 1964."<sup>55</sup>

In retrospect it is hard to imagine that anything positive can be said about America's military intervention in Vietnam. We destroyed the culture of South Vietnam, our own credibility, and thousands of lives. The dominos fell, and the United States won the Cold War without them. The student movement, forged by nuclear fear, helped bring that conflict to an end. It was radical, loud, and occasionally obnoxious, but it was never a serious threat to the dominant institutions of the United States. Not all political activism is so benign.

### **IT'S THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT, AND I FEEL FINE?**

In 1979 Barbara Tuchman published *A Distant Mirror*, a history of the 14<sup>th</sup> century. In 1979 détente and accommodation between the Soviet Union and the United States appeared to be failing. There was a new incentive to rearm the country with more accurate, more terrible, technologically advanced nuclear weapons. In her forward, Tuchman wrote, "The genesis of this book was a desire to find out what were the effects on society of the most lethal disaster of recorded history—that is to say, of the Black Death of 1348-50. Given the possibilities of our time, the reason for my interest is obvious."<sup>56</sup> Given the possibilities of our time, the reasons for reassessing children's thoughts and reactions to the arms race may also be obvious.

On September 11, 2001 the world watched as thousands of people died on live television. As the World Trade Center imploded, NBC's Tom Brokaw said "it looked like nuclear winter in lower Manhattan." The attacks of 9/11 were followed by



weeks of anthrax scares, war in Afghanistan, war in Iraq, instructions to families to stock up on duct tape and plastic sheeting, and continuous talk about dirty bombs and alert levels.

When the Cold War ended, some political scientists speculated that it was the end of history and the beginning of a rational world governed by democratic institutions and free market capitalism. They were wrong. As a nation we see a world beset with conflict and the dangers of terrorism. How will the children of this era's apocalypse react? There is currently little information to guide us. It is simply too early, and most of what does exist has understandably focused on children in the regions of the attacks.<sup>57</sup> More research obviously needs to be done, and it should focus on the political aspects of the issue as well as the psychological manifestations. In retrospect, we can gain some insight by reviewing how children reacted during the Cuban Missile Crisis and later in an era when limited nuclear war was viewed as a rational policy.

Children's parents and their social and economic class greatly influence their reactions. It was so in the past. What Scott Hamilton and his associates said in the 1980s applies today. We would be doing a serious disservice to our children if we did not formally discuss this new conflict with them merely because it is controversial and complex. If nothing else, this might be an excellent time to listen to all our children, to educate them and raise the level of their confidence in our political system and in their own abilities. A nation in which the majority of the young people vote, participate in the political process, and understand the issues is certainly preferable to a nation populated with uneducated, alienated, easily manipulated young people.

Sadly, what could be learned from the research may have little impact on the current crisis. A recent book about the Cuban Missile Crisis cites Schwebel's study, mentions that the smarter children were less afraid, but dismisses the ramifications saying, "Schwebel inferred that the students most aware of wars danger 'may be less able to face the possibility to admit or to comprehend that human beings could turn the nightmare into reality.'"<sup>58</sup> The author does not mention that many of those children had hope for the future and a belief in their ability to change it. This is an unfortunate interpretation because the way children reacted during the Cold War might not give us a crystal ball, but it might give us a reflection from a distant mirror.

Atom bomb exploding  
near Bikini Island.  
Credit:  
Library of Congress





**IN A LEAGUE OF  
THEIR OWN:  
WOMEN AND GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY  
ON THE SUBURBAN FRONTIER**

by Heather Thorwald

*For years now my wife has been consorting with the League of Women Voters, an organization whose function, as I understand it, is to tell husbands how to vote, especially on those local issues commuting males do not read about in the big city papers.<sup>1</sup>*

*John Ciardi, Saturday Review,  
13 November 1965*

As Ciardi's comment demonstrates, the distance between idealism and reality on the postwar suburban frontier stretched even farther than the daily commute. With economical mass housing and governmental encouragement, suburbs beckoned ever-greater numbers of Americans after World War II. Suburbia seemed to offer the tree-shaded neighborliness of a small town within easy reach of the city. A man could earn his family's living downtown, while spending his nights and weekends in a place where he would be on a first-name basis with the police chief, the school board president, and the mayor.

Above: Photo of early 1950's League of Women Voters car canvassing neighborhoods in a get out the vote campaign. Credit: League of Women Voters.

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No matter how rapid the commuter's transit, however, he could not be in two places at once. As early as 1925, sociologist Harlan Paul Douglass noted the "divided personality" of the suburban commuter, tied to both workplace and residential communities, with less time for either.<sup>2</sup> The small-town aura could only cover suburbia so far: as Ciardi admits, "I don't spend enough time in this town to know who's mayor" – much less to grab a cup of coffee with him at the local diner.<sup>3</sup>

In the absence of strong local ties, sociologists like Douglass championed the commuter as vanguard of a new metropolitanism, "an enlarged citizenship" in a wider community beyond his suburb.<sup>4</sup> Yet, thirty years after Douglass, suburbanites still preferred to form small municipalities rather than join metropolitan conglomerations. Grassroots political ideals, identified by historian Frederick Jackson Turner as a hallmark of the nineteenth-century frontier, still held sway over the American imagination in the twentieth century. The small-town model, however impractical for a commuting population, retained its appeal.

Someone had to tend this grassroots democracy, and Ciardi's column reveals the answer. He expresses his chagrin at relying on his "wife's civic shopping list" at the polls, but he admits that his frequent absences make it nearly impossible for him to keep up with local affairs. Eavesdropping on her League of Women Voters meeting, his "male ego's superior intuition about politics" feels threatened, but he recognizes that these women have a much better grasp on local and state issues than he does.<sup>5</sup> With many men like Ciardi absent from civic life, and with many housewives seeking an outlet from a purely domestic existence, women's voluntary organizations like the League of Women Voters emerged as a political force in postwar suburban communities.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Ciardi was not alone in offering a somewhat begrudging acceptance of politically active women. Articles from the popular press about the League of Women Voters demonstrated men's uneasiness with abdicating their civic responsibilities to women. While coverage in women's magazines was straightforward and informational,<sup>6</sup> general-interest magazines were more apt to feature the League's "comely" young matrons and "civic watchdogs in high heels," perhaps reassuring male readers that these women were still feminine and maternal despite being politically engaged. Compliments were usually of the backhanded variety: one unnamed political writer said of the League, "'no group operates on the high level . . . that these dames do.'"<sup>7</sup>

From today's vantage point, one could easily read too much hostility into comments that were generally acceptable in their time. But whether these politically active women elicited respect, bemusement, belittlement, or embarrassment among men, members of the League of Women Voters found new opportunities on the suburban frontier. With confidence and eagerness, they promoted the kind of grassroots democracy cherished by suburban Americans. Yet, as experienced political observers, they also recognized when suburban reality made frontier ideals obsolete.

## GRASSROOTS IDEALISM AND SUBURBAN REALITY

*Suburbia symbolizes the fullest, most unadulterated embodiment of contemporary culture.*<sup>8</sup>

*Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier*

In the popular imagination, the image of suburbia conjures up a sitcom set – “Father Knows Best” or “The Brady Bunch,” depending on the generation. But American suburbs are not simply creations of postwar consumerism and automobility; their roots stretch back to the nineteenth century, to the Brooklyn ferry commuters of the 1830s and the cultural influence of English suburban villas.<sup>9</sup> With each new transportation system – railroads, horse cars, electric streetcars – more Americans could afford to live separated from their workplace, preferably beyond the crowded conditions of inner cities.<sup>10</sup> By the 1920s, the advent of the automobile made it possible for commuters to live beyond walking distance from transit lines, opening up even greater areas of land for residential development.<sup>11</sup>

Despite its long history, suburbia has been associated with the post-World War II period for good reason. By the late 1940s, new building practices and mass production techniques made single-family homes more affordable than before the war. Equally significant, the federal government had begun to take an active role in housing. Through mortgage insurance under the Federal Housing Administration (established in 1934) and the Veterans Administration (established in 1944), the government reduced the risk for lenders, enabling them to offer borrowers low down payments and longer repayment periods. While the FHA had no direct control over home-builders or buyers, it exerted considerable influence by only insuring mortgages for those properties it considered acceptable. Obviously, builders who wanted the widest possible market for their products needed to meet FHA guidelines. As documented by historian Kenneth T. Jackson, FHA standards favored new, single-family homes in racially homogenous communities: “Not surprisingly, the middle-class suburban family with the new house and the long-term, fixed-rate, FHA-insured mortgage became a symbol, and perhaps a stereotype, of the American way of life.”<sup>12</sup>

Technology and government could not have created the suburban boom alone; rather, they brought suburban living within reach of a highly motivated public. More and more Americans who could now afford to leave cities rapidly did so, pushing out the frontiers of urban civilization farther into the countryside. In part, the choice to live in the suburbs represented a reaction against urban forms, including big government. “It is suburbia’s role today to proclaim, with the memories of the big city fresh in mind, than even in a modern habitat, grassroots government can continue,” wrote political scientist Robert C. Wood in 1958.<sup>13</sup> The sprawling growth and economic interdependency of metropolitan areas seemed to encourage larger governmental forms, but most suburbs preferred incorporation rather than annexation or metro-wide cooperation. Wood argued that, by forming a myriad of small municipalities within metropolitan

areas, suburbanites attempted to “recaptur[e] the special flavor of the consensus, the tone of personalized government and active interest which characterized earlier small towns . . . on the frontier of the Old Northwest.”<sup>14</sup>

This concept of frontier government—small, grassroots, democratic—had taken shape more than six decades earlier in the writings of historian Frederick Jackson Turner. “The frontier individualism has from the beginning promoted democracy,” Turner claimed famously in 1893.<sup>15</sup> Leaving established government behind, Turner’s frontier settlers relied on their own innate political sense to build what institutions they needed, and to decide what they could well do without. “There is a strain of fierceness in their energetic petitions demanding self-government under the theory that every people have the right to establish their own political institutions in an area which they have won from the wilderness,” wrote Turner in 1903.<sup>16</sup> Key to Turner’s idea of grassroots frontier democracy was direct participation: “By free choice and not by compulsion, by spontaneous impulse, and not by the domination of a caste, [people of the frontier] rallied around a cause, they supported an issue.”<sup>17</sup>

As Wood argued, this ideal of grassroots democracy exerted a powerful influence over the pioneers of the postwar suburban frontier, even as the commuter lifestyle made it nearly unworkable. “Although responsibility to the community is a value strongly stressed by home and school alike,” wrote a team of suburban sociologists in 1956, “there does not seem to be a widespread participation in local affairs, particularly in the case of men.”<sup>18</sup> In a 1951 study, sociologist Alvin H. Schaff found that commuters had a much lower incidence of suburban community participation than non-commuters. Schaff concluded that “whatever community interest the commuter expresses is likely to be divided between his place of residence and his place of work.”<sup>19</sup>

The vacuum of community participation left by commuters did not go unfilled, however. “As a result of the daily commuting of males, women play an unusually important role in voluntary association and other interaction situations in the suburbs,” wrote Walter T. Martin in 1958.<sup>20</sup> As sociologists rushed to study that archetypal creature of the postwar age, the suburbanite, many concurred with Martin’s findings that women and women’s groups had considerable influence in suburban affairs.<sup>21</sup>

At a time when middle-class women were encouraged to confine themselves to a domestic role, community involvement served as a socially acceptable outlet. Through membership in organizations, a woman could pursue activities outside the home without competing with her husband’s role as breadwinner.<sup>22</sup> As noted by historian Carole Stanford Bucy, organizations like the League of Women Voters “challenged the boundaries” of the domestic sphere without actually breaking through them.<sup>23</sup> Active participation might require a hefty time commitment, but it did not necessarily conflict with running a household. “I joined the League to give me something interesting to think about while I washed dishes and folded diapers,” said one member quoted in the *Christian Science Monitor* in 1956.<sup>24</sup>

While some housewives may have felt trapped in the world of dishes and diapers, others found new opportunities in the suburban environment of the 1950s and 1960s. “For many women the suburban situation opens new vistas and provides real avenues

for expression and meaningful activity,” noted sociologist Martin.<sup>25</sup> With husbands disconnected from civic affairs, and with new and rapidly growing suburban communities outstripping existing power structures, the political field opened for groups like the League of Women Voters to make a significant impact on local government.

By joining the League, women demonstrated a genuine concern for their communities, places in which they spent the majority of their time. In contrast, their commuting husbands looked to home life for respite and relaxation. “[The suburban housewife’s] world is the local community and the household her central fortress, with occasional sallies into the central city,” wrote sociologist Ernest Mowrer in 1958. “In contrast, the central city is the world of her husband with the household as a retreat and an occasional sally into the local community.”<sup>26</sup> Whether housewife by choice or by cultural pressure, or some of both, the postwar suburban woman reached beyond her “fortress” into her community, maximizing her position on the suburban frontier through membership in the League of Women Voters. Through the League, she took part in grassroots politics and made participation more feasible for her suburban neighbors.

### **THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY, AND SUBURBIA**

*Many men, too busy these days to dig into the pros and cons of complex issues, have come to depend on the League of Women Voters to do it for them. They admit it . . . I take my politics from my wife because she has time to study these things,’ said one forthright spouse.<sup>27</sup>*

The Christian Science Monitor, 9 February 1956

The flourishing League of Women Voters of the 1950s and 1960s could already look back on an illustrious heritage. Established in 1919, the League grew directly out of the National American Woman Suffrage Association. After the 1920 ratification of the 19th Amendment, NAWSA officially disbanded and reformed as the National League of Women Voters under the leadership of Carrie Chapman Catt, a suffragist protégé of Susan B. Anthony. Originally focused on providing civic education for newly enfranchised women, the League soon evolved to include study of and non-partisan advocacy for political issues, particularly those emphasizing international cooperation, representative government, human welfare, and environmental conservation.<sup>28</sup>

Despite some success in advocating for child-welfare laws, the League’s post-suffrage euphoria soon waned. Membership, briefly near 200,000 just after 1920, soon dropped to 80,000 by 1930, and bottomed out in the mid-1930s at around 40,000.<sup>29</sup> Renewed energy came after World War II with a younger, post-suffragist generation of leadership, “wives and mothers who had gained experience working with local issues with their local leagues before becoming national leaders.”<sup>30</sup> With an eye to the future, these new leaders took a hard look at the national organization’s structure as a cumbersome federation of state leagues.



In its postwar reorganization, the League showed the same esteem for grassroots ideals as Turner's frontiersmen. Recognizing the importance of communication between the national office and individual members, the League became a direct member organization in 1946; every member of a local league was now a member of the national League. A slight name change – to the League of Women Voters of the United States – signified this new focus.<sup>31</sup> Energy and action would now originate at the neighborhood level, where women met in discussion units to study issues and communicate their conclusions to the national office. As League historian Louise Young noted, “The local league emerged as the organization’s core.”<sup>32</sup>

With this new structure, the League became even more attractive to women. Its postwar membership climbed back to near-1920 levels, topping 120,000 in the early 1950s and reaching nearly 160,000 in the late 1960s.<sup>33</sup> This growth reflected both the era’s culture of volunteerism and its pressing postwar concerns. “YOUR informed opinion on vital domestic and international politics, YOUR choice of leaders, YOUR vote, will make America’s future,” exhorted Edith Cherrington, president of the Denver-area League in 1943.<sup>34</sup> As America entered the atomic age two years later, Cherrington’s message of thoughtful participation seemed all the more urgent. “The intelligent woman in this extending era of world wars and world cold wars cannot escape acute apprehension of the fact that today’s world is a grimly threatening world,” wrote Warner Olivier in a 1954 *Saturday Evening Post* profile of the League.<sup>35</sup>

While members may have been motivated by international concerns, most of their efforts remained closer to home. Local units, while supporting national drives for the United Nations and civilian control of atomic energy, made their presence felt in dealing with community issues. Concern for local government had long been part of League tradition; influenced by Jane Addams and settlement house movement of 1890s, the League saw one of its roles as cleaning up municipal corruption and waste.<sup>36</sup> As the *Saturday Evening Post* noted, “They reconstitute the city fathers, they modernize old jails, campaign for juvenile-detention homes, modern garbage-disposal plants and a thousand and one other projects which need to be done.”<sup>37</sup>

The League’s commitment to careful research at the local level could have surprising results. A 1957 *Reader’s Digest* article related the story of one League member, “a comely young mother of three who happens to have a degree in public administration,” who discovered a major tax rate discrepancy while studying the government structure of her suburban Long Island town. Due to a clerical error, many town residents had paid a double rate for fire and water services for nearly two decades. League involvement not only gave this woman an opportunity to apply her professional skills, but it also provided many of her neighbors with a major tax refund.<sup>38</sup>

Local leagues succeeded best where they had the greatest numbers and the easiest access to the mechanisms of government: in the small-town democracy found on the suburban frontier. League historian Young wrote, “Much of the most influential action of the League occurred at the community level, above all in the smaller cities and suburban jurisdictions, where League organization was strongest in these [postwar] decades.”<sup>39</sup> The demographic profile of the postwar League membership bears out

the correlation between organizational growth and suburbanization. A 1956-1958 League survey by the University of Michigan found the typical member to be white, in her late 30s or early 40s, middle class, educated, living in a suburban area or small town, and married to a professional or white-collar worker. Suburban members were slightly younger than the League average, and fewer were employed full- or part-time outside the home – a bonus for an almost entirely volunteer-run organization that demanded a great deal of time from its members.<sup>40</sup>

In addition to demographic harmony, suburbs offered the League a ripe field for its efforts. For example, the League's emphasis on voter education found a home in the unsettled political conditions of rapidly growing suburbs. Local leagues commonly made an operational study of government in their area a top priority, often resulting in publication of a "Know Your Town" booklet. Members surveyed municipal governments, as well as quasi-governmental entities and special districts, common features of hodgepodge urban fringe areas. They sorted out and explained local government structure, budgets, services, voting precincts, and polling places. The local leagues aimed their informational booklets, written in a conversational tone, at both League members and fellow citizens.<sup>41</sup> While such civic fact-finding lacked the urgency of a major campaign against municipal corruption or poor sanitation, it served a particularly valuable purpose in suburban areas.

The publication efforts of the League of Women Voters of Jefferson County, Colorado, included two booklets focusing on the cities of Arvada and Lakewood. *This is Arvada*, published in 1965, profiled the city's history, government, budget, and services. Like many postwar suburbs, Arvada had grown from a farming community of less than 1,500 in 1940 to a rapidly expanding Denver suburb of 19,000 by 1960, with expectations for adding another 50,000 residents in the following decade.<sup>42</sup> With thousands of new residents, many of them busy Denver commuters, Arvada needed the civic shortcut of the League's booklet to encourage civic participation. In the case of *This is Lakewood* (1972), the municipality was not yet three years old when the booklet was published. After decades of making do with county services and special districts, the sprawling new city of nearly 100,000 residents was served by three fire departments and 53 separate water and sewer districts. Only the committed study of League members could hope to make sense of this piecemeal suburban government.<sup>43</sup>

League booklets like *This is Arvada* sought to provide the citizen with "a short summary of facts . . . which will lead him to further study of – and activity in – his socio-political environment."<sup>44</sup> Local units followed up this information gathering with get-out-the-vote campaigns and candidates' forums, a key component of League activities nationwide. As Young noted, the organization's 1946 reemphasis on grassroots efforts had "carried with it a challenge to increased participation in the political life of the community through the Voters Service."<sup>45</sup> After the war, the reenergized service provided local leagues with year-round guidelines for activities. While few units could have carried out all the recommendations, the guidelines reminded members of the importance of these activities to the League's public visibility. Voters Service activities remain perhaps the best-known work of the League to this day.<sup>46</sup>

Through voter education efforts such as “Know Your Government,” the League worked to make civic participation as convenient as possible for harried, disconnected suburbanites. Once concerned with orienting newly enfranchised women to government, by the 1950s the League had a much larger, highly mobile, disoriented population to educate. While many voters may have preferred to rely solely on their political intuition, those on the new suburban terrain needed help just to find their local polling place, much less to make informed decisions at the ballot box. The maze of small municipalities and special districts they encountered – a creation of their grassroots ideals – required suburbanites to depend on the League’s experienced guides rather than on their own instincts.

Even Frederick Jackson Turner recognized that his rugged individualists eventually ran up against a more complex reality. “At each new stage of Western development, the people have had to grapple with larger areas, with bigger combinations . . . Individualism began to give way to coöperation and to governmental activity,” he wrote in 1903.<sup>47</sup> When it came to municipal organization, however, the suburban frontiersman resisted the call for “bigger combinations.” He might work in the city, shop in downtown department stores, and visit friends in neighboring suburbs, but he still wanted a small-town government for his own patch of ground. Again, the problem of suburban American and metropolitan growth needed the patience of the League of Women Voters to untangle realistic democratic principles from frontier political myths.

#### THE LEAGUE AND THE LIMITS OF FRONTIER DEMOCRACY

*Stubbornly cherishing the illusion that we are still a rural nation, we are trying to impose the economic and social patterns of the urban twentieth century on the political divisions of the horse-and-buggy days. The result is about the same as trying to harness a jet engine to a two-horse wagon.*<sup>48</sup>

Saturday Evening Post, 16 January 1960

In 1958, Percy Maxim Lee ended a successful eight years as national League president. In her inspiring valedictory address to delegates at the national convention, Lee encouraged members to pursue “fresh initiatives,” to challenge old habits of thinking that prevented Americans from honestly addressing issues of foreign policy, education, and urban growth. Updating municipal housecleaning for the postwar world, Lee exhorted the League to apply itself to “governmental reforms to meet the needs of metropolitan areas.”<sup>49</sup> The organization had already begun the process through five regional conferences on the issue in 1957 and 1958. Now members responded to Lee’s call: by 1961, state leagues in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon had made metropolitan cooperation a major priority of their annual agendas.<sup>50</sup>

Calls for metropolitan consolidation were not new to the postwar period, nor to the League of Women Voters. The common nineteenth-century practice of urban municipalities annexing their fringe areas declined in the early twentieth century, as suburbs began to mount a resistance. Technological improvements and organization of special districts allowed suburbanites to afford and enjoy the same public services as their city-dwelling counterparts, removing the major attraction of consolidation into the city.<sup>51</sup> The same urban corruption that mobilized suffragists and early League members further encouraged suburbanites to turn away from city government and form their own smaller municipalities. The 1920s and 1930s saw campaigns for uniting metropolitan areas as federations in cities such as Cleveland and Pittsburgh; the League was among the staunchest supporters of these plans.<sup>52</sup> Yet none of these efforts succeeded. As Wood observed a quarter-century later, “Over the years, proposals for consolidation in metropolitan government flounder on the rocks of suburban memories of city politics and suburban insistence that their politics, nonpartisan, small in scope, close to home, is best.”<sup>53</sup>

Rapid postwar growth again brought urgency to calls for metropolitan cooperation in the 1950s. Critics like Wood noted the high cost of providing public services over small areas, rather than taking advantage of economies of scale in larger municipalities. “This maintenance of separate suburban bureaucracies is not only costly, it is also an affront to common sense,” Wood wrote. “A crazy-quilt hodge-podge of local agencies appears, criminals escape because no police jurisdiction can mount an effective pursuit, fires rage while equipment lies idle in the next town, and sewage is dumped into the river by one government to contaminate the waters of the neighboring jurisdiction.”<sup>54</sup>

Such gross inefficiency rankled League members. “A consistent and crucial dimension of League action has revolved around good government,” noted League historian Young.<sup>55</sup> These concerns manifested themselves early on in the League’s efforts for national civil service reform in the 1920s and 1930s. At the local level, League members frequently campaigned for council-manager forms of government with notable success.<sup>56</sup> Reflecting an inheritance of Progressive Era ideals, the League’s emphasis on professionalized government naturally extended to concerns of metropolitan areas. “As progressives, these women were united by a strong belief that all levels of government had a responsibility to solve the problems of cities,” wrote Bucy.<sup>57</sup> The League recognized that issues of metropolitan growth required widespread cooperation. Indeed, possible solutions such as expanded county services or metropolitan-wide federation often required amendment of state constitutional provisions for local government.

As state leagues took on these issues after Lee’s speech, they reaffirmed their commitment to efficient government. In a three-part report, the League of Women Voters of Colorado made the choice facing metropolitan areas clear in the title – *Cooperation or Confusion?* “Each political subdivision insists on fighting its own battles in its own way, ignoring the troubles which beset its neighbors and the entire metropolitan community,” the report noted.<sup>58</sup> Out on the suburban frontier, such individualism had created enormous problems. Covered by nearly 200 governmental

units, Denver's rapidly growing fringe areas were still woefully under serviced: "Areas which are already under six or eight layers of taxing jurisdiction still have a pattern of public services which is full of gaps."<sup>59</sup> After two years of study, Colorado's League of Women voters concluded, "Some way is needed to bring about coordination between the central city and its booming hinterland in the solution of those problems which are truly metropolitan in character, whether this be by voluntary cooperation, through federation, or by outright political consolidation."<sup>60</sup>

Support of larger governmental forms may seem to contradict the League's commitment to grassroots democracy, but in fact citizen participation played a major role in establishing the organization's position advocating municipal consolidations. The Colorado league found that, despite the frontier ethos of resistance to big government, the suburbanite often had much less say in political matters than his urban counterpart: "When he moved to the suburb, the suburbanite who works in the city lost all voice in the management of the city in which he spends his daylight hours and upon which he usually depends for many of his recreation and cultural activities."<sup>61</sup>

While abdicating his influence on (and responsibility to) city government, the suburbanite frequently lost a voice in his residential community as well. Suburbs seemed to belong to village America, but in reality they rarely had the stand-alone government of an independent town, with a single fire department or water system. Instead, special districts proliferated, particularly in the unincorporated areas that had only recently exploded with new suburban housing developments. "It would be almost impossible for a conscientious citizen in such a community to be fully informed and participate actively in all the layers of government under which he lives," the Colorado league report noted. "Furthermore, he may not be able to participate in some of the special districts, because their directors are appointed by other levels of government or serve *ex officio*."<sup>62</sup> Clearly, a citizen did not necessarily have a better chance of being heard in a small government.

Reaching similar conclusions, League chapters throughout the country became high-profile supporters of consolidation efforts in the 1950s. The National Municipal League sought their help in developing "metropolitan consciousness" – that same consciousness Harlan Douglass had hoped their commuter husbands would perpetuate back in the 1920s.<sup>63</sup> The League played a major role in the successful consolidation of Nashville-Davidson County in 1962, and it supported other unsuccessful efforts in communities such as St. Louis and Miami.<sup>64</sup> Overall, however, the trend in the 1960s continued away from larger government, and not just on the suburban frontier. As Jackson noted, "Power to the people' became a common goal for blacks who sought greater control of their inner-city neighborhoods, for middle-class whites who wanted to protect a suburban way of life, and for professionals and intellectuals who feared that respect for institutions and authority was being eroded by mindless bureaucracies."<sup>65</sup> In most cases, despite the efforts of the League, the consequences of metropolitan fragmentation did not prove strong enough to overcome grassroots idealism.

## CONCLUSION

*He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased.*<sup>66</sup>

*Frederick Jackson Turner, 1893*

As cultural conditions on the suburban frontier changed in the 1970s, the League of Women Voters experienced a steady decline in membership. The commuter husband/housewife lifestyle no longer predominated in suburbia. Many women now focused their energies on professional development, rather than directing their talents solely to the volunteer and domestic spheres. In a study of changes in League membership, political scientist John Mark Hansen noted, “Jobs provided many of the same benefits as League membership – sociability and intellectual engagement – and consumed time, a resource especially precious to the highly participatory League.”<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile, newer second-wave feminist groups such as the National Organization for Women and the National Abortion Rights Action League attracted younger women eager to concentrate on particular issues. The League’s painstaking methods of study and consensus, and its reluctance to get involved in specific women’s issues such as the Equal Rights Amendment, led many feminists to characterize the organization as overly genteel and detached. NOW and NARAL lobbyists benefited from mentoring by the experienced political operatives of the League, but such cooperation did not translate into cross-membership.<sup>68</sup>

Yet the League’s decline can also be taken as a sign of its success. “The experience the League gave its members would enable them to go beyond its studies to even greater activism” in the changed culture of the 1970s, Bucy noted.<sup>69</sup> Betty Friedan and Phyllis Schlafly, two of the era’s most visible (and diametrically opposed) activists, had both been involved in the League at one time; both left the League to pursue a more aggressive course.<sup>70</sup> No longer content to work behind the scenes, many women used League experience as a springboard to holding political office. One 1972 survey of female state legislators found that 40 percent had been active in the League.<sup>71</sup> While the League’s precise impact on civic participation may be impossible to determine, it clearly transformed its own members into the active citizens of the frontier ideal.

As more suburban women pursued lives outside the domestic sphere, the frontier on which they lived changed as well. Bedroom communities, trying to operate solely on residential property tax revenues from increasingly hostile homeowners, sought economic diversification. Retailers responded, moving out from downtown and bringing their merchandise to suburban shopping malls. Employers also followed, seeking more bucolic surroundings for corporate campuses and convenient access for specialized workers. By the 1990s, many suburbs more closely resembled the cities they surrounded than the small towns they had once aspired to be.<sup>72</sup>

The closing of the suburban frontier has forced its grassroots-styled governments to adjust to a wider, more metropolitan mindset. Aging suburbs now must face many of the problems of urban America – poverty, crime, congestion – and must apply the



same tools as inner-city government.<sup>73</sup> As their challenges grow ever more complex, suburban jurisdictions need the interest and commitment of their residents. Organizations like the League of Women Voters, still seeking to engage suburbanites in civic life, must overcome a challenging climate of post-Watergate cynicism and overworked distraction among both sexes. Yet their work continues to be vital: now would be a disastrous time to let the grassroots grow wild.

Photograph of two women in the early 1970's encouraging people to vote.  
Credit:  
League of Women Voters.





## CONTROLLING THE FUTURE: MANIPULATION OF THE HITLER YOUTH

by Linnie Boteler

Hitler once said, “He alone who owns the youth gains the future.”<sup>1</sup> This belief allowed Hitler to create a youth movement in Germany, in which the youth followed the word of Hitler fanatically. This essay seeks to examine the rise of this fanaticism more closely. Also it will show how Hitler’s control over the youth created an environment and following that allowed for the rise and permanence of a totalitarian government. Members of the Hitler Youth would sacrifice their lives for Hitler and Germany, and as we shall see, as the Third Reich progressed and war ensued, the Hitler Youth were asked to prove their devotion to Hitler and their passion for German nationalism. German policy changes throughout World War II would put more responsibility in the hands of Hitler Youth members. This essay shows that these changes not only increased the power of the Hitler Youth, but also put their lives at greater risk.

Above: Hitler perfected the craft of joining young boys together to further the cause of the Motherland. Members of the early Hitler Youth movement would later become the backbone of the Third Reich during World War II. Credit: The Simon Wiesenthal Center.

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## THE HITLER YOUTH PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

The idea of the National Socialist Youth movement had been in place since 1922. In fact, the *HitlerJugend*, Hitler Youth, was born July 3, 1926, when Hitler was speaking at a National Socialist rally in Weimar.<sup>2</sup> At this time the *HitlerJugend* was named the official youth movement of the NSDAP, National Socialist German Worker's Party. This party was to become what is today known as the Nazi party. The Hitler Youth was placed under the command of the SA in November of 1926; however, the Hitler Youth would not dominate youth organizations until Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany in 1933.<sup>3</sup> According to Jennifer Keeley, when the Nazis came to power "it was their goal to persuade every qualified German boy and girl to be part of the Hitler Youth organization."<sup>4</sup> In order to achieve this goal quickly and efficiently, Hitler either absorbed other youth organizations into the Hitler Youth or banned them from existence by the end of 1933.<sup>5</sup> The non-Hitler Youth organizations that were allowed to remain in existence were those of the Catholic Church. The reason for this was the Concordat, which was an agreement between the Nazis and the Vatican, in which the Pope agreed to uphold Nazi ideology.<sup>6</sup>

Because of Hitler's belief in the importance of controlling the youth in Germany, Baldur von Shirach was named youth leader of the German Reich and given control over all youth activities in Germany in June of 1933.<sup>7</sup> Shirach quickly structured the *HitlerJugend* into two groups based upon age qualifications. The *Jungvolk* was for boys ages ten to fourteen, while the *HitlerJugend* was for boys ages fourteen to eighteen. Once young men reached the age of nineteen they were expected to become members of the NSDAP. The girls were organized in much the same way. Girls ages ten to fourteen were members of the *Jungenmadelbund*. At the age of fourteen, girls became members of the *Bund Deutscher Madel* (BdM). At age seventeen, girls became eligible for membership in the *Glaube und Schonheit* (Faith and Beauty) organization. This organization was to become an elite organization of the ideal Nazi woman.<sup>8</sup>

Hitler believed that in order for the Third Reich to survive he must control and educate the youth of Germany. As stated before, boys and girls became eligible for membership in the *Jungvolk* and *Jungenmadelbund* at the age of ten. However, as Alfons Heck, a former member of the Hitler Youth, explained in his memoir, children began learning about nationalism and the gloriousness of Hitler at age five or six when they entered elementary school.<sup>9</sup> After Hitler came to power in 1933, the laws concerning education changed. At this time all teachers who were Jewish were removed from their positions.<sup>10</sup> Teachers who remained were forced to join the National Socialist Teachers' League. If a teacher refused to join or did not agree with Nazi ideology he or she was dismissed. In contrast to the Weimar Republic, which left control of education to the individual states, the Nazi Party centralized control of education through the Reich Ministry of Education.<sup>11</sup>

In the early years of the Nazi regime the curriculum in schools was not changed because textbooks already contained a strong nationalist bias.<sup>12</sup> Government officials of the Weimar Republic had also understood the importance of glorifying Germany and building strong national character in the people of Germany. By the late 1930s and early 1940s school curricula had been changed to further the advancement of

the Nazi ideology. Boys and girls were taught about the superiority of the Nordic, or German, race over “inferior” races. History was taught in such a way as to show that all positive advances in civilization were made by those of the Nordic race. Textbooks, censored and approved by the government, reminded students that Aryans had been fighting evil Jews and their influence for centuries. Teachers glorified the idea of dying for Hitler and the Motherland.<sup>13</sup> Biology and science classes were used to teach racial ideology such as the idea of racial purity and heredity. Students learned that in order to keep the race pure they needed to mate with those of the same race to produce more of the superior race.<sup>14</sup> Students learned that people with hereditary diseases should not reproduce because they increased the number of the “unfit” race. According to Alfons Heck, it is important to understand that children were “learning Anti-Semitism, war and other aspects of Nazi ideology well before they joined the Hitler Youth. This type of ideology was expressed in primary school to children as young as six years old.”<sup>15</sup>

Many historians convincingly argue that the education of the Hitler Youth suffered greatly during the Nazi regime because intellectual education became second to physical education. As the Nazi regime gained power and changed the structure of German society, the Hitler Youth went from being an optional organization to a mandatory duty among the youth of Germany. Hitler himself said “A violently active, dominating, brutal youth...that is what I am after. Youth must be indifferent to pain...I will have no intellectual training. Knowledge is ruin to my young men.”<sup>16</sup>



Although uniformity played an important role during their schooling it is hard not to notice the serious look and different hairstyles that these individuals sport. Credit: Christopher Wagner.

Examples of this can be seen in the increased importance placed on physical education in every aspect of the youth’s life from school, to duties in the Hitler Youth. Boxing became a required class in school. Teachers allowed fighting in school. This would validate the ideas of survival of the fittest and might makes right. Alfons Heck, also, claimed that despite the benefits to the Hitler Youth, this increased emphasis on physical education “contributed to lower scholastic standards, since it claimed so much of our time and energy.”<sup>17</sup> The youth of Germany during this time were taught that only one way of thinking was acceptable: the Nazi way. Children were taught to accept Nazi ideology and to never question the order of a superior or authority figure.<sup>18</sup> This idea of acting on command without question would prove to be a major characteristic in the Hitler Youth military units used during World War II, a point to which I will return.

By the time children reached the age of ten they had been indoctrinated with National Socialist ideology. This belief in and commitment to the National Socialist Party ideals were reasons boys and girls joined Hitler Youth organizations. Yet, there were many other reasons to become part of this national movement. Hitler frequently expressed the importance of the youth to the future of Germany. He spoke of the

obligation of the youth to “be guarantors for the security of the existence and thus the future of the German people.”<sup>19</sup> This presented the youth of Germany with a noble goal that they must fulfill. The founding principle of the Hitler Youth was youth leading youth. Because of this principle, boys and girls were given the opportunity to be placed in powerful leadership positions. Hitler himself would speak to youth members, giving them the feeling that the leader of the country was listening to them.<sup>20</sup> This feeling of power and approval by Hitler was another reason to join the movement. These were two significant factors in the rapid growth of the Hitler Youth movement, especially for the older generation of members age 14-18. These aspects allowed young men and women to feel as if their involvement in the Hitler Youth would promote a better German future, and allow them the resources and power to accept their destiny in the Third Reich.<sup>21</sup>

These reasons alone were not the only motivators of boys and girls who joined the youth movement. Some members joined to rebel against their conservative parents. Others joined because the Hitler Youth organizations offered fun and exciting activities. Alfons Heck recalled, “I could barely contain my impatience,” to join the *Jungvolk* because like most ten year olds “I craved action.”<sup>22</sup> Heck continued by saying “Hitler Youth life seemed exciting, free from parental control and filled with ‘duties’ that were absolute pleasure.”<sup>23</sup> According to Herta Grabarz, a former member of the *Bund Deutscher Madel*, children joined because everyone did: “We didn’t want to be left behind, so we went along with it.”<sup>24</sup> The Nazi party, moreover, developed ways to attract impressionable youth. For example, they used intricate uniforms and medals to entice new members. It seems uniforms allowed the boys and girls to feel as if they were a part of the group that was returning Germany to greatness.

Those boys and girls who were eligible but did not join the Hitler Youth were subjected to harassment and physical threats at school and in public. Those who chose not to join the Hitler Youth were defined as enemies of the state.<sup>25</sup> As enemies of the state, cruelties to their person were of little significance to those following Nazi ideology. Oftentimes parents of children who were not members of the Hitler Youth were dismissed from their jobs or denied promotions. Many parents felt they had no choice but to encourage their children to join the Hitler Youth.<sup>26</sup> As children became adults, if they had not been a member of the Hitler Youth, their job options were extremely limited. This, too, caused parents to persuade their children to join the organization. Membership in the Hitler Youth was important to all aspects of a child’s social and academic life and to their future. By 1939 Hitler made membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory. With this new law membership numbers soared.<sup>27</sup>

Once a youth decided to join the organization, an examination into his or her background was conducted by the Nazi leader of the community to prove the candidate’s racial purity. As a member of the *Jungvolk*, boys were called *pimpfs* and had to keep records of their accomplishments in Hitler Youth activities. During a *pimpf* initiation a boy had to recite Nazi dogma, run sixty meters in twelve seconds and complete a day and a half cross country hike.<sup>28</sup> A *Pimpf* was expected to participate in small-arms drills, marching and learning Nazi ideology. At the age of fourteen his promotion into the *HJ* was only granted if the boy had successfully proved his abilities

as a physically fit keeper of Nazi beliefs. Most boys entered the General *HJ*. However, some outstanding boys could choose between three divisions of the *HitlerJugend*: the *Flieger HJ* (airforce), the Motor *HJ*, or the Marine *HJ*.<sup>29</sup>

The *Flieger HJ* was the most popular of the divisions, in which boys were trained in aviation. They were taught skills by building and flying glider planes. In the early years before World War II started, boys trained with gliders, and received their A, B or C class wings. They then attended two or three week training courses at an actual Luftwaffe base.<sup>30</sup> This was particularly exciting if a Luftwaffe pilot allowed the boy to co-pilot his bomber or fighter plane. When a boy reached the age of nineteen he became a member of the Air SA, which was a division of the Nazi party.<sup>31</sup>

The Motor *HJ* had one special requirement different from the other divisions: members had to be sixteen years old to join. Sixteen was the age at which German youth could officially receive a driver's license for a motorcycle. In this division members obtained driving techniques, complete mechanical knowledge and total knowledge of both national and international traffic codes. At age nineteen, members were expected to join a motorized unit in the driver's corps of the Wehrmacht.<sup>32</sup>

The Marine *HJ* trained boys in the art of sailing. While a member of the Marine *HJ*, boys could acquire all the necessary sailing certificates. Members also learned the importance of river navigation. Prior to the onset of World War II, members were given the opportunity to perform an exercise on one of two sailing ships used by the German navy. Men were expected to join the German naval forces at the age of nineteen.<sup>33</sup>

Young German girls had no special division within their organizations. In each organization the girls were taught to be dutiful wives and mothers. In the *Jungmadel*, girls learned Nazi songs and facts, competed in sports events, camped, hiked and attended youth "homes" in addition to numerous other physical activities.<sup>34</sup> As girls matured and became members of the *Bund Deutscher Madel* the activities began to revolve around skills needed for domestic chores and nursing. Hygiene was also taught along with information on how to be healthy mothers of fit Nazi children.<sup>35</sup> Members of the BdM were taught that a woman's duty was to serve her husband and raise healthy children while fulfilling her duties at home. At age nineteen when girls joined the Faith and Beauty organization, young women continued to participate in sports activities and hygiene education, but they also learned social graces including dancing and could attend schools for fashion design.<sup>36</sup>

## THE HITLER YOUTH AND EDUCATION

The Nazi regime created elite schools to train and educate the future military and government leaders of Nazi Germany. Students were chosen to attend these schools while still in primary school, after two years of service in the *Jungvolk*. The decisive criteria for selection were "blood and race," as well as grades and physical performance in school.<sup>37</sup> Two particular types of schools were created: the National Political Education Institutions, or *Napolas*, and the Adolf Hitler (AH) schools. Both types of schools were boarding schools for young men that emphasized the teaching of history,



biology and geography; however, physical strength, military skill, and obedience to the regime were also considered extremely important aspects of a student's education.<sup>38</sup> A difference between the *Napolas* and traditional schools was that the boys spent more time on physical training and military engagement. The *Napolas* were modeled after Prussian military cadet schools and their motto was, "Believe, Obey, Fight."<sup>39</sup> Another distinguishing feature of *Napolas* education was that the boys were required to do community service. Younger boys worked on farms gathering the harvest and older boys worked in steel foundries or coal mines.<sup>40</sup> *Napolas* were trained with an emphasis on duty, courage and simplicity. They were also taught to fully dedicate themselves to the National Socialist ideology and the protection of Germany.<sup>41</sup> At the age of eighteen, boys received their diplomas and opportunities for success in a military or government position of the Third Reich.

AH schools were another type of elite training boarding school for boys. These schools were designed to create future party and Hitler Youth leaders. AH schools were very similar to *Napolas* in that they taught Nazi ideology with a strong emphasis on physical and military training. The one striking difference between AH schools and *Napolas* was that in the former, students did not receive grades or take formal examinations.<sup>42</sup> They were judged according to their performance in general competitions. Students in AH schools tended to come from the lower middle class because elite Germans preferred traditional education at regular secondary schools and universities.<sup>43</sup>

It is estimated that by 1939 over 8 million Germans were part of the Hitler Youth organization.<sup>44</sup> By this time older children and teenagers had been indoctrinated with Nazi ideology and practices for six years. Many who came of age during this period knew no alternative to Nazism. Children joined for excitement and a sense of belonging. Teenagers continued membership because Nazi ideology was all they knew and most members believed that they were helping to create and protect a better Germany. As war began in 1939, the activities and the responsibilities of the Hitler Youth shifted. Members of the Hitler Youth would experience the effects of "total war" long before other German civilians.

## **HITLER YOUTH DURING WORLD WAR II**

As the war began, education of the Hitler Youth was again diminished as more military training took its place. The Nazi leaders wanted the youth to feel that they were crucial to the war effort. The help of the youth on the home front was invaluable to the victory of Germany.<sup>45</sup> Special tasks were given by Nazi community leaders to all divisions and organizations within the Hitler Youth. All groups, male and female, collected scrap metal and distributed ration cards once a month to village and city households. The *HitlerJugend* provided a messenger service between German military units and distributed draft cards to men of their villages. Boys also assisted police and firefighter units in their hometowns.<sup>46</sup> German units unfamiliar with the terrain relied on Hitler Youth to serve as guides. Boys were used to dig trenches and fortify breastworks. BdM members were sent to field hospitals to care for the wounded and

kindergartens to help with education. BdM members became typists and telephone operators, and also provided food and drink for troop trains in transit.<sup>47</sup>

In October of 1939 the Reich intensified military training for the Hitler Youth by implementing drills every weekend. After Germany's quick defeat of Poland, Hitler Youth units, consisting of boys fourteen to eighteen, were sent to the occupied territory and quickly put their military training to use. Hitler Youth squads oversaw the removal of Polish, Jewish and Slavic families from their farms and homes. It was the duty of the *Hitlerjugend* to make sure the families only took the most basic of their possessions.<sup>48</sup> Once Germany invaded Russia and acquired more territory, Hitler Youth squads were sent to organize additional units among the youth of racial Germans. This indoctrination of Nazi ideals among ethnic Germans in this area was especially difficult because oftentimes the people did not speak German. According to Alfons Heck, in the summer of 1940 it became compulsory for all males and females over fifteen years of age, including those in occupied territories, to perform land service for Germany.<sup>49</sup> During this time, the youth worked in the fields preparing the land for planting and harvesting crops.<sup>50</sup>

In 1940, British air raids over Berlin increased in response to the Blitz over London. Now the *Hitlerjugend* boys who had been serving as air raid wardens and anti-aircraft gun assistants since the beginning of war were launched into action. Because of the increased need for able-bodied soldiers, it became possible in 1940 for boys and girls who were called to war service to receive their school leaving certificate without taking the customary formal examinations.<sup>51</sup> This was another step taken towards the deterioration of the educational system in Germany under the Third Reich.

As the war continued, the structure of the Hitler Youth was reorganized. Prior to 1941 there had been fourteen different departments; after 1941 there were three: military training, deployment and ideological education.<sup>52</sup> This reorganization served as a turning point for the role of the Hitler Youth in World War II. The Hitler Youth would no longer work in relative safety from danger; they would now use their military skills and training to protect Germany against the Allies, even if it meant serving on the front lines.

As bombing raids began to increase in Germany, evacuation camps, or *Kinderlandverschickung* (KLV), came into operation in 1941.<sup>53</sup> Children ages six to nine were evacuated from cities and sent to live with rural families. Children ages ten to sixteen were sent to segregated KLV camps. The camps served as schools and houses for the youth who were evacuated. The camps were controlled by a Hitler Youth Squad Leader and a Nazi approved teacher.<sup>54</sup> Hitler Youth leaders had dominant power in the camps. Because of these Hitler Youth leaders, more emphasis was placed on military and physical training than education.<sup>55</sup> Parents had little choice about sending their children to these camps. Once children were placed in the camps the only contact they had with their parents was through censored letters.<sup>56</sup> Even during war the Nazi regime found ways to manipulate situations in order to tighten their hold on the youth of Germany.

In 1942 mandatory war training camps were created for boys ages sixteen to eighteen “under the supervision of the Wehrmacht.”<sup>57</sup> Boys, with the appropriate racial characteristics, in defeated territories were also mandated to attend these camps, which included three weeks of basic military training, plus specialized training in the use of German infantry weapons and leadership preparation.<sup>58</sup> Once the boys completed this training they were expected to enter the army or Luftwaffe. However, as the war continued and more able-bodied soldiers were needed, German military training decreased and the boys’ missions became more dangerous.

After the surrender of the German army at Stalingrad and the recognition by some German leaders of the plausibility of German defeat, there again came a change in the Hitler Youth’s role in the war. The Nazi leaders now put greater responsibility in the hands of the Hitler Youth. In December of 1943 a decree was issued which called for increased efforts of the *HitlerJugend* on the home front. This decree gave the HJ an official status in the war effort for the first time.<sup>59</sup> However, the transformation of the Hitler Youth to actual soldiers experienced many setbacks. Many leaders of the HJ were volunteering or being called up for military service, which resulted in the promotions of inexperienced younger members.<sup>60</sup> In other cases, older military veterans were appointed to lead units, contradicting the Hitler Youth motto of “youth leading youth.”

1943 was a year of many changes for the Hitler Youth. The most notable unit of the Hitler Youth used during World War II was the 12<sup>th</sup> SS Panzer Division. In 1943, as total war engulfed Europe the idea occurred to the military create a special division of the Hitler Youth.<sup>61</sup> Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, was against this idea, fearing it would provide the enemy with propaganda against Germany. However, Hitler overruled Goebbels in June of 1943 to create the *Waffen SS*, which became the 12<sup>th</sup> SS Panzer Division *HitlerJugend*.<sup>62</sup>

In August of the same year ten thousand boys, most under the age of seventeen, arrived in Belgium to begin training.<sup>63</sup> The boys in this unit were trained for actual combat, not simply marching and standing at attention. In contrast to German units consisting of older men, a great emphasis was placed on building informal relationships between officers and the soldier-boys.<sup>64</sup> The soldiers of this division were given special rations and received an additional sweet ration instead of a ration of cigarettes, which all other military units received.<sup>65</sup> It is ironic that the leaders of Nazi Germany would not give a boy under the age of eighteen a cigarette, but they would recruit, enlist, train and create a boy soldier to be sent off to battle to die for the Fatherland.

The Battle of Normandy in 1944 became the 12<sup>th</sup> SS Panzer Division *HitlerJugend*’s first introduction into battle. In the beginning the division experienced some success by stalling British and Canadian forces near Caen.<sup>66</sup> However, as American reinforcements arrived the Hitler Youth was devastated. Within a month of fighting the Hitler Youth division had suffered casualties that equaled: 20% of boys killed, 40% of boys wounded or missing, and 50% of the units’ armored vehicles and tanks had been destroyed or lost.<sup>67</sup> After Normandy the 12<sup>th</sup> SS Panzer Division *Hitlerjungend* continued to exist, but the recruits became younger and younger as the last vestiges of

Germany's manpower were used. In 1945 when the division surrendered to American troops over 9,000 boys had sacrificed their lives for Germany and the Fuhrer.<sup>68</sup>

The loss of thousands of young lives did not stop Nazi leaders from continuing to exploit the fanatical Hitler Youth. These boys were willing to sacrifice their lives for the Fuhrer and Germany until the very end of the war, even after the older generations had realized the defeat of Germany. The creation of the home front security guard, *Volkssturm*, in 1944 required old men and young boys to take up arms and protect villages, towns and cities while the men of Germany were fighting on the front.<sup>69</sup> Young boys of the Hitler Youth were sent to round up the old men in the community. All members of the *Volkssturm* were trained in the use of German bazookas, anti-tank weapons. Units were often commanded by high ranking members of the HJ who were often under the age of eighteen. In 1944 the minimum age limit for military action was 14. By 1945, boys as young as twelve were armed to protect the home front.<sup>70</sup> Despite the age requirements, boys even younger than twelve also participated in these units. According to Heck, most boys age eight and up had learned to fire a German bazooka.<sup>71</sup>

The Nazi leadership in 1944 also began preparing female military auxiliaries, known as *Wehrmachthelferinnenkorps*. Young women had to swear allegiance to Hitler, the Fuhrer and commander in chief of the Wehrmacht.<sup>72</sup> Girls were trained on how to use German infantry weapons. As the war progressed even girls who could not fire a machine gun were called to man anti-aircraft batteries.<sup>73</sup> The later years of World War II called to duty every man, woman and child of Germany.

In the final days of World War II, just prior to the Fuhrer's suicide, Hitler Youth units were called upon to defend the capital city of Berlin. Boys and girls were sent to the gun towers surrounding three points of the city, manning anti-aircraft guns night and day. Hitler Youth were also serving on all fronts in Berlin. The boys who were proficient in the use of bazookas would use these weapons to destroy Russian tanks in a type of guerilla warfare.<sup>74</sup> The youth fighting to defend Berlin had heard of the cruelty of the Russian Army, so they were fighting with a "kill or be killed" mentality.<sup>75</sup> After one month of desperate fighting, Berlin was overtaken by the Red Army. Three days later the Nazi regime surrendered. In the end, of 5,000 Hitler Youth called upon to protect Berlin only 500 survived.<sup>76</sup>

Hitler's last public appearance on April 20, 1945, ten days before his suicide, was to Hitler Youth who were receiving the Iron Cross for bravery. According to Heck, who was interviewed in the documentary film, *Heil Hitler: Confessions of a Hitler Youth*, many young people were eager to die for Hitler knowing that Germany would be defeated.<sup>77</sup> After Hitler's death, soldiers and boys were told that he was killed in action, not that he committed suicide. Many *HitlerJugend* preferred to die than live in Germany without the Fuhrer.<sup>78</sup>

Since the beginning of the Third Reich, the youth had been indoctrinated with Nazi ideology and the ideas of strength and power over intelligence and wisdom. These young men and women had been raised in a society where hate and violence were bred against weaker or inferior people. The children of Nazi Germany were taught

to worship Adolf Hitler and follow the orders of their leaders without question. The *HitlerJugend* dominated every aspect of the lives of children from school to home. These young men and women were fanatic followers of the Nazi regime completely believing in the creation and superiority of the master race in Germany and willing to die for the Fatherland.

The Hitler Youth serving in World War II, either on the home front or on the battlefield, were victims of the abuses of power and idealism. These young men and women fell prey to the wants and desires of a regime founded on hate and racism. Many fought a bitter war protecting the Nazi ideology and sacrificed their most prized possession: their lives. Alfons Heck said it best when he stated, "The experience of the Hitler Youth in Nazi Germany constitutes a massive case of child abuse. Out of millions of basically innocent children, Hitler and his regime succeeded in creating potential monsters. Could it happen again today? Of course it can."<sup>79</sup> The children of the Hitler Youth were made to believe in the ideals of the Nazi regime; in the aftermath of war they were forced to acknowledge the horrors and atrocities committed by the leaders, whom they admired and obeyed. The actions committed by these children and the ideals in which they whole-heartedly believed would haunt them throughout the de-Nazification process and for the remainder of their lives. The challenges of coming to terms with the carnage of the Nazi regime and the part played by the Hitler Youth would be a lasting struggle as the surviving youth worked to rebuild Germany after the war.

Young boys beating drums in a wild frenzy while at a NAZI function.  
Credit:  
Christopher Wagner.





## THE PALMER RAIDS: WHEN AMERICA BURNED RED

by David M. Seaman

In the early evening of January 2, 1920, agents of the Department of Justice sat ready at their posts in thirty-three cities across America awaiting the commencement of a nation-wide strike against the organizations known as the Communist Party of America and the Communist Labor Party of America. The offensive had been carefully and systematically planned and the agents had received confidential instructions just a week before from the office of the Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer.

The agents had been split into groups, each with its own leader and objectives. Each team carried a list of all local meeting places as well as the names and addresses of officers and heads of the organizations they were to arrest. Any persons in the presence of those arrested were also to be apprehended. The agents were to conduct thorough searches of all suspects, meeting places, and houses, and confiscate all literature, membership records, correspondence, and pictures on the walls of the meeting places as evidence. They were to move promptly and simultaneously at 8:30 P.M. and without exception, were to remain on duty until relieved.

Above: Political cartoons played a role in how the media portrayed the raids. This political cartoon was found on the front page of the Rocky Mountain News Monday, January 5, 1920. Credit: Rocky Mountain News.

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At the appointed time, the federal agents moved swiftly into action, withdrawing from their posts and descending upon hundreds of meeting halls, houses, and tenements in cities across the country. In New York, Special Agent Frank Francisco moved with his men throughout Manhattan. They ascended the stairs to the headquarters of the First Assembly District Communist Party and came upon a locked door, which they promptly knocked down. In a flash, the agents had fifty men up against the wall searching them for incriminating evidence. Still in New York City, Special Agent Joseph Tucker conducted many rapid, successive raids, including the Second Assembly District Communist Club, the headquarters of the Communist Labor Party, and the printing office of the *Communist World*, rounding up scores of men and literature. Another team of agents raided the printing offices of *Novy Mir*, a Russian publication, taking with them several truckloads of literature. The agents advanced through the city into the early hours of the morning, raiding thirteen Communist Party and Communist Labor Party headquarters and bringing in over seven hundred suspects, who were taken to Ellis Island to await deportation.

In New Jersey, the raiding was just as swift, as Justice Department agents and local police swept through the city centers. Agents in Newark, with the assistance of American Legion men, promptly left the Federal Building at 8:30, climbing into fifteen automobiles and dispersing throughout the city to carry out their objectives. They pounced upon the offices of the First Russian Branch, the Second Russian Branch, and the Ukrainian Branch of the Communist Party, as well as the local headquarters of the Communist Labor Party, apprehending over 300 radicals.

In Chicago, John T. Creighton, special assistant to Attorney General Palmer, set out to round up every radical in the city and its surrounding suburbs. His agents stormed the many meeting halls and homes, including the headquarters of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.), which just the day before had been raided and searched.<sup>1</sup> As Creighton's dragnet swept up hundreds of radicals, the city's jails began to overflow due to the hundreds of suspects taken the day before.

From coast to coast, the raids continued through the night and into the morning. By noon the next day, William J. Flynn, Chief of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, who directed the New York raids from the comfort of his government headquarters, believed "that with these raids, the backbone of the radical movement in this country [had] been broken." Yet, federal agents and local police continued to crack down into the evening hours of January 3. When the raids finally came to a halt and the numbers were tallied, those who glimpsed the headlines of the *New York Times* on January 4 would have read:

*"REDS PLOTTED COUNTY-WIDE STRIKE"  
"ARRESTS EXCEED 5,000, 2,635 HELD"  
"THREE TRANSPORTS READY FOR THEM."*

Justice Department officials confidently report, "that the nation-wide raids had blasted the most menacing revolutionary plot yet unearthed." Every arrested alien and US citizen was held on charges of belonging to an organization, which taught or

advocated the overthrow of the government by force or violence. Under this charge, all aliens were to be deported and all US citizens were to be tried under state laws of criminal syndicalism and anarchy. The evidence against them had been seized during the raids and consisted of books, newspapers, charters, red flags, communist membership cards, and even photographs of Lenin and Trotsky. For the majority of Americans, however, no evidence was needed to rid their country of these feared and detested alien radicals. Before the dust of the raiding even settled, evangelist Billy Sunday praised the heavy hand of the Justice Department and offered his personal enlightened alternative to deportation: "I would stand everyone of the ornery, wide-eyed I.W.W.'s, anarchist, crazy socialists, and any other types of Reds up before a firing squad and save space on our ships."<sup>2</sup>

### **PALMER: AMERICANISM, ANARCHIST OR RED SCARE PROPAGANDA?**

The raids discussed above were the second in a series of nation-wide raids carried out by the Justice Department against radicals during 1919 and 1920, which later became known as the Palmer Raids. Under the guise of Americanism, Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer and his Justice Department arrested thousands of aliens and citizens alike - in many cases without warrants, - and held them in custody, during which they were denied the due process of law and abused by Justice Department agents as a means of procuring evidence to be used against them. With the ultimate goal of deporting all radical aliens, Palmer was fervently sweeping the United States clean of what he saw to be dangerous foreign elements polluting the national body, whose ultimate goal, he professed, was to overthrow the government, its laws and institutions, and replace it with "the horror and terrorism of bolshevik [sic] tyranny."<sup>3</sup>

As the Great Red Scare of 1919-1920 engulfed America in a state of national frenzy, it served as both a stimulant and a pretext for Palmer's campaign. In turn, the Red Scare itself was a symptom of a rampant nativism that had gripped America in the



A. Mitchell Palmer on the stump. Palmer would use this platform any time he was given in order to further his criticism of the Red insurgents.  
Credit: Library of Congress.

early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as waves of eastern and southern European immigrants were arriving into the country. This native, xenophobic attitude only intensified during World War I as the wartime movement of 100% Americanism began to boil over. Following the armistice of World War I on November 11, 1918, this nativism was mobilized into a revitalization movement, which attempted not only to bring recovery to an America characterized by widespread social disruption, but also to form a coherent national identity.

In the mist of this super patriotism, the devious enemy Hun agents, who were believed to have been behind any and every act of sabotage during the war, were now dangerous Bolsheviks lurking in every alley, intent on setting American democracy ablaze with their torch of anarchy. The postwar situation in Europe did little to ease the American consciousness. President Wilson's calls for a fourteen-point Democracy

appeared to be faltering in the face of Lenin's calls for world revolution. In January 1919, a communist group moved against the young German republic, and in March a communist regime took power in Hungary. It looked as if the rest of Eastern Europe would also succumb to this revolutionary fervor, as it continued to spread.

In America, war orders were being canceled, prices were rising, labor was dissenting, and violent social upheavals like the Centralia Massacre and the May Day Riots were becoming the order of the day.<sup>4</sup> Those who espoused the nativist and xenophobic attitudes of the time blamed their country's woes on a radical Red menace and were intent on exterminating this disease by any means necessary. At a victory loan pageant in the nation's capital, the audience gave a standing ovation when an infuriated spectator shot a man for refusing to stand during the performance of the *Star-Spangled Banner*.<sup>5</sup> During a film documentary in New York a man commended the policies of the Bolshevik regime and was not only beaten by the audience but also arrested for disturbing the peace.<sup>6</sup> Events like these were applauded in the newspapers, which fanned the flames of the hatred, fear and distrust toward the radical left. The majority of labor strikes – over four million workers took part in 3,600 strikes in 1919<sup>7</sup> – even if organized by the moderate American Federation of Labor, were reported as Bolshevik instigated and signaled the beginning of a lawless and violent revolution in America. From all sides came calls for an anti-Red crusade, and when bombs exploded during that heated summer of 1919, the strong arm of the Federal Government would be compelled to retaliate with force.

#### **NEFARIOUS BOMB PLOTS UNCOVERED**

At the end of April the authorities uncovered a bomb plot. On April 29, a package addressed to Senator Thomas W. Hardwick exploded when his maid opened it, blowing off her hands. The next morning, eleven more mail bombs were discovered in a New York City post office. The packages were carefully dismantled and they all bore the return address of the Gimbel Brothers department store. The Gimbel Brothers vehemently denied any responsibility for the packages. Several more of these malicious packages were intercepted the next day before reaching their intended targets. In all, thirty-six parcels were discovered, addressed to government officials including the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of Labor, and prominent businessmen such as John D. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan.

Because some of the intended victims were known to be anti-Bolshevik and had engaged in various efforts to suppress the radical labor movement, police authorities promptly declared that the “conspiracy had every earmark of an I.W.W.-Bolshevik origin.”<sup>8</sup> Newspapers across the country gave their headlines to the deadly postal bomb conspiracy, claiming it had been a Red-plot to unleash chaos throughout America on May Day. The newspapers followed the investigations closely, sensationalizing every significant new lead detectives uncovered. By the end of May the investigations had failed to turn up a single responsible conspirator, and the story quietly disappeared from the papers. The talk of anarchistic bomb conspiracies, however, did not leave the public eye for long.

In the late night hours of June 3, bombs exploded in eight major cities across America. The infernal machines blasted into public buildings and the houses of Mayors, Judges, and Congressmen in Cleveland, Philadelphia, New York, and other cities, leaving a night watchman and three of the bombers dead. In Washington, a bomb blew in the front of Attorney General Palmer's House. Detectives concluded that the bomb had detonated prematurely, which had saved the lives of Palmer and his family, but destroyed the bomber, whose body was blown throughout the neighborhood. Scattered around the street in front of the Attorney General's house, detectives found anarchist leaflets and an Italian-English dictionary. The leaflets were titled *Plain Words*, and signed by "The Anarchist Fighters." The message of the letter was extreme, closing with the lines: "There will have to be bloodshed; we will not dodge; there will have to be murder; we will kill, because it is necessary; there will have to be destruction; we will destroy to rid the world of your tyrannical institutions."<sup>9</sup>

If the April postal bomb plot had not already convinced the majority of the American public that radicals were intent on the violent destruction of America democracy, then news reports of the June bombings would have more than persuaded them that "the anarchist conspiracy revealed in [the] bomb attacks" proved that "the same persons who a few weeks ago mailed bombs broadcast to prominent men . . . were responsible for [this] last outrage in the opinion of the various agencies in both the municipal and Federal Governments working on the case." The *Plain Words* leaflets scattered around the street in front of the Attorney General's wrecked home, were evidence enough that "anarchists of Bolsheviki [sic]" exploded the bombs<sup>10</sup>

The hysterical Red-baiting news reports of the bombings were filled with unsubstantiated claims of a devious Red plot to overthrow the government and they did not go without suspicion. Shortly after the April postal bomb plot, the Socialist Party sent out its response, and referred to the postal bombs as an obvious "plant, concocted by the police or some other secret or so-called intelligence department." The June 3 bombings met with the same apprehension from the left. John Reed, author of the book *Ten Days That Shook the World*, told the *New York Tribune* on June 4, that "the present series of bomb explosions bears all the marks of the first series . . . clearly . . . these bombs were planted by some one who was interested in terrifying the ruling class into destroying the radical labor movement in this country."<sup>11</sup>

The bomb plots of April and June were never solved, yet the damage was done and the consequences were clear. Attorney General Palmer summed up the paranoid and patriotic anti-Red sentiments of the time when he later recollected the state of the nation as the summer of 1919 came to a close:

*Like a prairie-fire, the blaze of revolution was sweeping over every American institution of law and order . . . It was eating its way into the homes of the American workman, its sharp tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the altars of the churches, leaping into the belfry of the school bell, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society.<sup>12</sup>*

Having narrowly escaped death, Palmer was shocked. With newspapers, Congress, and the majority of Americans calling for the heads of radicals, and with his eye on the presidency, Palmer began to gear up the Department of Justice for a belligerent anti-Red crusade.

### **HOOVER: PREPARATIONS FOR A RED SCARE UPRISING**

On June 17, he met with his subordinates and they planned a mass round up and planned deportation of alien radicals. He immediately submitted a request to congress for additional funds and created a new department in the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation called the Radical Division, which was charged with collecting information on the country's radical movement. Palmer brought in a fervently motivated, baby-faced twenty-four years old by the name of J. Edgar Hoover to head the new department. The young Hoover was a likely candidate for the job, as he had worked during the war in the Alien Enemy Bureau of the Justice Department, deciding the fate of German aliens. Because enemy aliens had no protection of rights during the war, Hoover had experienced first hand how swift administrative procedures could take the place of the uncertainties in the legal process. Thus, he brought with him a detailed understanding of the administrative procedures dealing with aliens. He also brought with him a proud, bureaucratic, middle class Americanism, which took great pride in the preservation of a government believed to be threatened by radicals, and an American way of life believed to be decomposing in the face of the immoral and dangerous foreigner.<sup>13</sup>

Hoover began a massive undertaking of familiarizing himself with the enemy. He organized a team of translators and readers, who monitored over 400 domestic and foreign radical publications. He immersed himself with radical writings from Marx to Trotsky, becoming the government's expert authority on radicalism. In a few short months, Hoover boasted a card catalog with an index of over 60,000 "radically inclined" individuals, publications, and organizations.<sup>14</sup> Armed with an extensive knowledge of the enemy – perhaps more extensive than the enemy itself, - the Department of Justice needed now to find the best method of carrying out their plans.

Palmer and Hoover realized that under the existing laws it would be quite difficult to get at US citizen radicals. There were two existing statutes of the federal criminal code that could be used in dealing with anarchy, but they were of no use to Palmer's ultimate goals, because they would not allow the Justice Department to get at radicals before a crime took place.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, they would desperately push a criminal sedition law before congress, but until then, they would take advantage of the existing immigration laws to put down radical aliens. The Immigration Act of 1917 and its amendment of October 16, 1918 gave Palmer and Hoover the vehicle, with which to get at radical aliens. The Act of October 16, 1918 provided:

*(1) aliens who disbelieve in or advocate or teach the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States shall be deported; (2) aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States shall be deported.*<sup>16</sup>

The success of using this act to sweep America of radical aliens, however, would require close cooperation with the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Labor. The deportation process during this time was administrative rather than judicial. After being arrested under a warrant issued from the Department of Labor, the alien would receive an administrative hearing from an immigration inspector who would submit his decision and the supporting evidence to the Department of Labor. There the Secretary of Labor would make the final decision regarding deportation. In the event that the Secretary of Labor decided on deportation, the alien would have the right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.<sup>17</sup>

Under these procedures, which Hoover knew so well from his time spent in the Alien Enemy Bureau, he was confident that radical aliens could be pushed through this administrative procedure wholesale and found deportable on the grounds of membership in a radical organization. Thus, the one thing left was to convince the Secretary of Labor that certain radical organizations fell under the Act of October 16, 1918, so that warrants could be issued and deportation would be ordered. Armed with his vast card catalog on the ultra-radicals, Hoover set to work.

The most obvious suspects at this time were the Union of Russian Workers, whom the Department of Labor had previously established as accountable under the Act of October 16, 1918.<sup>18</sup> The organization, which for the most part served as a meeting place for Russians, consisted of roughly 5,000 members at this time. Hoover was able to get his hands on some of the union's membership records and hurriedly forwarded the names of 600 members to the Department of Labor asking for warrants of arrests.<sup>19</sup>

After months of preparation and planning, it was time for the Justice Department to strike. In carrying out these first assessment raids on the Union of Russian Workers, they would not only have the chance to test their plan of swift mass arrest and deportation, but also assess the resulting public response. They chose November 7, 1919, the second anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, as the best "psychological moment to strike," the *New York Times* reported.<sup>20</sup>

#### **NOVEMBER 7, 1919: THE ASSESSMENT RAIDS**

Armed with the Department of Labor warrants, Justice Department agents coordinated sweeping raids on Union of Russian Worker's halls, Russian People's Homes and other meeting places of radicals in over 18 cities. They busted down doors and broke up meetings, arresting hundreds of people. They smashed apart desks, pulled up carpets, and even sounded the walls, searching and seizing masses of literature, membership records, and other documents. Those arrested were then herded back to various detention centers for immediate interrogation.



The raiding was carried out mercilessly in New York City at the Russian Peoples House located at 133 E. Fifteenth St. There, Justice Department agents brought along the bomb squad and they surrounded the building. Inside, several educational classes were in session, where students were studying English, Russian and arithmetic. As the *New York Times* so cleverly explained the next morning: “those within had not the slightest idea of what was coming.” Police and agents swarmed the building, busting into classrooms with the rapid command of: “Out into the hall everybody . . . line up there and don’t make any noise.” When a few of the women questioned what was going on, they received the response to “shut up, there, you, if you know what’s good for you.”<sup>21</sup>

Mitchel Lavrowsky was teaching algebra when a Justice Department agent walked into the classroom holding a gun. He ordered Lavrowsky to step forward and remove his glasses. The agent then slammed his elbow into the man’s face. Two other agents brutally beat him and threw him down the stairs, where two other officers further beat him with pieces of wood they had broken off the banisters.<sup>22</sup>

In another classroom, detectives ordered everyone out in the hall. As the students filed out of the room one by one, they received blows from two detectives standing on either side of the doorway. Nicaoli Melikoff was struck on the head. He was the last one to leave the room; one of the detectives knocked him down, thrust his knee into Melikoff’s back, and bent his body back until blood flowed from his mouth and nose. The detective then ordered him to the sink to wash his face before throwing him down the stairs. He was then taken to the waiting transport outside.<sup>23</sup> As one group of agents herded the prisoners back to the Department of Justice offices at 13 Park Row, to be bandaged up and interrogated, another group of agents stayed behind, senselessly destroying the offices and classrooms.

Hundreds of suspects were arrested during these November 7 raids. Judging from some local figures, it seems that many more were apprehended than the 600 Department of Labor warrants had provided for. In New York City for example, there were 200 arrested but only twenty-seven warrants issued. 150 were arrested in Newark with only thirty-six warrants having been issued.<sup>24</sup> A majority of those apprehended during the raids were released after interrogation - some by proving citizenship, and others by lack of sufficient evidence for a conviction. Those prisoners, where enough evidence was found for deportation, were transported to Ellis Island.

Palmer and his Justice Department were treated like national heroes, as remarks of praise flowed from newspaper headlines the next morning. The *New York Times* exclaimed how “Palmer’s Blow Friday Hit Leaders of Russian Society.” The *Times* continued to quote the Attorney General as saying, “This is the first big step, to rid the country of these foreign trouble makers.”<sup>25</sup> During the ensuing weeks, many small mop-up raids were carried out through the country, bringing in more aliens to join those already waiting at Ellis Island.

Dizzy with success, Palmer and Hoover continued planning phase two of their anti-Red crusade, which would make the November 7, 1919 raids seem frivolous in comparison. The two had been plotting this next move since September 1919, when

the left wing of the Socialist Party split and formed the Communist Party of America and the Communist Labor Party. With tens of thousands of radicals - the majority of them being aliens - coming under organizations, which openly expressed their beliefs in the form of a constitution, Hoover had immediately set to work preparing briefs on the organizations to convince the Secretary of Labor that aliens were deportable on grounds of membership in these parties.

In his brief on the Communist Party of America, Hoover analyzed with utmost scrutiny the manifesto of the Third Communist International, and the constitution and platform of the Communist Party of America. Using numerous quotations from these documents, Hoover exposed the organization as advocating "doctrines for the overthrow of the Government of the United States, not by parliamentary action but by direct action or mass action, which . . . means force and violence. Thus the Communist Party of America stands indicted under the Act of October 16, 1918." Furthermore, because all applicants for party membership were to sign an application stating that they had read the constitution and program of the party and would adhere to its principles and tactics, Hoover declared there would be no doubt of individual responsibility and that mere membership would be evidence enough for deportation. In his Communist Labor Party brief, Hoover simply claimed the practices and principles were "practically the same" as the Communist Party, therefore making the organization subject to the Act of Oct. 16, 1918.<sup>26</sup>

With everything going according to plan and public opinion in favor of the Justice Department's actions, Palmer rode the tide of the November raids to a dramatic climax. Shortly before Christmas, he delivered on his promises of deportation. In the early morning hours of December 21, 1919 the army transport Buford began its journey to the Soviet Union carrying a cargo of 249 accused Reds, closely guarded by 250-armed soldiers. As the Buford sailed out of its New York Harbor, Palmer boldly promised more deportations in the coming weeks.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile, Palmer and Hoover finished up preparations for the second nationwide raids. In December, acting Secretary of Labor, John Abercrombie, affixed his signature to 3,000 Justice Department warrants for members of the Communist Party and Communist Labor Party. By the request of Hoover and on recommendation from the Commissioner General of Immigration, Anthony Camenitti, Abercrombie also signed away the due process of Law, by changing Rule 22 in the deportation statutes. The new Rule 22 stripped the alien of the right to counsel, the right to hear the charges against him, and the right to inspect the warrant and evidence used against him.<sup>28</sup>

With the alien now stripped of the right of counsel, the Justice Department had turned the deportation process into a cold and callous assembly line, by which they hoped to rid the country of those evil foreign insurgents with the utmost efficiency. Palmer wasted no time, he fixed the date of the raids for January 2, 1920 and had secret instructions issued to every agent informing them to "arrange with [their] under-cover informants to have meetings of the COMMUNIST PARTY and COMMUNIST LABOR PARTY held on the night set."<sup>29</sup>

## JANUARY 2, 1920: THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR PALMER

The nation-wide raids of January 2, 1920, were of a colossal scale. The Justice Department nabbed over 5,000 suspects throughout the country in as little as twenty-four hours, and continued mop-up operations in the weeks following. Just as the November raids and the sailing of the *Buford* had boosted Palmer and his Justice Department to national stardom, the successful January raids against the Communist Party and Communist Labor Party kept them there. "Revolution Is Smashed," exclaimed a headline of the *New York Times* two days after the raids, and followed the claim with a call for more ships, like the *Buford*; to deport the 2,635 "perfect cases" Palmer claimed to be holding for deportation.<sup>30</sup>

With high presidential ambitions, and the Democratic National Convention approaching in the spring, Palmer found himself in an excellent position. His glory however, would not last long. Apprehending upwards of 5,000 Reds and holding more than half that many, situations in Jails turned to chaos, immigration officers quickly became bogged down with deportation cases as the detention centers over-filled, and for the first time since Palmer had launched his anti-Red crusade, dissent began to build. The first sign came on January 12, when United States Attorney of Philadelphia, Francis Fisher Kane, sent a letter of resignation to President Wilson, explaining that he felt "out of sympathy with the anti-radical policies of Mr. Palmer and his actions of carrying them out."<sup>31</sup> More cracks appeared in the ensuing weeks, as some newspapers and liberal magazines such as *The Nation* began exposing the shocking conditions at certain detention centers.

At the beginning of March 1920, acting Secretary of Labor Abercrombie became quite disturbed by the massive amounts of deportation cases before him and took leave. At this time, Palmers 2,635 Red cases for deportation came before the decision of Abercrombie's replacement, Louis F. Post. Upon plunging into the thousands of cases massed before him, Post found, "the whole 'red' [sic] crusade stood revealed as a stupendous and cruel fake."<sup>32</sup> From March 3, 1920 to April 10, 1920 Post decided on 1,600 Red deportation cases, canceling 1,140 of these.

The majority of the deportation warrants examined by Post were cases, in which the alien was charged only with membership in the Communist Party. In cases where membership had been transferred from another club or union, or membership was based on illegally seized evidence, Post canceled the deportations. He ordered the release of all those who were being held with no warrants and in most cases reduced the bail of prisoners, which the Department of Justice had purposely set at high levels. Upon reviewing the facts of the Communist Labor Party, Post found that the organization was not subject to the Act of October 16, 1918, because they did not adhere to the same constitution and platform as the Communist Party. Bringing this fact to the attention of Secretary of Labor, Wilson, all cases of membership in the Communist Labor Party were canceled.<sup>33</sup>

Post's actions as acting Secretary of Labor infuriated Palmer and Hoover. With the cancellation of thousands of deportation cases, their anti-Red crusade came to a halt. Branding Post a friend of anarchists, Palmer demanded that impeachment

charges be brought against him. In May, Post appeared before the House Committee on Rules and confidently testified to his defense. After proving his behavior in the deportation cases as that of a consciences and loyal government officer, Post then exposed the madness of the whole anti-Red crusade to the committee, maintaining that the Justice Department seemed to be abusing the rights of Americans rather than protecting them.

Just as Post was being cleared of the charges, the hideous illegality of the raids came to the attention of the American people in wholesale amounts. In May, the National Popular Government League published and distributed a pamphlet entitled *To the American People: Report Upon The Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice*. The pamphlet, prepared by twelve prominent lawyers, including the Dean of Harvard Law School, clearly exposed the Justice Department's flagrant disregard of the United States Constitution and its laws. The lawyers charged the Department of Justice with violations under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments and provided a mass of evidence to substantiate their accusations. As this pamphlet made its way to Senators, newspapers and religious groups throughout the country, it became very clear that the Justice Department had undermined those same principles and laws they were charged with upholding.<sup>34</sup>

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution entitles:

*The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.*<sup>35</sup>

Violation of this constitutional amendment was evident in the wholesale arrests of hundreds of citizens and aliens without warrants or with illegitimate warrants. Those who were apprehended without warrants were either released, or detained until a warrant was finally produced, sometimes weeks after their arrest. In many cases, the warrants themselves were quite defective.<sup>36</sup>

One method that became a common practice of agents during the raids was to wire requests for telegraph warrants of those already arrested. In the three weeks following the January 1920 raids, the Justice Department sent 2,750 names to Caminetti, requesting warrants to be telegraphed to detention centers.<sup>37</sup> So many arrests without warrants were not just mistakes due to the resulting confusion of the sheer amount of raids or the immoral behavior of a few overly eager agents, but rather specifically authorized by Washington. It was made explicitly clear by the secret instructions issued to all Justice Department agents on December 27, 1919, that "in cases where arrests are made of persons not covered by warrants, you should at once request . . . for warrants."<sup>38</sup>

Even in the areas where the agents bothered bringing the warrants along on the raids,<sup>39</sup> there was no probable cause by which they had been issued. The instructions to the agents had made clear the grounds for the arrests to be based solely upon membership

in the Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party, yet these organizations were not even established as illegal organizations under the Act of October 16, 1918 until a whole month later, on January 24, 1920.

With no search warrants, Justice Department agents searched the meeting rooms of organizations and the homes of hundreds of aliens and citizens, seizing massive amounts of property. In doing so, the agents were once again merely following the secret instructions from Washington. During a raid in New Hampshire, Sedar Seachuch asked the agent to see the search warrant, to which the agent showed Seachuch his fist and said, "this is your warrant, and continued to search the room."<sup>40</sup> Washington had simply left the agents to their own devices: "I leave it entirely to your discretion as to the method by which you should gain access to such places. If, due to the local conditions in your area, you find it is absolutely necessary to obtain a search warrant for the premises, you should contact the local authorities a few hours before . . . the arrests . . . and request a warrant to search the premises."<sup>41</sup>

Along with the violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Justice Department belligerently tarnished the Eighth Amendment's guarantee that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."<sup>42</sup> In order to hold their prisoners indefinitely, the Justice Department, in many cases, had set bail at levels ten times higher than what the Department of Labor had fixed.<sup>43</sup> Before the House Committee on Rules, Palmer was questioned about this and reasoned that the bail was fixed at such an unreachable amount based on past cases where alien anarchists were released on bail and failed to report back for deportation.<sup>44</sup>

In this period of indefinite detention, many times in make shift jails, prisoners were kept sometimes for several months, where they were subjected to unsanitary and dangerous conditions and malicious interrogations by Justice Department agents. Following the January 2, 1920 raids in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 97 prisoners were taken to the Hartford city jail, where for five months they slept on iron bunks with no mattresses or covers. There the prisoners were beaten, threatened with being lynched and were thrown in small punishment rooms above the boiler room of the building. There they were subject to scorching temperatures with no ventilation for periods of thirty-six to sixty hours. During the five months of solitary confinement in the Hartford city jail, prisoners were denied visits from relatives and friends, receiving only an occasional, malevolent visit from Department of Justice men.<sup>45</sup>

In Detroit, 800 men – more than 350 citizens - were arrested in a raid on the House of the Masses, where some future detainee's were attending a dance and others a class in physical geography. They were taken to the city's antiquated federal building, where they were imprisoned from three to six weeks in a long, narrow and windowless corridor. There they slept on the bare cement floor, ate only what food their families and friends brought in, and were forced to stand in long lines to access the one toilet and water sink available.<sup>46</sup>

Violations of the Fifth Amendment were extensive. Suspects were harshly “deprived of life, liberty, [and] property, without due process of law”<sup>47</sup> and made to be witnesses against themselves. Due to the change of Rule 22 by Abercrombie, thousands of aliens had been stripped of the right to counsel. Cruel and violent methods were used by agents to coerce prisoners into signing incriminating testimonies in the form of questionnaires, which had already been filled out for them. Where no evidence lay, the Justice Department created it. One such case was Gaspare Cannone, who was seized from his home without a warrant and taken to the Department of Justice Offices, where he was beaten and kicked to “tell the truth” and “stop lying.” Before his transfer to Ellis Island, a confession was put before Cannone to sign his name to. Upon his refusal, the agents simply forged the signature.<sup>48</sup>

In many cases, agents transferred membership in unions or various social organizations into Communist Party membership. When Koly Honcheckoff was apprehended in New Hampshire, he denied membership in the Communist Party. During interrogation proceedings, he was asked if he belonged to a union, to which he replied, “yes, for three years.” The officer then recorded three years in the Communist Party, and the questionnaire became official evidence. Anton Harbatuk had joined a club at the paper mill where he worked because “he had no other place to go and thought [he] ought to belong to some organization.” Justice Department agents also transferred him into membership of the Communist Party.<sup>49</sup>

From beginning to end, the actions of the Justice Department were illegal and unethical. Federal agents had infiltrated social clubs, unions, and political parties, where they participated in strikes and attended union and party meetings. Although the Bureau of Investigation took good care to protect the identities of their agents, they seemed to flaunt the fact that they had successfully infiltrated various organizations. A report in the *New York Times* even concurs this:

*For months Department of Justice Men, dropping all other work, had concentrated on the Reds. Agents quietly infiltrated into the radical ranks, slipped casually into centers of agitation, and went to work, sometimes as cooks in remote mining colonies, sometimes as miners, again as steelworkers, and, where the opportunity presented itself, as “agitators” of the wildest type . . . several of the agents, “under cover” men, managed to rise in the radical movement and become in at least one instance, the recognized leader of a district.<sup>50</sup>*

In a Habeas Corpus proceeding, after hearing testimonies and examining the secret instructions informing agents to organize party meetings for the specific date set, Judge Anderson found that “beyond reasonable dispute, . . . the Government owns and operates some part of the Communist Party.”<sup>51</sup> Not only was the Department of Justice sending agent agitators into the same radical organizations it had deemed illegal, but it was also fermenting the hatred and fear of these organizations amongst in the public.



With his annual funds from congress, specifically for the “detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States,”<sup>52</sup> Palmer had turned the Justice Department into a propaganda machine. In 1920 he published and distributed a pamphlet entitled *Red Radicalism as Described by its Own Leaders*. It was also the practice to send ready-made plates to newspapers at no cost, which framed headlines like: “WARN NATION OF RED PERIL,” or “OVERTHROW WORLD ORDER! CRY COMMUNISTS.”<sup>53</sup>

Sworn into office under a constitution that establishes justice, insures domestic tranquility, promotes the general welfare, and secures the blessings of liberty and posterity to the people, Palmer and the Justice Department carried out unspeakable acts of lawlessness, attacking the same rights they were required to protect. Once brought to the attention of the American people, Palmer’s crusade cracked. Then, when his anxious predictions of a violent 1920 May Day revolution across America failed to transpire, the American people began to think of Palmer himself as little more than a crack. America had been gripped by Red hysteria for over a year and when the excesses of the raids were recognized, it was the Justice Department, who came to be seen as radical.

As revolutions in Europe stalled and the Bolsheviks became confined to Russia, Red hysteria in America collapsed as quickly as it had begun. Along with it vanished Palmer’s chances as a democratic presidential candidate. By June 1920, when Palmer was called before the House Committee on Rules to defend the charges made against him by Post and his lawyer, he was a beaten man. The committee brought charge upon charge of the alleged illegal behavior of the Justice Department before Palmer, who dismissed the charges as “outrageous and unconscionable falsehoods.”<sup>54</sup> He dodged questions with ambiguous responses, defended the illegal charges with evasive and shabby evidence, or simply declared he was unaware of the matter and would investigate the claims. In the end, the committee decided to let the whole affair drop.

#### **TARGET: 100% AMERICANISM**

During his speech before the House Committee on Rules, Palmer shared his definition of Americanism: “To be a good man today for an American is to be a loyal and confident believer in the American method of making progress through the institutions of law and order and in constant accord with the plan of the fathers whose wisdom, vision and sacrifice gave us a priceless heritage of civil liberty, happiness and prosperity, the fullest, the truest, the richest in all the world.”<sup>55</sup> Such a conviction clearly conflicts with the methods Palmer used to obtain his desired results, yet, it seems he was able to justify this paradox in his own mind. The answers to this rationalization are perhaps found in Palmer’s all out effort to put the radical press out of commission and deny those organizations the protection of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In his letter sent along with the propaganda plates, Palmer charged the radical press of not exercising the right of free speech, but rather disrespecting that right by sabotaging public thought, and he went on to explain that he did not want to see

the “American people misled.”<sup>56</sup> Therefore, Palmer makes clear his right to use the First Amendment in disseminating his own propaganda in order to safeguard this constitutional right for the American people and protect them from the destructive ideas he saw as un-American. In doing so, Palmer was striving to preserve “the priceless heritage of civil liberty,” which he emphasized in his definition of Americanism.<sup>57</sup>

Palmer identified the ideas that threatened this Americanism by a simple method, which he touched on when promoting the Justice Department’s peacetime sedition bill to the House – The bill, if passed, would have consigned the First Amendment. Speaking on the right of free speech, Palmer stated: “Free speech is not unbridled speech. Free speech is not license to say anything and not suffer the consequences.” He then made clear what he meant by this. He saw a “dead line,” in such a freedom, which must be clearly drawn in order for the government to defend itself and protect the national body.<sup>58</sup> To Palmer, this “dead line” was the border between loyalty and treachery. Once this border was crossed, “the plan of the fathers” – Americanism – became threatened, and its protection would justify the use of any means necessary. And that he was a firm believer that his attack on the Reds had saved America from destruction, he clarified to a Senate Subcommittee in January 1921, when once again called on to dispute the charges brought against the Justice Department: “I apologize for nothing that the Department of Justice has done in this matter. I glory in it . . . and if, as I said before, some of my agents out in the field . . . were a little rough and unkind, or short and curt . . . I think it might be well overlooked in the general good to the country which has come from it.”<sup>59</sup>

A. Mitchell Palmer and the nativists of 1919-1920 defined their Americanism in the context of those elements they deemed as a threat to national identity. They looked not to what Americanism consisted of, or should consist of, but rather what it did not consist of – foreign radicals with foreign ideas. In order to preserve the existence of this national identity, these threatening elements naturally had to be purged from society. In doing so, however, the nativists undermined the real aspects of Americanism defined by its traditional ideals of freedom, liberty, and equality.

These foreign radicals - the thousands of alien immigrants the Justice Department seized from dances, educational classes, union hall meetings and even the privacy of their own homes - were the working men and women who formed the backbone of the drudgery and toil of an industrial nation. They worked in the sweltering heat of dark mills and the murky environment of wet mines, continuously facing unsanitary and dangerous conditions. These people joined together in various social and political organizations not only to address their grievances and attempt to secure an honest day’s pay for an honest day’s work, but also to establish for themselves a sense of belonging in an intolerant nation that callously shunned them.

The Palmer Raids were a direct symptom of the frenzied mix of xenophobia, nativism and patriotism, which characterized the Great Red Scare of 1919 and 1920. Palmer was the source of his own undoing; he became a martyr to a cause he had unwaveringly sustained. Having long retired from the world of American politics,

A. Mitchell Palmer died in 1936. Perhaps Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, that wonderful agitator and fighter of individual rights, wrote Palmer's historical epitaph when she spoke of him in her autobiography:

*An attorney general who saw 'reds' in schools, at dances, in plays, in unions, under the bed – just anywhere . . . His name was A. Mitchell Palmer. Let us hope no red roses grow near his grave to disturb his slumber. He would be entirely forgotten except for one thing – a shameful happening in American history is named after him, the Palmer Raids.<sup>60</sup>*

With the words DEPORTATION written on the broomstick handle one got the feeling that Uncle Sam and A. Mitchell Palmer took the topic very serious. The political cartoon was found on the front page of the Denver Post Sunday, January 4, 1920.  
Credit:  
Denver Post.





## GERMAN IDENTITY IN WESTPHALIA, MISSOURI

by Sister Phoebe Schwartz, OSB

The question of cultural identity often comes up in the United States. Is everybody in America American or do they consider themselves Japanese-American, Irish-American, German-American, etc? Does the old world identity overshadow the fact that all of these people are now living in America and often are several generations removed from the countries of their ancestry? There still exist communities like the German-Americans in Freeman, South Dakota, where I grew up, who still celebrate *Schmeckfest* every year and the nearby community of Tabor with its Czech Days, which honors a strong Czech identity. There is also an area in south central North Dakota where Lawrence Welk was raised and where fourth- and fifth-generation Germans-from-Russia-Americans who live there still speak with an accent like his and for whom *knoeffle* soup (a soup of small dumplings and potatoes) is still a necessity.

Above: This is a portion of an early Galbraith's Railway Mail Service Map of Missouri (ca. 1897). Notice Westphalia towards the center as well as the German influences in the surrounding town names, pictures, and faces printed on the map.

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When thinking about the question of identity I recalled a conversation I had in October 1991 with my great-uncle Vincent Schwartz as he showed me around the town of Westphalia, Missouri, where two sets of my great-great-grandparents settled. He described the town as “still being German.” When I asked him to elaborate he said that just about everyone in town was descended from the Germans that had settled the town and that St. Joseph’s Catholic Church, built by Germans like my great-great-grandmother Gertrude (Kramer) Schwartz who donated one of the four bells in the church tower, was still the only Church. I noticed that even the street signs were in both German and English. This did not seem to be a community parted from their old world identity and completely immersed in a new American identity. They are all proud Americans but they also seem to be proud of their heritage and celebrate it as part of their identity.

So how did this happen? Is this a case of a small town that never assimilated into American life or is my great-uncle mistaken? How did these Germans come to be in this town and what experiences did they have as a community that helped them to retain their German identity while also becoming Americans?

New Westphalia Settlement was settled in 1835 by Germans from Westphalia, a province of Prussia, along a bend of the Maries River. It is the oldest German Catholic settlement west of the Mississippi River.<sup>1</sup> The first Germans to see the area had come in 1830 looking for a place to establish an institute of learning. They did not find the land suitable for their institute of learning but others came. Near the site of what would be later renamed Westphalia, a Mr. Schiller built the second mill in Osage County in 1833 and followed this by building a still.<sup>2</sup> In 1835, Dr. Bernhard Bruns from Oelde, Westphalia was visiting St. Louis looking for a place for his family. He met a fellow German, Nicolaus Hesse, who had just settled with a few other families on the Maries River at the New Westphalia settlement. Hesse persuaded Bruns to come there and Bruns bought land and hired workers to start construction on a home for his family while he went back to Germany to settle his affairs and move his family.<sup>3</sup> In July, 1836, Dr. Bruns with his wife Henriette, called Jette, their son Hermann, and several other family members along with several other families from Oelde including innkeeper Gottfried Schwartz, his wife Gertrude and their four children left Bremen on the *Ulysses* and sailed for Baltimore, Maryland. They traveled overland to Philadelphia and then by canals and rivers to the New Westphalia Settlement.<sup>4</sup> It was not easy at first, with land to clear for farming and homes to build.

Faith was very important to all of the immigrants. One of the first institutions to be organized was a church. It is virtually impossible to separate the parish history from the community’s history. The first recorded Mass was celebrated on the banks of the Maries River on August 6, 1835. The first log chapel was built shortly after and the first resident priest, Father Ferdinand Helias was installed on May 13, 1838. Fr. Helias’ parish census of 1838 included 51 families.<sup>5</sup> However, the Nicolaus Hesse family was not one of them. Discouraged by how hard the life was Hesse chose to return to Germany in 1837. Ironically, he was to write a book *Das westliche Nordamerika, in besonderer Beziehung auf die deutschen Einwanderer in ihren landwirtschaftlichen,*

*Handels-und Gewerbeverhältnissen* about his experiences in America, which influenced many other Germans to come despite his descriptions of how hard the life was. After 1840, emigration officials in Germany would dutifully ask if the potential emigrant had read Hesse's book and they would all answer yes.<sup>6</sup>

Why did they come? Many Germans were influenced by the vision of a new *Germania* and were enticed to Missouri by Gottfried Duden's book, *Report on a Journey to the Western States of North America and a Stay of Several Years Along the Missouri (During the Years 1824, '25, '26, and 1827)*.<sup>7</sup> Duden gave a highly romanticized account of America, in part because he had been very fortunate in his stay. While he was there the winters were very mild, and he was able to hire people to build his house, do all the clearing of land and building of fences and even hunt for him while he spent his time reading, studying and enjoying the outdoors.<sup>8</sup> Walter Kamphoefner in his book *The Westfalians: From Germany to Missouri* calls his book, "one of the most famous pieces of promotional literature."<sup>9</sup> The Hesse book mentioned earlier was also influential. Many others chose to immigrate because of letters from family members and friends who had immigrated. Other Germans immigrated for political reasons, the revolutions of 1830 and more importantly of 1848, for example.<sup>10</sup>

Why did those who first came to Westphalia, Missouri emigrate? Dr. Bernhard Bruns came in part because of the widespread poverty he encountered in his medical practice. He knew that for some people to pay their doctor bill meant that their family would have to go without something. It was very discouraging to him. As Jette wrote to her brother in January 1832, her husband was "tired of having to extort his fees."<sup>11</sup> There was also a lot of talk of emigrating going on in the area at that time. As Jette wrote, "it was in the air and we talked a lot about it."<sup>12</sup> There did not seem to be a lot of economic need for the emigration of Nicolaus Hesse and his family. Hesse was a government official, had a "comfortable livelihood" but like Bruns "was sensitive to the poverty and suffering he saw around him" and had "fallen victim to the emigration fever sweeping Germany, fostered by Duden's *Report*, emigration societies, and other reports and letters of life in America."<sup>13</sup> Included in the group that came with the Bruns' family, there were a theologian, a nobleman, a journeyman miller, my great-great-great-grandfather, innkeeper Godfried Schwartze, his family and their maid.<sup>14</sup> One of the other indications that they were not suffering economically was that they did not travel in steerage but shared a large cabin.<sup>15</sup> Many of these first settlers were educated with little farming experience but most were willing to try.

There were also economic reasons for Germans to immigrate to the United States. Cottage industries involving textiles, especially linen, were collapsing due to mechanization. The areas which were heavily involved in this industry, were some of the areas with the highest amounts of emigration. There was also a failure to develop centers of mechanization that could "absorb surplus population."<sup>16</sup> From 1780-1840, cotton was replacing linen as the preferred raw material for fabrics and Great Britain was ahead of the German states in developing the new machines and in making the switch to producing cotton textiles.<sup>17</sup> Many of the emigrants who settled in Westphalia were from the area that was most affected by these economic changes. My great-great-great-



grandparents Ferdinand and Elizabeth (Heckemeier) Holterman who moved from Wadersloh in Westphalia to Westphalia, Missouri in 1838 were among the emigrants affected by these changes.<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps some came because of a desire to own land. Land was very expensive in Germany and there was not a big quantity of land available for sale. America had great amounts of cheap land. Timothy Anderson in his dissertation “Immigrants in the World-system: Domestic Industry and Industrialization in Northwest Germany and the Migration to Osage County, Missouri 1835-1900” compares the price of farmland in the mid 1830s. In Germany it was approximately \$64.00 per acre and in the United States it was approximately \$1.25 per acre for land purchased from the government. He points out that even the sale of a small parcel of land in Germany could finance a family’s move and enable them to purchase land in the United States and have some leftover for equipment and supplies.<sup>19</sup>

After these first groups, many came to Westphalia because they had family or friends or had some other connection to the new settlement. Many like Johann Jodocus Borgmeyer put Westphalia, Missouri as their destination on their emigration forms.<sup>20</sup> This pattern of chain migration was typical of a great deal of German emigration. Kamphoefner describes the experience of Johann Dothage, who settled in Warren County, Missouri, another popular destination for Westfalians:

*He knew where he was going, and what awaited him there. A brother-in-law from the neighboring farm had emigrated to Missouri in 1837 and had been followed by his brother two years later. In fact, during the eight years prior to Dothage’s departure in 1840, a large settlement from his home town and neighboring areas—practically a transplanted village—had sprung up.<sup>21</sup>*

Kamphoefner goes on to say, “The trek to America was anything but a leap into the dark for chain migrants.”<sup>22</sup> Westphalia, Missouri continued to be settled through chain migration. From it, seventeen new German Catholic settlements were established in the surrounding area. There were six hundred families in these new settlements by 1840. Also by 1840, even though there had been old-stock Americans in the original settlement, “all of the landowners within three miles of Westphalia were both German and Catholic.”<sup>23</sup> The old-stock Americans had sold out to new immigrants from Germany.

As Nicolaus Hesse discovered, life was not easy on the frontier. Land had to be cleared and homes built. The Germans had to learn to plant different crops in different soil and climate. Everyone worked very hard and not everything succeeded. Jette Bruns in an August 1837 letter to her brother Heinrich in Germany wrote:

*We have had very little luck with anything that we have tackled this year, and it takes a great deal of perseverance and patience not to lose courage. You know that we believe we would be able to occupy our house soon after our arrival. But still only the skeleton is standing, and a few shingles have been attached to indicate how the roof will be...The corn stand is good, so*

*we hope the corn will ripen, although it has received very little care. In the spring our horses suddenly got sick and we could not plow, and the weeds got out of hand ...We could plant only very few vegetables because the little fellow took too much of my time...Now we have many people and little to eat. A great worry for the housewife!<sup>24</sup>*

For women who probably were not as infected with emigration fever, the frontier was hard work half a world away from the homes, families, familiar routines and customs left behind. It was hard work as Jette Bruns discovered. They cooked, gardened, raised their children, and made the family's clothing as well as everyday items like candles and brooms. Even for those who could afford to keep maids the work was unending.<sup>25</sup>

Some settlers got discouraged and went back to Germany like the Hesse family. Illnesses like cholera, typhoid fever, influenza, and dysentery killed the vulnerable. Many gravestones in cemeteries in the area show rows of graves from outbreaks of these diseases. There were recorded incidents of suicide and many other personal tragedies. My great-great-great-grandfather Godfried fell off a horse and froze to death six and half years after they arrived, leaving a widow and six children. My great-great-great-grandmother Gertrude persevered; she kept up the farm and raised her children. As Jette wrote to her brother:

*The widow Schwarze [sic] saw her [son] Bernhard die of a stroke a little while back. It is too hard! I believe I could not survive such setbacks. It happened on the second anniversary of the death of her husband. All her support is gone now. She has four girls and a three-year-old boy, Wilhelm, who are everything to her. She is, however, a strong woman and is rather composed again. In the beginning she wanted to return to Germany. I told her that if I were in her place I would do this too, but Bruns said it is better for her and for the children here. Now she has a hired hand, she herself works along with the children, and they do what they can.<sup>26</sup>*

Jette, Gertrude and others persevered and good things also happened. The little three-year-old boy Wilhelm grew up to be a judge and a prosperous farmer.

Despite many difficulties the German immigrants prospered, one immigrant saying to a German pastor:

*You see, Herr Pastor, America is indeed a splendid land. Here a person can still acquire something. In Germany, I didn't have as much property as I could hold in my hand, and dared not hope, no matter how hard I worked and saved, ever to acquire any property. What you see here belongs to me. I have had to work terribly hard, that is true, but I have something to show for it, too. Here I have eaten more pork in one year than I have ever seen in Germany my whole life. We have plenty of potatoes, too; what more could we want, if we stay healthy?<sup>27</sup>*

Prosperous farmers helped business prosper. Henry Wallenkamp became a successful businessman, selling supplies to farmers and others and providing other services like shipping of products to market. Also, as he had learned English in school, he translated and wrote deeds and contracts for the others in his German speaking community. Immigrants like Wallenkamp who were willing to work at whatever jobs were available, learning whatever new skills they needed to succeed and improve their lives could create better lives for themselves and their children.<sup>28</sup>

The German immigrants were successful farmers. To be successful they recognized that they would have to adapt to a new climate and new markets. They were highly successful in developing their farming operations. There was economic assimilation as “they responded to market pressures in much the same way as Americans. As such, economic forces did more to shape behavior and agricultural production than did any cultural baggage transferred across the Atlantic.”<sup>29</sup> Germans were praised for their farming skills and the care they took of their farms, buildings, and equipment. There was less clutter and disrepair.<sup>30</sup> Land ownership was important to them. As Kamphoefner states:

*Land ownership was much more important to people who had known the problems of population pressure and land shortages than it was to those who viewed America's land reserves as vast and unlimited. As early as 1850 a higher percentage of Germans than Americans were landowners in both Missouri and Texas. Not only those who could exchange small, expensive plots in Germany for large and cheap pieces of real estate became land owners in the United States, but even immigrants from the rural lower class were able to achieve this status.*<sup>31</sup>

While taking the responsibilities of farming quite seriously, many German-American farmers have come to be criticized for not being more modern. They are said to have turned some methods of farming into unbreakable traditions. In her essay “The German-American Family Farm in Missouri: A Personal View,” Laura Barnitz speaks of her German-American family and its five generations of farmers in southern Missouri. Barnitz acknowledges that her family knows that by managing the farm more impersonally it might become more productive, yet family pride and tradition is more important. She relates all this to being German-American.<sup>32</sup>

Anderson makes the point that even though the German farms were not laid out in traditional German forms, probably because of the American township/range survey system, the pattern of isolated farmsteads was very similar to what the Westfalian and the Rhennish settlers of Osage County knew back in Germany. Even though the farms were not laid out exactly the same, they did recreate their old settlement pattern of isolated farmsteads. This pattern has not really changed over the years. This could be due in part to the fact that many farmsteads have stayed in the same family from the beginning of German settlement in Osage County.<sup>33</sup>

Germans became influential in politics. They voted. They served in the legislature, judiciary and in local government. For the most part they were strongly antislavery, which did not always make them popular in Missouri where many whites owned slaves and were for the South. Perhaps the most influential of all German immigrants was Carl Schurz. He convinced many German-Americans to vote for Lincoln and the Republicans in 1860, helping Lincoln to win. He spoke and wrote against slavery. He fought for the Union army and became a major general. Before becoming a Senator from Missouri he was a journalist. He worked against corruption in government and became Secretary of the Interior under President Hayes.<sup>34</sup> Schurz is one example of the many contributions that German immigrants brought to their new country.

The German immigrants to Westphalia brought their love of social gatherings to their community. As already indicated, the first and most important thing was to build a church, which was the heart of the community. As was frequently the case soon a school was part of the parish as well. Fr. Jacob Bushotts, a Jesuit who had immigrated to America with Fr. Helias in 1833, started teaching school in Westphalia in 1836. The first log school was built in 1838. In 1848, the cornerstone was laid for a stone church. The old log church served as the school until 1868, when a three-story brick building was built and served as a convent and boarding school. The boarding school housed rural students and students preparing for First Communion.<sup>35</sup> Westphalia was not to have a public school until early in the twentieth century. For many years nuns staffed the public school and the reality was that parochial schools were being supported by taxes and were being called “public.”

There were only a few non-Catholics in the area and there were never any recorded complaints about the situation.<sup>36</sup> Besides the school, the church brought to the Westphalian community other events like the annual Corpus Christi festival, a carry-over from Germany. During the three-day celebration, altars were constructed throughout the town and people would process from altar to altar reciting the rosary. The whole town would participate in this festival to honor the Eucharist and also to ask for a good harvest. The fields would also be blessed. This festival continued until the 1950s.<sup>37</sup> Other social groups included the Young Men’s Sodality, Young Ladies’ Sodality, the St. Joseph’s Church Choir and later a Knights of Columbus chapter. Many activities revolved around the church but there were also secular groups and activities like a baseball club.

Westphalia and surrounding communities became almost exclusively German. As they prospered and as further chain migration took place, Germans bought out any old stock American farmers, sometimes at higher than market prices. Many non-Germans were willing to leave, both because of the good price they got for their land and also to get away from so many Germans who they considered clannish. To this day, many of the farms in the area are owned by descendents of the original German owners.<sup>38</sup> This includes the original Schwartze farm, today owned by Godfried and Gertrude’s great-great-granddaughter and her husband. Other cousins own businesses in Westphalia.<sup>39</sup> These Germans stayed and few moved elsewhere. By 1860, immigration to Washington Township, of which Westphalia is the center, had

virtually ceased. The residents were almost all German immigrants or their children or grandchildren with few new immigrants joining the community. In the 1900 census, Washington Township had 90.59% of people who were either native Germans or second- or third-generation German. In all of Osage County, which has two highly German townships including Washington and one that is more diverse, the percentage was 74.57.<sup>40</sup> As late as the 1980 census, 71.6% of people in Osage county recorded their ancestry as German.<sup>41</sup>

Westphalia's continuing German identity can also be seen through its continued use of the German language in church, school, newspapers and daily life. This was also the case with the Protestant communities. In Protestant German communities in Missouri, the church was a center of the community as it was in Westphalia for the Roman Catholics. Each German community remained faithful to its denomination and generally there was not a lot of intermingling. In Perry County, Missouri, US Highway 61 is seen as a boundary between Catholics and Lutherans and as Gerlach was interviewing farmers before publication of his book in 1976, he found that "each group prefers to remain on its own side of the highway, and each hoped the other would do the same."<sup>42</sup> In each Protestant community the church was a center of social contact for them. For Protestants the use of the German language was encouraged to help maintain cultural traditions and preserve identity. Gerlach suggests that the many German theological students who came to serve in those churches facilitated the use of German in Protestant church services.<sup>43</sup>

In the Roman Catholic Church, parishes throughout the United States were encouraged to use English to further their Americanization. This was in part a response to prejudice against Catholics who were thought by many to be an alien church under the control of a foreign power. It was also an attempt to bring uniformity to the Roman Catholic Church in America, which had members from many diverse cultures speaking many languages. Not all Roman Catholic parishes complied. As Gerlach says, "Of all Catholics, however, Germans were most fervently opposed to the Americanization of their church, and where their settlements were large, they were often able to retain the national or ethnic character of their parishes."<sup>44</sup> In Catholic Westphalia, German was used in church services until at least World War II. It was also used in the schools until 1952, half of the day, school was taught in German and the other half in English. Westphalia had a German language newspaper, the *Osage County Volksblatt* that was published until 1917. The 1970 census of Osage County recorded over 2,000, nearly 10% of the county's population who said German was their first language.<sup>45</sup> Other German communities in Missouri also retained use of German well into the middle of the twentieth century. Ken Luebbering, currently a writer and professor at Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri, says his was the first generation in his family who spoke English as their first language. His ancestors came from Germany to Missouri over a hundred years before his birth.<sup>46</sup> The use of German continued despite prejudice against German-Americans in World Wars I and II.

Westphalia remains a type of string village or *Strassendorfer* with almost all the buildings in town arranged along Main Street on either side of the church, which is at the center. This was a pattern that came with them from Germany and is made even

more traditional by the lack of front yards with only a narrow sidewalk separating houses from the street.<sup>47</sup> In the countryside around Westphalia, there are large stone houses with casement windows and hipped gables that resemble urban structures from the areas in Germany they came from. Many other German-American homes were built in the linear house style and while this is not a traditional German style of housing, it is striking that so many homes of German-Americans were of this type as contrasted with non-German-Americans. There also appears to be a greater use of flowers, shutters, and double front doors among the German-Americans than among non-German.<sup>48</sup> While not all of these are traditions that came from Germany, one could conclude that there is still great uniformity in the tastes of German-Americans.

Of the many visual German influences still apparent in Westphalia, the most important example is St. Joseph's Church that recalls the Romanesque cathedrals of Germany. To this day it still dominates the skyline. Inside the church, the beautiful stained glass windows are labeled in German. The iron crosses in the cemetery also are reminders of the parishioners' German roots.

Among the crafts that came over from Germany and remained a tradition for a long period of time, was the making of sabots or wooden shoes. Wooden shoes were practical and inexpensive footwear for farm work. Shoemakers were among the first immigrants and wooden shoes were made in isolated rural areas until World War I. Henry Stradkoetter continued to make them until 1889 in Westphalia.<sup>49</sup>

So does all of this mean that Westphalia is still German? Anderson, in his dissertation, tries to determine the extent of "cultural retention and transformation" while acknowledging the economic assimilation that happened relatively quickly for the Germans in Westphalia due to their willingness to adapt to new market pressures and strategies. At the end of his dissertation, Anderson quotes from "Ethnicity on the Land" in *The Making of the American Landscape*, pp. 221-248, using Michael Conzen's statement:

*Five factors which contribute to the retention of ethnicity and its physical imprint in the cultural landscape: the volume of immigration and the size of the ethnic enclave, the extent of economic success, the recency of arrival, the extent of geographical isolation from the host society and the strength of shared values among immigrants with the same geographic and cultural background.*<sup>50</sup>

Anderson, writing in 1994, reminds us that the German pioneers and their children became the dominant group, really the only group, in Westphalia. They were geographically isolated. They had economic success. They had strong shared values. They meet the criteria to be considered for ethnic landscape establishment yet Anderson says, "the German ethnic imprint in Osage County is, at best, hard to establish and define ... why is their imprint not dominated by more outward forms?"<sup>51</sup> He answers his question by suggesting that the imprint has been very subtle and was easily transferred from Germany to Missouri. He suggests that economic assimilation came



quickly and the establishment of a “large, homogeneous immigrant community... fostered a retention of some Old-world traditions for a longer period.”<sup>52</sup> There were no economic reasons to abandon their culture.

At the end of his study, *The Westfalians: From Germany to Missouri*, Walter Kamphoefner, writing in 1987 suggests that the “still tightly knit and homogeneous” community “gradually, almost imperceptibly, lost its distinctively ethnic character. But even as of this writing, there are back roads and small towns in Missouri where traces of a transplanted culture remain.”<sup>53</sup> Westphalia is one of these communities.

Russell Gerlach, writing in 1976, says “One would have to conclude that as of today the Ozark German sees himself as an American and not as a hyphenated German-American.”<sup>54</sup> Yet at the very end of his book, quoting from *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, Irish of New York City*, he says he “concurs with Glazer and Moynihan, who observe: ‘The American nationality is still forming: It’s processes are mysterious, and the final form, if there is ever to be a final form, is as yet unknown.’”<sup>55</sup> Perhaps there is a case to be made both for retaining ethnic identity and for assimilation into the larger American culture.

Has Westphalia assimilated fully into American life and culture? Certainly, it seems that many Germans have achieved the “American dream” of financial success and so have assimilated economically. The example of Barnitz’s family suggests that this assimilation is still on their own terms. Census figures show that the population of Westphalia and the surrounding area has not changed greatly since most immigration ended in 1860. Many of the farms have stayed in the same family from when they first arrived in the area. The German language seemed to have remained a constant for most of Westphalia’s history, playing a role in church, school, newspapers and other aspects of daily life. The street signs are in German and English. There seems to be great conformity of taste, perhaps forged from early experiences of immigrant life, where new settlers had to work very hard. Perhaps the common faith helped forge that conformity of taste. Is Westphalia still German? As a descendent of Westphalians and as one who knows that all of her ancestors have come from some part of Germany or Austria, I consider myself German through and through but I am also American and proud to be both.

On April 2, 1985, in the sesquicentennial year of Westphalia’s founding, a big first happened in the town when a woman, Pat Hilkemeyer was elected mayor. Hilkemeyer had been active in the community all her life, especially in her parish of St. Joseph’s. She was very important in the effort to get the church listed on the National Register of Historic Places and was working to get the town declared a historic district. Although not originally from Westphalia, she is of German descent from a nearby community in Missouri. Her late husband Gerhard was a fifth-generation Westphalian. The article describes Westphalia as a “largely German community.” She mentions “all the people around here come from an area in Germany probably as big as from here to Linn to Koeltztown.” (Both these towns are about 20 miles away from Westphalia.) She also says that when she was asked about running for mayor she said, “Can’t you find a man to do it? Westphalia is really an old time German community and I wasn’t sure the

people would accept a woman as mayor.”<sup>56</sup> So the question remains, is Westphalia a real “old time German community” or have they assimilated into American life so much that they can elect a woman as mayor? The answer is both.

Recently I stood on the Hauptstrasse or Main Street of Westphalia and looked up and down the street. The old German-style string village that my ancestors helped to create on the bluff above the Maries River was still there. The businesses still had German names. The beautiful church with its stained glass windows labeled in German was ringing its bells calling people to worship. However on Highway 50 below, there was a modern convenience store and other new businesses. There were beautiful modern houses on the north end of town as the old Main Street meets the highway. Things are changing for Westphalia as elsewhere in the United States. Perhaps how we discuss these things needs to change as well. I question whether or not we need to keep talking about immigration and assimilation with old models. As Anderson suggests, the process is very complex and involves too many cultural groups and other issues.<sup>57</sup> All of our ancestors brought their own culture, traditions and language, which have become part of our history and part of our American culture without transforming everyone into one uniform whole. As more immigrants come, we will be enriched by their culture and changed by it as we change them. We need to welcome them and celebrate our diversity both as it exists now and as it will change in the future.

Photograph of Westphalia, Germany (ca. 1890-1900).

Credit:

Detroit Photographic Company Collection located at the Library of Congress.



Photograph of present day Westphalia, Missouri.

Photograph depicts the St. Joseph Church in the middle of this town that is referred to as “The Pearl of Osage County.”

Credit:

St. Joseph Church

## ENDNOTES

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# IN A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN: WOMEN AND GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY ON THE SUBURBAN FRONTIER

by Heather Thorwald

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48. Harold H. Martin, "Can We Halt the Chaos?," *Saturday Evening Post*, 16 January 1960, 84.
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50. Bucy, 214; League of Women Voters of the United States, *State Current Agenda and Continuing Responsibilities* (Washington, D.C.: League of Women Voters of the United States, July 1961), 1-16, typewritten. Downloaded as PDF from <<http://www.lwv.org/elibrary/histdocs/hist3.htm>> on 24 October 2003.
51. Jackson 148-153; Jon C. Teaford, *City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979): 76-81.
52. Teaford, 129-131, 159, 162, 167.
53. Wood, "Governing," 167-168. Teaford disagrees with Wood's assertion that suburbanites blocked consolidation plans, arguing instead that the strongest opposition came from African Americans in the inner cities concerned over losing their political voice in a metro-wide government; Teaford, 180-185.
54. *Ibid.*, 171.



55. Young, 169.
56. *Ibid.*, 113-117; Olivier, 97.
57. Bucy, 213. Bucy argues that the League's Progressive Era heritage influenced the organization's agenda much more than its suffragist background, which explains its de-emphasis on feminist causes.
58. League of Women Voters of Colorado, *Cooperation or Confusion?*, part II, *The Urban and Metropolitan Problem in Colorado* (Denver: League of Women Voters of Colorado, 1961): 6.
59. *Ibid.*, 7.
60. *Ibid.*, 6.
61. *Ibid.*, 8.
62. *Ibid.*, 8.
63. Bucy, 214-215; NML quotation in Bucy from League of Women Voters, *The National Voter*, November 1957, 4.
64. *Ibid.*, 213-214; Teaford, 176-179.
65. Jackson, 153-154. Jackson notes an exception to this trend in the large-scale suburban annexations by Houston, Dallas, and Jacksonville from the 1960s to the 1980s.
66. Turner, "Significance," 227.
67. John Mark Hansen, "The Political Economy of Group Membership," *The American Political Science Review* 79, no. 1 (March 1985): 89. The League today claims a membership of 130,000, including men; <<http://www.lwv.org/about/lwvus.html>>, accessed 12 November 2003.
68. *Ibid.*, 89; Kaledin, 33, 92; Anne N. Costain, "Representing Women: The Transition from Social Movement to Interest Group," *The Western Political Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (March 1981): 109.
69. Bucy, 254.
70. *Ibid.*, 2. Bucy concludes that the League's greatest achievement was not in successfully promoting specific legislation but in training women as political activists.
71. Kaledin, 89. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Political Woman* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 44, quoted in Ware, 292. Because the League was officially nonpartisan, board members at the local, state, and national level were not allowed to participate in party activities or run for office, although rank-and-file members were encouraged to pursue such political involvement.
72. Joel Garreau, *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (New York: Doubleday, 1991): 4.
73. Jackson, 285-287, 301.

## CONTROLLING THE FUTURE:

### MANIPULATION OF THE HITLER YOUTH

by Linnie Boteler

1. Jennifer Keeley, *Life in the Hitler Youth* (San Diego: Lucent Books, Inc., 2000), 1.
2. H. W. Koch, *Duped Generation* (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1972), 32.
3. *Ibid.*, 32.
4. Keeley, 11.
5. Matthew Hughes and Chris Mann, *Inside Hitler's Germany* (Dulles, VA: Brown Partworks Ltd., 2000), 51.
6. Hughes & Mann, 51.
7. Koch, 65.
8. Hughes & Mann, 54.
9. Alfons Heck, *A Child of Hitler* (Frederick, CO: Renaissance House, 1985), 2.
10. Keeley, 43.
11. Jackson Spielvogel, *Hitler and Nazi Germany* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 172.
12. *Ibid.*, 172.
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14. *Ibid.*, 27.
15. Alfons Heck, *The Burden of Hitler's Legacy* (Frederick, CO: Renaissance House Publishers, 1988), 48.
16. Hughes & Mann, 52.
17. Heck, *A Child of Hitler*, 39.
18. Heck, *The Burden of Hitler's Legacy*, 84.

19. Keeley, 15.
20. Ibid., 17.
21. Ibid., 17.
22. Heck, *A Child of Hitler*, 9.
23. Ibid., 9.
24. *Master Race: Nazism Overtakes Germany*, Jonathan Lewis, 56 minutes, Boston Video, 1998, videocassette.
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26. George L. Mosse, *Nazi Culture* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966), 275.
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28. Keeley, 21.
29. Koch, 137.
30. Keeley, 12.
31. Ibid., 13.
32. Ibid., 137.
33. Ibid., 137.
34. Spielvogel, 170.
35. Ibid., 170.
36. Richard Grunberger, *The 12 Year Reich* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 290.
37. Spielvogel, 173.
38. Ibid., 173.
39. Ibid., 173.
40. Koch, 126.
41. Ibid., 114.
42. Stachura, 150.
43. Spielvogel, 174.
44. Koch, 145.
45. Stachura, 159.
46. Ibid., 159.
47. Koch, 145.
48. Keeley, 35.
49. Heck, *The Burden of Hitler's Legacy*, 74.
50. Ibid., 74.
51. Stachura, 153.
52. Keeley, 84.
53. Stachura, 156.
54. Stachura, 156.
55. Keeley, 71.
56. Ibid., 71.
57. Stachura, 164.
58. Ibid., 164.
59. Ibid., 160.
60. Ibid., 161.
61. Keeley, 86.
62. Stachura, 164.
63. Koch, 153.
64. Ibid., 153.
65. Ibid., 153.
66. Keeley, 88.
67. Ibid., 88.
68. Ibid., 88.
69. Stachura, 165.
70. *Heil Hitler: Confessions of a Hitler Youth*, Arthur Holch, Ambrose Video Publishing, Inc. 1991, videocassette.
71. *Heil Hitler: Confessions of a Hitler Youth*.

72. Anthony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin* (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 181.
73. Koch, 154.
74. *Master Race: Nazism overtakes Germany.*
75. *Master Race: Nazism overtakes Germany.*
76. Keeley, 94.
77. *Heil Hitler: Confessions of a Hitler Youth.*
78. *Heil Hitler: Confessions of a Hitler Youth.*
79. *Heil Hitler: Confessions of a Hitler Youth.*

## THE PALMER RAIDS: WHEN AMERICA BURNED RED

by David M. Seaman

1. Illinois State Attorney Hoyne had conducted raids of radical organizations in Chicago on the previous night of Jan. 1, apprehending over 300 suspects. Hoyne carried out the raids in defiance of the Justice Department, possibly hampering the effectiveness of the Jan. 3 Federal raids in the Chicago area (*New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1920).
2. All information of the raids is compiled from the *New York Times*, Jan. 3, 4, 1920.
3. A. Mitchell Palmer, "The Case Against the Reds," *Forum*, 63 (Feb. 1920): 183.
4. The Centralia Massacre took place on Armistice Day 1919, when a clash broke out between marching ex-soldiers and the I.W.W. Four American Legion men were killed, one I.W.W. was lynched, and the I.W.W. union hall was ransacked. On May Day 1919, riots were wide spread in cities across America, as violence erupted between patriotic mobs and radicals. The worst of the rioting took place in Cleveland, where Army tanks were sent in to break up a mass meeting of 20,000 people. Hundreds were shot and beaten, resulting in two deaths (Stanley Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician*, [New York: Columbia University Press, 1963], 204).
5. As cited in Stanley Coben, "A Study in Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919-20," *Political Science Quarterly*, 79:1 (Mar. 1964): 52.
6. As cited in David R. Colburn, "Governor Alfred E. Smith and the Red Scare, 1919-20," *Political Science Quarterly*, 88:3 (Sept. 1973): 425.
7. Richard Gid Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover*, (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 58.
8. Among these men were Judge Landis, who just a year earlier had prosecuted 100 I.W.W.'s under the 1917 espionage act at conspiring to hinder the war effort, and Senator Overman who was currently leading an inquiry into Bolshevism in the US (*New York Times*, May 1, 1919).
9. According to the report of the bombing at the Attorney General's house, the blast was so strong that it blew in the entire front of the lower level of Palmer's house and cracked the upper part of the first story. It destroyed the house next door almost as badly as palmer's house, blew in the front windows of not only the Roosevelt residence across the street, but the neighboring houses as well, and even "blew to smithereens," the front windows of a house on the next block. The explosion projected portions of the bomber's body into "various parts of the neighborhood," including a "fragment" across the street onto the doorstep of the Roosevelt residence and a "part" through the front window of a neighboring house. The blast was so strong that it literally obliterated a human being, yet detectives were able to find "about 50...blackened," leaflets, measuring "about six by ten inches" in front of Palmer's house? (*New York Times*, June 3, 1919) The *Pittsburg Press* reported that the document – not several, as reported in the Times - had been found in the remains of the bombers brief case, which was found "buried under leaves and limbs of trees" (*Pittsburg Press*, June 3, 1919).  
That the stories do not match up could just be the errors of rushed reporting, however, it is interesting to note that officers claimed to have found several copies of the *Plain Words* pamphlet on the grounds of Judge Hayden's residence in Boston, which was bombed about an hour later than Palmer's residence. Shortly after the reporting of bombings in other cities, Major Pullman of the DC police sent the following telegram to every major city: "Unidentified man blown to bits while placing bomb at door of Attorney General's house here tonight. Carried Italian and English dictionary and anarchistic literature entitled 'Plain Words' and signed, 'The Anarchist Fighters,' printed on pink paper" (*Pittsburg Press*, June 3, 1919). That the pamphlets were planted at the crime

- scene or merely claimed to have been found, specifically to frame anarchists, is quite a possibility, but like the bombings themselves, the conspiracy remains unsolved. It was never discovered who exactly the Anarchist Fighters were. In February 1920, the Justice Department claimed to have found evidence, when they searched a printing shop where an associate of the Gallianist anarchist group worked as a printer. They reported finding pink paper, similar to that of the *Plain Words* leaflet (Labor Research Association, Robert W. Dunn, ed., *The Palmer Raids*, [New York: International Publishers. 1948], 18).
10. *New York Times*, June 3, 4, 1919.
  11. As cited in Labor Research Association, Robert W. Dunn, ed., *The Palmer Raids*, (New York: International Publishers. 1948), 16, 17.
  12. *A. Mitchell Palmer*, 174.
  13. Powers, 37-53.
  14. A year later, Hoover's catalog would contain 200,000 entries and his team would be scanning 625 radical publications.
  15. Section 4 of the criminal code made it a crime to incite or assist in an act of revolution against the United States or its laws. Section 6 made it a crime for two or more persons to conspire to overthrow the government. With regards to section 4, a revolution must first take place before anyone could be made accountable under this law. In the case of section 6, proof of a conspiracy must first be presented as evidence, and beyond that, it would be impossible to get at individuals, since it requires a conspiracy of two or more people. House of Representatives, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens of Anarchistic and similar Classes*, (Hearings, Report, 66 Congress, 2 Session, 1920), 4, 5.
  16. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens...*, 1, 2.
  17. Louis F. Post, *The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A Personal Narrative of an Historic Official Experience*, (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company, 1923), 52-55.
  18. The rhetoric, which made the Union of Russian Workers vulnerable under the deportation act, came from their 1911 constitution and was actually advocating the overthrow of the Czar's regime in Russia, not the Government of the United States. Nevertheless, the Department of Labor had found membership in the party as grounds for deportation.
  19. Powers, 75-77.
  20. *New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1919.
  21. *New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1919.
  22. From the sworn testimony of Mitchel Lavrowsky, reproduced as exhibit 2b in: R.G. Brown, et al., *Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice*, (Washington DC: National Popular Government League, 1920; reprint, New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969), 18.
  23. From the sworn testimony of Nicaoli Melikoff, reproduced as exhibit 2c in: R.G. Brown, et al., 19.
  24. Stanley Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 220, 221.
  25. *New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1919.
  26. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules. *Sedition*, (Hearings, 66 Congress, 2 Session, 1920), 52, 53.
  27. *New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1919.
  28. After the November raids on the Union of Russian Workers, The Justice Department found that when aliens had right to counsel during examination, they would remain silent, greatly hindering the immigration officers in obtaining the facts the Justice Department wanted. Palmer defended the new rule 22 as being in the best interest of the Government: "The warrant of arrest and the hearing subsequently accorded is for the purpose of enabling the alien to show cause why he should not be deported, and not for the purpose of the government showing cause why he should be deported" (House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, *Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others*, [Hearings, 66 Congress, 2 Session, 1920], 56).
  29. Secret instructions to Justice Department agents, reproduced as exhibit 11 in: R.G. Brown, et al., 37-41.
  30. *New York Times*, Jan. 4, 5, 1920.
  31. From portions of the letter printed in *New York Times*, Jan, 24, 1920.
  32. Post, 158.

33. Post, 167, 187.
34. The following analyses of the constitutional arguments and supporting evidence are taken from this pamphlet. Where I have provided additional supporting examples, not found in this pamphlet, the sources are noted.
35. Legal Information Institute, *Constitution of the United States of America*, Cornell University Law School. <<http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.table.html#amendments>> (Accessed February 5, 2005).
36. How these warrants were ever issued in the first place is worth an examination. Upon receiving an affidavit of probable cause from the Justice Department, the Bureau of Immigration produced the warrant and sent it to the Department of Labor, whereupon the signature of the Secretary of Labor made it official and final. During the time of the raids, the Department of Justice was churning out machine-made affidavits, which Louis F. Post would later explain, were simply mimeographed forms filled in and sworn to by supervising detectives upon the information provided by their agents. These Justice Department, machine-made affidavits, Post described as very often defective: "Some were not sworn to. Some were not even signed by the affiant. Some were even as blank as when they were ground out by the mimeographing machine, except for names and wear and tear" (Post, 68).
- The Justice Department affidavits were transferred into warrants and sent on to the Department of Labor by Anthony Caminetti, the Commissioner General of Immigration, who has been described as being as anti-Red as any Justice Department official (Stanley Coben, *A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician*, 224). Thus, it should come as no surprise that the warrants were sent from the Bureau of Immigration to the Department of Labor on the same colossal scale as the bogus affidavits were being issued by the Justice Department. As for the Secretary of Labor's signature on thousands of fraudulent warrants, Post explains that it was for a long time the practices of the Department of Labor to sign a warrant on the assurances of the Bureau of Immigration, and during Palmer's crusade, "the proceedings were on a scale so monstrous, the details were so numerous and so confused and confusing, the arrogance of the detective was so aggressive that the Department of Labor, largely dependant as it was on the Bureau of Immigration, became hardly more than a mechanical toy for the department of justice" (Post, 67).
37. Powers, 104.
38. Exhibit 11 in: R.G. Brown, et al., 37-41.
39. In some states, as in New Hampshire, the agents did not even bother to bring the warrants with them during the raids of Jan.2 and 3. The immigration officers were sent to the local police stations with the warrants, where they waited until the men were brought in and then proceeded to 'connect them up with the warrants' (R.G. Brown, et al., 46).
40. David Williams, "Sowing the Wind: The Deportation Raids of 1920 in New Hampshire," *Historical New Hampshire*, 34:1 (1979): 20.
41. Exhibit 11 in: R.G. Brown, et al., 37-41.
42. Legal Information Institute, *Constitution of the United States of America*, Cornell University Law School. <<http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.table.html#amendments>> (Accessed February 5, 2005).
43. The average bail of those apprehended was set at between 5,000-10,000 dollars. Secretary of Labor Wilson had previously established bail for all deportation cases at 1,000 dollars.
44. One such case cited by Palmer was Rugero Baccini. Palmer stated that after Baccini was released on bail, he took part in the bomb plot of June 2. Palmer did not however, disclose the source of his information, as it would have been "detrimental to the government's interest"(House Committee on Rules, *Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges...*, 36).
45. Exhibit 1 in R.G. Brown, et al., 11.
46. Frederick R. Barkley, "Jailing Radicals in Detroit," *The Nation*, (Jan. 31, 1920): 136.
47. Legal Information Institute, *Constitution of the United States of America*, Cornell University Law School. <<http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.table.html#amendments>> (Accessed February 5, 2005).
48. Exhibit 9 in R.G. Brown, et al., 34.
49. Williams, 22, 23.
50. *New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1920.
51. Exhibit 13 in R.G. Brown, et al., 42.
52. Post, 51.

53. One of these plates was sent to a sister magazine of *The Nation*. Wishing to expose this unethical behavior of the Justice Department, the plate was published in *The Nation*, (Mar. 6, 1920): 10.
54. House Committee on Rules, *Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges...*, 6.
55. House Committee on Rules, *Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges...*, 35.
56. From Palmer's letter accompanying the news plate. "What is Attorney General Palmer Doing?" *The Nation*, (Feb.14, 1920): 190.
57. House Committee on Rules, *Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges...*, 35.
58. House Committee on Rules, *Sedition*, 35, 36.
  
59. Robert K. Murray, "The Outer World and the Inner Light: A Case Study." *Pennsylvania History*, 36:3, (1969): 286.
60. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, *The Rebel Girl: An Autobiography*, (New York, International Publishers,1955), 255.

## GERMAN IDENTITY IN WESTPHALIA, MISSOURI

by Sister Phoebe Schwartz

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4. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-69.
5. Mary Ann Creda Klebba, ed., *St. Joseph's Sesquicentennial 1835-1985* (Linn, MO: Unterrified Democrat Printing Office, 1985), pp. 3-5.
6. Walter D. Kamphoefner, *The Westfalians: From Germany to Missouri* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 99.
7. Schroeder and Schultz-Geisberg, p. 1.
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9. Kamphoefner, *The Westfalians*, p. 5.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
11. Schroeder and Schultz-Geisberg, p. 8.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Kamphoefner, *The Westfalians*, p. 16.
17. Timothy Gene Anderson, "Immigrants in the World-system: Domestic Industry and Industrialization in Northwest Germany and the Migration to Osage County, Missouri 1835-1900" (Ph.D. diss., Texas A & M University, December, 1994.), p. 112.
18. Creda Klebba, pp. 162-163.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 132
21. Kamphoefner, *The Westfalians*, p. 4.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
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35. Creda Klebba, p.31.
36. Gerlach, *Immigrants to the Ozarks*, p.118.
37. Creda Klebba, p.11.
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51. Ibid., pp. 249-250.
52. Ibid., pp. 256-257.
53. Kamphoefner, *The Westfalians*, p.200.
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55. Ibid., p. 177.
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by Stephen Wright

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# IN A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN: WOMEN AND GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY ON THE SUBURBAN FRONTIER

by Heather Thorwald

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by Linnie Boteler

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## THE PALMER RAIDS: WHEN AMERICA BURNED RED

by David M. Seaman

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by Sister Phoebe Schwartz

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**WOMEN AND GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY  
ON THE SUBURBAN FRONTIER**

THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS  
**TWO MORE REDS SEIZED  
IN DENVER'S ROUND-UP  
OF ANARCHIST LEADERS**




**THE PALMER RAIDS:  
WHEN AMERICA BURNED RED**

**MANHATTAN'S CHILD:  
CHILDREN, THE BOMB, AND THE  
POLITICS OF FEAR**

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